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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question'

Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Reference	IOR/L/PS/12/2874
Date(s)	20 Nov 1933-17 Jan 1935 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English and French in Latin
Extent and Format	1 volume (598 folios)
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About this record

This volume is a continuation of IOR/L/PS/12/2873, and contains papers regarding the Assyrian Crisis in Iraq during 1933-1934. The papers concern the proposal to settle Assyrians on land owned by Paraná Plantations Limited in Brazil, and documents the negotiations between the League of Nations and the Government of Brazil, reports on the technical aspects by the Assyrian Resettlement Commission, and the breakdown of the scheme in the face of public and political opposition in Brazil. The file also documents the efforts to develop an alternative resettlement scheme, which proposed to settle the Assyrians in British Guiana, on land purchased from the Rupununi Company. In addition to these papers, the file also contains regular reports submitted by British and Iraqi officials to the League of Nations regarding the actions taken to ensure the safety of Assyrian communities still residing in Iraq.

The volume consists of the following materials:

- Correspondence between HM Ambassador at Baghdad (F Humphrys), HM Consul at Baghdad (Ogilvie-Forbes), HM Consul at Geneva (Sterndale Bennett), HM Minister at Rio de Janeiro (W Seeds), the Foreign Office, the India Office Political Department, the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana (C Douglas-Jones), the League of Nations Secretariat, and the Government of Iraq.

- Papers circulated by the League of Nations Council and Committee for the Resettlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, including minutes of the 11th to 36th Meetings of the Committee, copy resolutions, reports on the proposed resettlement areas, reports on the treatment of Assyrians in Iraq, and evidence submitted by the British, Iraqi, Spanish and Assyrian representatives.

- Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Standing Official Sub-Committee on Questions Concerning the Middle East, regarding the Assyrian crisis.

A map of the proposed resettlement area in British Guiana is included at folio 114.

The volume includes a divider which gives a list of correspondence references contained in the volume by year. This is placed at the end of the correspondence (folio 1).







EXTERNAL

COLLECTION

17

FILE 16

IRAQ:

ASSYRIAN SITUATION

1933-1934

POL. & SEC.

DEPT.

Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [edge] (4/1206)

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [1r] (12/1206)

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Part 3

No. 17
File 16

POLITICAL (EXTERNAL) DEPARTMENT.

COLLECTION.

GENERAL HEADING: Iraq.

SUB-HEAD: The Assyrian Question.

Notes:

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1250 1000 10.32

INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 7480/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
225
1935

CONFIDENTIAL

India 2

MC

Keep

11/1

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
9 Jan, 1935.

P 7857/34

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 6171/1/93 of 20 Oct, 1934.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Record of 36th meeting of League Assyrian Committee of 11 Dec 1934.	

RECD. POL. DEPT.
10 JAN 1935
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 3 17 JAN 1935
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
C.O.
D.O.
W.O.
Treas.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P. Z.
225
1935

EASTERN (Iraq).

December 17, 1934.

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Section 2.

[E 7480/1/93]

No. 1.

Record of Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held on December 11, at 4 P.M.—(Communicated by Mr. Makins (Geneva) on December 12; Received in Foreign Office, December 17.)

THE committee had before it a memorandum by the Secretary-General on the present position of the work of the committee, two communications from the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations concerning the situation in the camp at Mosul, and a letter from the French Government regarding the funds necessary for the completion of the settlement of Assyrians of Iraq in Syria.

The President first explained the reasons for which he had convoked the committee. The information recently received from the Iraqi Government had caused him considerable uneasiness, and he was in particular disquieted by the departure of Major Thomson and by the partial closure by the Iraqi Government of the camp at Mosul. He was not satisfied about the situation, and he was not able to take the responsibility of allowing it to continue without consulting the committee.

The Secretary, on the invitation of the President, then gave the committee a summary of the previous history of the two questions raised. As regards the departure of Major Thomson, he said that, while the major had been appointed by the Iraqi Government, this appointment had been brought about as a result of negotiations with the committee. The committee had attached great importance to the presence of a foreign expert at Mosul, and had taken note of Major Thomson's appointment. Major Thomson had, moreover, undertaken not to leave before the work was completed, and he had also assumed the chairmanship of the relief committee at Mosul. Now he had departed without informing the committee at a time when the partial closure of the camp was creating serious problems. As regards the Mosul camp, there were several points which were not clear. The Iraqi Government had undertaken to maintain the camp; they had now, without informing the committee, pursued a policy of partial closure. It was not clear from the reports how many Assyrians remained in the camp and how many had been forced to leave it. Moreover, the camp had been, from the first, intended for Assyrians without resources; now, as result of the division into categories, it was found that there were in the camp not only persons with male supporters elsewhere in Iraq, but also with menfolk in the camp itself.

The President then proposed that the Iraqi representative should be invited to attend the committee and to give information on the points in doubt. He suggested that the committee should agree on a series of questions to be asked. He first proposed to enquire categorically whether the Iraqi Government had terminated Major Thomson's appointment or not.

The United Kingdom Representdtive said that on this point he understood that the correspondence quoted in the memorandum circulated by the Secretary-General gave an incorrect impression of the position. His information was that Major Thomson had left Iraq on the clear understanding that he would return when required to resume the post of President of the League Committee, and that he had actually been asked by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to return in February next. He, in fact, undertook to return whenever his services should be required for the purpose of preparatory work in connexion with the transference of the Assyrians to some other home. The United Kingdom representative was able to inform the committee confidentially of this, but he agreed that the information should properly come from the Iraqi representative and that a question should be addressed to him on the point.

The Danish Representative enquired whether the committee had authority to ask the Iraqi representative whether Major Thomson's appointment had been

[281 r—2]



terminated. The committee had only taken note of the Iraqi decision to inform the committee. After some discussion, it was agreed that the committee might make enquiries on the point, in particular because they had been informed of the departure of Major Thomson by the Iraqi Government, and there was some discrepancy in the two letters which had been received on this point.

The committee then agreed on a list of questions which the President proposed to ask the Iraqi representative.

The Iraqi Representative joined the committee, and thanked them warmly for doing him the honour of inviting him to attend.

The President referred to the discrepancy in the correspondence concerning Major Thomson's departure from Iraq, and enquired whether his appointment had or had not been terminated by the Iraqi Government.

The Iraqi Representative replied that Major Thomson had left Iraq because he had felt he had no work to do for the time being. The Iraqi Government were willing to re-employ him when the occasion arose, and, therefore, Major Thomson had left Iraq temporarily.

The President asked whether Major Thomson had resigned or whether he was on leave.

The Iraqi Representative said that he would not call it leave.

The President interpreted this to mean that Major Thomson's appointment had been terminated, but that he was ready to take up his duties again when called upon to do so.

The Iraqi Representative said he could not answer the question specifically and must refer it to his Government.

The President took note of this statement and asked the Iraqi Government for a precise declaration on the point.

The President then asked who had replaced Major Thomson on the local committee and on the relief committee.

The Iraqi Representative said that the mutessarif had replaced Major Thomson on both bodies, and that he was assisted by Major Wilson.

The President then referred to the inconsistency in the figures for the Assyrians who were left in the camp at Mosul, and asked the Iraqi representative for the exact figure.

The Iraqi Representative replied that, from information he had received on the 8th December, there were 372 Assyrians left in the camp. From information received on the same date, of those Assyrians who had accepted the Government's financial offer, some had gone to their villages and others were working with relatives in Bagdad and Mosul. He recalled the advice which had been given to the Iraqi Government that they should encourage the Assyrians to leave the camp.

The President asked what had happened to those Assyrians who had refused the Government's offer of financial assistance.

The Iraqi Representative could not give definite information on this point. He would refer the matter to his Government.

The President then pointed out that one of the categories into which the inmates of the camp had been divided was composed of persons who had menfolk in the camp. This was the first intimation of such a thing. In which category were these men placed?

The Iraqi Representative admitted that this question needed explanation and he would refer the matter to his Government.

The President then asked whether the Iraqi representative could supply a fuller report in regard to the execution of the measures taken to close one part of the camp.

The Iraqi Representative said that he would have to refer this matter to his Government.

The President then asked whether the arrangements which the Iraqi Government had now made in regard to the camp were final, or whether the Government had other measures in contemplation.

The Iraqi Representative said that he would refer the matter to his Government.

The President then asked a question which had been suggested by the Danish representative. He enquired whether the existence of a male relative in some part of Iraq was regarded as an adequate reason for requiring him to leave the camp, or whether they informed themselves as to the economic and financial position of that relative.

The Iraqi Representative said that he would again refer to his Government.

The President took note of the Iraqi representative's answers, and begged him to get replies as soon as possible.

The Iraqi Representative then expressed great concern that he had not had previous knowledge of the questions which would be put to him. He had, indeed, asked the Secretariat for hints on this point, but they had been unable to give him any information. He now wished to make a declaration. The Iraqi Government repeated the assurances which they had previously made to the committee with regard to the Assyrians in Iraq. They would continue to look after their welfare and to conform to the wishes of the committee.

(He then withdrew.)

The committee, on the proposal of the President, then agreed to defer consideration of the questions raised pending replies from the Iraqi Government.

The committee then considered the question of the relief of necessitous Assyrians.

The Secretary mentioned a communication which he had received from an Assyrian in Geneva, one Malik Andreos, containing alarmist prognostications as to the prospects of the Assyrians in Iraq during the coming winter.

The United Kingdom Representative was able to inform the committee confidentially that information which had been received from a neutral and thoroughly trustworthy source tended to show that accounts of hardship and destitution among the Assyrians should be treated with reserve; while it could not be said that there would be no distress among them during the winter, according to this information there was little likelihood of serious destitution occurring.

The President said that he was relieved to have this information.

A letter had been received from the Nansen representative in Syria asking for further assistance for the settlement of Assyrians in that country. The Secretary had also received a letter from Major Johnson of the Nansen Office, enclosing a draft appeal to various humanitarian and eleemosynary societies interested in the relief of refugees, asking for contributions towards the relief of refugees generally (Russians, &c.); the list of refugees in need of assistance included the Assyrians in Syria and the Assyrians in Mosul. It was explained that appeals of this character were sent out from time to time by the Nansen Office in the ordinary course of its work.

The committee decided that they could neither approve nor reject the despatch of this communication and could take no responsibility for it.

The President then enquired whether the French Government had received any reply from French Guiana.

The French Representative said that in spite of constant reminders the Government of the colony had still failed to furnish the necessary particulars.

The President said that it was important to have this information since it might be necessary to decide whether the mission to British Guiana should visit French Guiana on their way home.

The committee eventually, after some discussion, agreed that if the reply from British Guiana was favourable it would be useless for the mission to visit

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French Guiana. If it was unfavourable and satisfactory information was received from French Guiana, then the question might arise. It was not, however, necessary to take any decision for the moment, but the members of the committee would be consulted on this point if the need arose.

The committee then considered a letter from the French Government regarding the additional funds necessary for the completion of the settlement of the Assyrians from Iraq in Syria.

The French Representative expressed the opinion that this question might be postponed until the question of the future of the Assyrians could be considered as a whole. He explained that the matter was not one of extreme urgency.

The French Representative also informed the committee that enquiries in French possessions showed that there was no possibility of settling the Assyrians, as a whole, in any one colony. Small numbers of Assyrians might, perhaps, be taken in different colonies, but further than this the French Government could not go.

(The committee then adjourned.)

R. M. MAKINS.

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Notes.

Register No.
P.Z. 7857/34

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Minute Paper.

Dated 193 .
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			
Under Secretary	31.xii.34	J.G.L.	
Secretary of State...	5.i		
Committee............	8	S.H.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Assyrian Position.

Discussion in Official Middle East Committee on present position and question of what, if any, precautions are necessary and possible to guard against further outbreaks in Iraq.

Interim views of Sir Francis Humphrys.

SA 8/1

Copy of to

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
11 JAN 1935

FOR INFORMATION.

The Assyrian position, with special reference to the question what, if any, precautions are necessary and possible to guard against possible serious outbreaks in Iraq during the coming winter, was discussed in the Standing Middle East Sub-Committee on 30th November. The minutes of the meeting are flagged.

2. The discussion, at which the Ambassador-Designate, Mr. Clark Kerr, was present, shewed that the Foreign Office were much concerned at the possibility of further outbreaks, more particularly as there now seemed a risk that the British Guiana scheme might prove impracticable, and a further risk of a different type - that, if it did prove impracticable/

Previous papers :—

2730 1000 4.34

impracticable, there would be pressure in League circles to abandon any idea of expatriating the Assyrians and to insist on provision being made for them in Iraq under proper safeguards.

3. The Air Ministry agreed that if the British Guiana scheme broke down the risk of serious disturbances would be definitely increased. The D.C.A.S. expressed the view that if the Iraq Government were given to understand well in advance that H.M.G. would take a very serious view of any failure on their part to keep disorder in hand, no disorder would take place. If on the other hand they were under any misapprehension as to our probable attitude, he could not feel the same confidence. Pressed as to what attitude should be adopted by H.M.G. if widespread disorder were to break out with the acquiescence of the Iraq Govt., and in particular as to the attitude to be adopted by the R.A.F., Sir E. Ludlow Hewitt saw nothing for it (if H.M.G. were not prepared to sit still) but a partial or complete resumption of control by H.M.G.

4. The meeting felt that so major an issue as a possible resumption of control by H.M.G. in a State which was now a member of the League of Nations raised questions which were outside its competence and which only Ministers could consider. It was agreed that the first step was to explain to Sir Francis Humphrys in some detail the apprehensions entertained here as to the danger of further outbreaks and the reasons for those apprehensions; to consult him on the position generally and as to the possibility of precautionary measures, and in particular to sound him as to what steps we should take in the event of widespread disorder which the Iraq Government were either unable or unwilling to control. It was agreed further that in the light of the Ambassador's reply the Foreign Office should consider the desirability of a comprehensive reference to the Cabinet.

5. The reference made to Sir Francis Humphrys, which is a clear and useful summary of the position, will be found in

Minute Paper. Department.

Foreign Office despatch 842 of 6th December, on P.Z.7492/34. The Ambassador's interim reply is given in his telegram 277 of 19th December, on P.Z.7857/34 flagged.

6. The Ambassador's views may of course be modifiec in the light of his discussions with the A.O.C. and Sir K. Cornwallis. He has always been slightly inclined (perhaps not unnaturally) to look at the Assyrian problem to some extent through Iraqi spectacles - a tendency not lessened by the unwise behaviour of the Assyrians themselves, and in particular of the Patriarch, and there are suggestions of this in his present telegram. He is, too, perhaps inclined to underrate the risks that the British Guiar scheme may collapse and that the League may refuse to concern themselves further with the possibility of settlement outside Iraq. Again, while we may entirely accept all that he says as to the prohibitive cost anc the extreme political difficulty of resumption of control by H.M.G., the fact remains that we might still find ourselves in a most difficult position, bot internationally and in this country were the R.A.F. tc stand by during massacres of Assyrians and Chaldeans, however much unwise behaviour on the part of the Assyrians or the Patriarch might have contributed to such massacres.* But we may agree with the Ambassadc that the importance of finding a home for the Assyrians outside Iraq is on other grounds so great that no effort should be spared to secure this and that we should be prepared in the last resort to G. consider even the Syrian pis aller. As Sir Francis Humphrys remarks, "the most expensive form of resettlement/

om Mr. Sterndale nnett's remarks p.7 of the nutes of the ddle East Cttee. scussion, there ems little hope persuading the triarch to operate more tively with H.M. the lines ggested in para. of Sir F. mphrys' telegram.

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resettlement would cost far less and be infinitely more satisfactory than the mildest form of physical coercion undertaken against the Iraq Government in support of a provocative minority".

7. The question is primarily one for the Foreign Office and the Air Ministry, who will no doubt submit an agreed memorandum either to the Cabinet (as was contemplated in the Middle East Committee) or to the Standing Ministerial Middle East Committee, once the further report promised by Sir Francis Humphrys has been received and considered.

J. G. Laithwaite
31.xii.34.

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SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
11 JAN 1935

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P.Z.
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1934

India
Mut

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 7614/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

pp. 7+9r
Mc 10/12

Foreign Office,
24 December, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Fo. letter of Dec 7 (E 7286/1/93)

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad telegram N° 277 of 19 Dec	Position of Assyrians in Iraq.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 52 27 DEC 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
24 DEC 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O. A.M. Admlty. Co. Treasy
C.I.D.

14—6130 10292 (2)

8

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From IRAQ.

Decypher. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
19th December, 1934.

D. 10.25 a.m. 20th December, 1934.

R. 2.00 p.m. 20th December, 1934.

No. 277.

....

Your despatch No. 842.

Detailed reply by despatch will be sent as soon as possible but will take time as I shall have to consult Air Officer Commanding, Cornwallis (who is away on tour) and Wilson. I offer following preliminary observations.

1. I cannot contemplate possibility of failure to make offer of new home outside Iraq to those ex-Ottoman Assyrians who wish to leave. Such failure would inevitably result sooner or later in grave disorders in which His Majesty's Government could hardly escape becoming involved.

2. I consider it possible that offer of British Guiana if made will be refused by Assyrians as there is evidence of propaganda to this effect emanating from Patriarch. If British Guiana fails for whatever reason I strongly advocate alternative home being found by League closer to Iraq.

ed. 3. In spite of obvious objections x some of which I have already pointed out (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 612 of September 21st) offer of Syria would be far preferable to retention in this country of refugees who are unwilling to stay. My impression is that French would not be averse from making offer if invited to do so by the League and it seems likely that sufficient land could be found there for all ex-Ottoman Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq.

4.

x The main objections to Syria are (a) that it is only a temporary solution – the French being holders only of a mandate – (b) that the land which cd. probably be made available is not really suitable, & (c) that the Assyrians if settled as a whole in Syria wd. probably be a continual source of trouble to Syro-Iraqi relations (raids etc)

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4. I agree that risk of disorder lies chiefly in danger of desperate acts of folly by some Assyrians followed by severe reprisals but consider it most unlikely that these reprisals would be taken by tribes except in isolated cases without encouragement from Iraqi Government. I therefore suggest that my efforts should be concentrated on persuading Iraqi Government to discourage retaliatory measures even in face of provocation and that issue of proclamation to tribes themselves would be likely to disturb rather than tranquillise situation.

5. I would also stress that it is high time to take measures to prevent the Patriarch from issuing propaganda liable to excite these disorders. If he could be persuaded to change his tactics and co-operate with His Majesty's Government and League of Nations the gravest source of danger would be eliminated. It is in the temper of the Assyrians rather than in the attitude of Iraqi Government that potentialities of disorder lie. So long as former abstain from acts of folly I am confident, as I was in 1932, that Iraqi Government will not incite or conduct any form of terrorism against Assyrians.

6. Employment of Royal Air Force in Iraq on the side of the Assyrians against Iraqi Government forces must be avoided at all costs as it would inevitably spell disaster.

7. Subject to Air Officer Commanding's comments I am of opinion that very large ground forces would be necessary for successful armed intervention (such as is foreshadowed in paragraph 17 of your despatch) cost of which would be entirely prohibitive. Moreover employment of armed forces against our ally would entail unjustifiable reversal of policy and when our

forces

forces were withdrawn would involve expulsion or extermination of Christian minorities and lasting alienation of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

To sum up. We cannot abandon policy of settling outside Iraq those Assyrians who wish to leave and some means must be found for putting this policy into effect. Re-settlement within the British Empire is much the best solution but offer of Syria though a pis aller is infinitely better than no offer at all. The most expensive form of re-settlement would cost far less and be infinitely more satisfactory than the mildest form of physical coercion undertaken against Iraqi Government in support of a provocative minority.

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No. E 7286/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
7492
1934

India "
umr

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
December 7, 1934.

pp 6987.

17/16

Reference to previous correspondence:

Committee of Imperial Defence M.E. (O) 38^d meeting of 30 nov.
below

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To H.M. Representative Bagdad. No. 842. December 6, 1934.	Situation of the Assyrians in Iraq.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 50 13 DEC 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
8 DEC 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
Admty
Treas.
C.O.

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P. Z.
7492
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

December 6, 1934.

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SECTION 1.

[E 7286/1/93]

No. 1.

Sir John Simon to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).

(No. 842.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 6, 1934.

AS you are aware, the preliminary report of General Browne's mission to British Guiana to investigate the possibilities of the Rupununi district of that colony for the resettlement of the Assyrians from Iraq is expected very shortly, and I have recently had under consideration, in consultation with the other interested Departments of His Majesty's Government, the situation which would be likely to arise should that report prove unfavourable. Such a possibility is, unfortunately, far from being out of the question. As you are aware, it was because His Majesty's Government found it impossible, on the information available, to decide upon the practicability of the proposal to settle the Assyrians in British Guiana that that proposal was put forward to the League of Nations in so tentative a manner, and that so much emphasis was laid upon the necessity of its investigation by an independent mission. It is still most doubtful whether climatic conditions will be found to be such as to offer a reasonable prospect of the Assyrians thriving in the colony, while reports have been received suggesting that the soil may possess insufficient phosphates to make agriculture remunerative. Moreover, as your Excellency knows, certain large areas have already been set aside as Indian reservations on which it would be impossible to encroach, and if the area of suitable land should prove more limited than was at first anticipated, the extent of these reservations may cause a further complication. While His Majesty's Government greatly hope that these obstacles may not prove insuperable, they are clearly sufficiently serious to make it desirable to face without further delay the situation which may arise if General Browne's mission finds itself obliged to send an unfavourable report on the prospects of the scheme.

2. In such an event—or if General Browne's report were of so doubtful a character as to postpone a definitely favourable decision for a further considerable period—the news would be likely to reach Iraq very rapidly, since it would be impossible to conceal the nature of the report either in Georgetown or in Geneva. It is important, therefore, to consider the effect which such an adverse or uncertain report would have, on the one hand, in Iraq, both on the Assyrians and the Iraqis, and, on the other, in Geneva on the Assyrian Committee and on the Council of the League, with special regard to the relations between the League and the Iraqi Government.

3. As regards the effect in Geneva, you will be aware from the proceedings of the Assyrian Committee during the past year that whenever difficulties have arisen there has been a strong tendency to abandon the idea of settlement outside Iraq and to press for the resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq itself under certain specific safeguards. There is every reason to believe that, in the event of General Browne's report on the British Guiana scheme proving unfavourable, neither the Assyrian Committee nor the Council itself would be willing to consider further alternatives, even if any such alternatives should have been seriously put forward. The vague and tentative French suggestions for settlement in the bend of the Niger or in French Guiana seem hardly likely to offer practicable alternatives. Nor does there appear to be any real hope of a satisfactory resettlement of any large numbers of Assyrians in Syria—a proposal which, even if accepted by the French, would be open to many serious objections. For these and other reasons it seems clear that the League would almost certainly in such circumstances revive the proposal for the resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq and for the establishment of safeguards for their future, and in such an event a serious dispute between the League and the Iraqi Government may be expected to arise, with results which might prove far-reaching.

4. But, apart altogether from the Geneva aspect of this question, the news that the British Guiana scheme was impracticable, or that a decision in regard

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to it must be deferred for a further indefinite period, may be expected to lead to very serious reactions in Iraq. You have yourself stated in the course of the oral discussions which took place during your visit to England last summer on leave that you regard it as essential that between 6,000 and 8,000 of the Assyrians should be removed from Iraq in the near future if a further disaster is to be avoided. If, however, British Guiana proves unsuitable and the Assyrian Committee and the Council of the League decide not to pursue further the search for an alternative destination, it will become clear that these people must remain indefinitely where they are. The situation in the Assyrian districts appears to be far from satisfactory, and there seems no doubt that it contains sufficient inflammable material for a very small spark to cause a new and serious conflagration.

5. I am well aware of the fact that many of these difficulties are due to the attitude of the Assyrians themselves, who, influenced no doubt by the Patriarch and his party as well as by the risks and uncertainties of the situation, have refused the assistance offered to them by the Iraqi Government to enable them to resume their normal life pending emigration. I am aware that many of the Assyrians have developed a refugee mentality, and that they have preferred to rely on voluntary help from outside in case of need rather than to become self-supporting by returning to their villages, ploughing their land and sowing their crops. Whatever the causes of the present situation may be, however, there seems little doubt that it contains grave elements of danger.

6. This danger is likely to be much aggravated by the fact that hardship and distress among the Assyrians may be expected to be more serious this winter even than last. Even in the country districts in which the Assyrians have remained or to which they have partially returned, there seems to be good reason to believe that the Assyrians are subject to a considerable amount of petty vexation, injustice and robbery, which seems likely to bring about a situation of increasing tension. The reports which had already reached me of small but constant thefts of livestock, crops, tools, utensils, building materials and even ploughs left in the fields in accordance with local custom, have recently been confirmed in conversations which members of my staff have held with Mr. Cumberland, the very level-headed and well-informed American missionary in Dohuk, who is well known to you and who recently passed through London on his way to America. I understand that in such cases the Assyrians find considerable difficulty in obtaining effective redress owing to the fact that the police and the local authorities, though often not ill-disposed, are still influenced by their recollection that those who helped or protected the Assyrians in the summer and autumn of 1933 obtained no commendation or reward, while those who were most active against them have not only suffered no punishment, but in many cases have gained materially.

7. It appears indeed that many of those responsible for the excesses of 1933—for instance, a notorious police sergeant from Simel and various village headmen in the Dohuk area—were, after a short period, promoted or specially favoured, and that the significance of this fact has not been lost either upon the police or local authorities as a whole, or upon the Kurds, whose attitude is an important factor in considering the dangers of the situation. It is no doubt true that in 1933 many of the leading Kurds did much to help and protect the Assyrians; but there seems good reason to believe that in the event of further trouble they will be unwilling or unable to take a similar line or at least to restrain their followers. I have, in fact, heard of no action being taken against those Kurds who took part in the looting in 1933, but many observers have testified to the discontent of those Kurds who did not participate in this looting, and to their determination to obtain a due share of loot before the Assyrians eventually depart from Iraq. These circumstances, which must be well known to the Assyrians and may in fact be represented in an exaggerated form to those who have not yet returned to their villages, have no doubt greatly increased the difficulty of persuading the Assyrians in Mosul to resume their normal life.

8. Apart from these circumstances, which, combined with the wretched conditions under which a section at all events of the Assyrians appear to be living, might well be enough to produce an extremely dangerous situation, the position is further complicated by the unfortunate influence of the Patriarch, who still appears to command the blind allegiance of a very large section, or, as many maintain, of the majority of the Assyrian community. The Patriarch's efforts

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have, as you are well aware, had the effect of increasing, rather than diminishing, the difficulties of the Assyrian problem since the troubles of August 1933. Not only can the Patriarch not be counted upon to exercise a moderating influence upon his people, but he appears to have deliberately refrained from encouraging, if he has not actively discouraged, any return by his people to normal life pending emigration from Iraq. It appears, moreover, that there is in the Patriarch's party in Iraq an active group of propagandists who may easily create trouble in the very unstable and uncertain situation which will exist should the British Guiana scheme prove impracticable. There is, as you are aware, no means at present of changing this situation. The Patriarch's influence is a fact which must be faced and reckoned with. Moreover, an open breach between His Majesty's Government and the Patriarch would, in present circumstances, only still further complicate the situation, since it is likely to prove extremely difficult to bring about any kind of solution of the Assyrian problem without the Patriarch's acquiescence, if not his active co-operation.

9. I have so far described the dangers of the situation, as I see them, in the light of the various reports which have reached me, entirely in relation to the possible breakdown of the British Guiana scheme. They seem to me, however, so serious as to make it desirable to consider without further delay the possibility of further trouble occurring, even if General Browne's preliminary report from British Guiana should be of a favourable character. It must be remembered that even in that event there will still inevitably be many further serious difficulties and delays, particularly in regard to finance, before any emigration scheme can be put into effect. A favourable preliminary report will not necessarily be final, and it will be necessary to await a detailed report, which cannot be available before the end of January, before any concrete proposals can be placed before the Assyrians. The scheme will then have to be put before the Assyrians themselves, and there have been indications that many of them may find it extremely unpalatable. Moreover, much preparatory work will have to be carried out, both in Iraq and in British Guiana before any large-scale migration can be undertaken. It is most doubtful whether it will be possible, even in the most favourable circumstances, to transport any considerable number of Assyrians from Iraq before the autumn of 1935. Meanwhile, the dangers of the situation are not likely to grow less. This aspect of the matter has recently been much insisted upon in ecclesiastical circles in this country, and it is not possible for His Majesty's Government to reply to the expression of such misgivings with mere general reassurances that the situation need cause no real anxiety.

10. His Majesty's Government, therefore, feel that it is essential to consider as a matter of urgency what measures, if any, can be taken to reduce the risk of further trouble breaking out, and to decide on the policy to be followed should troubles nevertheless occur in spite of any such precautions. It is clearly extremely difficult to estimate with any precision the chances of an incident occurring, and I am well aware that the Assyrians, being for the most part disarmed and in a more or less cowed condition, are less likely to provoke an incident than they were before the troubles of August 1933. Nevertheless, the increasing destitution of a large number of the Assyrians, the continuance of the petty vexations to which they are undoubtedly, though possibly inevitably, subjected, and the combination of prolonged idleness, penury and fear, reacting on an essentially hot-headed and short-sighted people, might easily, it seems to me, lead a small body of the wilder spirits among them, particularly if prompted by the intrigues of the Patriarchal party, to commit some desperate act of folly or aggression, which might in turn lead to severe reprisals and far-reaching results. Mr. Cumberland, whose sound judgment and level-headedness are widely acknowledged, endorses the views I had already formed as to the reality of this danger, and I consider that his opinion must carry considerable weight.

11. It is difficult to forecast in what form any danger is likely to arise. The possibility of a concentration by the Assyrians in the Amadia district, where they are understood to be still well armed, cannot presumably be entirely ruled out, and any such concentration could no doubt be joined by Assyrians from other districts and from Mosul. Such a movement would, however, be in the nature of an open rebellion, and in such circumstances the Iraqi Government could probably be left to deal with the situation in the same way as with a rebellion on the part of the Kurds or other sections of Iraq, while the policy of His Majesty's Government would necessarily be confined to endeavouring to localise the trouble.

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12. A much more probable contingency, however, appears to be that which would arise from some isolated act of folly on the part of a small group of Assyrians leading to immediate retaliation as suggested in paragraph 10 above. The experience of 1933 shows that such an incident might quickly spread, and that the Chaldeans and other non-Moslem minorities of Mosul and its surrounding villages might easily become involved. The possibility of the news of trouble in the villages becoming the signal for a round-up and massacre of some minority element in Mosul clearly cannot be excluded.

13. I need not emphasise to you the extremely difficult position in which His Majesty's Government would be placed should the situation get out of hand in this way, and should any active movement be allowed to develop in Northern Iraq—particularly in Mosul—against the Assyrians or other Christian minorities. The peculiar position of His Majesty's Government in Iraq, the large material British interests involved, and, in particular, the presence of the Royal Air Force in Mosul, in the immediate neighbourhood of the probable scene of any disturbance, would make it extremely difficulty for the latter to remain indifferent to, or unaffected by, any such outbreak, particularly if it took the form of an attack on a Christian minority. Apart from the strong feelings which would be aroused in public opinion in this country were British forces to remain inactive during and in the immediate neighbourhood of anti-Christian excesses, His Majesty's Government, as a member of the Council of the League of Nations, could not remain indifferent to the fate of minorities for whose proper treatment the Iraqi Government gave special guarantees at the time of Iraq's admission to membership of the League.

14. At the same time, it is obviously in the highest degree undesirable that His Majesty's Government should be dragged into intervention in Iraq on behalf of a minority against the Iraqi Government, or into assisting the Iraqi Government in putting down its own unruly elements. In any eventuality, such an outbreak as that the possibility of which I have indicated would be likely to cause His Majesty's Government further serious loss of prestige in Iraq and the Middle East, since, if they remained inactive, they would be despised by the Moslems for having failed to afford any protection to the Christians, and regarded by the Christians as having abandoned them to their fate, while, if they were to intervene on either side, they might become most seriously involved, with consequences the gravity of which I need not further emphasise at this stage. It is clear, therefore, that any trouble on the lines which I have foreshadowed would confront His Majesty's Government with a most embarrassing dilemma and could not fail to have a profound effect upon their whole policy in regard to Iraq. In these circumstances, it seems essential, whether the British Guiana scheme proves practicable or not, to take every possible step to anticipate such trouble and to prevent the risk of its development.

15. It seems clear that, whatever may be the attitude of the Assyrians, over which His Majesty's Government are not in a position to exercise any influence, the decisive factor is likely to be the attitude of the Iraqi Government. There seems no doubt that with the forces and organisation at their disposal the Iraqi Government are, in fact, in a position to prevent serious disturbances occurring, and to check any acts of retaliation or reprisal on any considerable scale by Kurds or Arabs against the Assyrians, even if a small group of the latter should seek to provoke trouble. One of the main dangers of the present situation, however, seems to lie in the indifference which the Iraqi Government showed in connexion with the troubles of 1933. The impression which their apparent condonation of the Simel massacre and of the subsequent looting and excesses seems to have produced in Iraq may well lead the Kurds to imagine that, in the event of any incident occurring which would give them an excuse for acts of aggression against the Assyrians, no more effective steps would be taken to punish them than were taken against the majority of those guilty of excesses a year ago. Incidentally, the Iraqi Government, by allowing any outbreak to occur, would be playing into the hands of the extremists on the Assyrian side, who, as you know, would be by no means averse to seeing a recurrence of the troubles of 1933.

16. It appears, therefore, most desirable that the Iraqi Government should give clear evidence in advance, and before further trouble breaks out, of their determination to suppress disorder from whatever quarter it may arise, and that they should let it be clearly and generally understood in the Kurdish districts that no victimisation of the Assyrians will be allowed even in retaliation for

Assyrian provocation. If the Iraqi Government could be induced to do this, I feel that the risk of an incident arising, or at any rate spreading to dangerous dimensions, would be greatly reduced.

17. If the Iraqi Government should fail to take these steps and should allow trouble to develop, possibly ending in a serious anti-Christian outbreak in Mosul or elsewhere, it might, for the reasons given in paragraph 13 above, be extremely difficult for the British forces to refrain from intervening. It is therefore conceivable that a situation might arise in which His Majesty's Government would be faced with the alternative of a humiliating withdrawal, which might be fatal to their prestige, or of action which might involve them in serious operations which could only be sustained by a virtual resumption of physical control over the affected area. It is clearly impossible at the present stage for His Majesty's Government to contemplate so far-reaching a suggestion as the resumption of direct physical control in any part of Iraq, but it is difficult to see what clear alternative policy they could pursue in the event of the Iraqi Government allowing a serious outbreak to occur. Before considering this aspect of the matter further, I shall welcome your views as to the action which it would be open to His Majesty's Government to take in such an eventuality. You will no doubt consult the Air Officer Commanding before replying on this aspect of the question.

18. I shall in any case be glad to receive your Excellency's views at a very early date on all the various aspects of the problem discussed in this despatch. In view of the imminence of the issue of General Browne's preliminary report, you may think it well to send me your preliminary views by telegram. I fully realise that the dangers anticipated in this despatch may never materialise, and that, more especially if General Browne's report is not unfavourable, the situation may drift on without seriously deteriorating further, and may even gradually improve. It may be that the Iraqi Government are already fully alive to these dangers, and to the extremely grave reaction on the international position of Iraq, which any recurrence, on however small a scale and at whoever's instigation, of the troubles of 1933, would bring about. Nevertheless, the consequences of any trouble would be so serious, not only for Iraq but also for His Majesty's Government, and might so gravely imperil the future of the constructive work which has, largely through your own personal efforts, hitherto been achieved in Iraq, that it is clearly of the first importance to form as accurate an opinion as possible of the precise extent of these dangers, and, above all, to make every possible effort to forestall or prevent them. His Majesty's Government, in forming this opinion and in deciding on their future policy, must naturally rely mainly on your assistance and advice.

19. Meanwhile, you are authorised, without waiting for further instructions, and should you consider it desirable to do so, to use all your influence with the Iraqi Government, with a view to making them realise the potential dangers of the situation, and the importance of assuring themselves of the reliability of their officials in the northern districts, of issuing appropriate instructions to all such authorities, and of leaving the Kurds under no misapprehension as to the severe measures which would be taken against anyone indulging in looting or any other acts of aggression (in whatever way they may be provoked) against the Assyrians or the other Chrisian minorities of Iraq.

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

P.Z. 7492/34.

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COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

MINUTES of the Thirty-eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee, held at No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., on Friday, 30th November, 1934, at 11.0 a.m.

SUBJECT: SITUATION RE THE ASSYRIANS IN IRAQ.

PRESENT:-

Mr. A.C.C.Parkinson, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Assistant Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office. (In the Chair).

. G.W.Rendel, C.M.G.,
Counsellor, Foreign Office.

Colonel P.J.Mackesy, D.S.O.,
M.C., General Staff, War
Office.

oup Captain R.H.Peck, O.B.E.,
Deputy Director of Operations
and Intelligence, Air Ministry.

Mr. E.E.Bridges, M.C.,
Assistant Secretary, Treasury.

Mr. J.G.Laithwaite,
Principal, India Office.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

. A.J.K.Clark Kerr,
His Majesty's Ambassador
(designate) at Baghdad.

Air Marshal Sir E.Ludlow-Hewitt,
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

r Vice-Marshal W.G.S.Mitchell,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.F.C.,
Air Officer Commanding
(designate) British Forces
in Iraq.

Commander R.K.Dickson, R.N.,
Plans Division, Admiralty.

. J.C.Sterndale Bennett,
C.M.G., M.C., First
Secretary, Foreign Office.
(United Kingdom representative
on the Assyrian Committee of
the Council of the League of
Nations).

Mr. E.B.B.Speed, M.C.,
Principal, Treasury.

eut.-Colonel N.G. Hind, M.C. .... Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

jor F.B. Webb. .... Secretary designate to the Sub-Committee.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE had under consideration the following papers on the situation of the Assyrians in Northern Iraq -

> Copy of a letter from Air Marshal Sir E.Ludlow-Hewitt, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to Mr. Rendel, Foreign Office, dated 21st November, 1934, together with Mr. Rendel's reply thereto, dated 24th November, 1934.
> (Paper No. M.E.(O) 166).

THE CHAIRMAN stated that the meeting had been called at the request of the Foreign Office in order to consider the possible dangers that might arise regarding the Assyrians and to ascertain whether there was any political or other action which could usefully be taken at Baghdad or elsewhere, either as a precautionary measure or to deal with trouble should it occur.

MR. RENDEL explained that the Foreign Office did not wish to appear unduly alarmist. He recognised that it was very probable that the dangers referred to in his letter to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff would not materialise. Moreover, the British Authorities on the spot had not up to now been inclined to take at all an alarmist view of the situation, and he did not wish to appear to be taking a line which was in any way opposed to the attitude of the men on the spot.

There were, however, certain new factors in the situation which were extremely disquieting. He felt that a good deal of the confidence which had been expressed as to the future was based on the assumption that the British Guiana scheme would prove practicable. This was by no means certain, and he felt that, if it were to prove impracticable, a most dangerous situation might develop very suddenly.

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He was well aware of the difficulties of reviewing an essentially hypothetical situation. He felt, however, that it was important frankly to face these possible dangers and, if possible, to reach some conclusion as to the action which should be taken to meet or forestall them, so that His Majesty's Government might not be caught unawares in the event of trouble. It was a fortunate circumstance that both Mr. Clark Kerr who was to succeed Sir Francis Humphrys as Ambassador at Baghdad early next year, and Air Vice-Marshal Mitchell who was to succeed Air Vice-Marshal Burnett as Air Officer Commanding in Iraq next month, had been available and were therefore able to attend the discussion.

The greatest danger seemed to him to be that which would arise if the British Guiana scheme proved impracticable. It was generally agreed that the majority of the Assyrians must leave Iraq and Sir Francis Humphrys himself had stated that between 6,000 and 8,000 Assyrians at least must be got out of Iraq by some means or other if further disaster was to be averted. Everyone hoped that the British Guiana scheme would prove practicable, but there were still many very doubtful factors about it. There was reason to fear that much of the soil might not possess sufficient phosphates to make agriculture possible. Certain large areas had already been set aside as Indian reservations. Others seemed unsuitable climatically. If the scheme were found impracticable, the news of its failure would immediately reach Geneva and Iraq, and a very unpleasant situation indeed might develop.

Even if the Report of General Browne's Mission were favourable, and the scheme were proceeded with, there would inevitably be many further serious difficulties and delays, particularly over finance. The cost

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of the scheme would be well over £300,000 and it was likely to be extremely difficult to extract more than £100,000 at most from the Iraqi Government. The Cabinet had decided a year ago against any contribution by His Majesty's Government otherwise than as part of a contribution by the League, but the League was likely to make great difficulties about contributing. It was thus most uncertain whether and when it would be possible to give the Assyrians any real hope of re-settlement outside Iraq, and any decision that they must stay in Iraq might well lead to an immediate outbreak either on their part or on that of their neighbours.

The Iraqi Government could no doubt guard against these dangers and control the situation. But their attitude in exonerating the perpetrators of the outrages of 1933 and in failing to penalise any of the Kurds or other tribesmen who had benefited at the expense of the Assyrians - e.g., by securing loot from Assyrian villages - might well encourage the Kurds who had not yet had any share in this loot to further excesses. The Assyrians were capable of any folly and the possibility must be faced of their provoking some incident which would give the Kurds or even the Iraqi Authorities an excellent excuse for retaliation. Passions were much inflamed and a conflagration might very easily develop from very small beginnings. We might thus find ourselves faced with a massacre in some part of the town of Mosul before we had been able to consider the situation or to take any measures to bring it under control.

On the other hand, it was extremely difficult to make any constructive proposals. On the whole, he was inclined to suggest that the best course would be to put these considerations to Sir Francis Humphrys emphasising the possibility

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of the British Guiana scheme falling through, and drawing attention to the dangerous situation to which this might give rise, and to ask him for any suggestions which he could make for reducing the danger of the situation.

Meanwhile, he suggested that everything possible should be done to ensure that we received rapidly and regularly all available information as to the local situation through such sources as were open to us, i.e., His Majesty's Consular Officers, and the Royal Air Force Intelligence Officers. A great deal might also depend on the attitude and personality of the Iraqi military officers in the northern districts, and possibly the British Military Mission might be able to give useful information on this point. Meanwhile, Sir F. Humphrys might be able to induce the Iraqi Government to review the appointment of civilian officials in the northern areas with a view to making sure that suitable and reliable men held the various key positions.

THE CHAIRMAN noted that Mr. Rendel had alluded to the possibility of delays in carrying the British Guiana scheme into effect even if it were proved to be practicable. He wished to draw attention to the fact that, in the view of the Colonial Office, even if General Browne's Report were satisfactory and assuming that arrangements could be made for finance, preparatory measures in British Guiana would be required, which were likely to render it impossible for any Assyrians to be transported thither before the Autumn of 1935.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT, in reply to a request to explain what programme the Assyrian Committee of the League had in mind, said that a preliminary report from General Browne's mission was expected in the latter part of December. But if it were favourable it would be necessary to await a detailed report, which could not be available before the end of January, before concrete proposals could be placed before the Assyrians. The wishes of the Assyrians would then have to be ascertained, and it was probably only then that the thorny question of finance could be seriously tackled. It was impossible to say yet how or how quickly this question would be solved. When the scheme had been proved to be physically and financially practicable, time would still be needed for preparatory work in Iraq as well as for the work in British Guiana to which the Chairman had referred. The Assyrian Committee hoped that it might be possible, in spite of all the difficulties, to send out an advance party of Assyrians to British Guiana by April next before the wet season, but it seemed more than likely that no migration would, in fact, be possible until the autumn.

But although all these delays, if British Guiana were suitable, would be regrettable and perhaps attended by a certain risk, the situation which seemed to call for urgent consideration was that likely to arise if General Browne's report were unfavourable. It was not merely a question of how the Assyrians in Iraq would react. There would be difficulties at Geneva. He anticipated a strong movement in the Assyrian Committee against any further effort being made to settle the Assyrians outside Iraq. There was a feeling among those who were not directly concerned and did not realise the danger of the situation in Iraq, that it was wrong for the Assyrians to be moved from that country; that the Iraqi Government were

entirely to blame for what had occurred, and that the Assyrians could and ought to be resettled in Iraq under certain safeguards. Whenever difficulties regarding settlement elsewhere had arisen during the past year, there had been a tendency in the Assyrian Committee to abandon the idea, and if the British Guiana scheme failed, it would be extremely difficult to persuade the Committee to embark upon, or the League Council to authorise, a further search for a suitable alternative. A serious dispute betweem the League and Iraq might therefore be expected, and in such an event, the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq was likely to become extremely precarious.

MR. RENDEL explained that what the Foreign Office feared was the situation which would develop if the British Guiana scheme had to be ruled out altogether. If it were known that it was a practicable possibility, and that arrangements were being proceeded with to carry it into effect, the situation would be greatly eased, even if there was to be some further delay in taking out the main party.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether anything was known about the attitude of the Assyrians towards the British Guiana scheme, and whether any moderating influence could be exercised upon them through the Mar Shimun.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT said that reports about the attitude of the Assyrians varied, and it would be impossible to obtain any clear idea until a concrete scheme could be put before them. A great many would not commit themselves without a lead from the Mar Shimun.

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MR. RENDEL thought that the Mar Shimun's attitude would not necessarily be unfavourable, as he had been consulted in the selection of General Browne to investigate settlement schemes, and had then said that he would accept any recommendation which General Browne might make.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Mar Shimun would be prepared to exercise a moderating influence on his people if the British Guiana scheme broke down or difficulties arose. It was obviously to his interest to keep the situation in Iraq unstable until a solution to his liking was reached. So far as could be ascertained, the difficulties of the present situation were largely due to his influence in discouraging any return to normal life pending emigration.

THE CHAIRMAN said that he understood that the Mar Shimun had claimed temporal as well as spiritual authority in Iraq, and had demanded autonomy there. Was not this attitude likely to cause difficulties in British Guiana?

MR. RENDEL replied that it was most difficult to separate temporal and religious questions in the East. The Assyrians regarded themselves as a nation or "millet" no less than as a religion, and the Mar Shimun was essentially their national leader, and recognised as such by the majority of the Assyrians,

who were blindly loyal to him. On the other hand, if the Assyrians were settled in territory under British control, it should eventually be possible to restrict the Mar Shimun's authority to the purely spiritual sphere. It would be better, however, not to raise this question for the present as it would be essential to secure the Mar Shimun's support and co-operation if any resettlement scheme were to be a success.

AIR MARSHAL SIR EDGAR LUDLOW-HEWITT agreed that all possible measures to prevent an outbreak should be considered. He concurred in the proposal that Sir Francis Humphrys should be asked to use his influence with the Iraqi Government. Should that Government make it clear that no victimisation of the Assyrians would be allowed, it was unlikely that the Kurds would interfere, and the chance of incidents arising would be lessened. The Iraqi Government were the sole people who could take such action. The action of the British forces in Iraq had been laid down in 1932, in C.I.D. Paper No: 1088-B. It was confined to the protection of British interests, and they could only be called upon to deal with internal disorder at the request of the Iraqi Government. In the event of trouble at Mosul, our Air Force there would have no justification to take action, as responsibility for internal security rested solely with the Iraqi Government. There was a strong detachment of Iraqi troops stationed at Mosul, which was perfectly capable of dealing with any trouble, and of nipping in the bud any outbreak against the Government. A massacre or major disorder could not therefore break out in Mosul

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without the knowledge, or at least the acquiescence, of the Iraqi Government. This being so, the best way of preventing any such event would be for His Majesty's Government to make it clear to the Iraqi Government in advance that they would take an extremely strong line if a massacre occurred, if necessary even resuming control of the country. Such a threat, he felt sure, would prove effective, and although it would be extremely difficult to implement, the mere fact that it was in the background would be sufficient to safeguard the situation.

MR. RENDEL feared that it would not be possible to authorise Sir Francis Humphrys to use such a threat unless His Majesty's Government were prepared in the last resort to implement it, and this would obviously require Cabinet sanction. It was however likely to prove impossible to obtain Cabinet sanction for so important and far-reaching a decision on a purely hypothetical issue.

SIR E. LUDLOW-HEWITT agreed, but felt that it was only by the use of such a threat that all danger could really be averted. He agreed that it would be extremely embarrassing for the Royal Air Force to stand by inactively at Mosul while a massacre was actually taking place in the town.

THE CHAIRMAN felt that the issue which had been raised was too big a one for the Sub-Committee to consider. Only the Cabinet could consider so far-reaching a proposition as the resumption of control by His Majesty's Government over Iraq. For immediate purposes he thought that the Foreign Office should obtain Sir Francis Humphrys' views on all aspects of the situation.

MR. RENDEL felt that in view of the attitude which the Iraqi Government had taken up in the summer of 1933, the Kurds might well imagine that they could indulge in renewed looting or other activities against the Assyrians with impunity. The Assyrians might easily give them or the Iraqis great provocation, and any trouble in a village

might spread very quickly and affect the situation in Mosul itself. He considered therefore that the possibility (though perhaps not probability) of a round up and massacre of minority elements in some quarter of Mosul must be frankly faced, and if anything of this kind occurred, it must be remembered that there were other Christian minorities, richer, more defenceless and far more numerous than the Assyrians who might offer a very tempting prey. Trouble might thus spread to the Chaldeans, Jacobites, Syrian Catholics and other sects, and might even affect the Jews.

In such an event His Majesty's Government might find themselves in a very embarrassing and humiliating position indeed, as the British air forces in Mosul could not very well passively stand by without very considerable loss of prestige while Christian minorities were being massacred; nor could they very well abandon Mosul and leave the Christian minorities to their fate without equally humiliating results.

As regards the action to be taken should the Iraqi Government fail to take any adequate measures to discourage an outbreak or prevent a massacre, it must be remembered that there was also an important League of Nations aspect to this question, since the League had officially been entrusted with the solution of the Assyrian problem. Iraq was a fully independent Member of the League of Nations, and the Council of the League would certainly be closely concerned if any trouble arose in connection with the Assyrian situation. On the other hand, the League machinery necessarily moved slowly, and the League would certainly be most reluctant to assume any direct responsibility.

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The crisis under discussion, if it arose, would, ex hypothesi, arise very suddenly, and there would certainly be no time in such an eventuality to bring League machinery into play. Probably there would not be time even to obtain a Cabinet decision. It was for this reason that it was desirable to face the possibility in advance.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT said that it was naturally difficult to forecast in what form the danger would arise. The eventuality hitherto contemplated by the Sub-Committee was a minor incident in some village, probably provoked by the folly of a small body of Assyrians, which would lead to reprisals on a rapidly increasing scale, which might involve other non-Moslem communities. But some more general move on the part of the Assyrians, though perhaps not so likely, might have to be taken into account. In the Amadia district the Assyrians were still well armed, and a concentration in that area might be joined by Assyrians in other districts, who, while nothing like so well equipped, still possessed some arms. In the event of an Assyrian rising of this sort, the Iraqi Government would presumably have to be allowed to deal with the situation, our efforts being concentrated on localising the trouble.

SIR EDGAR LUDLOW-HEWITT did not believe that there was real danger of such a rising, but if it occurred, the Assyrians would have put themselves completely in the wrong, and there would be no alternative but to

leave the Iraqi Government to deal with the situation in the same way as we should leave them to deal with any rebellion on the part of the Kurds. The situation which would really face His Majesty's Government with a difficult problem would be a renewal of massacres and outrages against the Assyrians, spreading perhaps to other communities.

MR. RENDEL agreed with Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. In the event of any large-scale concentration by the Assyrians which could be reasonably regarded as in the nature of a rebellion, our efforts would necessarily have to be concentrated on localising the trouble. Moreover such a development would probably give time for further consideration of the problem in the light of the circumstances of the moment. What he was more afraid of was some act of folly on the part of the Assyrians which would lead to immediate retaliation, spreading to anti-Christian outrages in Mosul town in immediate proximity to the Royal Air Force cantonment.

In reply to a question by the Chairman, MR. RENDEL said that while Sir Francis Humphrys was in a position to exercise very strong personal influence on the Iraqi Government, there was no likelihood of his being able to do so with the Assyrians. The Assyrians were now unlikely to be influenced by any British Official, and not even Major Thomson carried as much weight with them as he had once done. In any case, Major Thomson was no longer in Iraq, and would probably only return there if the British Guiana scheme turned out to be suitable. Mr. Rendel feared therefore that nothing

could be done from the Assyrian side of the matter to reduce the possibility of trouble.

SIR E. LUDLOW-HEWITT said that in the event of the Iraqi Government being guilty of acquiescence in a massacre of Assyrians, there were two alternatives; either for His Majesty's Government to sit still and do nothing, or to take a strong line with the Iraqi Government. He thought that the most that could be done at present would be to lay all the facts before Sir Francis Humphrys and to ask his advice as to what measures could be taken to prevent such a situation arising.

MR. RENDEL thought that it should be possible to draft a despatch to Sir Francis Humphrys somewhat on the following lines. The immediate occasion of the despatch would be the danger of the British Guiana scheme proving impracticable, with the result that the six or eight thousand Assyrians whose early emigration from Iraq Sir Francis Humphrys himself had regarded as essential would be obliged to remain in Iraq, with very serious consequent risks. Those risks could then be developed on the lines indicated in Mr. Rendel's letter of 24th November to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and Sir Francis Humphrys' attention could be drawn to the extremely embarrassing position in which His Majesty's Government would find themselves in the unfortunate event of any trouble developing in Mosul Town in close proximity to the Royal Air Force cantonment. Sir Francis Humphrys' views could then be asked as to the best methods of forestalling these various eventualities and particularly how far it would be possible to bring strong influence to bear on the Iraqi Government with a view to making them realise the gravity of the situation and the importance of issuing proper instructions to all their authorities in northern Iraq and of leaving the Kurds under no misapprehension as to the consequences which would follow if they indulged in any looting or other acts of

aggression or retaliation against the Assyrians. The despatch could be so framed as to ask for a full and detailed reply on each specific point from Sir Francis Humphrys. When those replies were received, the two papers could then if necessary be circulated as a self-contained and self-explanatory document for Cabinet consideration.

He wished incidentally to explain that he had not yet had an opportunity of submitting this matter to his Secretary of State. His action in bringing it before the Sub-Committee was therefore taken entirely on his own initiative and responsibility.

He could not, however, accept the view that there was plenty of time. It was quite possible, as he had said at first, that no trouble would occur. But if things did go wrong and trouble were to break out, it might well break out in the near future as the result of unsatisfactory news from British Guiana or of some act of folly on the part of some Assyrian group, and it might then spread very rapidly so that urgent action would be required. One of the most dangerous moments would be towards the end of December, when the preliminary report of General Browne's mission might be expected.

THE CHAIRMAN, in summing up, felt that the Sub-Committee were agreed that Sir Francis Humphrys should be apprised of the views taken by the Foreign Office. He thought that Sir Francis Humphrys' advice should be asked as to what action could be taken to prevent any outbreaks, and, in the event of any occurring, the best steps to deal with them. The Sub-Committee could not do anything as regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of the Iraqi Government being found guilty of acquiescing in or instigating a massacre. This was a remote contingency, but should it occur action must be decided by the Cabinet in the light of the circumstances existing at the time.

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CONCLUSION.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE agreed:-

(1) that, in the first instance, the Foreign Office should address a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad -

(a) drawing his attention to the risks indicated in Mr. Rendel's letter of 24th November to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and particularly to the dangerous situation which might suddenly arise if the British Guiana scheme should prove impracticable.

(b) explaining the extremely difficult position in which His Majesty's Government might find themselves if for any reason the situation should get out of hand and any active movement develop or incidents occur, in Northern Iraq, and particularly in Mosul, against the Assyrians or the other Christian minorities.

(c) asking his advice as to what steps could be taken to anticipate and prevent any such development.

(d) instructing him to use his influence with the Iraqi Government with a view to ensuring that they should take all possible action to this end, and in particular that they should let it be known in Northern Iraq that severe measures would be taken against anyone indulging in any form of looting or in any other activities against the Assyrians; and

(e) asking his views as to the policy to be followed by His Majesty's Government in the event of the dangers alluded to above materialising or the Iraqi Government failing to prevent or repress any outrages against the Assyrians or the other minorities in Mosul or elsewhere.

(2) That the Air Ministry should draw the attention of the Air Officer Commanding to the dangers of the situation and ask him to furnish, preferably by telegraph, full periodical reports based on any information obtainable through the Air Intelligence Officers as to the Assyrian situation.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

30th November, 1934.

DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

RET.

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17/16

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

Meeting held on Friday, 30th November, 1934, at 11 a.m.

A copy of the Draft Minutes of the above meeting is enclosed herewith for favour of approval or amendment. An early return is requested.

(Signed) G. HIND,
Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
4th December, 1934.

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SECRET.

M.E.(O) 38th Meeting.

COPY NO. 8

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

DRAFT MINUTES of the Thirty-eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee, held at No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., on Friday, 30th November, 1934, at 11.0 a.m.

SUBJECT: SITUATION RE THE ASSYRIANS IN IRAQ.

PRESENT:-

Mr. A.C.C.Parkinson, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Assistant Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office. (In the Chair).

Mr. G.W.Rendel, C.M.G.,
Counsellor, Foreign Office.

Group Captain R.H.Peck, O.B.E.,
Deputy Director of Operations
and Intelligence, Air Ministry.

Colonel P.J.Mackesy, D.S.O.,
M.C., General Staff, War
Office.

Mr. E.E.Bridges, M.C.,
Assistant Secretary, Treasury.

Mr. J.G.Laithwaite,
Principal, India Office.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Mr. A.J.K.Clark Kerr,
His Majesty's Minister
(designate) at Baghdad.

Air Vice-Marshal W.G.S.Mitchell,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.F.C.,
Air Officer Commanding
(designate) British Forces
in Iraq.

Mr. J.C.Sterndale Bennett,
C.M.G., M.C., First
Secretary, Foreign Office.

Air Marshal Sir E.Ludlow-Hewitt,
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

Commander R.K.Dickson, R.N.,
Plans Division, Admiralty.

Mr. E.B.B.Speed, M.C.,
Principal, Treasury.

Lieut.-Colonel N.G.Hind, M.C........... Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

Major F.B.Webb................Secretary designate to the Sub-Committee.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE had under consideration the following papers on the situation of the Assyrians in Northern Iraq -

> Copy of a letter from Air Marshal Sir E.Ludlow-Hewitt, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to Mr. Rendel, Foreign Office, dated 21st November, 1934, together with Mr. Rendel's reply thereto, dated 24th November, 1934. (Paper No. M.E.(O) 166).

THE CHAIRMAN stated that the meeting had been called at the request of the Foreign Office in order to consider the possible dangers that might arise regarding the Assyrians and to ascertain whether there was any political or other action which could usefully be taken at Baghdad or elsewhere, either as a precautionary measure or to deal with trouble should it occur.

MR. RENDEL explained that the Foreign Office did not wish to appear unduly alarmist. He recognised that it was very probable that the dangers referred to in his letter to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff would not materialise. Moreover, the British Authorities on the spot had not up to now been inclined to take at all an alarmist view of the situation, and he did not wish to appear to be taking a line which was in any way opposed to the attitude of the men on the spot.

There were, however, certain new factors in the situation which were extremely disquieting. He felt that a good deal of the confidence which had been expressed as to the future was based on the assumption that the British Guiana scheme would prove practicable. This was by no means certain, and he felt that, if it were to prove impracticable, a most dangerous situation might develop very suddenly.

He was well aware of the difficulties of reviewing an essentially hypothetical situation. He felt, however, that it was important frankly to face these possible dangers and, if possible, to reach some conclusion as to the action which should be taken to meet or forestall them, so that His Majesty's Government might not be caught unawares in the event of trouble. It was a fortunate circumstance that both Mr. Clark Kerr who was to succeed Sir F. Humphrys as Ambassador at Baghdad early next year, and Air Vice-Marshal Mitchell who was to succeed Air Vice-Marshal Burnett as Air Officer Commanding in Iraq next month, had been available and were therefore able to attend the discussion.

The greatest danger seemed to him to be that which would arise if the British Guiana scheme proved impracticable. It was generally agreed that the majority of the Assyrians must leave Iraq and Sir F. Humphrys himself had stated that between 6,000 and 8,000 Assyrians at least must be got out of Iraq by some means or other if their lives were to be saved. Everyone hoped that the British Guiana scheme would prove practicable, but there were still many very doubtful factors about it. There was reason to fear that much of the soil might not possess sufficient phosphates to make agriculture possible. Certain large areas had already been set aside as Indian reservations. Others seemed unsuitable climatically. If the scheme were found impracticable, the news of its failure would immediate reach Geneva and Iraq, and a very unpleasant situation indeed might develop.

Even if the Report of General Browne's Mission were favourable, and the scheme were proceeded with, there would inevitably be many further serious difficulties and delays, particularly over finance. The cost

of the scheme would be well over £300,000 and it was likely to be extremely difficult to extract more than £100,000 at most from the Iraqi Government. The Cabinet had decided a year ago against any contribution by His Majesty's Government otherwise than as part of a contribution by the League, but the League was likely to make great difficulties about contributing. It was thus most uncertain whether and when it would be possible to give the Assyrians any real hope of re-settlement outside Iraq, and any decision that they must stay in Iraq might well lead to an immediate outbreak either on their part or on that of their neighbours.

The Iraqi Government could no doubt guard against these dangers and control the situation. But their attitude in exonerating the perpetrators of the outrages of 1933 and in failing to penalise any of the Kurds or other tribesmen who had benefited at the expense of the Assyrians - e.g., by securing loot from Assyrian villages - might well encourage the Kurds who had not yet had any share in this loot to further excesses. The Assyrians were capable of any folly and the possibility must be faced of their provoking some incident which would give the Kurds or even the Iraqi Authorities an excellent excuse for retaliation. Passions were much inflamed and a conflagration might very easily develop from very small beginnings. We might thus find ourselves faced with a massacre in some part of the town of Mosul before we had been able to consider the situation or to take any measures to bring it under control.

On the other hand, it was extremely difficult to make any constructive proposals. On the whole, he was inclined to suggest that the best course would be to put these considerations to Sir F. Humphrys emphasising the possibility

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of the British Guiana scheme falling through, and drawing attention to the dangerous situation to which this might give rise, and to ask him for any suggestions which he could make for reducing the danger of the situation.

Meanwhile, he suggested that everything possible should be done to ensure that we received rapidly and regularly all available information as to the local situation through such sources as were open to us, i.e., His Majesty's Consular Officers, and the Royal Air Force Intelligence Officers. A great deal might also depend on the attitude and personality of the Iraqi military officers in command of the northern district, and possibly the British Military Mission might be able to give useful information on this point. Meanwhile, Sir F. Humphrys might be able to induce the Iraqi Government to review the appointment of civilian officials in the northern areas with a view to making sure that suitable and reliable men held the various key positions.

THE CHAIRMAN noted that Mr. Rendel had alluded to the possibility of delays in carrying the British Guiana scheme into effect even if it were proved to be practicable. He wished to draw attention to the fact that, from the Colonial Office point of view, even if General Browne's Report were satisfactory, practical measures in British Guiana would be required, which were likely to render it impossible for any Assyrians to be transported thither before the autumn of 1935.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT, in reply to a request to explain what programme the Assyrian Committee of the League had in mind, said that a preliminary report from General Browne's mission was expected in the latter part of December. But if it were favourable it would be necessary to await a detailed report, which could not be available before the end of January, before a concrete proposal could be placed before the Assyrians. The wishes of the Assyrians would then be ascertained, and it was probably only then that the thorny question of finance could be seriously tackled. It was impossible to say yet how or how quickly this question would be solved. When the scheme had been proved to be physically and financially practicable, time would still be needed for preparatory work in Iraq as well as for the work in British Guiana to which the Chairman had referred. The Assyrian Committee hoped that it might be possible, in spite of all the difficulties, to send out an advance party of Assyrians to British Guiana by April next before the wet season, but it seemed more than likely that no migration would, in fact, be possible until the autumn.

But although all these delays, if British Guiana were suitable, would be regrettable and perhaps attended by a certain risk, the situation which seemed to call for urgent consideration was that likely to arise if General Browne's report were unfavourable. It was not merely a question of how the Assyrians in Iraq would react. There would be difficulties at Geneva. He anticipated a strong movement in the Assyrian Committee against any further effort being made to settle the Assyrians outside Iraq. There was a feeling among those who were not directly concerned and did not realise the danger of the situation in Iraq, that it was wrong for the Assyrians to be moved from that country; that the Iraqi Government were

entirely to blame for what had occurred, and that the Assyrians could and ought to be resettled in Iraq under certain safeguards. Whenever difficulties regarding settlement elsewhere had arisen during the past year, there had been a tendency in the Assyrian Committee to abandon the idea, and if the British Guiana scheme failed, it would be extremely difficult to persuade the Committee to embark upon, or the League Council to authorise, a further search for a suitable alternative. A serious dispute betweem the League and Iraq might therefore be expected, and in such an event, the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq was likely to become extremely precarious.

MR. RENDEL explained that what the Foreign Office feared was the situation which would develop if the British Guiana scheme had to be ruled out altogether. If it were known that it was a practicable possibility, and that arrangements were being proceeded with to carry it into effect, the situation would be greatly eased, even if there was to be some further delay in taking out the main party.

THE CHAIRMAN asked whether anything was known about the attitude of the Assyrians towards the British Guiana scheme, and whether any moderating influence could be exercised upon them through the Mar Shimun.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT said that reports about the attitude of the Assyrians varied, and it would be impossible to obtain any clear idea until a concrete scheme could be put before them. A great many would not commit themselves without a lead from the Mar Shimun.

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MR. RENDEL thought that the Mar Shimun's attitude would not necessarily be unfavourable, as he had been consulted in the selection of General Browne to investigate settlement schemes, and had then said that he would accept any recommendation which General Browne might make.

MR. STERNDALE BENNETT expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Mar Shimun would be prepared to exercise a moderating influence on his people if the British Guiana scheme broke down or difficulties arose. It was obviously to his interest to keep the situation in Iraq unstable until a solution to his liking was reached. So far as could be ascertained, the difficulties of the present situation were largely due to his influence in discouraging any return to normal life pending emigration.

THE CHAIRMAN understood that the Mar Shimun had claimed temporal as well as spiritual authority in Iraq, and had demanded autonomy there. Was not this attitude likely to cause difficulties in British Guiana?

MR. RENDEL replied that it was most difficult to separate temporal and religious questions in the East. The Assyrians regarded themselves as a nation or "millet" no less than as a religion. and the Mar Shimun was essentially their national leader, and recognised as such by the majority of the people,

who were blindly loyal to him. On the other hand, if the Assyrians were settled in territory under British control, it should eventually be possible to restrict the Mar Shimun's authority to the purely spiritual sphere. It was better, however, not to raise this question for the present as it would be essential to secure the Mar Shimun's support and co-operation if any resettlement scheme were to be a success.

AIR MARSHAL SIR EDGAR LUDLOW-HEWITT agreed that all possible measures to prevent an outbreak should be considered. He concurred in the proposal that Sir Francis Humphrys should be asked to use his influence with the Iraqi Government. Should that Government make it clear that no victimisation of the Assyrians would be allowed, it was unlikely that the Kurds would interfere, and the chance of incidents arising would be lessened. The Iraqi Government were the sole people who could take such action. The action of the British forces in Iraq was laid down in 1932, vide C.I.D. Paper No: 1088-B. They were confined solely to the protection of British interests, and could only be called upon to deal with internal disorder at the request of the Iraqi Government. In the event of trouble at Mosul, our Air Force there would have no justification to take action, as responsibility for internal security rested solely with the Iraqi Government. There was a strong detachment of Iraqi troops stationed at Mosul, which was perfectly capable of dealing with any trouble, and of nipping in the bud any outbreak against the Government. A massacre or major disorder could not therefore break out in Mosul

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without the knowledge, or at least the acquiescence, of the Iraqi Government. This being so, the best way of preventing any such event would be for His Majesty's Government to make it clear to the Iraqi Government in advance that they would take an extremely strong line if a massacre occurred, if necessary even resuming control of the country. Such a threat, he felt sure, would prove effective, and although it would be extremely difficult to implement, the mere fact that it was in the background would be sufficient to safeguard the situation.

MR. RENDEL feared that it would not be possible to authorise Sir F. Humphrys to use such a threat unless His Majesty's Government were prepared in the last resort to implement it, and this would obviously require Cabinet sanction. It was however likely to prove impossible to obtain Cabinet sanction for so important and far-reaching a decision on a purely hypothetical issue.

SIR E. LUDLOW-HEWITT agreed, but felt that it was only by the use of such a threat that all danger could really be averted. He agreed that it would be impossible for the Royal Air Force to stand by inactively at Mosul while a massacre was actually taking place in the town.

THE CHAIRMAN felt that the issue which had been raised was too big a one for the Sub-Committee to consider further at this stage. He felt that in the first instance it was essential to obtain Sir F. Humphrys' views on all aspects of the situation.

MR. RENDEL felt that in view of the attitude which the Iraqi Government had taken up in the summer of 1933, the Kurds might well imagine that they could indulge in renewed looting or other activities against the Assyrians with impunity. The Assyrians might easily give them or the Iraqis great provocation, and any trouble in a village

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might spread very quickly and affect the situation in Mosul itself. He considered therefore that the possibility (though perhaps not probability) of a round up and massacre of minority elements in some quarter of Mosul must be frankly faced, and if anything of this kind occurred, it must be remembered that there were other Christian minorities, richer, more defenceless and far more numerous than the Assyrians who might offer a very tempting prey. Trouble might thus spread to the Chaldeans, Jacobeans, Syrian Orthodox and other sects, and might even affect the Jews.

In such an event His Majesty's Government might find themselves in a very embarrassing and humiliating position indeed, as the British air forces in Mosul could not very well passively stand by without very considerable loss of prestige while Christian minorities were being massacred; nor could they very well abandon Mosul and leave the Christian minorities to their fate without equally humiliating results.

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MR. STERNDALE BENNETT said that it was naturally difficult to forecast in what form the danger would arise. The eventuality hitherto contemplated by the Sub-Committee was a minor incident in some village, probably provoked by the folly of a small body of Assyrians, which would lead to reprisals on a rapidly increasing scale, which might involve other non-Moslem communities. But some more general move on the part of the Assyrians, though perhaps not so likely, might have to be taken into account. In the Amadia district the Assyrians were still well armed, and a concentration in that area might be joined by Assyrians in other districts, who, while nothing like so well equipped, still possessed some arms. In the event of an Assyrian rising of this sort, the Iraqi Government would presumably have to be allowed to deal with the situation, our efforts being concentrated on localising the trouble.

SIR EDGAR LUDLOW-HEWITT did not believe that there was real danger of such a rising, but if it occurred, the Assyrians would have put themselves completely in the wrong, and there would be no alternative but to

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leave the Iraqi Government to deal with the situation in the same way as we should leave them to deal with any rebellion on the part of the Kurds. The situation which would really face His Majesty's Government with a difficult problem would be a renewal of massacres and outrages against the Assyrians, spreading perhaps to other communities.

MR. RENDEL agreed with Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. In the event of any large-scale concentration by the Assyrians which could be reasonably regarded as in the nature of a rebellion, our efforts would necessarily have to be concentrated on localising the trouble. Moreover such a development would probably give time for further consideration of the problem in the light of the circumstances of the moment. What he was more afraid of was some act of folly on the part of the Assyrians which would lead to immediate retaliation, spreading to anti-Christian outrages in Mosul town in immediate proximity to the Royal Air Force cantonment.

In reply to a question by the Chairman, MR. RENDEL said that while Sir Francis Humphrys was in a position to exercise very strong personal influence on the Iraqi Government, there was no likelihood of his being able to do so with the Assyrians. The Assyrians were now unlikely to be influenced by any British Official, and not even Major Thomson carried as much weight with them as he had once done. In any case, Major Thomson was no longer in Iraq, and would probably only return there if the British Guiana scheme turned out to be suitable. Mr. Rendel feared therefore that nothing

could be done from the Assyrian side of the matter to reduce the possibility of trouble.

THE CHAIRMAN said that in the event of the Iraqi Government being found guilty of acquiescence in a massacre, a very difficult situation would arise. It was obviously impossible to make a threat to that Government that unless they maintained order His Majesty's Government would step in and resume control. This was a very grave decision which could only be considered by the Cabinet, and to use such a threat which might not be implemented was not for the Official Sub-Committee to consider.

SIR E. LUDLOW-HEWITT said that should such a situation arise, there were two alternatives; either to sit still and do nothing, or to take a strong line with the Iraqi Government. He thought that the most that could be done at present would be to lay all the facts before Sir F. Humphrys and to ask his advice as to what measures could be taken to prevent such a situation arising.

MR. RENDEL thought that it should be possible to draft a despatch to Sir F. Humphrys somewhat on the following lines. The immediate occasion of the despatch would be the danger of the British Guiana scheme proving impracticable, with the result that the six or eight thousand Assyrians whose early emigration from Iraq Sir F. Humphrys himself had regarded as essential would be obliged to remain in Iraq, with very serious consequent risks. Those risks could then be developed on the lines indicated in Mr. Rendel's letter of 24th November to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and Sir F. Humphrys' attention could be drawn to the extremely embarrassing position in which His Majesty's Government would find themselves in the unfortunate event of any trouble developing in Mosul Town in close proximity to the Royal Air Force cantonment. Sir F.

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Humphrys' views could then be asked as to the best methods of forestalling these various eventualities and particularly by bringing strong influence to bear on the Iraqi Government with a view to making them realise the gravity of the situation and the importance of issuing proper instructions to all their authorities in northern Iraq and leaving the Kurds under no misapprehension as to the consequences which would follow if they indulged in any looting or other acts of aggression or retaliation against the Assyrians. The despatch could be so framed as to ask for a full and detailed reply on each specific point from Sir F. Humphrys. When that reply was received, the two papers could then if necessary be circulated as a self-contained and self-explanatory document for Cabinet consideration.

He could not, however, accept the view that there was plenty of time. It was quite possible, as he had said at first, that no trouble would occur. But if things did go wrong and trouble were to break out, it might well break out in the near future as the result of unsatisfactory news from British Guiana or of some act of folly on the part of some Assyrian group, and it might then spread very rapidly so that urgent action would be required. One of the most dangerous moments would be towards the end of December, when the preliminary report of General Browne's mission might be expected.

THE CHAIRMAN, in summing up, felt that the Sub-Committee were agreed that Sir Francis Humphrys should be apprised of the views taken by the Foreign Office. He thought that Sir Francis Humphrys' advice should be asked as to what action could be taken to prevent any outbreaks, and, in the event of any occurring, the best steps to deal with them. The Sub-Committee could not very well do anything as regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of the Iraqi Government being found guilty of instigating a massacre. This was a remote contingency, but should it occur our action must be decided by the Cabinet in the light of the circumstances existing at the time.

CONCLUSION.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE agreed:-

(1) that, in the first instance, the Foreign Office should address a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad -

(a) drawing his attention to the risks indicated in Mr. Rendel's letter of 24th November to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and particularly to the dangerous situation which might suddenly arise if the British Guiana scheme should prove impracticable.

(b) explaining the extremely difficult position in which His Majesty's Government might find themselves if for any reason the situation should get out of hand and any active movement develop or incidents occur, in Northern Iraq, and particularly in Mosul, against the Assyrians or the other Christian minorities.

(c) asking his advice as to what steps could be taken to anticipate and prevent any such development.

(d) instructing him to use his influence with the Iraqi Government with a view to ensuring that they should take all possible action to this end, and in particular that they should let it be known in Northern Iraq that severe measures will be taken against anyone indulging in any form of looting or in any other activities against the Assyrians; and

(e) asking his views as to the policy to be followed by His Majesty's Government in the event of the dangers alluded to above materialising or the Iraqi Government failing to prevent or repress any outrages against the Assyrians or the other minorities in Mosul or elsewhere.

(2) That the Air Ministry should draw the attention of the Air Officer Commanding to the dangers of the situation and ask him to furnish full periodical reports based on any information obtainable through the Air Intelligence Officers as to the Assyrian situation.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

30th November, 1934.

48

Keep. G.W.L. 30/11

Can I q take any positive steps by decln. or otherwise to make clear about they will do.

LH

Cumberland points.

50:50 a high risk

1 write to Humphrys.
2 Regular reports from Consular officers in Iraq
3 Detailed A.L. reports.
4 BMM [illegible] who [illegible] [Iraqi mil. activities]
5 Press [illegible] for suitable [illegible] of [illegible] advisers [illegible] of Interior.

Posn. of Mar Shimun as natl. leader "autonomy"

Try & get immediate Humphrys

Future

If you don't act, we take [illegible] || diffs

Moral [illegible]

49

Mr Laithwaite
I quite agree
29.11

Assyrian situation.

Mr Walton.

Please see Mr Crombie's summary below (Flag D) of the correspondence since this file was last submitted; and the correspondence attached between Mr Rendel & the DCAS, which is for consideration in the Middle East Ctee on Friday.

Broadly speaking the AOC & the Air Ministry are inclined to take a fairly optimistic view of the position during the coming winter & of the attitude of the Iraq Govt. The F.O, for the reasons given in Mr Rendel's letter, are more pessimistic; and are anxious to consider in a general way whether there is any political or other action which can usefully be taken at Baghdad or elsewhere either at once, as a precaution, or if & when there are signs of trouble – & what steps are to be taken if trouble does break out.

We are not as an office very directly concerned: but the S. of S. has been closely interested in this question in the past. Mr Rendel has intimated that he wd. be grateful for any support that the I.O. can give him. I do not think we can go beyond saying that we are not directly concerned: but that in the circumstances described in his letter we agree as to the advantage of considering possible difficulties & courses of action well in advance, & of taking any precautions that may commend themselves to the Depts. more closely interested: & that we share the FO view as to the embarrassing situation that wd. arise were there to be any recurrence of serious trouble. If you agree, I will take this line?

J.G. Laithwaite

28.xi.34

50

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C[illegible]E T.

(O) 38th Meeting. COPY NO. 10

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

SITUATION RE THE ASSYRIANS IN IRAQ.

A meeting of the Sub-Committee will be held in Conference Room 'A', No. 2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1., at 11 a.m., on Friday next, 30th November, 1934, to consider the situation regarding the Assyrians in Iraq.

Mr. A.J.K.Clark Kerr, His Majesty's Minister designate at Baghdad, will probably attend.

(Signed) G. HIND,
Secretary to the Sub-Committee.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
26th November, 1934.

51

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ECRET.

E.(0) 166. COPY NO. 11

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

STANDING OFFICIAL SUB-COMMITTEE FOR QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST.

ASSYRIAN SITUATION.

Copy of correspondence between Air Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and Mr. Rendel, Foreign Office.

I.

(E 7042/1/93).
DCAS/85.

AIR MINISTRY,
Kingsway, W.C.2.

21st November, 1934.

My dear Rendel,

I have had a very reassuring signal from the A.O.C., Iraq.

2. He admits that there might be minor incidents during the winter months if destitution amongst the Assyrians becomes serious but he adds that it depends upon the attitude of the Iraq Government whether or not minor incidents of this kind lead to serious disturbances. He thinks that the Iraq Government are unlikely to be provocative and well realise the necessity of proceeding wisely. He does not consider that serious outbreaks in the North need be apprehended at present, neither does he believe that anti-Assyrian massacres are probable, particularly if it is known that there is some prospect of the British Guiana scheme materalising within the next nine or ten months. There is also a prospect that the French may take more Assyrians into Syria. They have recently accepted another ninety dependants.

G.W.Rendel, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Moreover, the Assyrians in the Mosul area have recently shown an inclination to return temporarily to their villages and to cultivate, with the assistance given by the Iraq Government. Finally, he has no anxiety as to the safety of our own forces even if trouble did arise in the North. He has confidence in the present government to maintain control.

3. I agree that so far as our own position in Iraq is concerned we need have no particular anxiety. I expect, therefore, that you will agree that it is scarcely necessary to call a meeting to consider this aspect of the matter. On the other hand, I sympathise with your desire to consider what our policy should be in the event of such disturbances arising in Iraq. To interfere would, of course, run counter to our Treaty implications and would probably lead us into all sorts of difficult complications. Moreover, our Imperial forces are not located in Iraq for the purpose of interfering with the Iraq Government; neither are their present dispositions suitable for that purpose.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E.R.Ludlow-Hewitt.

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II.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

(E 7042/1/93). 24th November, 1934.

My dear Ludlow-Hewitt,

Many thanks for your letter (D.C.A.S./85) of 21st November about the situation in northern Iraq.

2. Burnett's message certainly sounds reassuring, and I think that any report from Humphrys would probably be to much the same effect, as admittedly the situation is very different from that which existed before the outbreak of 1933, and there are no outward and visible signs of further immediate trouble on a similar scale. Indeed, there are many factors which seem to render it unlikely that the danger of trouble in the north is either imminent or serious. The Assyrians are nothing like so well armed as they were, and there is reason to suppose that they are too cowed to take any definite initiative as a body in provoking trouble. The Iraqi Government on their side may be expected to have learnt the necessity of proceeding more wisely, and there is no concentration of Iraqi troops in the north. I agree, too, that the prospect of the British Guiana scheme materialising in the comparatively near future - so long as that prospect exists - may be expected to make the situation easier. In view of all these good reasons for assuming that there is no real cause for anxiety, it is only with great diffidence that I venture to put forward one or two considerations which seem to me to put the matter in rather a different light.

Air Vice-Marshal
Sir E.R.Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.M.G.

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3. Although there are no obvious signs of an early recurrence of trouble on the scale of the events of August, 1933, I think there is no doubt that hardship and distress among the Assyrians will be worse this winter than last. This is largely, if not entirely, their own fault. The Patriarchal party have been exercising a steady pressure on the Assyrians to prevent them from going back to their homes, ploughing their land and sowing crops. The Assyrians themselves have preferred to wait on events on the chance of some emigration scheme materialising or some voluntary help coming from outside. The stories of Assyrians refusing to go back to the land, particularly in the Shaikhan area are numerous. One cannot, of course, help people beyond a certain point against themselves, and I think there is no doubt that the Assyrians have brought this particular trouble on their own heads - although, seeing that they have mostly been deprived of their arms, and that public security in the country districts appears to have deteriorated, I am not altogether surprised at their hesitation about returning. My point, however, is not who is responsible for the situation. It is that, as a result of this general failure to produce crops or carry on agricultural or pastoral work, destitution must inevitably, it seems to me, become increasingly serious, and that when people reach a certain point of destitution (particularly if as in this case they are also idle and afraid) the danger of their doing something desperate or idiotic is much increased.

4. The second feature of the situation which seems to me to justify anxiety is the Iraqi attitude towards the various elements concerned in the troubles of 1933. I have read a great many reports from very different sources on this question, and obtained a good deal of first-hand information, and I do not remember having come across a single case where the Iraqi Government have imposed any

serious penalty on anyone responsible either for looting or for massacre, or obtained any restitution of loot on any considerable scale. On the contrary, I have had reliable reports to the effect that many of those responsible for the worst excesses of 1933 - e.g., certain of the police officers at Simel and village headmen of the Dohuk area - were, after a short period, promoted or specially favoured, while those who held their men back or went out of their way to protect the Assyrians, not only received no commendation, but were often looked on askance. It is true that many of the leading Kurds in 1933 did a good deal to help and protect the Assyrians. There seems very good reason to believe, however, that they would be unwilling or unable to take a similar line again; and one leading Kurdish Agha in particular told Cumberland, the American missionary from Dohuk, only a few weeks ago, that if any opportunity occurred for renewed looting, it would be out of the question for him to hold his men back. In fact, everyone whom I have met has agreed that those Kurds who did not take part in the looting of the summer and autumn of 1933 are feeling very resentful and are becoming increasingly anxious to secure for themselves a share in what may be going, corresponding to that so easily obtained and kept by a number of their less scrupulous fellow-tribesmen. I have heard of many wild statements, chiefly on the part of the Kurds who were at one time well-disposed towards the Assyrians, to the effect that if the Assyrians are to leave Iraq for some new place of settlement, steps will be taken to make sure that they at any rate take nothing away with them.

5. Thirdly, there seems even now to be a great deal of petty vexation, injustice and robbery going on against the Assyrians, which, while hardly amounting to systematic persecution must, it seems to me, bring about a situation of increasing tension. According to Cumberland petty thefts

are very numerous, not only from the Assyrians but also from the Chaldeans. For example, it is now common for ploughs left in fields which were being tilled to be stolen overnight. Until last year ploughs, as being instruments necessary for the sustenance of life, were, I understand, universally regarded as sacrosanct. Livestock, tools and utensils are stolen from the lower floors of houses in Assyrian and Chaldean villages while the occupants are asleep above. Cases have been quoted of building materials collected for building or repairing a house, e.g., poplar roof poles, being regularly taken as soon as they are collected. Livestock are also stolen while grazing. In all these cases there is no effective redress, and the Assyrians, as Cumberland put it, know that they "cannot get a square deal", since the police and local authorities, though often not ill-disposed, are still under the influence of the fact that those who helped the Assyrians in the summer and autumn of 1933 gained nothing, while those who were most active against them have not only suffered no punishment, but have, in many cases, gained materially.

6. The fourth disquieting feature of the situation seems to me to be the mischievous propaganda and suicidal folly of the Patriarch's party, who unfortunately still commands the blind allegiance of the majority. This party are, of course, deeply committed to establish their contention that it is quite impossible for any Assyrians to remain in Iraq. As far as I can see, the Patriarch is indifferent to the hardships which he may be imposing on his people in Iraq, or indeed to any of

their best interests. My own impression is that he would not hestiate to bring about a massacre - regardless of any of its ultimate consequences - if he felt that this would have a good propaganda value in Europe and America. Certainly, this has been my own impression when I have talked to him myself. He is, as you know, extraordinarily shortsighted and wrong-headed, and his aunt, who still seems to have the means to bring strong influence to bear on the followers of the Patriarchal family in Iraq, is probably even more dangerous in this way. There seems no doubt that there is an active group of propagandists of the Mar Shimun's faction in Mosul who are out to create as much trouble as possible and to make sure that things get a good deal worse before they get better. It seems to me that they have a great deal of extremely inflammable material to deal with and that the situation as a whole is quite sufficiently full of danger to give them plenty of opportunity for serious mischief.

7. I was already feeling very uncomfortable about the whole situation when I had my two long talks with Cumberland on the 20th and 21st November which I mentioned to you over the telephone. I think you already know all about Cumberland, and it is probably unnecessary, therefore, for me to say anything more about him. I would only remark that my two recent interviews have more than confirmed the high opinion I had already formed of his sound judgment and objective and impartial outlook. He struck us all here as exceedingly well-balanced and well-informed. There is nothing fanatical about him and he is fully alive to all the faults and failings of the Assyrians, whom he regards as having brought their disasters upon themselves. He is, however, in a particularly good position to form an opinion as to the present situation, since he has lived in the heart of the Assyrian district on terms of friendship both with Assyrians and Kurds for many years, and can, it seems to me, obtain a great deal of information which is not normally

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available to official sources, however well-informed they may be.

8. Cumberland fully recognised that on the surface, for the reasons given in paragraph 2 of this letter, the danger is less acute than before the trouble of 1933. Nevertheless he thought that the risk of further trouble was both grave and constant. The increasing destitution of the Assyrians, the intrigues of the Patriarchal party, and the dissatisfaction of the Kurds who got no loot in 1933, were all in his view extremely dangerous factors. He described us as living in this area "on the edge of a volcano", and what seems to him - and to me - the greatest danger, is that so far as we can see there would be nothing to prevent a very small spark leading to a very big conflagration.

9. It was on this point that I was most impressed by what he told me. He thought there was every chance that some group of Assyrian hotheads might at any moment commit an act of folly which might easily lead to retaliations. He had no hesitation in saying that if by any chance there were an outbreak in one of the villages it would be the signal for outbreaks in or against a great number of others. He felt himself - and I confess that, as far as my information enables me to judge, I entirely agree - that such outbreaks would not stop at the small villages in the hills, but would affect the richer Chaldean villages nearer Mosul before it was possible in present conditions to call a halt. He regarded the situation in Mosul itself as equally dangerous, as passions are still inflamed as a result of what happened last year, so that the wilder elements of the population might easily start an attack against not only the Assyrians but also the Chaldeans in the town if they had any excuse to do so such as would be furnished by news of trouble in the villages. The fact that the Iraqi Government showed themselves so indifferent last year

and took no effective steps to prevent a massacre or to punish those guilty of excesses, has made a strong impression, and unless the Iraqi Government can give clear evidence of a different attitude before trouble breaks out, it may well be too late for them with the best will in the world, to do anything to stop trouble if and when it begins.

10. I think a particularly disquieting feature of Cumberland's statements to me is the probability - on which he laid great stress - of the trouble spreading to the Chaldeans, not only because they are much more numerous and richer than the Nestorian Assyrians, but also because I think this might easily lead to the trouble spreading further still to other sects and races, and might incidentally involve international complications, as the French and Italians would probably, for political reasons, take up the Chaldean cause on the plea that they are Catholics in union with Rome.

11. I have set all this out at great length because I want to make it clear why, in spite of the re-assuring report of the Air Officer Commanding, I still feel that the situation is so dangerous as to make it desirable to have a general political discussion about it in the Middle East Official Sub-Committee. It is of course quite possible that the situation will drift on indefinitely without ever reaching a crisis. But the risk of the contrary is I think considerable. I should myself be inclined to put the chances at about fifty-fifty - an estimate with which Cumberland tells me that he agrees. Even Burnett's reassuring report expresses a doubt. He admits that there might be minor incidents, and adds that it depends upon the attitude of the Iraqi Government whether or not such incidents lead to serious disturbances.

12. It is admittedly difficult to discuss a hypothetical situation, but with so many elements of doubt and risk I do not think we can afford to postpone all consideration of our policy at any rate from the political angle until trouble actually arises. There is, moreover, one factor which makes

the matter urgent. Burnett's views are based to a large extent on the prospect of the British Guiana scheme materialising. It is, however, by no means certain yet that it will materialise. We put it forward to the League very tentatively and insisted on a League investigation as a first step because we had ourselves considerable misgivings as to its practicability. The League mission is now in British Guiana, and we hope that its preliminary report may be available during the latter half of December. We must, however, face the possibility that this report may be unfavourable, and in that event the Assyrians will be confronted with the prospect of remaining in Iraq, or at any rate waiting a very long time while further possibilities are being explored. In such circumstances we may be faced with an immediate outbreak of really serious trouble (for it will probably be impossible to conceal the news, which will be known in Georgetown and Geneva), and I feel strongly therefore that it is important to consider, before the preliminary report of the League mission is received, what line it might be possible for us to take if trouble should occur.

13. I understand from Pirie that the Chief of the Air Staff has had a re-assuring talk with Major Thomson. I have a great respect for Thomson who has done remarkably fine executive work in Mosul. But his recent experience has been almost entirely in Mosul itself; and for this and other reasons I doubt whether it would be wise to take his evidence as altogether final. Moreover, he has not, as far as I know, discussed the eventuality discussed in paragraph 12 above.

14. I agree of course with a great deal of what you say in paragraph 3 of your letter; it is obviously undesirable, if it can be avoided, that His Majesty's Government should be dragged into intervention in Iraq on behalf of a minority against the Iraqi Government, or into assisting the Iraqi

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Government in putting down its own unruly elements. Although I do not think that our interference would necessarily be contrary to the Treaty, as you suggest, the Treaty certainly does not give us any right of intervention, and I agree with you that intervention in any form would probably lead us into all sorts of difficult complications. Moreover, I entirely agree that Imperial forces are not stationed in Iraq for the purpose of interfering with the Iraqi Government, and I note that their present dispositions would not in any case be suitable for that purpose. But these are all, it seems to me, further reasons why it is necessary for us to consider in advance what our policy ought to be in a given eventuality. We may wish to keep out of any trouble which may arise, but placed as we are may not events make it physically - or morally - impossible for us to do so? We found ourselves in August 1933 in a very humiliating position, and I am anxious to do whatever may be possible to reduce the risk of our being caught insufficiently prepared by a similar situation. I think, therefore, that we ought to consider the possibilities without delay, and try to clear our minds as to whether there is any political or other action which can usefully be taken at Bagdad or elsewhere either at once as a precaution, or if and when there are signs of trouble really breaking out; and as to what action should be taken if trouble does break out, i.e., what steps, if any, could be taken to remedy or localise it, or alternatively to minimise the risk of British forces becoming unwillingly involved.

15. Please forgive this unduly long letter, but it seemed to me there might be certain advantages in putting my views in writing to show why I still think that a meeting of the Middle East Official Sub-Committee is desirable. Unless you see any strong objection I should like to ask Hind to arrange a

meeting during the coming week and I think it would be an advantage if this letter could be circulated together with your letter of the 21st November as documents for consideration.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G. W. RENDEL.

Proposed Settlement of the Assyrians in British Guiana.

The chief developments which have taken place since the file was last submitted at P.Z.5454/34 are as follows:-

The option on the Rupununi lands which is valid up to 20th March 1935 was finally confirmed by meetings of the shareholders of the Rupununi Company on 7th and 20th September last, and on 21st September the Legislative Council of British Guiana unanimously adopted the following resolution:-

> "This Council approves the proposal that His Majesty's Government should inform the League of Nations that there is land available in the Colony of British Guiana which appears prima facie to be suitable for settlement by the Assyrians, and is of the opinion that, as settlers, these people would be welcomed by the inhabitants of the colony; and agrees that the Government of British Guiana should co-operate in carrying such settlement into effect if it is decided to proceed with the project."

His Majesty's Government were therefore able to address a letter to the President of the Assyrian Committee of the League of Nations on 22nd September (P.Z.6066/34), covering a memorandum on the possibilities of Assyrian settlement in British Guiana. It was emphasised in the letter that while the prospects of the scheme seemed _prima facie_ such as to justify H.M.G. in bringing them to the notice of the Committee a much closer examination would be necessary before the area suggested could be definitely pronounced as suitable for Assyrian settlement. The Assyrian Committee at once agreed to the despatch of a Mission of Investigation consisting of Brigadier General Brown and an Italian Agricultural Expert, and it is understood that the Mission arrived in British Guiana at

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the end of October. It is estimated that it will require at least three months for its investigations.

P.Z.6501/34

At the same time the Committee had under consideration a letter from the French Government on the possibility of settling the Assyrians in the French Sudan. The question of sending a Mission of Investigation to French West Africa has not yet been decided, pending the receipt of further information from the French Government about the Sudan scheme. It seems doubtful whether much can be expected of this scheme since the French Government have suggested that in the first instance Assyrian immigration should only be carried out on the small scale of a few families as an experimental measure.

Meanwhile a satisfactory agreement has been reached between the French and the Iraq Governments, providing for the transfer from Iraq to Syria of the families of certain Assyrians who had already been accommodated in the latter country. Some 1400 persons have been transferred from Iraq to Syria under this arrangement.

On the surface at least the position of the Assyrians in Iraq seems fairly satisfactory.x It is to be hoped that it will be possible to maintain their security during the coming winter, since even if the British Guiana scheme is finally declared to be practicable it is anticipated that no more than a small advance party will be able to go to British Guiana before the rainy season sets in in April next, and it will not be possible to transport the main body of the Assyrians to the Colony until the beginning of September 1935. If, after all, the British Guiana scheme fails to materialise, the danger of further serious Assyrian troubles in Iraq would again be acute.

x The Iraq Govt. were considering in September last the closing down of the Assyrian Camp at Mosul but Jafar Pasha assured the Assyrian Committee that in that event alternative arrangements would be made equally advantageous to the Assyrians. (Flag E).

J.E. Crombie
28/11/34

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Mr. Ce.

Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.........		
Parliamentary Under Secretary.		
Secretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Question by Mr. Rhys Davies

For Monday, 12th November 1934

*180. Mr. Rhys Davies,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what is the position as regards the settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in British Guiana. [*Monday 12th November.*]

MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Mr. Eden): I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given on the 1st November to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Isle of Wight (Captain P. Macdonald). The mission of investigation has now arrived in British Guiana, but some considerable time must still elapse before its report is received.

Mr. DAVIES: In view of the very urgent necessity of doing something for these people, and of the universal impression which has been created that we have let them down very badly, will the right hon. Gentleman consider the matter?

Mr. EDEN: I am not prepared to accept the hon. Gentleman's impression as being any kind of accurate statement of the facts. Everything possible is being done in this matter, but clearly, if the mission is to do its work, it had better do it properly while it is there. It will take at least three months to carry through the investigation.

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E6116/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

DEXED

P. Z.
6987
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

pp 6821.

Foreign Office,
12 Nov. , 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence: 6550

F.O. letter E6171/1/93 of Oct 20.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations 28 Sept.	Assyrian resettlement question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 46 15 NOV 1934
FROM SECRETARY, [illegible] AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
13 NOV 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
W.O.
A.M.
Treas.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P.Z.
6987
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

October 2, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 6116/1/93]

No. 1.

Eighty-second Session of the Council, League of Nations.

Extract from Final Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Public and Private, held on September 28, 1934, Geneva.

Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

JA'FAR PASHA-AL-ASKARI, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. López Oliván presented the following report and resolution(¹):—

"The report of our Committee on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq (document C.427.1934.VII) is evidence that the appeal which the Council made to Governments on the 7th June, 1934, was not made in vain.

"In letters dated the 22nd and 24th September, 1934 (document C.427.1934.VII), the Governments of the United Kingdom and France have made proposals, which are now being considered by the committee, for the possible settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in British Guiana and the bend of the Niger in West Africa. It is also possible that other proposals may be made by the six Governments that have not yet replied.

"I am sure you will agree that the Council should tender its heartiest thanks to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for the valuable co-operation they are offering the committee.

"You will doubtless have noticed the special importance attached by your committee to preliminary enquiries being made on the spot by persons whose ability and integrity afford every guarantee of the successful settlement of the Assyrians under the League's auspices. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France themselves requested in their letters that these missions of enquiry should be despatched. You will, I feel sure, vote the necessary funds and leave the committee entirely free to make its choice among the candidates and to come to any other arrangements that may be desirable.

"You will certainly wish to express your satisfaction and to congratulate the Governments of France and Iraq on the happy issue of the direct negotiations that have led to the settlement of some 2,000 Assyrians in Syria pending the final decision on the problem as a whole.

"I beg to move the following resolution:—

> "'The Council:
>
> "'Approves the committee's report and the present report;
>
> "'Thanks the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for the proposals they have made to the committee for the possible settlement, in the Rupununi area in British Guiana and in the bend of the Niger in West Africa, of such of the Assyrians of Iraq as may express the desire to leave that country; and
>
> "'Authorises the Secretary-General to draw, in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Financial Regulations, a sum not exceeding 50,000 Swiss francs from the item "Working Capital Fund," to meet the cost of preliminary enquiries with a view to the settlement of such Assyrians as may wish to leave Iraq. These expenses will be repaid to the League out of the funds that will be made available for financing the scheme as a whole.'"

Mr. Eden did not wish to make any comments on the details of the report before the Council, for, as regards the possibilities of settlement in British

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(¹) Document C.429(1).1934.VII.

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Guiana, he could add nothing to what was contained in the note of the 22nd September from the United Kingdom Government. He would, however, be glad to take the opportunity of associating himself warmly with what the *rapporteur* had said about the agreement relating to the transfer to Syria, and the provisional accommodation there, of the families of those Assyrians who had been interned in Syria last year. That agreement would, he felt sure, be welcomed by all the members of the Council on humanitarian grounds, and as putting an end to a state of affairs which had been a potential source of discontent, and therefore of friction. It did credit both to the French and to the Iraqi Governments, to both of whom Mr. Eden desired to pay a tribute for the spirit of accommodation which had made possible the liquidation of this important, if subsidiary, aspect of the Assyrian problem.

M. Massigli desired to tender his thanks to the representative of the United Kingdom and to the *rapporteur* for the tribute they had just paid to his Government's endeavours to promote a solution—if only a partial solution—of the Assyrian problem. There had been special difficulties, arising out of local circumstances, but these had been successfully overcome, thanks to the authority of the League, the assistance of the committee and the goodwill of the Iraqi Government, and also, M. Massigli felt bound to say, to the valuable aid rendered on the spot by Dr. Burnier, the representative of the Refugees Office.

Cemal Hüsnü Bey said that he wished to associate himself very warmly with the *rapporteur's* thanks to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France. One radical and wholly satisfactory solution of the question which had been engaging the Council's attention for some time past, and one which was in the interests of the Assyrian people itself, would undoubtedly be settlement in countries such as those proposed by the United Kingdom and French Governments. Accordingly, in agreeing to the appointment of a mission of enquiry, the representative of Turkey would, here and now, offer it his best wishes for the success of its work.

The President noted that the members of the Council were unanimous in paying a grateful tribute to the Powers for the practical efforts they were now making to solve a highly important problem.

The resolution was adopted.

(Ja'far Pasha-al-Askari withdrew.)

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The more important papers added to the file since the submission on PZ 5454/34 are:-

1. PZ 6066 A letter dated 22nd Sept. informing the President of the Assyrian Cttee of the possibilities in British Guiana
2. PZ 6501 Report of the Assyrian Cttee to the Council, approved by the Council 28th Sept.
3. The few marked passages in the minutes of the Assyrian Cttee meetings of 26th & 28th Sept. regarding the French Sudan scheme & the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq pending their settlement outside it. (PZ 6550)

The enquiry body was due to arrive in British Guiana on 31st October.

It is anticipated that only a small advance party at the outside will be able to go to B.G. before the rains begin in April 1935. The main resettlement will be delayed until the 1935-36 season, beginning in Sept. 1935. (PZ 6550)

HWR.
12/xi/34.

(3)

69

India
MR

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6344/1/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
6821
1934

NDEXED

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Secretary of the Air Ministry and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith cop y of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2nd November, 1934.

pp. 6550 – [illegible] 22/10

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. E 6139/1/93 of 8th October

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations 4th Oct	Welfare of Assyrians in Iraq

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 45 - 8 NOV 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

3 NOV 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to

14—6130 10292 (2)

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Committee for the
Settlement of the
Assyrians of Iraq.

C/Min.Ass/ 72.

Geneva, October 4th, 1945.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ

Letter of October 1st, 1934, from the Head of the Permanent Iraq Delegation to the Chairman of the Committee.

Geneva, October 1st, 1934.

Sir,

With reference to the letter of September 24th, 1934, from the Mar Shimun (C/Min.Ass/67) I venture to draw your attention to the fact that in the report from my Government of September 21st, 1934 (C/Min.Ass/65) the case of the assassination of the Assyrian Anwiya Gurgis was already mentioned. This crime while regrettable is no more than a murder committed for the purpose of robbery. The assassin has moreover been arrested and the stolen articles have been found. The Mar Shimun naturally desires to attribute a more serious character to this assassination and to find in it some connection with the events of last year.

As regards the so-called "siege" of the village of Harir by the Kurds, not having received any information whatever on this subject, I have asked my Government for particulars which I will communicate to you as soon as they arrive.

It would appear, however, that as usual the picture submitted by the Mar Shimun does not confine itself to reproducing the plain truth, and that the "Patriarch" has on this occasion again allowed himself to be drawn into an exaggeration of the importance of the facts.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) M. SHABANDAR.

For the Head of the Permanent Delegation.

Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.........		
Parliamentary Under Secretary.		
Secretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Question by Captain P. Macdonald.

For Thursday, 1st November 1934

PZ 6550 – m R 22/10

*46. Captain Peter Macdonald, — To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what progress has been made with regard to providing a suitable settlement for the Assyrians of Iraq; and whether he can make any statement with regard to this matter. [*Thursday* 1st *November.*]

IRAQ.

ASSYRIANS, SETTLEMENT.

Captain P. MACDONALD asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made with regard to providing a suitable settlement for the Assyrians of Iraq; and whether he can make any statement with regard to this matter?

Mr. EDEN: In a note dated 22nd September His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom communicated to the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations a detailed statement regarding the possibilities, in so far as they are known, of settling the Assyrians in the Rupununi district of British Guiana. In a note of 24th September the French Government put forward for the Committee's consideration the idea of settlement in the bend of the River Niger in French West Africa. Both Governments urged the importance, however, as a first step of despatching missions of investigation to the areas in question to pronounce upon their suitability for the particular purpose of Assyrian settlement. The Committee has since despatched a Mission of Investigation to British Guiana. It is estimated that this Mission, which was due to arrive in the colony on 31st October, will require three months for the accomplishment of its task. The question of sending a similar Mission to French West Africa is to be considered further by the Assyrian Committee on the receipt of supplementary information which it has asked the French Government to furnish.

MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

Please note reply
[illegible]
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INDEXED

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India
M^r R

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6171/1/93.
d address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6550
1934

CONFIDENTIAL

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
20 Oct., 1934.

pp 6501.
M^r R 19/10

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 3856/1/93 of July 11.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva No 157 of 28 Sept. 158 of 28 .. (Comm^d.) of 29 ..	Records of 33rd, 34th, & 35th meetings of League Council Assyrian Committee

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 43 25 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O. W.O.
D.O. A.M.
Treas.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [73r] (156/1206)

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P. Z.
6550
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

October 1, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 6106/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 157.)

THE United Kingdom Delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the 33rd meeting of the Council Committee, on the 24th September, respecting the Assyrian question.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, September 28, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of Thirty-third Meeting of the Council Committee, held on September 24, 1934, *at* 4 P.M.

THE President reported that unfavourable replies to the committee's appeal of the 11th June last had been received from Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; that certain replies were still outstanding; and that affirmative replies had been received from the United Kingdom Government and from the French Government.

Before proceeding to consider these two replies, there was one point of procedure which the President wished to clear up. He expected to be away from his post between the 8th October and the 9th November. During that period the committee might be obliged to meet, and he would like to arrange for the appointment of a vice-president. The Spanish consul would attend the committee on his behalf, but it was clearly desirable that the presidency of the committee should be in the hands of one of the members who had attended its meetings throughout and was familiar with the work. He therefore proposed that the Danish representative should be appointed vice-president. This was unanimously agreed to.

The President then went on to discuss the communication from the United Kingdom Government. He recalled that that communication emphasised the urgency of the solution. The problem in Iraq brooked of no delay. The season for immigration in British Guiana ended in April next, and much remained to be done even after the mission of investigation had completed its work. Even this, according to the United Kingdom Government's communication, would require three months. The President was personally in favour of despatching a mission of investigation, as proposed by the United Kingdom Government. He thought this mission should be generally on the lines of the one sent to Brazil, and he thought it would be particularly useful if Brigadier Browne—in view of his Assyrian experience and the further experience which he had gained in Brazil—could form part of the mission. The committee might wish the United Kingdom representative to ascertain whether Brigadier Browne was willing to serve.

The Mexican Representative observed that paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom note provided a strong argument in favour of a mission of investigation.

The Danish Representative suggested that an agricultural expert should go out with Brigadier Browne. He wished to emphasise the necessity for speed. Apart from other considerations, the option for the purchase of the assets of

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the Rupununi Company would end on the 20th March. He suggested, therefore, that the possibility should be considered, with a view to avoiding not only expense but also waste of time, of asking the Administration of one of the neighbouring countries, *e.g.*, French or Dutch Guiana or Venezuela, to nominate such an agricultural expert. This would ensure that someone familiar with the type of country under consideration would be chosen.

The President said that the choice of the personnel of the mission obviously presented many difficulties, and he suggested that it might be best to leave it to himself and to the secretariat to submit a list of suitable candidates.

The United Kingdom Representative supported this proposal, and expressed the view that it would be advisable to see whether any agricultural expert of international repute were immediately available in Europe, so that he could have the advantage of consultation with the committee before proceeding on the mission. The possibility of such consultation might outweigh the disadvantage on the grounds of expense.

The Danish Representative asked, as regards expense, whether the committee could proceed without the consent of the Assembly, seeing that the Assembly was still sitting.

M. Arocha said that, as regards the expense of a mission, only the consent of the Council would be required.

The President said that if the committee decided to send out a mission or more than one mission, the committee could submit a resolution to the Council asking for authority to cover the necessary expense.

The Mexican Representative said that the United Kingdom communication suggested to him that the addition of a medical expert to the mission might be advisable.

The President deprecated this on the grounds of expense. He recalled that no medical expert had been included in the mission to Brazil, where considerations of health had been equally important. A *questionnaire* had been drawn up for the guidance of the mission, and this procedure could again be adopted. In the case of Brazil, the mission had been able to form an opinion regarding health conditions. He felt sure, moreover, that the British medical service in British Guiana would give every assistance, and would provide material on which the members of the mission—though not medical experts themselves—could form a reliable opinion. The mission must rely to a large extent on information provided by the local administration, and its main object, after all, was to see whether general conditions were such as to be likely to suit the Assyrians.

The French Representative raised the question whether the Nansen Office should be represented on the mission.

The President said that this suggestion certainly deserved consideration. It might be that it would be sufficient to have a Nansen Office representative on the mission instead of an agricultural expert. He himself, however, was a little doubtful about this. Incidentally, he recalled a statement at an earlier meeting by the president of the Nansen Office which seemed to indicate that the Nansen Office were not prepared to accept further responsibility for settlement in an area so remote as South America. He doubted, therefore, whether the Nansen Office would be willing to associate itself with the British Guiana scheme.

The Italian Representative expressed the view that an agricultural expert was most needed on the mission, and he doubted whether the Nansen Office had any representative who could be called an agricultural expert.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that, in any case, the question could not be decided precisely on the analogy of the procedure adopted in the case of Brazil. He recalled that the Brazilian plan had been suggested in the first place by the Nansen Office, and that it was at the request of the Nansen Office itself that one of its representatives accompanied the mission, and he had accompanied it at the expense of the Nansen Office and not of the League.

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The President said he thought this an important consideration. In the present case the offer was made, not by a private company, but by a Government. Moreover, the only representative available was probably Major Johnson, and while he did not suggest that two British subjects would not produce a perfectly impartial report on a British colony, he thought it would be preferable from many points of view if the mission did not consist of two British subjects. He thought that Brigadier Browne must obviously be part of the mission, but not Major Johnson.

The President noted that the committee was in principle agreed on the despatch of a mission to British Guiana, and asked the United Kingdom representative to ascertain whether Brigadier Browne would be prepared to join the mission. At the next meeting of the committee the secretariat would present the names of likely candidates for attachment to the mission in the capacity of agricultural expert.

The President then proposed the examination of the French Government's note. In many respects the problem which that note presented was similar to the British Guiana scheme. Certain details, however, were different or less sharply defined, and he himself found it difficult at the moment to pronounce on the question as to whether a mission of investigation should be sent out at the present stage, as suggested by the French Government. He would, in the first place, like further information, and he suggested that the French Government might furnish it under the headings contained in the *questionnaire* by which the mission to Brazil had been guided.

In reply to a question from the President, the *French Representative* said that a great deal of detailed information was available at the Quai d'Orsay, and he would do his best to obtain it by telephone.

The President said that, in view of the urgency of the problem, there was a good deal to be said for sending two missions simultaneously, one to British Guiana and one to French West Africa. He proposed, however, that the committee, before taking any decision, should await further details of the French scheme. The question of personnel might also present difficulties.

The Italian Representative observed that a careful investigation seemed all the more necessary as the French Government were apparently only prepared at present to contemplate an experimental settlement of a few families.

The President said that he was not unduly perturbed by this suggestion. The French representative had helped to overcome a similar condition laid down by the Brazilian Government, and he felt that he would be all the more able to overcome the scruples of his own Government. He agreed, however, with the view of the Italian representative.

The Danish Representative found the French proposal for an experimental settlement the most difficult part of the scheme. The French note spoke of the difficulties of acclimatisation, and expressed some doubt as to whether transplantation of the Assyrians would be successful. It seemed to him that many years might be needed for an experimental period. It was possible that the emigrants might thrive in the first two years or so, and that their energies might flag afterwards. Perhaps it might be possible to find volunteers among the Assyrians who would go to French West Africa at once as an experiment, without any preliminary investigation.

Doubt was expressed by various representatives as to whether the committee could take the responsibility without much more careful examination of sending out volunteers, even if they were forthcoming.

The President expressed the view that as a first step a mission of investigation was an absolute necessity. In the absence of such a mission the responsibility of the committee would be too great. But he repeated that before deciding on the despatch of a mission, further details were desirable regarding : (1) the chance of adaptation by the Assyrians; and (2) the economic basis of the French plan.

The French Representative said that he would certainly obtain further details, but he did not think that this would meet M. Borberg's point about experimental settlement.

M. Olivan said that he himself did not like the idea of an experiment. If the experiment turned out badly, and the first batch of settlers either died off or had to be transferred elsewhere, the committee would bear a heavy responsibility.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought a mission of investigation absolutely essential as a first step before any settlement took place, even on an experimental basis. He hoped, however, that if the report of the mission were satisfactory, this would lead the French Government to reconsider their attitude regarding experimental settlement. It seemed to him that the object of the mission must be to establish definitely one way or the other whether the Assyrians could be expected to thrive in the area in question. M. Borberg had already pointed out the time difficulty as regards any experiment, and it would be recalled that the same point had arisen in connexion with the Brazilian scheme. The Assyrian problem in Iraq was acute and called for the early removal from Iraq of all the Assyrians who wished to go. The committee had been obliged to indicate to the Brazilian Government that the experimental settlement of a few families would offer no solution to the problem with which the committee was faced. Quite apart from the time factor, an experiment raised the question of repatriation, and from the political point of view it was fairly clear that there could be no question of repatriating to Iraq any of the Assyrians who elected to leave the country.

The Danish Representative expressed doubt whether a mission of investigation would serve any useful purpose. The French Government themselves, who might be expected to know the country well, clearly did not know whether it would be suitable and, in fact, feared ill results.

The President said that in the light of the further information which the French delegation would furnish, the committee would have to consider whether a theoretical test, *i.e.*, the despatch of a mission of investigation, could replace a practical test, *i.e.*, experimental settlement.

The French Representative said that the reason why the French could not express a definite opinion was that this was an entirely new problem. White labour had never been introduced into the area concerned, and the French Government did not know how it would work. The area had been irrigated, with the result that cotton was being more and more cultivated, but the cultivation hitherto had been by native labour.

Petitions from the Mar Shimun.

The President observed that the Mar Shimun had addressed a number of petitions to the committee since its last session. His own opinion was that these were not worth close examination. The observations which the Iraqi delegation had furnished on previous petitions had shown the Mar Shimun's previous complaints to be without substantial foundation.

M. Arocha said that the Iraqi delegation had indicated to him that the Iraqi Government would prefer that further petitions from the Mar Shimun should be ignored. M. Arocha had simply replied that this was a matter for the committee to decide.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he did not think that the Iraqi Government were justified in complaining if these petitions were referred to them for observations, and it seemed to him that it was useful that they should be so referred. Many of the Mar Shimun's complaints had been shown conclusively to be baseless, but it was impossible to say for certain that there was no truth in any complaint which he might make, and by ignoring his complaints the committee might be assuming an undesirable responsibility. In any case he thought that the communication of the petitions served a useful purpose in showing the Iraqi Government that the committee took an interest in the situation of the Assyrians so long as they remained in Iraq, and perhaps made the Iraqi Government pay more careful attention than they might otherwise do to this aspect of the question. There was one point, however, which the United Kingdom representative wished to raise in connexion with the Mar Shimun's petitions. This related to the attacks, which recent petitions had

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contained, upon Major Thomson. These attacks were particularly stupid and unfair. The Assyrians had, in fact, a great deal to thank Major Thomson for, and, in trying to carry out an unwelcome settlement scheme in 1933, and more recently, in advising the Assyrians to return to their villages and cultivate, Major Thomson had merely been attempting to put into effect, in the first place, a resolution of the League Council, and, in the second place, a message drawn up by the Assyrian Committee of the Council. This was perfectly well known, but the Mar Shimun chose to ignore the facts.

It was agreed that there should be no change in the procedure, whereby the Mar Shimun's petitions were circulated to members of the committee and sent to the Iraqi delegation for observations.

Reports of the Iraqi Government.

The President stated that regular reports on the situation of the Assyrians had been received up to and including the month of August. Moreover, the special points on which the Iraqi delegation had been asked for further information (see C. Min. Ass. 43), had been answered by the Iraqi delegation in a manner which M. Oliván considered generally satisfactory.

Internees in Syria.

The President expressed the thanks of the committee to the French Government for their efforts in carrying out with the Iraqi Government arrangements for transferring to Syria the families of those Assyrians who were interned in French mandated territory in August 1933. He asked the French representative whether he had any observations to make on this subject.

The French Representative said that the French High Commissioner in Syria had reported that the movement of the families of the internees into Syria had been completed on the 10th September. This was the result of fairly long negotiations, the chief difficulty in which had been the question of finance. The Iraqi Government had at first only been prepared to pay a sum of £2,000–£3,000, but had eventually agreed to pay £10,000. The actual cost of settlement, however, far exceeded this sum. The French Government had thought it best, in view of the uncertainty which existed as regards the time which the families would spend in Syria, to settle them on the land in villages where they could become self-supporting, rather than to keep them in camps as had been done in Iraq. A scheme of settlement had therefore been worked out by M. Burnier—the local Nansen Office representative—which it was estimated would cost 3,400,000 fr. It was clear that the difference between this sum and the payment made by the Iraqi Government could not be borne by the Syrian budget, since Syria was not directly concerned with the Assyrian question, and he thought that there would be criticism, not only locally, but from the Mandates Commission, if any attempt were made to place the burden upon Syria. In the circumstances, he thought that it would be best to insert in the committee's report to the Council a formula to the effect that the difference between the sum paid by Iraq and the estimated cost of settlement should be eventually refunded to the Syrian budget by the League of Nations from the final Assyrian settlement funds. The French representative added that the French Government reserved the right to claim priority for the inclusion of the internees in Syria in any final Assyrian settlement scheme.

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The United Kingdom Representative asked for information regarding the sum mentioned by the French representative, namely, 3,400,000 fr. Did this represent the cost of the temporary settlement of the internees, or was it based on the hypothesis that they might remain indefinitely in Syria. Was it, in fact, an estimate for their permanent settlement there? The United Kingdom representative understood that the negotiations with Iraq had been for a purely temporary settlement, and that the sum paid by the Iraqi Government, namely, 10,000 dinars, was intended to represent the cost of maintaining the Assyrians for a certain period, namely, six months or a year, on the basis of the actual cost of their maintenance in Iraq.

The French Representative regretted that he did not know what the estimate of 3,400,000 fr. represented. The French High Commissioner had simply reported that settlement would cost that amount, and he did not know how it was made up, or on what basis it had been calculated.

The President said that he understood the French proposal to be that one section of the committee's report to the Council should be concerned with the transfer of the internees, and should point out that the difference between M. Burnier's estimate and the sum paid by the Iraqi Government would have to be charged to the eventual settlement fund. If, however, for some reason a settlement scheme outside Iraq for all the Assyrians could not be worked out, was it the intention of the French Government that the League of Nations should be responsible for the sum in question?

The French Representative explained that the responsibility might not necessarily lie with the League of Nations. The point was that the Syrian budget was at present being charged with expenses which did not really concern it, and the French Government were anxious that the money should eventually be refunded from other sources.

The Danish Representative observed that this was the first time the matter had been mentioned officially. He asked whether the committee or the Council could take the responsibility of accepting the charge named, and whether even the Assembly at this late date could do so.

The President said that in loyalty to the French representative he must state that the French delegate had consulted him a little time ago as to whether to raise this point in the appropriate commission of the Assembly. The President had recommended him not to do so. He therefore bore a certain personal responsibility, which he fully accepted.

The Danish Representative observed that the question was not a simple one. He understood that the sum mentioned by the French representative was for the development of the area in which the internees were being settled. It represented the cost of irrigation, buildings, &c. This development would be of some advantage to Syria, and in calculating what sum should be refunded to the Syrian budget attention must be paid to the permanent value to Syria of the work undertaken.

The President thought that the committee must, in the first place, recognise that the French Government had helped to solve a difficult problem. In his view they might be entitled to a refund of some part, at all events, of the expense to which they had been put, but the point which chiefly concerned him was what would happen if there was no Assyrian settlement fund from which a refund could be made. It was possible that there might be no settlement scheme or that there might be difficulties about the financing of any settlement scheme. The question was whether in such a case the League of Nations would have to take the responsibility of any refund to the French Government.

The United Kingdom Representative said that the committee as a whole would certainly be grateful to the French Government for having solved this tiresome problem of the internees. He was, therefore, all the more reluctant to give any appearance of criticising what had been done. At the same time the present French proposal raised an important question of principle. The committee had been given to understand that negotiations were being conducted directly between Iraq and France for the temporary settlement of the families of the internees. It now appeared that instead of settling the internees in a temporary manner, the French Government had decided to take the risk of settling them on what might be called a permanent basis. They had done this, however, without consulting the Council Committee in any way, and the Council Committee had had no opportunity of examining the scheme, and, more particularly, the estimated cost. It seemed rather difficult, therefore, to expect the League to assume the responsibility for an operation over which it had had no control.

The French Representative observed that the scheme had been worked out and the estimates prepared by the representative of the Nansen Office, which was an accredited organisation of the League.

It was pointed out, however, by *M. Arocha* and by the *United Kingdom Representative* that the French Government had merely asked for the services of M. Burnier in order to control the entry of the internees into Syria and to keep the accounts once they had arrived there. It was this limited task which had been given to M. Burnier, and it had been made clear in writing to the Nansen Office by the League Secretariat that M. Burnier had no authority to go beyond this limited task.

The French Representative said that he appreciated the points which had been raised, and he would like to consider the matter further in the light of them. It was agreed that the discussion should be continued at a later meeting.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva, September 27, 1934.

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1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

October 1, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[E 6107/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 158.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirty-fourth meeting of the Council Committee on the 26th September respecting the Assyrian question, a copy of which has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, September 28, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of Thirty-fourth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held on September 26, 1934, *at* 10 A.M.

THE committee had before it a draft report to the Council.

The President said that, before examining this in detail, there were two general observations which he wished to make. In the first place, he thought that the idea should be developed in the report that the committee was impressed by the urgent need of a solution, and that the fact that it was sending out commissions of enquiry which would need a certain time for the accomplishment of their task did not mean that it had overlooked considerations of urgency. The other observation concerned the Mosul camp. In this respect the report needed to be completed after a discussion with the Iraqi delegate, who had been asked to attend the meeting at a later stage. He proposed to tell the Iraqi delegate that the committee had taken note of the suggestion in the Iraqi delegation's letter of the 31st August that the closure of the Mosul camp was under consideration. He proposed then to recall the previous statement of the Iraqi delegate that the Mosul camp would be mainained until the whole resettlement operation was finished.

The French Representative said that as regards urgency the committee must not let this consideration interfere with the desirability of ensuring that any particular place was suitable and of obtaining every guarantee against the Assyrians being thrown from one uncertain situation into another.

The President thought that the despatch of missions of investigation showed the committee's preoccupation on this score. His wish to insert a passage about the urgency of the problem in the report was to forestall criticism, which he anticipated from a section of public opinion, to the effect that the committee by sending out commissions was simply wasting time and postponing a decision.

The United Kingdom Representative asked the committee to consider very carefully what should be said to Jafar Pasha on the subject of the Mosul camp. It was quite true that Taufiq Beg Suwaidi had, in January last, given an assurance that the Iraqi Government would maintain the camp until the settlement operation had been completely carried out. The committee would no doubt be justified in holding the Iraqi Government to the letter of this assurance, but the United Kingdom representative doubted whether it would be wise to do so. In the first place, Taufiq Beg Suwaidi had, at a later stage, indicated that, if the Brazilian scheme broke down, the maintenance of the camp might have to be reconsidered, and he had foreshadowed that the Council Committee would in due course be consulted on this point. In the second place, it was a very difficult

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thing to decide whether the maintenance of the camp was in itself desirable. He thought that the committee would do well to hold the Iraqi Government to their more general assurances regarding the welfare and security of the Assyrians rather than to this particular assurance about the maintenance of the Mosul camp, which was only one means of ensuring the welfare of the Assyrians. He thought that the specific measures to give effect to the general assurances should be left to the Iraqi Government. If the committee began to advocate any particular method, it assumed a responsibility which it had hitherto been careful to avoid. He thought, therefore, that the best course would be for the committee merely to show its concern at the closure of the camp and to bring before Jafar Pasha certain considerations which it hoped that the Iraqi Government would take into account before reaching a decision.

The discussion, at this point, was postponed until after detailed consideration of the draft report.

The draft report was accepted in principle, it being left to the Secretariat to complete it in two or three particulars. The discussion regarding the Mosul camp was then resumed.

The United Kingdom Representative said that the main argument for the closure of the camp was, in his view, not the financial one, since any alternative scheme would presumably cost money, but the doubt whether maintenance in a camp was in the interests of the Assyrians themselves. It had undoubtedly a pauperising and demoralising effect. On the other hand, it would be, perhaps, unfortunate if the camp were closed at the present stage, when fresh prospects of settlement outside Iraq had just come to light. It was certain that if the Assyrians were moved from the camp into the villages, many of them would go unwillingly and the committee would be bombarded with petitions. There was certain, in consequence, to be an agitation by the Assyrian sympathisers and the issue of settlement was likely to be obscured.

The Danish Representative expressed the view that the committee ought to recommend the maintenance of the camp at least until the results of the missions of investigation were known. It would be better, in any case, if the camp was maintained during the coming winter.

The President then outlined the statement which he proposed to make to the Iraqi delegate based on the various considerations which had been put forward.

Jafar Pasha, accompanied by M. Shabandar and Major Edmonds, then joined the meeting.

The President informed Jafar Pasha that committee had received communications from the United Kingdom Government and the French Government respectively, regarding the prospects of settlement in British Guiana and French West Africa. The committee proposed to take all necessary measures to see before any decision was reached that the conditions in the territories concerned were suitable for the Assyrians. They proposed to proceed as in the case of Brazil and to send missions of investigation. After obtaining all necessary guarantees in this way, they would make recommendations to the Council.

The President then thanked the Iraqi delegate for the information contained in the situation reports which the Iraqi Government had submitted periodically and which the committee had carefully studied. There was one report which called for observations, namely, the letter of the 31st August. That letter stated that an agreement had been reached with the French Government for the transfer to Syria of the families of the Assyrian internees in Syria. The committee wished to congratulate the French and Iraqi Governments on the happy outcome of these negotiations. In the second place, the letter stated the intention of the Iraqi Government to appoint a Ministerial Committee to study the possibility of closing the Mosul camp and to find some more practical arrangement. The reasons given for the closure of the camp were that the numbers of the refugees in the camp had been reduced as a result of the agreement with the French Government, and that the Council Committee was evidently finding it impossible to discover a place of settlement outside Iraq. As regards the second reason, the situation had now changed, and in view of the fresh possibilities which had been opened up, the committee wished to know whether the Iraqi Government would persist in its intention to close the camp or would reconsider the question.

Jafar Pasha said that the Iraqi Government had set up the camp to help the Assyrians in a spirit of goodwill and in accordance with the promises which it had made regarding the welfare of the Assyrians. He wished to emphasise that when the closure of the camp had been considered there was no intention whatever of pushing the inhabitants into the desert. Some 800 persons still remained in the camp after the transfer to Syria of the families of the internees; some of them had relatives in villages, and it was proposed that they should be settled with these relatives and given sufficient money for their maintenance for four or five months. Others who had no relatives the Government proposed to assist from time to time. When the camp had been set up it was expected that settlement outside Iraq would take place within a few months. Maintenance in a camp was then regarded as the most economic and suitable method of looking after the Assyrians. Unfortunately, however, camp life had a demoralising effect. Moreover, there were Assyrians outside the camp who were jealous of the special measures which were taken for the maintenance of the inhabitants in the camp. The closure of the camp was in any case only a proposal. It had not yet been put into effect. A committee had been formed to study the question, and Jafar Pasha could not say what the attitude of the Iraqi Government would be in the new circumstances created by the offers from His Majesty's Government and the French Government. He would refer the point to his Government and inform the committee regarding their attitude as soon as possible.

The President thanked Jafar Pasha and expressed the hope that the Iraqi Government would take into consideration not only the new situation which had been created, but also the approach of winter. The committee recollected that the Iraqi Government had given general assurances relating to the safety and welfare of the Assyrians pending their emigration elsewhere, and they must leave it to the Iraqi Government to decide upon the particular methods of giving effect to these assurances. At the same time, they hoped that if the Mosul camp were closed, arrangements not less favourable to the Assyrians and not less efficacious would be adopted. If the situation of the Assyrians would, in fact, be bettered by the closure of the camp, then, of course, the committee would be only too glad.

The President asked whether any other member of the committee wished to make observations.

The United Kingdom Representative said that there was one other consideration which the president had not mentioned. New hope had been raised by the possibilities of settlement in British Guiana and in French West Africa, and it would be a pity if the issue were obscured at this moment by the complaints which might be expected to follow the closure of the camp from some, at all events, of the Assyrians who would perhaps return unwillingly to the villages. It was a psychological consideration, but the whole Assyrian problem might well be complicated in this way.

The Danish Representative observed that the Iraqi Government proposed to provide the inhabitants of the camp with funds for four or five months. This would maintain them at the outside until February or March. Was it possible for them to cultivate and become self-supporting before they had spent this money?

Jafar Pasha said that he had perhaps not made himself clear. One section of the inhabitants of the camp had relatives outside, and these relatives, with whom they would be settled, had means. As regards those inhabitants of the camp who had no relatives, the Government proposed to support them periodically until they were definitely settled.

The Mexican Representative asked what was the prevailing opinion among officials in Iraq regarding the maintenance of the camp.

Jafar Pasha said that when the question was considered previously the prevailing opinion was that the camp was an unsatisfactory method of dealing with the Assyrians. The British and French propositions, however, undoubtedly created a different situation, which the Iraqi Government would certainly consider. In any case the committee might feel assured that any alternative to the maintenance of the camp would be equally effective and advantageous to the Assyrians. It was the wish of the Iraqi Government to do their best for the welfare of the Assyrians. They would look after them as children and as friends.

They wished to live as brothers with all people of whatever race who were under their rule and living on their territory.

The Iraqi delegation then withdrew.

The President said that the secretariat was not yet in a position to submit a list of candidates for the proposed mission of investigation to British Guiana.

The United Kingdom Representative, in reply to a question from the president, said that he had been in telephonic communication with Brigadier Browne, and that the latter had told him that he was definitely willing to go to British Guiana if he received an invitation. Brigadier Browne had certain arrangements to make before he could go, but he said that a maximum of three weeks would be sufficient for this purpose, and that he hoped to be able to leave by the middle of October. He had also expressed the view that a three months' stay in the colony would not be necessary, and he intended, having in view the urgency of the problem, to cut it down to the minimum consistent with a careful examination of the territory.

The President said that as regards French West Africa the committee had, at its last meeting, asked the French Government for further information. This information was likely to be a little delayed, but if it arrived during the present session, the question of sending a mission of investigation to French West Africa also would be considered. In any case, the sum which the Council was being asked to sanction was estimated on the assumption that two missions would have to be sent.

M. Arocha said that it had been arranged for the Assyrian question to be taken by the Council on the following morning if the committee's report could be ready in time.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the committee should be held, after the Council had risen, to discuss details regarding the mission of investigation to British Guiana.

Geneva, September 27, 1934.

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EASTERN (IRAQ). October 4, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 6171/1/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

(Confidential.)

Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on September 28, 1934, *at* 3 P.M.—(*Communicated by United Kingdom Delegation at Geneva; Received October* 4, 1934.)

Selection of Mission to British Guiana.

The President said that the main task of the committee was to select the mission of investigation to go to British Guiana. Before candidates were considered, however, a point of principle had arisen regarding the inclusion or otherwise of a representative of the Nansen Office.

The attached letter from Major Johnson was then read (Annex A).

M. Arocha explained that the conversation referred to in the letter had taken place when Major Johnson had called upon him to ask whether a Nansen Office representative would be invited to join the mission to British Guiana. M. Arocha had replied that he did not think that the committee intended to issue such an invitation. Major Johnson had then expressed the opinion that it was essential for the Nansen Office to be represented. In the report of the Governing Body mention had been made of the continued co-operation of the Nansen Office in this question, and, if the Nansen Office were not represented on the mission to British Guiana, public opinion might take it as in some way a reflection upon the Nansen Office, and might gain the impression that the Nansen Office was being set aside. M. Arocha had said that the committee had no such idea. The co-operation which the Nansen Office had hitherto given was considered extremely valuable, and Major Johnson was evidently under a misunderstanding. M. Arocha had recalled the text of the Council Committee's resolution of the 31st October last, which made it clear that the co-operation of the Nansen Office would be invited, when a destination had been found and under conditions to be laid down by the committee. In the case of Brazil there were special reasons why the Nansen Office should have been represented on the preliminary mission of investigation, as the whole scheme was one which the Nansen Office had produced, and it had been anticipated that its entire execution would be in the hands of the Nansen Office. In the present case, however, it was a question of a proposal made by a Government, and it was not yet clear how the scheme would be organised, if it were found suitable. Major Johnson would also appreciate the difficulty which the committee felt in sending a mission composed entirely, or in the main, of British subjects to a British colony. Major Johnson had professed to understand this point, but had indicated that he thought it desirable for some representative of the Nansen Office other than himself to be sent out to British Guiana and for the Nansen Office to co-operate in the whole scheme, *i.e.*, not only in the preliminary measures but also in the settlement itself, until such time as the Assyrians had been completely assimilated and all the money advanced to them had been paid back. M. Arocha had said that he had no doubt that the co-operation of the Nansen Office would be welcomed by the committee, at all events for the preparatory work, but he could not yet say to what extent the services of any organisation would be required in British Guiana for the actual work of settlement. In any case the extracts from the reports of the Governing Body, the Managing Committee and the Finance Commission, quoted in Major Johnson's letter, showed that the Nansen Office, as a body, was not disposed to collaborate in the work of Assyrian settlement until sufficient funds had been subscribed and the place of settlement had been fixed.

M. Arocha, after reporting this conversation, expressed the view that the extracts quoted by Major Johnson in his letter showed clearly that the committee was not obliged to accept the collaboration of the Nansen Office. It was a point, however, on which the committee must decide.

The President said that it was really a question of interpreting resolutions by the Governing Body and by committees of the Nansen Office. He doubted whether Major Johnson was in a position to interpret these resolutions, and, if the committee desired the position to be cleared up, he thought that the best method would be a letter to the president of the Nansen Office.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he also had had a conversation with Major Johnson, when the latter had advanced much the same views as those which M. Arocha had reported. The United Kingdom representative had taken the line that the committee must consider each case on its merits and adopt the procedure most suited to the circumstances. It was an entire misapprehension to suppose that, if a Nansen Office representative were not included in the mission of enquiry to British Guiana, this meant that the committee was dissatisfied with the Nansen Office. Nor did he think that public opinion would form any such impression. It was known that the Nansen Office was still co-operating in the Assyrian question. Appreciative references had, in fact, been made only that morning in the Council to the work which its representative in Syria had done in connexion with the transfer of the Assyrian families to Syria. It was true that the committee had adopted a resolution on the 31st October, 1933, regarding its intention to utilise the services of the Nansen Office in regard to any plan of settlement, but only after a certain stage had been reached and under conditions to be laid down later. The United Kingdom representative had said to Major Johnson that the services of the Nansen Office would, he thought, almost certainly be required in some degree in connexion with the British Guiana scheme, if it were put into effect. For instance, it was contemplated that the Nansen Office should in any case be concerned in the preparatory work in Iraq, and the degree of its further co-operation would be a matter for the committee to decide at the proper moment. Whether the services of the Nansen Office would be required in connexion with the actual settlement operation inside British Guiana was a matter to be decided later. He had felt bound, however, to point out that in the memorandum attached to His Majesty's Government's note of the 22nd September, it had been contemplated that the settlement would form part of the ordinary district administration of the colony. But the immediate question was the composition of a mission of investigation to look into a certain scheme and not the eventual means by which that scheme should be executed, if found suitable; and in considering this question, a very material fact, as he had indicated to Major Johnson, was that the committee, since passing its resolution of the 31st October, had been led in various ways to believe that the Nansen Office, as a body, was not anxious to be saddled with responsibility for schemes for the settlement of the Assyrians in such remote areas as South America. The attitude of M. Werner at various meetings of the committee and in personal conversations had made this clear. Moreover, the resolutions quoted in Major Johnson's letter to M. Arocha spoke for themselves, and Major Johnson, in the last paragraph of the letter under consideration, specifically stated that it was the desire of the Governing Body to refrain from accepting responsibility concerning the choice of the country for the settlement of the Assyrians. Major Johnson, in his conversation with the United Kingdom representative, had again admitted that this was the case, and the United Kingdom representative considered this to be quite conclusive.

The President agreed, and said that he did not think it necessary to consider the question further. He did not, however, wish the Nansen Office to have any sense of grievance, and he thought that the best thing might be to keep the president of the Nansen Office *au courant* with what the committee was doing in British Guiana, so that the Nansen Office might be in a position to co-operate, if required, at any given moment, with full knowledge of the facts. In that way, any idea of a slight could be removed.

This procedure was agreed to.

The committee then proceeded to the selection of the mission of enquiry in British Guiana.

The President recalled that it had already been agreed that it should consist of an Assyrian expert and an agricultural expert, and that in the former capacity Brigadier-General Browne should be appointed. For the post of agricultural expert three names were available. The first was that of Signor Guido Renzo Giglioli, who was about thirty years of age, and who had been proposed by the Italian representative. Signor Giglioli was a member of the Royal Colonial Institute of Agriculture in Florence, and had already visited British Guiana as a member of an Italian scientific expedition. The second candidate was M. Krolikowski, who was forty years of age, had been for a long time a director in the Ministry of Agriculture in Poland, spoke French and German well, but no English. The third candidate was M. Auguste Iwanski, who was in the forties, had been agricultural adviser to the Polish Embassies in Paris and Washington, and was at present Director of the Chamber of Agriculture at Vilno. He spoke French and English well.

The Italian Representative said that he had ascertained that Signor Giglioli was prepared to proceed to British Guiana at once, if invited to do so by the committee.

It was unanimously agreed that Signor Giglioli, in view of his previous experience in British Guiana, should be appointed.

The committee then considered the instructions to be issued to Brigadier Browne and Signor Giglioli, and these were eventually approved in the form of the attached letters (Annexes B and C).

Message to the Assyrians.

The United Kingdom Representative said that it had been indicated to him that, unless the present position were carefully explained to the Assyrians in Iraq, they might, on hearing of the British Guiana scheme, conclude that their settlement outside Iraq was already assured and cease cultivation. This would be disastrous, for, even if the British Guiana scheme were proved suitable, it was clear that only a small advance party at the outside would be able to go to the colony during the present season, since, after the report of the mission of investigation had been received, the wishes of the Assyrians would have to be consulted, questions of finance settled, and many preparations completed, both in Iraq and British Guiana. The season for emigration ended in April, after which the rains began. It was clear, therefore, that practically all the Assyrians would have to remain in Iraq during the coming winter at all events, and many of them might be there until next autumn at least. It was essential, therefore, that they should continue their agricultural life. In the circumstances he felt that the committee would be justified in urging the Iraqi Government to explain matters to the Assyrians in the interests of all concerned, and he had prepared a draft letter to the Iraqi delegate for consideration.

After a short discussion this draft was accepted in the form of the letter attached as Annex D.

French West Africa.

The President asked when the further information which the French Government had been asked to furnish would be available. The *French Representative* said that new documents had arrived from the territory concerned containing a considerable amount of information, which would need rather careful consideration. There were various factors involved, and he thought it would not be possible to rely on the information being available to the committee until about the end of October.

The President proposed, and it was agreed, that on receipt of the further information it should be analysed and distributed by the Secretariat, and that a further meeting should be held as soon as possible to consider whether a mission of investigation should be despatched. Meanwhile, this question remained open.

In reply to a question by the President, the *French Representative* said that he thought that a mission of investigation to French West Africa would require

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only two months for the accomplishment of its task. The French authorities estimated that it would require three weeks on the spot and two weeks each way for the journey.

The President observed that, in these circumstances, it seemed possible that matters could be so arranged that the report of the mission, if sent, might be available for consideration by the committee simultaneously with the report of the mission from British Guiana.

Annex A.

Major Johnson to M. Arocha.

September 27, 1934.

Dear M. Arocha,

WITH reference to our conversation this morning regarding the co-operation of the office in the settlement of the Assyrian refugees of Iraq, the following are the references to that question in the report of the Governing Body to the Assembly :—

> "The close and active co-operation of the office has been invoked by the Assyrian Committee of the Council appointed to consider the question of the settlement outside Iraq of the Assyrians, who might decide they could not settle permanently in Iraq, following the conflict between Iraqi and Assyrian forces in the summer of 1933."

Extract from Resolution adopted by the Assyrian Committee in October 1933.

> "Finally, it decides that, once a destination has been agreed upon for the Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, the task of preparing and executing plans for the transfer and settlement of these Assyrians shall be entrusted, under conditions which will be defined later by the committee, to the Nansen Office, working in close collaboration, through the League Secretariat, with the Council Committee."

* * * * * *

> "At the request of the Council, it (the committee) decided to consider the question of finding elsewhere a suitable home for the Assyrians, and, in response to its request, the office will continue to afford its co-operation to the committee for the examination of settlement proposals which may be brought to its attention."

The above extracts are taken from chapter IV (1) (*b*) of the report of the Governing Body (document A.12.1934).

It may also interest you to be acquainted with the following extracts from the reports of the last meetings of the Governing Body and of the Managing Committee of the office relative to the same subject :—

Extract from the Report of the Ninth Session of the Governing Body held on the 25th April, 1934.

> "Après discussion, le conseil d'administration confirme la décision de la Commission mixte du 17 avril, conformément à laquelle l'Office ne pourra en aucun cas collaborer à cette œuvre, soit directement par l'envoi en Irak d'un représentant de l'Office, soit même indirectement de toute autre façon, avant que des fonds suffisants soient mis à sa disposition pour l'action à entreprendre, et que le lieu d'établissement de ces réfugiés lui soit désigné d'une façon précise."

Extract from the Report of the Eighth Session of the Managing Committee and Finance Commission held on the 3rd September, 1934 :—

> "L'Office devra ainsi se borner à examiner les propositions qui lui seront soumises, et sa collaboration effective ne pourra être envisagée avant que des fonds suffisants soient mis à sa disposition pour l'action à entreprendre et que le lieu d'établissement de ces réfugiés lui soit désigné d'une façon précise."

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It is, I think you will agree, quite clear from the foregoing extracts that it was merely the desire of the Governing Body to refrain from accepting responsibility concerning the choice of the country for the settlement of the Assyrians as well as for the raising of the funds necessary for their settlement, but that it was always perfectly willing to render the services contemplated in its resolution of October last, quoted in paragraph 3 above.

Yours sincerely,
T. F. JOHNSON.

Annex B.

Secretary-General to Brigadier-General Browne.

Geneva, September 28, 1934.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Council Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has recently had under consideration a communication from the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the possibility of settlement in the Rupununi district of British Guiana. A report by the committee to the Council and a report by the Council's *rapporteur*, which deal, *inter alia*, with this communication, and which were adopted by the Council on the 28th September, 1934, are enclosed herewith.(¹)

2. You will observe that it is proposed to send an independent and impartial mission of investigation to the area concerned at the earliest possible moment under the auspices of the League of Nations. The task of this mission will be to furnish the Council Committee with all the elements necessary to form an opinion as to whether, in the light of local physical and economic conditions and of Assyrian needs and characteristics, a scheme of settlement in the area concerned can be worked out under which the Assyrians can be expected to thrive and to become a useful element in British Guiana. For this purpose, the committee has reached the conclusion that the mission should be composed of two persons, one an expert in agricultural matters, and the other possessing special knowledge of the Assyrians.

3. The committee, remembering with appreciation your previous assistance in this latter capacity in connexion with the scheme for settlement in Brazil, desires to avail itself once more of your services, and is happy to learn that you are willing to form part of the new mission. It has decided to appoint as your colleague Signor Guido Renzo Giglioli, a member of the Royal Colonial Institute of Agriculture in Florence, who has already visited British Guiana as a member of an Italian scientific expedition in 1931, and is the author of a pamphlet on agricultural and economic conditions in that colony.

4. In view of the great urgency of finding a solution of the Assyrian problem, the committee desires that the mission shall proceed at the earliest possible moment to British Guiana, and that it shall complete its work there in the minimum time compatible with the importance of the task allotted to it. The committee would appreciate a preliminary telegraphic report as soon as the mission, after local investigation, is in a position to indicate generally whether or not, in its view, Assyrian settlement in the area concerned is likely to prove successful. This preliminary telegraphic report should be followed as soon as practicable by a detailed appreciation of the prospects, and if the mission considers these to be favourable, by any special recommendations which it may desire to make, and, if possible, by an estimate of the cost of settlement on a sliding-scale basis according to the numbers of Assyrians who may eventually elect to go to British Guiana. The committee understands from figures supplied by the Iraqi Government that the ex-Ottoman Assyrians in Iraq, who may have to be provided for, number 20,000. It is impossible at this stage to obtain any indication of the number who will wish to avail themselves of any settlement scheme, but the committee has hitherto worked on the assumption that it will be necessary to settle a minimum of 10,000.

5. In judging the suitability of the area, the *questionnaire*, which you took with you to Brazil and of which a copy is enclosed for convenience of reference, will again be a useful guide, and particular attention should be paid to health

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(¹) Not printed.

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conditions, communications, the pastoral and agricultural potentialities of the area and the prospects of markets for produce.

6. It would clearly be useful if an early meeting could take place between yourself and Signor Giglioli at Geneva, to provide an opportunity of making financial and other necessary arrangements in connexion with your mission, and of consulting the League Secretariat on any points on which you may desire further information and guidance. I shall be glad if you will let me know the earliest date on which you can conveniently come to Geneva for this purpose.

7. A similar letter is being addressed to Signor Giglioli.

I have, &c.

Secretary-General.

Enclosure in Annex B.

Questions concerning the Suitability of Conditions in Parana for the Assyrians.

I. *Climate.*

Temperature :—

(*a*) Summer : (1) maximum; (2) mean; (3) minimum.
(*b*) Winter : (1) minimum; (2) mean.

Rainfall : average annual and rainy periods. Comparison of findings under paragraph I above with conditions in regions inhabited by Assyrians.

II. *Cultivation.*

Report on crops most easily cultivated in Parana, with indications showing to what extent the Assyrians are accusomted to the cultivation of those crops, or should be able, without great difficulty, to adapt themselves to their cultivation.

III. *Cattle and Sheep Raising and Pig-Breeding.*

Similar enquiries to those outlined in paragraph II.

IV. *Agricultural Settlement Conditions.*

1. Possibility of village settlement on conditions similar to those to which the Assyrians are accustomed.
2. Are 5 alqueires per family sufficient for the reasonable requirements of an Assyrian family?
3. Prospects of becoming self-supporting.
4. Feasibility of establishing two separate settlements.

V. *Other Occupations.*

Prospects of employment for other than agricultural categories, evenutally by means of the creation of an agricultural adaptation centre.

VI. *Food.*

Could the reasonable food requirements of the Assyrians be satisfied at accessible prices?

VII. *Medical Attention.*

VIII. *Religion.*

Would the Assyrians be allowed facilities for the practice of their religion under the direction of their own religious leader?

IX. *Schools.*

Similar enquiry to that under paragraph VIII (religion).

Annex C.

Secretary-General to Signor Giglioli.

Geneva, September 28, 1934.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 14th October, 1933, the Council of the League of Nations set up a committee consisting of six of its members (the representatives of Spain, Denmark, France, Italy, Mexico and the United Kingdom), under the presidency of the representative of Spain, to consider the problem of the settlement outside Iraq of the Assyrians who wished to leave that country. The attached copy of an appeal(¹) which was addressed to various Governments on the 11th June last will explain how that problem has arisen and the steps which have been taken towards its solution.

2. The Council Committee has recently had under consideration a communication from the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the possibilities of settlement in the Rupununi district of British Guiana. A report by the committee to the Council and a report by the Council's *rapporteur*, which deal, *inter alia*, with this communication and which were adopted by the Council on the 28th September, 1934, are also enclosed herewith.(¹)

3. You will observe that it is proposed to send an independent and impartial mission of investigation to the area concerned at the earliest possible moment under the auspices of the League of Nations. The task of this mission will be to furnish the Council Committee with all the elements necessary to form an opinion as to whether, in the light of local physical and economic conditions and of Assyrian needs and characteristics, a scheme of settlement in the area concerned can be worked out under which the Assyrians can be expected to thrive and to become a useful element in British Guiana.

4. For this purpose the committee has reached the conclusion that the mission should be composed of two persons, one an expert in agricultural matters and the other possessing special knowledge of the Assyrians. The committee considers itself fortunate to find in you an agricultural expert with some previous personal experience of British Guiana. It accordingly desires to avail itself of your services and is happy to learn that you are willing to form part of the mission. It has decided to appoint as your colleague Brigadier-General J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., who, for eight years, commanded the Assyrian Levies in Iraq and earlier this year visited Brazil on a mission similar to that now contemplated on behalf of the Council Committee.

5. In view of the great urgency of finding a solution of the Assyrian problem, the committee desires that the mission shall proceed at the earliest possible moment to British Guiana and that it shall complete its work there in the minimum time compatible with the importance of the task allotted to it. The committee would appreciate a preliminary telegraphic report as soon as the mission, after local investigation, is in a position to indicate generally whether or not, in its views, Assyrian settlement in the area concerned is likely to prove successful. This preliminary telegraphic report should be followed as soon as practicable by a detailed appreciation of the prospects, and if the mission considers these to be favourable, by any special recommendations which it may desire to make, and if possible, by an estimate of the cost of settlement on a sliding-scale basis according to the numbers of Assyrians who may eventually elect to go to British Guiana. The committee understands from figures supplied by the Iraqi Government that the ex-Ottoman Assyrians in Iraq who may have to be provided for number 20,000. It is impossible at this stage to obtain any indication of the number who will wish to avail themselves of any settlement scheme, but the committee has hitherto worked on the assumption that it will be necessary to settle a minimum of 10,000.

6. In judging the suitability of the area, the *questionnaire* which was taken out by the earlier mission to Brazil, and of which a copy is enclosed,(²) will be a useful guide, and particular attention should be paid to health conditions, communications, the pastoral and agricultural potentialities of the area and the prospects of markets for produce.

7. It would clearly be useful if an early meeting could take place between yourself and Brigadier-General Browne at Geneva to provide an opportunity of

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(¹) Not printed.

(²) Enclosure in Annex B.

making financial and other necessary arrangements in connexion with your mission and of consulting the League Secretariat on any points on which you may desire further information and guidance. I shall be glad if you will let me know the earliest date on which you can conveniently come to Geneva for this purpose.

8. A similar letter is being addressed to Brigadier-General Browne.

I have, &c.

Secretary-General.

Annex D.

Committee for Settlement of Assyrians of Iraq to Permanent Delegation of Iraq to League of Nations.

Sir, *Geneva, September* 28, 1934.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to-day decided on the composition of the proposed mission of investigation into the possibilities of settlement in British Guiana. Considering that this mission should consist of two persons, one possessing special knowledge of the Assyrians, and the other an expert knowledge of agricultural matters, the committee decided to appoint Brigadier-General J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., who is already known to you, and Signor Guido Renzo Giglioli, a member of the Royal Colonial Institute of Agriculture in Florence.

2. A decision regarding the despatch of a mission of investigation to French West Africa will be taken after consideration of further information regarding that territory, which the French Government has been asked to furnish.

3. The Iraqi Government will no doubt consider it desirable to make an early announcement to the Assyrians on the subject of the fresh efforts which are being made to find a place of settlement for them outside Iraq. While it is for the Iraqi Government to decide upon the nature of such an announcement, it is naturally to the interest of all concerned in the solution of this question to guard against any misunderstanding of the position which might lead to premature conclusions or exaggerated hopes.

4. The committee accordingly desires me to suggest the advisability of making it clear to the Assyrians that investigations into the possibilities of settlement in British Guiana and in French West Africa are still only in the preliminary stage, and that, although the committee is doing its best to expedite matters and hopes that its efforts may eventually be crowned with success, the territories now under consideration have yet to be proved suitable for Assyrian settlement, and no definite scheme of settlement is yet in being.

5. The situation is, in fact, similar to that which existed when, in my letter of the 9th April last, I forwarded to the Iraqi permanent delegate a message for communication to the Assyrians; and the committee is therefore quite willing to authorise the Iraqi Government, should the latter consider it desirable to do so, to inform the Assyrians of the committee's view that the advice contained in that message still holds good.

6. It is, I feel sure, unnecessary for me to add that the committee, in reaffirming this advice, continues to rely implicitly upon the Iraqi Government to take all possible measures for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians and for the maintenance of stability and order in the areas where they may reside until emigration shall be possible.

I have, &c.

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India
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M R

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6084/1/93,
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

EXED

P.Z.
6501
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
18 Oct., 1934.

pp. 6398 — m: A 17/x

6036

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 5933/1/93 of Sept 24.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C.427 of 28 Sept.	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 43 25 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
19 OCT 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to D.O.
W.O.

14–6130 10292 (2)

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P.Z.
6501
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

October 1, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 6104/1/93]

No. 1.

(Official No.: C. 427. 1934. VII.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by the Committee to the Council.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 1.)

ON the 5th June last, the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq was obliged to report to the Council the breakdown of the plan for settlement in Brazil which it had been pursuing up to that time. The Council, after considering, on the 7th June, the situation resulting from this development, instructed the committee to persist in its efforts to find a destination for the Assyrians, and urged the Governments to whom the committee might address representations to give favourable consideration to such representations and to facilitate the solution of the problem in view of its great importance.

In pursuance of this decision, the Council Committee at once despatched urgent appeals to the Governments of the following countries in respect of either their home or their overseas territories:—

Union of South Africa.
Argentina.
Australia.
Belgium.
United Kingdom.
Canada.
Colombia.
France.
Greece.
Italy.
Netherlands.
Portugal.
Spain.
Turkey.

The replies of the Governments of South Africa, Argentina, Canada, Colombia and Turkey are still awaited and the attitude of these Governments is at present unknown. Some of the other Governments concerned have felt obliged to return unfavourable replies to the appeals, though in one case further correspondence is proceeding. Meanwhile, however, the committee is glad to be able to submit to the Council the attached notes from the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, drawing attention to the possibilities of settlement in British Guiana and French West Africa respectively.

Such information as is immediately available regarding the extensive area concerned in British Guiana is contained in a memorandum(¹) attached to the note from the United Kingdom Government. In that note, however, the United Kingdom Government indicates that, while the area appears to have possibilities of further development as a stock-raising area, its agricultural potentialities have not yet been properly tested, and that much further examination will be necessary, with particular regard to considerations of health and climate and to pastoral and agricultural conditions, before the district can definitely be pronounced as suitable for Assyrian settlement. The Government of the United Kingdom accordingly considers that, before any decision is reached, an independent and impartial investigation should be conducted on the spot under the auspices of the League of Nations, and it suggests that such an investigation should be instituted with all possible speed.

The committee agrees as to the desirability of sending at the earliest possible moment a mission of experts specially qualified to form an opinion on the question at issue, and it proposes to act accordingly as soon as the selection of the necessary personnel, which is now under active consideration, has been completed.

The French Government also, in its note of the 24th September, urges the desirability of sending a mission of investigation to the area concerned in French West Africa, as a preliminary even to the limited settlement on an experimental basis, which the note contemplates in the first place. It is, of course, open to doubt whether settlement on an experimental basis would, in any case, offer an acceptable solution of the urgent problem with which the committee is faced. Before

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(¹) Enclosure in September 22, 1934, Section 1.

considering the question further, the committee has asked the French Government for certain supplementary information. Should it decide, however, in the light of this information when received, to proceed further with the scheme at this stage, it is clear that the first step must be an investigation on the spot into the suitability of the area concerned, and the committee would propose to send a mission of experts for this purpose. During the discussions which have already taken place on this point in the committee, the hope has been expressed that, if the report of any mission which may be sent is favourable, it may be sufficiently so to enable the French Government to reconsider its view regarding the necessity for a preliminary experimental settlement on a limited scale.

The Council will certainly appreciate that, in deciding to send out missions of investigation which will necessarily require a certain time in which to accomplish their task, the committee has not lost sight of the urgency of reaching a solution of the Assyrian problem. It feels, however, that considerations of urgency should not be allowed to obscure the necessity of obtaining, in the interests of the Assyrians themselves, the most complete guarantees as regards the suitability of a particular plan before it is put into execution.

The committee proposes to the Council that, in conformity with article 33 (2) of the Financial Regulations, the cost of the investigation in British Guiana and of any similar investigations which may be necessary elsewhere should be met in the first place, as in the case of the Brazilian scheme, from the "Working Capital Fund." It requests the Council to authorise the allocation for this purpose from the above fund of a sum not exceeding 50,000 Swiss francs, subject to reimbursement from the funds ultimately available for financing the Assyrian resettlement operation as a whole.

There is another matter on which the committee is happy to be able to report that progress has been made since the Council last considered the Assyrian problem. After the troubles of August 1933, some 550 Assyrian men remained in Syria, where they have been maintained by the French Government. Their families remained separated from them in Iraq. For some time, negotiations have been in progress between the French and Iraqi Governments regarding the transfer of the families to Syria, and these negotiations have now been brought to a successful conclusion. Under the agreement reached, some 1,400 persons have been transferred from Iraq to Syria and are being installed, with the original internees, in the valley of the western Khabur River, pending a final decision on the general question of Assyrian resettlement. The committee records with satisfaction the successful outcome of the negotiations.

There is, however, one point in this connexion which will require further consideration. A note from the French Government informing the committee of the arrangements made is attached to the present report. It will be observed that the French authorities in the mandated territory have thought it desirable not to maintain the Assyrians in question in a refugee camp, but to settle them on the land in villages to be constructed specially for the purpose, so that they may become gradually self-supporting during the period which may yet elapse before a general settlement scheme for the Assyrians has been put into effect. This operation, however, according to the French Government, which bases its opinion on estimates prepared by the representative in Beirut of the Nansen Office, will cost considerably more than the sum of 10,000 dinars paid under the agreement by the Iraqi Government, this sum being calculated on the basis of the probable cost of maintenance in a refugee camp over a fixed period. The French Government wishes to reserve the right to raise at a later stage the question of the incidence of the extra expenditure involved, which it considers it impossible to charge to the Syrian budget. The committee has not been able, in the short time since the note was received, to examine this question thoroughly, and it proposes to consider it further at one of its future meetings.

The committee has continued to receive monthly reports from the Iraqi Government concerning the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. The Iraqi Government has also elucidated various points in this connexion, on which the committee, as it stated in its report of the 5th June last, had felt bound to ask for further details and observations.

With one exception, these various communications call for no special observations on the part of the committee. That exception concerns a reference in a note dated the 31st August from the Iraqi delegation, informing the committee of the conclusion of the above-mentioned agreement relative to the

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transfer of the Assyrian families to Syria. That note observed that the agreement would result in a reduction in the number of refugees at the Mosul camp. It added that, in view of the fact that no territory had yet been found for the settlement of the Assyrians and of the difficulty which the Iraqi Government experienced in continuing to bear the heavy cost of maintaining the Mosul camp indefinitely, the Iraqi Cabinet had decided to form a Ministerial Committee for the purpose of submitting a report proposing a more practical arrangement.

In recent oral discussions with the Iraqi delegate, the committee, while recognising that it was for the Iraqi Government to decide on the particular manner in which effect should be given to its assurances regarding the welfare and security of the Assyrians pending emigration from Iraq, felt bound to express certain considerations which it hoped that the Iraqi Government would take into account before coming to a decision on the question of the closure of the Mosul camp. The Iraqi delegate on his side explained the reasons which had prompted his Government to review this question. He was not in a position to say what attitude his Government would now adopt, in view of the fresh possibilities which had just been brought to light of finding a place of settlement outside Iraq. He promised, however, to enquire and inform the committee of the result as soon as possible. He also undertook to communicate to his Government the considerations which the committee had put forward, and he added that the committee could, he felt, rest assured that, if it were decided to close the Mosul camp, the alternative arrangements would be equally efficacious and advantageous to the Assyrians, for whose welfare the Iraqi Government desired to do its best.

Geneva, September 26, 1934.

Appendix I.

[Printed as Enclosure in September 22, 1934, Section 1.]

Appendix II.

Letter from the French Government.

(Translation.) *Geneva, September* 24, 1934.

IN a letter dated the 11th June last, you were good enough to ask the French Government to give its favourable consideration to the possibility of receiving the Assyrians of Iraq in the oversea territories under its rule.

In reply to that communication, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic has given its closest attention to the question of the possible settlement of the Assyrians in those oversea territories.

From the investigations that have been made, it appears that the settlement of some Assyrian families might be contemplated in the bend of the Niger. The problem of an Assyrian immigration into the Sudan, however, calls for very careful consideration, because regard must be paid to the question of their acclimatisation and adaptation to the severe conditions of labour which agriculture in the tropics involves for all colonists of the white race. For instance, to what extent will the Assyrians, however accustomed they may be to rural life, react against malaria? Moreover, experience would seem to show that an individual cannot resist transplantation from his original environment unless he can find in the place to which he emigrates a diet substantially the same as that to which he has been accustomed from childhood. On this point no definite information is yet available.

That being so, should the experiment seem worth trying on various grounds, the wisest policy in this particular case would appear to be to send a mission to the Sudan to enquire into the conditions of life, housing and climate, and the possibilities of a first Assyrian immigration on the small scale of a few families. With the agreement of the local authorities and the mission of enquiry, those families would be sent to such regions as might seem most suitable for the acclimatisation of persons of white race.

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It would be only after this initial experiment, on which the Governor-General of French West Africa would keep a very careful eye, and on the explicit condition that its results were conclusive, that the despatch of a further, larger batch of emigrants could be contemplated.

In the French Government's opinion, the method set out above is the only one which would give the scheme for Assyrian immigration into the Sudan a chance of success.

To come to another point, the Government of the Republic feels that the various expenses involved by an Assyrian immigration into the Sudan could not be charged to the budget of French West Africa. The committee for the Assyrians of Iraq would therefore have to consider how to defray, not merely the expense of despatching the mission of enquiry, but also that of transporting the emigrants to Africa, and any repatriation expenses that might become necessary. Furthermore, it is essential to arrange that on their departure from Iraq the emigrants should be given money for the journey and sufficient funds to meet their installation expenses and to provide for their needs until the harvest. Funds would also be required for the very close medical supervision of the new immigrants.

Such is the preliminary information which I have thought it desirable to give you, in order to enable your committee to decide whether the idea of settling the Assyrians of Iraq in the Sudan is to be proceeded with. If so, a more detailed examination of the question would then become necessary.

For the Minister for Foreign Affairs and by authority:
R. MASSIGLI,
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Head of the French League of Nations Department.

Appendix III.

Letter from the French Government to the Chairman of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

(Translation.)

Mr. Chairman,

Geneva, September 26, 1934.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the negotiations undertaken between the High Commissariat of the French Republic in the Levant and the Iraqi Government for the transfer from Iraq to Syria of the families of the 550 Assyro-Chaldeans who, since July 1933, have been refugees in territory under French mandate, were successfully concluded last month.

As a consequence of this agreement, 1,400 or 1,500 persons arrived in the Assetcheh District in the first fortnight of September. The 2,000 old and new refugees will be divided between four villages, the construction of which was immediately begun and around which they will have cultivable land whence they will be able to derive a livelihood. Their installation is being carried out under the direction of M. Burnier, Director of the Nansen Office, whose competence and devotion the High Commissariat has been happy to utilise once again.

The Iraqi Government has been good enough to contribute a lump sum of £10,000 sterling to the expenses of this organisation. But the estimated total expenditure will exceed 3 million francs. So heavy a burden exceeds the financial capacity of the States under French mandate. I venture to hope that the committee will assist them to find the resources which will enable them to bring their humanitarian work to a successful conclusion.

RENÉ MASSIGLI.

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INDEXED

Communications on this subject should be addressed to—
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

P. Z.
6398
1934

I.O.
India
MR

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana.

pp. 6234.
R 8/x

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~*to*~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 4th October

21.9.34

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the F.O., Treas., W.O., A.M. & D.O.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 42 18 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
12 OCT 1934

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
13 October 1934.

(R1188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & Sp Gp 112

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TELEGRAM from the Governor of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 21 September 1934. Received 4.34 p.m. 21 September 1934.

No.203.Confidential.Your telegram No.217 Confidential. Memorandum of Agreement for option to purchase assets of the Rupununi Co.completed yesterday.

Today Legislative Council adopted following Resolution XX unanimously that with reference to the Officer Administering the Government's Message No.15 of the 20th September 1934 this Council approves proposal that His Majesty's Government should inform the League of Nations that there is land available in the Colony of British Guiana which appears prima facie to be suitable for settlement by the Assyrians, and is of the opinion that as settlers people would be welcomed by the inhabitants of the Colony, and agrees that the Government of British Guiana should cooperate in carrying such settlement to effect if it is decided to proceed with the project 13 Unofficial Members present 12 voted other Member left before division but expressed approval. Despatch with report of debate follows.

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India
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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6081/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
6234
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
6 Oct. , 1934.

pp 6218.
mi: R. 5/10

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 6004/1/93 of Sept 26.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva Tel no 63 Saving of 28 Sept.	Assyrian question

MAILS BRANCH
8 OCT 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 41 11 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
A.M.
W.O.
Treas.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P.Z.
6234
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Telegram (en clair) from H.M's Consul (Geneva).

D. (By Bag) 28th September, 1934.

R. 1.10 p.m. 29th September, 1934.

No.63. SAVING.

xxxxxxxxxx

Following from Mr. Eden.

Council on September 28th approved Report from Assyrian Committee, announcing decision to send mission of investigation to British Guiana as soon as necessary personnel can be selected, and foreshadowing possibility of similar mission to French West Africa after consideration of more detailed information which French Government have been asked to furnish. Report also deals with recent transfer to Syria of Assyrian internees, and records discussion with Jafar Pasha about future of Mosul camp, summarised in Geneva telegram No. 62 Saving (of September 28th.)

Council passed resolution thanking His Majesty's Government and French Government for the proposals which they had made and authorising advances up to 50,000 Swiss francs to meet cost of preliminary enquiries.

I took opportunity of welcoming agreement regarding transfer of families and congratulating French and Iraqi Governments on the outcome of their negotiations on this subject.

Later, on the same day, Assyrian Committee decided that mission of investigation to British Guiana should consist of two persons, namely Brigadier Browne and Signor Giglioli, an agricultural expert who visited British Guiana as a member of an Italian scientific expedition in 1931. It is hoped that mission will be able to start for British Guiana about the middle of October.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.63 Saving, repeated to Bagdad No.19 in code.

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ould be addressed to—
IE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
d the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Pol Depts

P. Z.
6218
1934

India 90
MR

Reference to previous correspondence :—

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of ~~the~~ even date

Downing Street,

4th October 1934.

pp. 6212 — MR 5/10

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, copies of the paper~~s~~ noted below, on the subject of the proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana.

MAILS BRANCH
5 OCT 1934
INDIA OFFICE

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. L. MAFFEY.

he Under Secretary of State,
India Office

Date.	Description.
ugust 1934 fidential)	From the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana

Copy also sent to Air Ministry, War Office and Dominions Office

97) Wt 47527/3095 5,000 9/33 H & Sp Gp 112

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 41 11 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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P.Z.
6218
1934

[E 5711/1/93]

Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office September 5.)

(Confidential.)

Government House,
British Guiana, August 20, 1934.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch of the 13th July on the subject of settling in British Guiana Assyrians at present living in Iraq, and to refer to the confidential telegrams which have been exchanged in this connexion.

2. I regard it as a fortunate circumstance that the suggestion to settle these people in Brazil has fallen through, as, *prima facie*, the prospects of the settlement of them in British Guiana are favourable. Moreover, the settlement of an agricultural and pastoral community of considerable numbers in the Rupununi savannahs will supply a population which this area of the colony urgently needs; there are no serious objections to such a settlement and I am satisfied that these people will be welcomed by the community as a whole.

3. The area suggested in the Rupununi district upon which these people could be settled and which is indicated on the enclosed map(¹) has an area of 13,110 square miles, bounded as follows:—

On the north by latitude 5° north; on the east by longitude 59° west to latitude 4° north, thence along that latitude to the Rupununi River, thence along the Rupununi, Rewa and Kwitaro Rivers and longitude 59° west to the intersection with latitude 2° north; and on the west by the Brazilian boundary.

This area is 5,000 square miles larger than Wales and three times as large as Jamaica, and is sufficiently large to accommodate the number who are likely voluntarily to leave Iraq.

Of this area 7,875 square miles comprise forest, 4,380 square miles open savannahs, and 855 square miles Indian reservations, which last-named will have to be preserved and excluded from areas available for settlement.

The remaining area of 12,255 square miles should easily be capable of accommodating 12,000 settlers and, to meet requirements of two groups, can conveniently be divided into two portions, north and south respectively, of approximately latitude 4° north, each portion containing proportionate areas of savannah and forest land.

No difficulty should arise in regard to Indian reserves, which have been duly proclaimed and are well defined and so situated as not to present, so far as can be foreseen, any likelihood of disturbance of Indians by settlement of Assyrians in the adjoining areas.

4. It might be possible to find other areas, but these would probably be densely forested, involving considerable time and cost in selection and clearing. In this connexion the western portion of the north-western district, which is hilly and well-watered, suggests itself, but is entirely forest-covered.

5. The savannah area in the Rupununi district is of a mean height of 300 feet above sea level, rising in the mountainous portions—the Pakaraima and Kanuku Mountains—to a height of 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level.

The river valleys in these mountains should be especially suitable for settlement, these having more fertile soils than the savannahs and many rivers and streams giving an ample supply of potable water all the year round.

In the open savannah itself are rivers and creeks which, when they dry up, leave ponds—and indications are that additional water can probably be obtained by boring shallow wells. Two ranchers have such wells, equipped with windmill pumps, which I understand have never failed to give an adequate supply of water for domestic and irrigation purposes.

The average rainfall over the area is 55–80 inches, two distinct seasons occurring, the wet from May to August and the dry from September to April.

(¹) See E 5933/1/93.

The temperature range is small—from 71·5° F. minimum to 91·9° F. maximum.

6. The reports available as to the agricultural possibility of the district based on examination of soil samples alone are not sufficiently comprehensive for a definite opinion to be given, and too much stress should not be laid upon them. Sir John Harrison's report of 1925 showed seven samples to be "fluviatile or riparian soils of the colony characterised by well-marked potential fertility. If properly drained and skilfully cultivated these soils should yield satisfactory crops of many tropical agricultural products." His report on certain other of the samples was undoubtedly unfavourable.

Mr. Follett-Smith in his report (1931) states that it does not appear that a sample typical of the soil of the Rupununi has been sent for analysis.

It appears, therefore, as is usually the case when one officer collects the samples and another examines them, that there is considerable doubt as to whether most of the soil samples are truly representative of the Rupununi.

I enclose reports, as set out in the enclosed schedule, on the potentialities of the district, and the reports of those who know the district well and who, I consider, are well able to form an opinion appear to indicate that there should be no difficulty in the settlers being able to grow sufficient food-stuffs for their requirements if settlement is carried out on the basis of small holdings. This can, I think, be regarded as the only doubt, although a serious one, as to the area being suitable, and this is one which can be dispelled only by a closer examination of the agricultural possibilities of the district. The responsibility for a decision must rest on those who, being fully acquainted with the requirements of the settlers, make a tour through the proposed area of settlement.

7. With regard to the reported phosphatic deficiencies in the district, the surgeon-general, according to available reports, suggests that, in the ordinary food consumed by the people in the district, vitamin B is lacking, *i.e.*, the "accessory substance" which exists in yeast and is present in varying amounts in all natural foods, and is necessary for growth. Diet will require to include provision of such articles as bread (whole-meal), cheese, eggs, fish meats, milk, potatoes, apples, bananas, grape fruit, oranges, pineapples, vegetables, cabbages, carrots, onions, tomatoes, turnips, &c.

8. If, in the light of an actual examination of the area, with particular reference to its agricultural possibilities and the route by which it is proposed to transport these people to the district and the permanent line of communication with the coast (which need not be the same as the route by which they are taken to the area), its possibilities are regarded as being favourable, there is no reason why such arrangements should not be made as will enable the first party to arrive not later than January next.

In this connexion, it would be well to note that before arriving in the colony settlers should be vaccinated against smallpox. It may also be advisable that they should be inoculated against the enterica.

9. I note that it is intended that no cost will fall upon the Colonial Government in regard to any scheme of settlement until such time as the new community is fully established and is in a position to take its share as an integral part of the population of the colony in contributing by way of taxation and otherwise to the general revenue.

It is presumed also that the colony will receive assistance towards the establishment and maintenance of social services, such as medical, agricultural, veterinary, schools, hospitals and dispensaries, police and prisons, as it is highly improbable that the settlers themselves will be in a position for some years to meet the cost of these services. The provision for the usual administrative and social services should present no difficulty, especially if with the Assyrians there come medical men, clerks, &c., while the former members of the levies may well form the nucleus of a police force.

The suggestion that the administration of the area and of the settlers should form an integral part of the district administration scheme of the colony would present no difficulty, and would, I think, be the best and less costly method to adopt.

I enclose an estimate of the cost of district administration. The senior members of the staff should, I consider, be of pure European descent, the junior ranks being recruited from among the Assyrians themselves.

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10. With the information at my disposal at present it is not easy to estimate the exact cost of settling a family of, say, five persons, but, exclusive of ocean transport, I consider that it should not exceed £80 in the first year, this estimate including the building of temporary housing accommodation for each family. After this year the settlers will still have to be maintained to a certain extent for a period of about two years, during which time they will be becoming more and more self-supporting.

An estimate of the cost of maintenance for these two years can be obtained from the cost of the usual Government weekly ration, which consists of 1 lb. salt beef, 7 pints of flour, 1¾ pints of peas, 1 lb. of pork, 7 sticks of chocolate, 2 lb. of sugar, 1 lb. of salt fish, 3½ pints of rice, and 1 lb. of biscuits. The cost per individual per day of this ration at contract rates in Georgetown is about 13 cents, whilst repacking and transport costs, wastage, &c., on long river journeys, make the final cost double or treble that amount. If the settlers possess cattle and catch fish, which abound in the rivers, the ration should not cost more than 20 cents per man per day, and allowing four rations as sufficient for a family of five persons, some of whom will be children, the cost of food per annum per family will be approximately 292 dollars, or, say, £61, for the first year, and half that amount for the second year, when ground provisions, rice and other quick-growing food-stuffs become available in the district. If the above ration is not suitable for the Assyrians, it could, of course, be varied to suit their taste.

11. With regard to supplying the settlers with a nucleus of cattle and sheep, I would refer to my telegram under reference, and to subsequent telegrams in which I stated that I regard it as essential that the assets of the Rupununi Development Company in the district should be acquired—lock, stock and barrel. These assets consist of large numbers of cattle (estimated at 47,000 head), a considerable number of horses, also houses and other buildings, which latter could readily be adapted for the use of officers placed in charge of the settlers and these homesteads could form centres around which to settle families in groups. The leases and permissions at present held by the company would be cancelled when the other assets are purchased.

It may also be considered desirable to purchase from ranchers at present established in the district some of their better cattle. This should not present any difficulty and the possession of this stock for immediate distribution to settlers would be a matter of considerable advantage and permit of the reduction of areas at present held by the ranchers under annual grazing permissions. The cost of purchasing the assets of the Rupununi Company has been dealt with in the telegraphic correspondence referred to, and the price of breeding-stock, if further numbers are required, runs from 15*s.* to £1 per head, so that the total cost of acquiring the company's assets and an additional supply of cattle if necessary should be less than the estimate for the purchase of land alone under the Brazilian scheme. In this connexion one of the desirable services would be a stock-farm under the care of an experienced veterinary officer. Veterinary opinion is that the progress of cattle on the present ranches is at present retarded more by inbreeding and lack of care than by any paucity of good grazing areas, but pure-bred bulls will have to be imported, and this will be an important item in the cost of this service. The same remark applies to agriculture and considerable assistance could be given to the settlers by the establishment of an agricultural experimental station in the district. These are, however, matters which need not be decided at the moment, but the sooner the services are established the better.

12. It may safely be said, in my opinion, that a suitable area upon which to settle the number of Assyrians who are likely voluntarily to elect to come to British Guiana, is assured; and as to the welcome they will receive in the colony there can, I think, be no doubt.

13. It now remains to deal in detail with the points which have been raised in your despatch, and with several other matters, knowledge of which will facilitate settlement.

14. I should welcome, at the outset, the arrival of a pioneer party of, say, 200 to 250 young men, and included in their number should be axemen, sawers, carpenters, mechanics, and if possible lorry-drivers, along with ordinary labourers. This party would be useful in erecting the base camps which would be necessary from which to distribute the settlers throughout the area, to erect their temporary houses and to put in order so much of the present cattle trail

south of Kurupukari as will enable families to be distributed quickly and comfortably by motor-lorry. I do not think it would be wise to employ these men on work on rest camps and communications within easy reach of the coastal belt, as there is still considerable unemployment and local labour should, I think, be employed in these initial stages and on the preliminary lines of communication as far as possible; otherwise there is certain to be criticism and an outcry against depriving local people of the means of obtaining employment, whilst there would be risk to the settlers of contracting malaria and possibly other complaints from native residents or camp followers. This would not apply when once the area assigned for the settlement of these people has been reached, and I should make it clearly understood that within that area all activities would be regarded as providing employment for the settlers.

15. With regard to the type of accommodation to which these people are accustomed, it would be of great assistance to me if I could be provided with photographs and descriptions of the style of dwelling. The local style of temporary dwelling usually adopted in the interior is well adapted to the needs of the climate and is constructed from material which is ready to hand.

16. I should also be glad to be informed of their usual necessaries of life and the food-stuffs to which they are accustomed, if these differ appreciably from the Government ration on which I have based my calculations. This will facilitate arriving at a closer approximation of what it will cost to maintain a family for two years.

17. It is presumed that on leaving Iraq each person will be supplied with sufficient clothing to last for, at least, one year. Its cost, and the cost of renewal, can best be estimated by those who have knowledge of the style of clothing these people are accustomed to, but it should be noted that warm clothing is unnecessary. A hammock and a blanket for each person will be necessary—they will be better than cots, at all events until the settlers become established in their permanent homes—and each person should be equipped also with a mosquito net for use with a hammock. If necessary, these can be purchased locally of the type generally used.

18. I am definitely of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by seeking the assistance of the Nansen Office, unless this may be a condition attending financial assistance from other nations members of the League of Nations. With British officers, with knowledge of these people, this Government with the financial assistance of His Majesty's Government can without fear assume full responsibility for the settlement of these people. If it is decided that eventually they should repay a part of cost of settlement, it is improbable that the assistance of the Nansen Organisation would be required in this connexion.

19. There is a matter, however, which should receive your consideration. I understand that the Assyrians have their own form of religion, and I anticipate that, as soon as settlement commences, a desire will be manifested by the several denominations of the Christian Church to establish missions amongst them. It would be wise to take such steps as will prevent any form of religious denominational competition arising. Anglican and Roman Catholic missions are already established in the district, and these would, no doubt, desire to extend their activities among the settlers. I mention this as a matter which should be considered, and, if necessary, such steps taken as to safeguard the settlers from the disturbing influence of contending religious denominations.

It would be well also if the numbers of the sexes could be approximately the same, and that no old or infirm people should accompany the earlier parties.

20. With regard to the routes which will be available for transporting the settlers to their destination, I referred, in my confidential telegram No. 157, to two alternative routes, which could be adopted in the first instance, and used for taking the people from the point of disembarkation from an ocean steamer to the Rupununi district. I consider that for this purpose the second alternative, namely, up the Demerara River to Canister Falls, and then by lorry along the cattle trail to Kurupukari, would be the more suitable. Ocean-going steamers can with ease be navigated to Wismar on the Demerara River, and in the vicinity of this point there would be no difficulty in establishing a camp, to which the settlers would be transferred from the steamer. The advantage of this route over the other suggested is that from Wismar to the Great Falls there are no difficult or dangerous rapids. At the Great Falls, however, it will be necessary to transfer from one system of river boats to another to avoid the half-mile portage of heavy

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boats around this fall. Between that and Canister Falls there are no rapids, and navigation is easy. The river journey from Wismar to the Great Falls should not exceed, in time, fifteen hours; that from the Great Falls to Canister Falls twelve hours. The question resolves itself, therefore, into the supply of a sufficient number of boats to clear each party before the arrival of the next steamer. It is usual to estimate thirty persons, with their kit and provisions, to each river boat, so that in order to clear 1,500 people fifty boat trips will be necessary during three weeks—the suggested interval between the arrival of the parties.

As each boat could make two or possibly three trips each week, ten boats would be quite sufficient for each stage.

It is possible also that the service between Wismar and the Great Falls could best be operated with a tug and two or three large barges.

21. The question of finance, however, must be considered in conjunction with the permanent line of communication with the district.

If the Demerara River route is selected as the most suitable one by which to take these people to the Rupununi district, a concentration camp will have to be provided at Wismar to accommodate at least 1,500 persons. I am informed that it can be estimated that to provide shelter for families, which would be of a temporary nature, the cost will be in the neighbourhood of 1·50 dollars per head; this would cost, therefore, 2,250 to 2,500 dollars. Smaller rest camps would be required at Great Falls, Canister Falls and Kurupukari, and at each camp provision will have to be made for certain services, food and medical supplies, the cost of which will have to be added to the cost of the buildings.

Owing to the distance and added cost of transportation of such material as cannot be provided on the spot, the smaller camps will cost, on the average, 1,000 dollars each, and it is probable, therefore, that the concentration and rest camps alone will cost approximately 6,000 dollars. There will be, in addition, the cost of hiring or purchase of boats, motor engines, and possibly a tug and barges—all costly items. I am not at present able to give an estimate of their cost, but am endeavouring to ascertain this; it cannot be less than 7,000 dollars.

Further, the District Commissioner estimates that to convert the cattle trail from Canister Falls to Kurupukari into a road suitable for motor vehicles will cost approximately 23,000 dollars.

22. Thus it appears that in addition to the provision of camps an expenditure of some 30,000 dollars will be necessary in order to convey the settlers to the Rupununi via the Demerara River route.

As a permanent means of communication with the district, the best route will be by an extension of the Bartica–Potaro–Konawaruk road in one of the following directions:—

(*a*) To a point on the Essequibo River shown on the map enclosed herewith as Mowasi Landing or some more suitable point higher up river, crossing the Essequibo River by punt, and thence to a point on the cattle trail north of Kurupukari; or alternatively

(*b*) Southward to a point just north of the junction of the Siparuni and the Burro-Burro Rivers, where the Siparuni River will be crossed either by punt or a bridge, and thence southward, connecting with the cattle trail south of Kurupukari.

From the information now at my disposal it seems probable that the second alternative, crossing the Siparuni, will be the better. One river crossing only is necessary as against two by the Essequibo route, and indications are that a watershed between the Potaro and the Essequibo exists along which the road can be constructed.

As the crow flies, these extensions are each approximately 50 miles, but it is not possible until a location has been surveyed to estimate closely the length of the actual extension nor its cost, but working on the basis of 2,500 dollars per mile, which has been found to be the average cost of road-making in the interior, the cost of the extension will be approximately 150,000 dollars. A similar estimate was used in the case of the Tiboku road extension, which is 175,000 dollars for a distance of 70 miles. This can, I think, be safely used as a basis.

Members of the Geological Survey are proceeding to examine the Konawaruk–Mowasi–Essequibo–Siparuni area, and this party will be able to give some useful information as to the physical features of this area, about which little or nothing is known at the present time.

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It may therefore be wise economically immediately to examine the possibility of extending the Potaro–Konawaruk road in one of the directions indicated above, with a view to using this route for the conveyance of the settlers to the Rupununi. The stages of this route would be as follows:—

By ocean steamer to Bartica, where the concentration camp could be established, then by motor lorry right through to Kurupukari, rest camps being situated near Garraway Stream and at some point intermediate between Garraway Stream and Kurupukari. These camps would cost approximately the same amount as is estimated if the Demerara River route were used, but no boats or tugs would be necessary, neither would the conversion of the cattle trail into a motor road between Canister Falls and Kurupukari, there being thus a saving of some 30,000 dollars. Moreover, all work done and the money expended in the opening up of this route would be of permanent benefit, as this route must undoubtedly be the permanent one to the district, whereas money spent on the temporary Demerara River route would be of no permanent advantage.

I suggest, therefore, that these alternative routes be surveyed as early as possible.

23. I am quite satisfied that, as regards transport routes, there is no difficulty in reaching the district. The question to be decided is which of the two routes suggested will be economically the better. An organised plan of transport and provisioning will present no difficulty, and all that will be necessary will be an adequate fleet of lorries operating from Bartica.

24. I suggested in my telegram that Brigadier-General Browne, accompanied—if it is thought necessary—by a civilian officer acquainted with the agricultural requirements and capabilities of the settlers, should visit the colony as soon as possible in order to satisfy you that the possibilities of the district are such as would commend it to the Assyrians as desirable for their future home.

I propose, as soon as I am informed that a mission will be despatched, to send to the Rupununi a party consisting of a medical officer, an agricultural officer, a soil chemist and a geologist (instead of a surveyor, as first suggested), which party will be able to make investigations and collect information pending the arrival of the mission. I further propose that Brigadier-General Browne should be accompanied from Georgetown by Major Bone, Government veterinary surgeon, who knows the district well; also by some person who has resided in the district as a cicerone. Mr. Haynes, the District Commissioner, will then meet this party at Kurupukari or Canister Falls, and from that point accompany them.

It is estimated that the cost of sending the preliminary party to and around the district will be about 2,760 dollars, and that the time occupied will be about sixty-four days. I shall be glad if, when notifying me that it has been decided to send a mission from England, you will authorise the expenditure of that amount as an advance against the cost of the scheme.

The mission should calculate on spending at least three months in the colony, and their journey to the district will cost not less than the amount quoted for the preliminary party.

In this connexion I enclose a minute by the Commissioner of Lands and Mines.

25. Although opinion generally is favourable as to the possibilities of this district for small holdings, yet I think the responsibility for a final decision must rest upon someone with intimate knowledge of these people. There is always the possibility that, after settlement, these people may not find the district entirely to their liking, and I note that, having once settled these people in an area selected, there can be no question of repatriation to Iraq.

26. As I have informed you in my telegram, I decided to consult my Executive Council confidentially. I had no misgivings as to the attitude of the members, but I felt that, in order to expedite the matter, as time appears to be a matter of considerable importance, it would be well to ascertain their views (especially those of the unofficial members) as soon as possible, and I am glad to have been able to inform you that the proposal was received with enthusiasm. The scheme is regarded as affording the opportunity for which the colony has long wanted to increase its population, and developing its vast uninhabited areas. I enclose a copy of the Executive Council minute in this connexion.

I have also asked that I may be permitted to inform the Legislative Council of the proposal in due course.

27. As it appears imperative for political reasons to move the Assyrians from Iraq as soon as possible, and as the Rupununi district of British Guiana promises to be the only suitable locality in which to settle them; time also being an important factor, I submit the following for your consideration:—

From September to April is the dry season in the Rupununi district and much can be done during those months to prepare for the settlers. If, however, full advantage of this season is not taken a delay of a year will probably result, as little can be done towards settlement in the wet season—May to August, during which months much of the savannahs is flooded, and communication, except by boat, is difficult.

The financial position of the Rupununi Company is such that it may be assumed that they are spending little or nothing on the maintenance of their assets in the district. Their cattle roam wildly over wide areas and their buildings and fencing are probably suffering from want of upkeep.

If competent supervision and money were provided now, much valuable time will be saved and heavy expenditure in the future avoided.

During this dry season also, much can be done to improve communication with the district.

The road from Konawaruk could be pushed through either to the Essequibo or Siparuni and thence to the cattle trail, the latter being examined with a view to obtaining the best alignment for a road for motor-vehicles, if the present alignment of the trail is not the best possible. Improvement of communication will greatly facilitate settlement of these people.

The area can also be examined and sites chosen and cleared for villages near to good land and water, and even temporary shelters erected.

My purpose in making these suggestions is to invite attention to the importance, if time is an essential factor, of carrying out as many of the preliminary operations as possible during this approaching dry season.

I have, &c.
C. DOUGLAS-JONES,
Officer Administering the Government.

SCHEDULE.

1. Memorandum by Mr. Harvey Read regarding settlement in Rupununi District, June 22, 1930.
2. Memorandum by Mr. L. H. Hill on Rupununi Land Settlement, July 6, 1930.
3. Copy of Report by Land Officer (Mr. E. A. Haynes), Rupununi District, September 4, 1931.
4. Copy of Report by Land Officer (Mr. E. A. Haynes), Rupununi District, November 4, 1931.
5. Letter from Mr. B. L. Hart to Mr. Haynes on experiments in wheat, May 25, 1931.
6. Copies of Reports by Mr. E. A. Haynes and the Reverend H. C. Mather, S.J., on experiments in wheat in the Rupununi District, September 15, 1931.
7. Observations by Dr. J. G. Myers on a journey from the mouth of the Amazon to Mount Roraima and down the Cattle Trail to Georgetown (extract).
8. Notes by acting Director of Agriculture—The Rupununi District, with especial reference to soil fertility, August 5, 1934.
9. Notes by Major T. Bone, Government Veterinary Surgeon, August 5, 1934.
10. Notes by Mr. C. C. King on Rupununi Colonisation, August 14, 1934.

See also photographs—

(*a*) Mr. B. L. Hart's ranch.
(*b*) Cattle and cattle trail.
(*c*) Rupununi district as per list attached.(¹)

(¹) Not reproduced.

1.—*Memorandum by Mr. Harvey Read regarding Settlement in Rupununi District.*

Private Secretary,
Government House.

26, *Oronoque Street, Georgetown,*
June 22, 1930.

Sir,

With reference to my conversation with his Excellency on the 16th instant regarding settlement in the Rupununi district, I have the honour to submit the following :—

Suitability.

A selected area near the Government Station at Annai could absorb, at the least, 500 families. The land is eminently suitable for stock-raising. The soil is arable and productive with natural drainage, excellent for dry farming. Health conditions everything to be desired. Permanent clean water supply. Fish is plentiful—an important consideration.

Settlers.

The Immigration Agent-General informed me that there are five East Indians from the Punjab—the soldier caste sihk, who have recently arrived from India, having paid their own passages. The inducements offered to warrant them sitting on the coastlands were not attractive enough. They are dry land workers only. I feel sure that conditions in the Rupununi district would suit them in every respect. To me they seem to be the ideal settlers for the district.

His Excellency's permission is requested to permit me to interview these men with the assistance of the Immigration Agent-General.

Advantages.

A ready market in the district would be open to these men for farine, corn and beans; farine is the staple food of the district. It is a necessity. I can guarantee to dispose of all the farine these men could produce at 2·50 dollars a basket (approximately 40 lb.). An estimate of their first crop would produce about 600 baskets—1,500 dollars.

Corn is scarce and in much demand. This is sold at the same price as farine. First crop 600 baskets—1,500 dollars.

There is a certain market for beans, but at present I cannot give prices or quantities.

Later on there would be a market for tapioca, starch and tobacco.

A hard-working East Indian named Singh, who served throughout the war, has fields near Annai, and his services could be utilised to assist the first settlers.

Disadvantages and Cost.

Settlers cannot use the cattle trail until November. On arrival fields have to be cut, houses built, and nothing can be planted until the beginning of next year's wet season—early May—corn and cassava (for farine) are planted in the same field. The corn is reaped after the rains, early September, and can be sold immediately. The cassava has to wait until the dry season of the following year, but during this time another field is cut and planted, and each year afterwards there is always a crop of corn and cassava.

- (i) The settler has to be shepherded through the cattle trail to his land and fed.
- (ii) On arrival fed for nine months.
- (iii) The services of Singh for a short period to "show them the ropes."
- (iv) A temporary shelter whilst they are making their own houses.
- (v) A supply of corn from the Department of Agriculture. Cassava shoots from the Aboriginal Indian.

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Estimated cost of—

	Dollars.
(i) Allowing for free passages to Paradise, 10 dollars a head to feed each man through the trail ...	50·00
Services of Singh	25·00
(ii)	100·00
(iii)	60·00
(iv)	20·00
(v) Allowing for free corn	15·00
Total estimated cost	270·00

I hope after the men have been interviewed that the cost will be considerably less.

Inducements.

Twenty-five acres of land. Free title to be given after three years if the responsible officer is satisfied that the land is beneficially occupied, which includes them sending for their wives. The Immigration Agent-General informs me that passages can be easily arranged.

Undoubtedly through their communicating with their wives in India information would be spread amongst their friends and relations as regards the inducements for settlement, and one might reasonably anticipate by this means a gradual automatic influx of the better type of East Indian.

Conclusion.

The East Indian Singh I feel sure could recruit locally the better type of Indian for settlement under similar conditions.

I have, &c.
D. HARVEY READ,
L.O., T.M., Rupununi District.

2.—*Memorandum by Mr. L. H. Hill on Rupununi Land Settlement.*

1. A free gift of 25 acres of land in the Rupununi to each head of a family in consideration of—

(*a*) Three years' beneficial occupation of the land allotted, which will be rent free during the period of probation (three years);

(*b*) A satisfactory report by the commissioner as to the intending settlers, industry and general behaviour during his period of probation;

(*c*) The settler bringing his wife and family to join him in the Rupununi within five years of his arrival on the settlement.

2. The intending settler to be provided with free transport by rail and steamer from Georgetown to Paradise on the Berbice River, from whence he will walk by easy stages to the site in the Rupununi he is to be settled on. This journey on foot will occupy eleven days.

3. The intending settler will be provided, free of cost, with such food as the country through which he will journey and be finally settled upon produces, from the time of his leaving Georgetown for the Rupununi to the time of his reaping the first crop from the land allotted him.

4. The intending settler will be escorted, free of charge, from Georgetown to the Rupununi by some suitable person selected by the commissioner of the district.

5. The intending settler will be provided free of cost with a temporary shelter that is weather-proof to live in on his arrival at his destination in the Rupununi, until such time as he is able to erect a house of his own.

6. The intending settler will have the benefit of the advice of the commissioner (or some person deputed by him for the purpose) in connexion with the building of his house and all matters pertaining to the crops best suited to the locality and the planting of them. The settler will be under protection of the commissioner, whose duty it will be—especially during his period of probation—to advise and help him in all matters appertaining to his welfare.

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7. The country in which the settler will be located is suitable to the growing of farinha (cassava), corn and beans. Farinha—the staple food of the district—fetches the equivalent of 2·50 dollars a basket of 40 lb. in weight. Five industrious men should, from their first planting, be able to reap 600 baskets (of 40 lb. each) worth 1,500 dollars. A ready sale for this quantity of farinha is guaranteed.

8. Planting is not possible before May in each year, when the rains commence. Corn planted then is reaped in September, cassava the following May.

9. The Rupununi is eminently suitable for stock-raising, cattle, horses, goats and sheep. Business is transacted mostly by barter and usually through the medium of farinha. A cow, for instance, is presently the equivalent of two baskets of farinha of 40 lb. in weight each, or about 5 dollars in money.

10. There are presently two shops at Mora (the locality in the Rupununi where it is proposed to put settlers on the land). These sell cloth, field implements, household utensils (pots, pans, &c.), food-stuffs, and most things that are needed.

The nearest shop would be about three hours' ride on horseback from where settlers will be located.

11. On account of the Rupununi being so far distant from the settled area of the colony, as well as being but sparsely populated, there are no doctors at present in the district. The services of a sick-nurse, however, will be available in case of sickness. The climate of the country is considered very healthy.

12. There is an abundance of good drinking water in the district. Rivers and streams abound and fish are plentiful. The areas over which stock may be grazed are at present practically unlimited.

13. Rice (*i.e.*, wet rice) is not presently being grown in the district, but there is land available for planting rice near by, which is under water from May to September every year.

14. Intending settlers journeying on foot along the cattle trail from Tacama on the Berbice River to the Rupununi must necessarily be prepared to carry whatever goods and chattels they propose taking with them themselves. This in addition to food supplies for the journey. The usual load carried by a man is one of 60 lb. weight.

15. The distance from Tacama to Mora is 180 miles. There are rest-houses along the trail, the stages of the journey being as follows:—

First stage	10	miles to Warinama.
Second stage	13½	miles to Labba.
Third stage	16¼	miles to Yawakuri.
Fourth stage	12¼	miles to Ite.
Fifth stage	15	miles to Keleueru.
Sixth stage	25	miles to Canister Falls.
Seventh stage	20	miles to Kurupukari.
Eighth stage	15	miles to First Grassfield.
Ninth stage	22	miles to Second Grassfield.
Tenth stage	15	miles to Surama.
Eleventh stage	16	miles to Annai.
	180	

16. Such settlers as are desirous of entering into occupation of lands in the Rupununi during 1930 should be prepared to leave Georgetown in November 1930.

17. In the event of a settler who arrived in the Rupununi in November-December deciding to return to Georgetown, his first opportunity for so doing would be by boat the following April.

L. H. H.

July 6, 1930.

3.—*Copy of Report by Land Officer, Rupununi District.*

Bon Success, Rupununi District,
September 4, 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report for the month of August 1931:—

During the first six days of the month I remained at Annai police station waiting for the return of my boat from the Rupununi mouth, where I had sent it back for cargo brought up by Garnett's boat for Bon Success and Annai, some for me, Public Works Department and Police Department, Annai. Whilst at Annai I visited the area I proposed to put in the small agriculturists, and on the 4th, 5th and 6th I held successive courts in its criminal jurisdiction.

2. On the 7th I left Annai and proceeded to Eupukari, thence to Bon Success, travelling by cart to Marikanata, thence by boat to Pirara, thence down the Pirara into the Ireng and Takutu rivers. We arrived at Bon Success on the evening of the 15th August.

3. Whilst at Parara I inspected Mr. Hart's homestead. His machine-shop is driven by a large windmill, and he has erected a steam-engine which obtains steam from a Merryweather boiler. He proposes to use this engine when there is no wind, or when extra power is needed. The other appliances were a circular wood-cutting saw, a band saw, a lathe, a wood-planing machine, one cassava grating mill, and one cassava press. Water was being pumped by the windmill to his house, kitchen, yard, kitchen-garden and surrounding orchard of orange, lime and grape fruit (all bearing fruit), also several kinds of fruit trees. All the useless weeds around the homestead had been replaced by Bahama grass, which was flourishing over some 4 acres. Mr. Hart had also a motor lorry which he had converted into a bus to carry seven passengers and their baggage. Both the steam-engine and the motor-bus are the first of their kind to be brought into the Rupununi district.

4. From the 16th to the 24th I was in office attending to district business and superintending the repairs to Bon Success buildings:—

(*a*) Boathand logie walled in with adobe.
(*b*) Two-thirds of the kitchen wall renewed and new ridge put on.
(*c*) The entire roof of Bon Success house with exception of the main body roof was pulled down and new leaf put on (five snakes came down with the old leaf and were killed). The concrete floor of the house patched in several places. One spare room and servants' room floors concreted. New office built in south-west gallery, floor cemented, three casement glass windows and one small one put in, one door facing south to admit public and another put in connecting the office with main building. The whole room walled in with adobe.

This puts an end to the public going into the dwelling part of the building, and allow of the police having sufficient room to do their office work when at Bon Success.

(*d*) A small house built in the yard for the saddling.

5. On the 25th I left Bon Success 11 A.M. and proceeded to the Kanaku Mountain and Indian reservation. Arriving there I was joined by Captain Samuel and two other Indians, who took me to the forest on the mountain, where I inspected the Indians' experimental field. The rice was doing fine, strong, healthy stalks, as good as I have seen on the coast. The rice plots were not large—each about 50 feet square. The first lot had thrown out full heads of full rice and beginning to turn yellow. The second plot planted early June was just bursting. The Indians were highly delighted over these plots. The pigeon peas, and increase (black-eye peas) were doing well, also plantains, &c. They propose to call the whole of the reservation Indians together to plant a big field next year. The soil on which the field is located is above flood level and is a dark loam.

6. On the 28th and 29th August I cut a line into the Kanaku Mountains, going across a spur from the main ridge between the Nappi and a tributary

named "Kraswata," about 1,500 feet in height. Sample of rocks taken forwarded:—

(a) Rock formation or exposure extending upwards from foot to about 700 feet.
(b) Rock exposure from 700 feet upwards to summit.
(c) Washing from creek gravel.

I came to a halt on the head waters of the Kraswata Creek (tributary to Nappi), where I could see the watershed, which rose to a further height, apparently about 2,000 feet above sea level. The interior of these mountains appear to me to be gabbro. The washings in the creek bed carry fragments of shale, and rounded quartz pebbles. Test washings indicated diamonds, not gold. I returned to Bon Success on the 30th August.

7. The rainfall for the month was 8 inches 87 parts. The creeks above and below this station are still too swollen for travelling, and at some points where it is possible to swim the horses there are no boats to cross equipment and provisions.

8. Experiments in four varieties of wheat in the Bon Success savannah were not successful owing to destruction by ants, bugs, and too much water on the ground. Nevertheless, that which survived grew to 18 inches in height, gave a full bloom with seed hardly inferior to the original seed sent me. These samples were planted the 1st June, 1931, reaped the 31st August, 1931. The results, with samples of bloom and seed, sent to the Director of Agriculture. If this seed had been planted in good soil at mountain foot the results might have been different.

I have, &c.
E. A. HAYNES.

4.—*Copy of Report by Land Officer, Rupununi, dated 4th November,* 1931.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report for the months of September and October:—

From the 1st to 17th September I was in office, and on the 18th, the creeks having become fordable, I left Bon Success to inspect the Rupununi Development Company (Limited) lease to the south of the Kanaku mountains, and also at the same time visit the Indian settlements in that part of the district.

On the 20th I attended a round-up of horses at Dadanawa. Some 200 were brought in, several were half-bred horses, well built, with good bone; the results of the imported stallion. A rancher, who was present, bought one to improve his stock.

Next day accompanied by Mr. Turner, the manager of the Rupununi Company (Limited), I visited Sand Creek or Katiwau Indian Reservation, where I commenced a rough compass survey of the reservation. This survey I completed on the 25th and left for Whichabi.

On the 26th I rode out from Whichabi into the area lying between the cattle trail, Kanaku Mountains, and the Rupununi River. There I saw about 1,000 head of cattle, a great many being half- and quarter-breed Herefords belonging to the Rupununi Development Company (Limited). I returned to Whichabi the same day.

At Whichabi, on the 27th September, I started a survey of 50 acres, for Mr. J. Melville, M.P. 1379/24, completing same on the afternoon of the 28th September.

On the 29th September I left for Dadanawa and resumed the inspection of the company's lease and making and examination of their books.

The 30th September, accompanied by Mr. Turner, I visited their paddocks and also saw a new paddock in course of construction—only about a mile remained to effect a closure on about 50 square miles. Mr. Turner returned to Dadanawa, and the Ranger and I continued south to an outstation on the Wariwau, about 25 miles to the south-east of Dadanawa. Here the company had a paddock 1 square mile, a large corral and one house. A Wapisiana Indian and his family living here was in charge of the station.

On the 1st October I rode across country some 20 miles to Out-Station No. 2, about 1 mile west of Shea Indian Village. Here another paddock 1 mile square, corral and house had been erected. Three families of Wapisiana lived on the spot, the head man being in charge of the station.

All the low-lying land or flats from Dadanawa to the Wariwau Creek were closely grazed. The hills were covered with old grass and practically untouched. The flats formed about 25 per cent. of the whole area. Several small herds of cattle were seen among the hills, but only a few could be approached close enough for inspection. Some of the horses met were absolutely wild and cleared off at half a mile. On the other hand, I was able to get close to some good horses with half-breed stallions, also a good many fine bullocks. A great number of old cows were seen that should not be allowed to breed; this might have some bearing on the poor quality calves complained of and not overstocking. On the way I climbed a hill some 250 feet high and had an excellent view of the surrounding country.

On the 2nd I left Out-Station No. 2 and travelled south at an average distance of about 3 miles from the apparent bush edge. (This forest is broken into islands of bush and savannah. Looking at it from the open savannah it appears to be one unbroken line of forest, but this savannah and forest extends some places to 7 miles in depth.) Visiting the Indian villages and settlements, starting at "Shea," and camped for the night at a settlement on the right bank of the Wariwau Creek at 5 P.M. Next day I rode down the right bank Wariwau back to the Out-Station No. 1, visiting on the way one Indian settlement, on the right bank, and another on the left bank, near the Out-Station.

On the 4th I left Out-Station No. 1 and rode to the south-east, thence south, thence south-west along the line of Indian villages to the last one in the open savannah, right bank Rupununi, camping at 4·45 P.M. All the Indians I saw and spoke with were well and contented, had no complaints. Only one man remarked to me that "the Government were taking every care to educate the black children on the coast whilst their children were being brought up like hogs for want of proper schools." (This was interpreted to me by the Ranger.)

The upper half of the savannah, right bank Rupununi, or that portion lying between the Wariwau Creek and towards the source of the Rupununi, did not contain many head of cattle. The flats and hills were ungrazed, and only in the vicinity of the Wapisiana villages I saw a few head of cattle and signs of the grass being grazed. It appeared that very few company cattle existed in this section; the last I saw were in the close vicinity of the Wariwau Out-Station No. 1.

On the 5th October I crossed the Rupununi River in the open savannah (about 1 mile from the bush line and about 15 miles from its source). After an hour's ride from the village we turned north and rode toward Out-Station No. 3, passing through on the way one Indian settlement, and reaching the out-station on the Taweiwau about 2 P.M. This station had a paddock 1 mile square, large corral and a house, also another house belonging to the Indian who was in charge of the station.

On the 6th I continued down the left bank Rupununi, and on the way I saw several small herds of cattle at close range, very excellent cattle in pink of condition, and in every herd were half and quarter-breed Hereford bulls, calves and full-grown animals. An average distance of 2 miles inland from the river right on to Dadanawa was closely grazed in the flats and portions of the hills. Arriving at Whichabi I camped for the night and on the 7th I left, riding along the Kanaku mountain foot. A few scattered head of cattle, of which a fair number was half and quarter Hereford, were met as far west as 15 miles of the Rupununi River. Thence no company cattle were seen, only a herd of animals belonging to the Makusi villages by the Kanaku Mountains. I returned to Bon Success on the 8th October at 11 A.M.

From the 9th to the 16th I was in office attending to head office correspondence, &c. I also attended a meeting of the cattle ranchers on the 14th, which was held at my quarters. On the 17th I left Bon Success to resume the inspection of the Rupununi Development Company's lease lying between the Rupununi and Takutu Rivers.

On the 19th October I crossed the Sawariwau River and camped for the night in Sand Creek Indian settlement to the north of Kusad Mountain; on the way here I saw a few company's cattle (the other cattle seen belonged to Indians) with the Hereford strain, and a few really A 1 half-breed Hereford bulls. The grass was merely touched here and there, indicating that the quantity of animals in this area was very small. Mr. Davis, the Forestry Officer, who accompanied me, remained at this point with the Ranger to ascend into the Kusad Mountain forest. I proceeded onward, passing between the Kusad and Pinnitet mountain groups, came to a halt at Kawariwau Creek in the Upper Takutu River.

Up to within 10 miles of Maiwau Creek (Duck Creek) I saw a few (very few) head of cattle of the company, but they were an excellent lot, having the Hereford strain. The grass was hardly touched in this area.

In the vicinity of the Kawariwau I only saw Indian cattle. There were several Indian settlements (too many to visit on this inspection) in the vicinity of the Kusad, Pinnitet and Raad mountain group; also along the Takutu.

On the 21st I started on my return journey, as the Indians told me that no company's cattle were to be seen beyond that point, except in the vicinity of the Tamatun Mountain foot, and that they were absolutely wild.

On the 22nd, from Maiwau I rode to Sawariwau, to a point about 10 miles below its source. Thence downwards, following the left bank to 5 miles below Mount Dakaban, where I crossed the river and returned to Bon Success on the afternoon of the 23rd at 3 P.M.

Since my last visit of inspection of the company's lease in 1923 there has been a wonderful improvement generally all round. Better horses, better strains of cattle, especially on the left bank Rupununi River. Extensive wiring in of paddocks, improved buildings, more corrals, better organisation and control. Lastly, the good relations existing between the company and the Indians, which did not exist in 1923, due to Captain Muster's idea that he could drive them into the mountains off the savannah.

In my opinion, half of the area on the right bank of the Rupununi River is fully stocked. The latter half practically vacant except for a few hundred head of Indian cattle. And on the left bank Rupununi River a belt along the river 30 by 10 miles is also satisfactorily stocked—about 300 square miles—but beyond that the cattle are very much scattered and lost in the area. If the lot were gathered into one spot, another 50 square miles would be sufficient to hold them.

The pasturage and condition of cattle are far better to the south of the Kanaku Mountain than it is to the north, and, further, the country to the south is more liberally watered.

The Indians (Wapisiana) are more civilised than their sister tribe, the Macusis, to the north, and with very little more help they will be on par or the same social level with the small rancher in the district. Perhaps the Rupununi Development Company might help them by dividing up the control of the company's cattle amongst them, with permission to take milk and an occasional kill. (This will put an end to cattle stealing, and if visited by the staff from time to time to see that they carry out this agreement, the wild animals will all be tamed in a short while.)

The 24th to 25th I was in office attending to correspondence with Head Office, and on the 26th I left Bon Success for Annai, arriving there 6 P.M. on the 28th October.

At Annai I held court on the 29th in its criminal jurisdiction, four cases. On the 30th, in its civil jurisdiction, one case. I attended to further correspondence which arrived at Annai, and on the 31st left Annai for Bon Success.

I have, &c.
E. A. HAYNES,
Land Officer, Rupununi.

5.—*Letter from Mr. B. L. Hart to Mr. Haynes on Experiments in Wheat.*

Good Luck Ranch,
Pirara, May 25, 1931.

Dear Haynes,

The wheat seed arrived to-day, and I will try my best to plant them in a place where it will give a fair test. I am sorry that there was not a sample of oats; to my opinion, oats would be the best, or at least it would be more valuable

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to us than wheat. Corn is another crop that there is room for experiments; of course, we know that corn does well here on the forest land or on savannah land that has been fertilised, such as old corrals, but what we need is better varieties, but, unfortunately, none has arrived in time to plant this season.

Very faithfully yours,
B. L. HART.

6.—*Reports on Experiments in Wheat in the Rupununi District.*

(1) Bon Success. Report on results forwarded.
(2) Rev. Fr. Mather. Report received and forwarded.
(3) B. L. Hart. Absolute failure. Seen by E. A. H.
(4) A. M. Grove. Absolute failure. Reported verbally by Grove.

(Signed) E. A. HAYNES,
Land Officer, Rupununi.

(1)

Experiment at Bon Success.

(*a*) Seed planted on plain, virgin savannah soil, not treated with manure. Land ploughed.

(*b*) Planted the 1st June, 1931. Reaped the 31st August, 1931.

(*c*) Results destroyed by coushi ants and a bug before quite ripe. Ants cur the leaves and stalk. Bug sucked out the milk from the wheat, and only left a few grains on each stalk or none at all.

(*d*) Weight of seed before planting, viz. :—

Kenya Governor 9 ounces net.
Kenya Standard 14 ounces net.
K2R5 (L.2) 7½ ounces net.
B.F$_2$.36.C.1.(c) 10 ounces net.

(*e*) All the wheat came up, but were destroyed as above stated before mature. I had to reap the little I am forwarding to the director about a fortnight too soon, or the bug would have destroyed it. The stalks were strong and stood 18 inches high; samples of bloom sent. The ripe seed compared favourably with the original sample sent.

(*f*) Samples forwarded, A.D.C. seed and bloom. Plot B was totally detroyed by the ants and bugs.

(*g*) The experiment is worth carrying out next year. This can be done in the experimental field at " Marikanota " Forest Island by Major Walker, and again, on the lands at the mountain foot by the Indians. The Kenya Standard appeared to me to be the best of the lot. B.F$_2$.36.C.1.(c) next best. All four samples bore fruit. As a test of the fertility of the land I planted the wheat on: I planted a patch of maize adjacent to it in the same enclosure. The results were very poor. The ears were in the majority small, some of the trees stunted, and the most that one stalk bore was two ears. This leads me to believe that if the wheat had been planted in the bush area belt in the vicinity of the Kanaku Mountain foot we would have had excellent results.

I inspected Mr. Hart's plot; there were at the time about four stalks still alive which had seed. Only a few grains remained in each bloom. The bugs had destroyed them, as at Bon Success. Weeds had also choked out the wheat. He planted his samples in an old corral which had been planted out repeatedly.

Mr. Grove reported similar results; he had planted in the savannah.

Report from Rev. Father Mather attached.

E. A. HAYNES.

September 15, 1931.

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(2)

To the Land Officer,
Rupununi District.

St. Ignatius' Mission, Takutu River,
Rupununi District,
September 12, 1931.

Dear Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the results of the experimental planting of the four samples of wheat :—

1. I regret to say that no success was achieved. Three samples failed owing to weeds; the fourth seemed not to germinate at all.

2. The samples were planted as follows :—

In every case two seeds to each hole; the holes 2 to 3 inches deep and 6 to 8 inches apart, running in rows from north to south.

Soil.—Light, well drained, rather sandy. It was a corral or cattle-pen some ten years ago, was cultivated and planted with maize about six years ago, but has been grass-grown for the past four years.

Situation.—Near our mission house (Takutu). It was weeded and hoed up six inches deep for the wheat planting experiment. A fair quantity of old cow-manure remained in the soil. No top-dressing was applied. The plot was fenced round with barbed wire and netting.

Time of planting, &c., vide infra.

Sample.	Weight.	Planted.	Remarks.
B.F$_2$.36.C.1(*c*)	4 oz.	June 2 and 3	Green shoots appeared in ten days. This sample promised well, showed the sturdiest growth and all the seeds seemed to germinate. Weeds came strongly, and in two and a half months had overshot and stifled the wheat.
K.2.R.5(L.2)	3 oz.	June 4 and 5	No blades appeared above the soil.
Kenya Governor ...	2½ oz.	June 8	Very sparse growth; about 2 per cent. germinated.
Kenya Standard ...	2½ oz.	June 9	Fairly promising at first; about 75 per cent. sprang up, but weeds overtook them, and in one month they were impoverished and soon died.

Weeding was not undertaken after planting for fear of damaging the wheat. The weed—" fowl-foot "—has spreading roots. It is a favourite grass for cattle. The first sample just kept level with the weeds and reached a height of about 2 feet only. The heads failed to ripen. The straws were thin and weak.

Weather Conditions.—During the period 1st June–31st August, 1931 were unfavourable (in my opinion), being unusually wet with very little sunshine. The rainfall was—

May	17·03 inches on 21 days.
June	12·77 inches on 22 days.
July	20·27 inches on 28 days.
August	11·05 inches on 22 days.

H. C. MATHER, S.J.,
St. Ignatius' Mission, Takutu River.

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7.—*Observations on a Journey from the Mouth of the Amazon to Mount Roraima and down the Cattle-Trail to Georgetown.*

BY

J. G. MYERS, D.Sc., F.E.S., F.Z.S.

Imperial Institute of Entomology, and Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture.

(Reprinted from the *Agricultural Journal of British Guiana*, Vol. V, 2, 1934.)

(Extract.)

The Rupununi Savannahs.

By far the predominant grass over the whole of the Rupununi savannahs, both north and south of the Kanuku Mountains, is *Trachypogon plumosus* (Macusi name, Wan-na). The distribution of other grasses and other savannah plants was studied in some detail. Three questions are of special interest to the ecologist and may be considered briefly here.

The first is that of stocking. As Major Bone has already remarked, the whole area is greatly understocked. One may ride for days and see practically no sign of grazing save in the immediate vicinity of corrals and homesteads. This is in marked contrast to the savannahs just across the border in Brazil and the still more extensive llanos of Venezuela, especially in the States of Guarico and Apure. Both the Brazilian and the Venezuelan plains have been stocked for a much longer period than the Rupununi. Save within 10 miles or so of the main affluents of the Orinoco they began with a closely similar vegetation, which has now been very profoundly modified over huge areas, especially in Venezuela. This modification, which is wholly in the direction of deterioration, is probably due less to gross overstocking than to mismanagement leading to overstocking for certain periods and in certain areas. There are now, especially in Venezuela, hundreds of square miles covered almost exclusively with inedible weeds, notably *Hyptis suaveolens* in the drier plains, and *Ipomoea crassicaulis* in the hollows. In the Brazilian campos of the Rio Branco there are similar though less extensive areas of *Sida* sp., a weed which, among others, also takes possession in the Rupununi, but so far only in small holding-paddocks and corrals, which are necessarily periodically overstocked. The Rupununi savannahs as a whole are as yet unspoiled; the vast bulk of their vegetation consisting of a grass, which, while not eminently palatable in its older stages on account of coarseness and toughness, is yet eaten regularly by cattle and must form one of their mainstays. The older settled savannahs of Brazil and Venezuela, however, undoubtedly indicate the changes which may be expected if stocking is increased in the Rupununi anywhere near to capacity without the provision of fences or other means for the correct management and rotation of pastures.

The second question is the much disputed one of burning the savannah. This was an old and traditional custom of the Indians for signalling and other purposes long before European stock was introduced, and has become a regular practice on both Brazilian and Rupununi ranches, with or without the consent and encouragement of the owner or manager. It is a matter of common observation that cattle concentrate from considerable distances on areas which have recently been burned, and graze eagerly on the fresh green growth. So far as one can gather from ecological study, this burning is not modifying and *at least under present conditions of stocking* cannot modify the composition of the savannah vegetation (which is what Clements calls a fire sub-climax)—the elements of which have been accustomed and adapted to periodic burning over a very long period of time. There would probably, under present low stocking, be more scrub and less grass if burning were not practised. It seems therefore unlikely, present conditions of stocking being always understood, that burning is doing any damage in the Rupununi, provided it is done early enough in the season to ensure that there will be sufficient rain coming to prevent the resultant young growth from dying. And at present, without the use of fire, there is not enough grazing to prevent an undesirable accumulation of coarse roughage, to the production of which the dominant grass, *Trachypogon*, particularly tends. There are no entomological grounds for the belief expressed to me more than once that burning destroys natural enemies of ticks and so increases the ear-tick infestation. Burning must probably destroy large numbers of larval ticks, and must thus, as far as it affects the tick problem at all, be considered beneficial.

As Hensel (*Jl. Agric. Res., Vol.* 23, *pp.* 631–643, 1923) remarked, after extensive and well-controlled experiments on Kansas grasslands: " The last word regarding burning has yet to be written. The results secured, as these experiments show, will likely depend not only on seasonal conditions but also upon the kind of grasses and other vegetation present." The results in question showed: (1) That, in the earlier part of the season, there was considerably more growth of grass on the burned areas; (2) after four years there were 21 per cent. more grass plants on the burned areas than when the experiments began, while the unburned areas showed an increase of only 7 per cent.; (3) there was a decrease of sedges on the burned areas, and an increase on the unburned; and (4) weeds decrease on the burned areas, and increased on the unburned. " The conclusion is that studies so far conducted have failed to show that burning is injurious." (Hensel). These remarks apply, of course, solely to the light burning of grassland. Forest fires, on the other hand, are, of course, always and everywhere injurious, but these are rarely deliberate, save in the tiny patches of Indian provision-ground, where the fire is well under control, and is restricted to the felled or partially felled area.

The third question is, what do the cattle actually eat? The application of the direct method in ecology, so successfully used by Dr. Leonard Cockayne in studying the montane tussock grasslands of New Zealand, is valuable here, and was employed by the writer, using as subjects the five pack-bullocks which brought his baggage to the coast. The result of this study will be published in detail, but it may be interesting to remark here that several savannah plants not commonly regarded as pasturage at all are evidently greedily eaten by stock. These include the dwarf shrubs *Byrsonima verbascifolia* (Macusi name, *kenamanarare*), *Byrsonima crassifolia* (*maripati*), and *Palicourea rigida.* The last is specially interesting since Le Cointe, writing of Amazonian pastures, mentions a *Palicourea* among the list of plants poisonous to stock. Chemical investigations would be desirable, but the animals seem to suffer no ill-effects.

The Rupununi savannahs form a biological island, separated in every direction from civilisation by vast forests, formerly only traversed by rivers, offering little chance of passage to introduced insect pests. As a direct result, the cultivated plants of the Rupununi are usually free from pests other than those, little serious, which are already indigenous to the hinterland.(¹) The cattle-trail has pierced this barrier in a small way, and additional traffic from the coast will provide opportunities for pests to reach the Rupununi. It would be eminently desirable to delay this ingress of pests as long as possible, if, as seems probable, it may not be practicable to stop it altogether. Ranchers bringing plants of any kind from the coast would be well-advised to fumigate or spray them before leaving; or else bring only seeds.

Rupununi to Roraima.

In the Rupununi during the month of September it was exceedingly difficult to procure Indians as carriers owing, chiefly, to the prevalence of severe fevers in many of the settlements. When we finally set out, up the left bank of the Ireng, towards Roraima, the first large village, Kurasabai, some 10 miles within the Pakaraima mountains, had just one-third of its total population down with fever, and there had been several deaths. In addition this village, formerly noted for its horses, had recently lost every one of them, apparently from *mal de caderas.* Beyond Kurasabai, right through the Pakaraimas, to Mazaruni Head and Roraima, we met no more fever among the Indians, save an outbreak among my own men, undoubtedly already infected. There were no more requests for quinine until we had left Roraima and were well down in the savannahs again on the Brazilian side.

The route lay very largely through forest—but forests of very varied types—some of the variation being due to widely different original botanical composition and others to extensive burning, resulting in different stages of second-growth succession. Much of the forest in the mountains just north of the Rupununi savannahs might almost be classified as monsoon-forest, with an abundance of such trees as *Ormosia histiophylla, Cochlospermum and Helicteres.* A considerable proportion of the trees in such woods are completely leafless during the dry

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(¹) Karinambo already forms an unfortunate exception to this, in that citrus plants there are seriously plagued with scale-insects attended by ants.

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season. But even when, further north, one traverses almost continuous high tropical rain-forest, different types succeed one another several times in the course of every day's march. In addition to typical mixed rain-forest, there were no fewer than four kinds in which dominance of one species was so nearly absolute that these woods consisted of almost pure stands over considerable areas. Unfortunately the problem of identification is almost insuperable to a traveller, especially as the trees in question were often quite unknown to my Macusis. Among these pure types was mora, which grows in this region in practically pure stands, as in Trinidad, and far more so than in the British Guiana lowlands. In one such stand I measured a fallen mora 152 feet long to where the main branches, still 7 inches thick, had rotted and fallen away. This tree must have been 200 feet high. Another gregarious tree, occupying smaller areas, however, was a species of *Peltogyne* (purpleheart). A third was a lofty tree with tremendously developed buttress roots, in this and other respects resembling closely a New Zealand *Laurelia*. The Patamona name for it is asheroa. A fourth, which covered larger areas than any of the others, showed a curious natural coppice-formation rising from huge elevated composite boles.

There are, however, in addition, extensive savannah lands at intervals *en route*. The most important may be briefly mentioned, in the order in which they are encountered. The Kurasabai savannah is extensive, and is remarkable for a much more varied grass vegetation than the main Rupununi. Among these other grasses are evidently some which form exceptionally good fodder, for I noted "the cattle looked the sleekest and fattest I have seen in the region, with backs reminiscent of Smithfield." Ichilibar savannah is even larger, but in its western portion at least, is very stony and the pasturage sparse and poor. Further north between Ichilibar and Kerikabaru there are several long stretches of upland savannah, and here for the first time the dominance of the main Rupununi grass is disputed by another species (*Paspalum contractum*) which frequently covers large areas almost to the exclusion of other plants. This is a definite loss from the ranching viewpoint, since this grass has a conspicuous flower-head but very scanty leafage. None of the savannahs between here and Roraima is stocked. At Roraima itself the Venezuelan Boundary Commission kept a small herd for beef. From the village of Ipisiau, on the Ireng, until we emerged into the upland savannah at the foot of the Roraima, we traversed almost continuous forest.

The Brazilian Savannahs of the Rio Branco.

The return route from Roraima to the Uraricuera and thence, via Boa Vista to the Rupununi again, traversed savannah country almost entirely. In keeping with the successive changes in elevation and geological structure these savannahs showed a much greater variety of vegetation than those of the Rupununi. As one approached the Uraricuera and the Takutu Rivers, especially the Rio Branco itself, they differed also in being much more heavily stocked; so much so that, as already indicated, there are considerable areas in which pasture deterioration has proceeded to its climax in pure stands of entirely inedible weeds (especially *Sida* and *Ipomœa crassicaulis*). In spite of this the types of cattle and horses throughout the Brazilian savannahs are usually markedly superior to those of the Rupununi.

The Hamilton Rice–Harvard Medical Expedition was very impressed by the wide prevalence of deficiency diseases and digestive troubles among the Brazilians of the Rio Branco savannahs. Thus Hamilton Rice writes that "the deleterious effects of the present ill-balanced, malnutritious dietary are very apparent in the generally adynamic condition of the majority of individuals presenting themselves for medical examination, advice and treatment." The regular diet consists almost exclusively of cassava farine and meat, chiefly in the dried form. I was particularly struck by the great contrast offered by the evident health of the savannah Indians living under very similar conditions and on the same diet—with this difference, that the Indians consume vast quantities cashiri, paiwari, parakari and other fermenting (rather than fermented) drinks, exceedingly rich in yeasts. The "civilisados" largely scorn these concoctions, and at the most drink them only when they visit Indian settlements. Personal experience indicated immediate benefit from these drinks whenever the above diet began to tell on the visitor. It seems eminently probable that their high vitamin content is a great factor in producing and maintaining the incomparably better health of the Indians. *Capsicum* peppers, which form such a regular, and to some palates, excessive feature of Indian diet, have lately been proved exceedingly rich in Vitamin C.

The Kanuku Mountains.

The Kanuku Mountains, which split the Rupununi savannahs into two, are very much less known biologically than Roraima. At their summits, from 2,000 to 2,500 feet, are a few areas of savannah land showing the same vegetation as that which occurs at similar elevations in the Pakaraimas, *e.g.*, just north of Ichilibar.

The most interesting find in the Kanukus, however, was a large "reef" of true wild cacao, shown me by Mr. John Melville. Its presence was first pointed out in this region by Mr. John Ogilvie. It is hoped to study this cacao at a later date, with a view to obtaining data on and perhaps assistance in the biological control of cacao pests. It is curious that unlike the wild cacao examined by the writer on an affluent of the Coppename River in Dutch Guiana several years ago, these Kanuku trees were apparently entirely free from witchbroom disease though belonging to exactly the same uniform type as the Surinaam trees. They were in fact in a highly flourishing condition, but there was evidence that most of the pods were taken by monkeys, which are unusually abundant in these mountains.

The Cattle Trail.

The cattle trail from the Rupununi savannahs to those of the Berbice is a magnificent piece of work. The main problem still connected with it seems to be an entirely ecological one, namely, to grow pasturage in the holding-paddocks *en route*, which, on the one hand, will endure during the dry season periodic heavy stocking and trampling, and, on the other hand, withstand during the whole of the wet season the competition of the forest second-growth. The former is rendered exceptionally difficult by the loose sand which is the predominant soil from Kurupukari downwards. Several of the holding-paddocks were as bare as a sea-beach.

It might be suggested that plants other than grasses and the usual legumes be investigated for feeding qualities and palatability, especially those which form common constituents of second-growth forest on the cattle trail or in other parts of the colony. In New Zealand it is customary in certain districts to tide the dairy cattle over bad times by felling and feeding to them the foliage of some of the forest trees, notably *Griselinia littoralis*, and the introduced willow (*Salix* spp.). On the trail we were informed that where pasture was lacking we could feed the pack-bullocks with trumpet-tree (*Cecropia*) and turu palm (*Oenocarpus*). The former is a common second-growth plant, and it would not be difficult to grow pure stands of it on cleared forest land, where browsing itself would keep it short enough to obviate felling. But we found that only with the greatest difficulty could our pack animals be persuaded to eat either of these plants. Major Bone informs me that considerable patience is necessary to accustom the savannah cattle to this strange food. Under these circumstances, the establishment of grass paddocks is naturally the only course. The pack-bullocks ate young bracken (*Pteridium esculentum*) and several unidentified forest trees more readily than the above two plants.

In conclusion, though this is not the place to acknowledge the assistance freely given by numerous authorities and ranchers on the Brazilian and Venezuelan sides, I should like to express my appreciation and gratitude for the very great and enthusiastic help and courtesies rendered to us by the ranchers of the Rupununi, the Commissioner, Mr. Haynes, the Land Officer, Mr. E. E. Melville, and the Chief and Secretary of the British Boundary Commission. The identification of the grasses was kindly made, or at least confirmed, by Dr. A. S. Hitchcock.

8.—*Notes on the Rupununi District, with especial Reference to Soil Fertility.*

General Position.

The Rupununi district comprises a large tract, yet very few scientific officers have been able to examine it personally; Bone and Myers are the only two who have done so. Summaries of their views and reports are given hereunder.

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Myers, in discussing the Rupununi savannahs, states *inter alia*:—

"The Rupununi savannahs as a whole are as yet unspoiled, the vast bulk of their vegetation consisting of grass, which, while not eminently palatable in its older stages on account of coarseness and toughness, is yet eaten regularly by cattle, and must form one of their mainstays. The older settled savannahs of Brazil and Venezuela, however, undoubtedly indicate the changes which may be expected if stocking is increased in the Rupununi anywhere near to capacity without the provision of fences or other means for the correct management and rotation of pastures. . . . . The Kurasabai savannah is extensive, and is remarkable for a much more varied grass vegetation than the main Rupununi. Among these other grasses are evidently some which form exceptionally good fodder." Later on, however, he states: "In spite of this, the types of cattle and horses throughout the Brazilian savannahs are usually marked superior to those of the Rupununi."

In commenting on the remarks of Myers, Bone states:—

"Dr. Myers concludes that the more varied grazing of the Kurasabai accounts for their superiority, but the superiority is due to breed and not to improved pasture. This is a point which should be stressed—the Rupununi pasture in its present condition can carry animals of improved breed; attempts to improve the pasture can follow."

Bone—Sessional Paper No. 6/31 on "Tour of the Savannahs of the Rupununi District and the Cattle Trail"—states:—

"There could be no better introduction to the savannahs, whether approached by river or trail, than Annai during the month of February. Undulating grassland, surrounded by forest-clad hills and a cool savannah breeze, have an immediate invigorating effect. The view from the police camp, two miles from Annai River landing, is one of great beauty, and later, when it is realised that all the rivers and creeks, of which there are many, abound with fish, and that almost any kind of fruit and vegetable can be easily grown, one is astounded that so very little is known of the attractions of the district by coast residents only 200 miles distant. Nature has endowed Rupununi with necessities and luxuries possessed by few other countries. Its many and great advantages have not been described, whereas any minor disadvantage it possesses has been exaggerated. The climate is healthy, the opportunities for development of savannahs and mountains are many; only capital and settlers are required."

It is obvious that both these writers regard the area entirely from a pasture point of view.

Analyses of Soil Samples.

Numerous soil samples collected by various Government officers have been sent to Georgetown for analysis. The conclusions of the various officers are given hereunder.

Harrison—Combined Court Paper No. 774, "Analytical Examination of Samples of Soils from the Rupununi Savannah District, 1914"—states:—

"The samples sent by the commissioner, if, as he states they are, truly representative of the districts, indicate that by far the largest portion of the area is a coarse sandy soil of low fertility, apparently at present suited only to the production of coarse grasses for pastoral or ranching purposes. Its very unfavourable physical condition does not hold out any hopes of its ready amelioration by ordinary local cultural methods. Where it is traversed by rivers and streams and their banks are subject to flooding, the soils are fertile and produce a 'lush' grass after such flooding. In places there are hollows or shallow depressions in the savannahs, where the soils are of considerable to high fertility, capable of producing many varieties of tropical products; whilst the savannahs are traversed by ridges or so-called 'islands' of land the soil of which, from its physical nature, is of well-marked fertility."

In 1925 Harrison submitted a further memorandum entitled "Compositions of the Samples of Soils collected during the Cattle Trail Survey between the

Berbice River and the Canister Falls, Demerara River," and in it he deals with the Rewa and Rupununi Rivers' soils. In the discussion he states, *inter alia*—

> "Several of the soils, for instance, those of the Rewa River District, Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and those from the Rupununi River District, Nos. 7, 8, 13 and 14, are fluviatile or riparian soils of the colony by well-marked potential fertility. If properly drained and skilfully cultivated these soils should yield satisfactory crops of many tropical agricultural products. Others of them, such as Nos. 2, 4, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 20, are of very low fertility and are for all practical purposes more or less sterile. They doubtless would support a sparse vegetation of coarse savannah grass, shrubs and low trees. . . . . In common with the great majority of soils from the interior of the colony I have examined, these soils are markedly deficient in their content of calcium oxide (lime), and especially of phosphoric anhydride soluble in hydrochloric acid. It is probable that in these sandy soils minute crystals and fragments of highly insoluble phosphatic minerals, such as apatite or monazite, occur, but such resistant minerals could have very little, if any, immediately beneficial effect on the fertility of the soils. I am satisfied that, even in the case of the more fertile of them, it will be absolutely necessary for permanent cultivation to dress the land with phosphatic manures, preferably with slag-phosphate or with substances of similar nature. . . . .
>
> "The sandy soils of the Rupununi savannahs with coarse herbage growing in tussocks, or even when covered by a short growth of soft grass after being flooded in the wet season, offer a more or less precarious sustenance to cattle allowed to roam over their practically unrestricted areas; but as grazing-grounds their value is governed by the depth of the water-table below the soil. Where the water-table is at a comparatively low depth the herbage will be of a better character and more luxurious in growth than it is elsewhere and will retain this character to a varying extent during the dry season."

In 1931, Follett-Smith submitted a report on the laboratory examination of fifteen soil samples from the Rupununi District. His conclusions are as follows:—

> "The laboratory examination of soil samples from the Rupununi District indicates that none of the soils possess a high level of fertility. There are marked deficiencies of lime and available phosphate and in some cases of available potash. The area appears to be better suited to cattle ranching than to the cultivation of marketable crops. It is possible that provisions, vegetables and fruit trees may be grown upon selected areas at the mountain foot and upon the site of the abandoned corrals where the savannah soil has received liberal additions of manure. It would be of great interest to examine representative samples of pasturage collected from different areas upon the savannah."

Bone, in commenting on this, states:—

> "The samples analysed by the chemist-ecologist represent the soils found in various parts of the Rupununi District of limited extent, but it does not appear that a sample typical of the soil of the large savannahs has been sent for analysis."

It appears, therefore, as is usually the case when one officer collects the samples and another examines them, that there is considerable doubt as to whether most of these soil samples are truly representative of the Rupununi. It seemed that Harrison placed greater confidence in the soils collected by Anderson and reported on in his memorandum on the cattle trail. His comments have been quoted in paragraph 7 above.

In addition, we have Harrison's opinion in a memorandum date the 2nd May, 1924, as follows:—

> "Its sole potentiality is ranching . . . . I also enclose a report I made on the examination of certain samples of soils from the Rupununi District in 1914. I sent a copy of this report to Buitenzorg, Java, for criticism by the Dutch tropical soil experts, with the result that the authorities there held that my views were unduly optimistic. They could perceive no agricultural

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future for these Rupununi savannahs soils. . . . . I had examined a large number, over 200, of samples of soils collected by the Cattle Trail Survey party and am preparing a report on them. I have never before examined a series of such hopelessly sterile soils as these are."

Coupled with this there is the evidence of Mr. McTurk given before the West India Royal Commission, which is of interest (Appendix C, Vol. II, Part II, p. 24):—

339. And it is really well suited for cattle?—It is not fit for anything else.

340. It is well suited for cattle?—At times the grass is 6 feet high, and nothing will eat it. The Indians put fire to it, and the deer eat it up as it springs up after the fire. If the cattle were there to tramp that grass down, other and better kinds would thrive. The Para grass only grows near streams, because the other grass chokes it. If the cattle were there to tramp down the long grass, the Para grass would spread.

341. Cattle and forest products are really the only resources which would be gained by opening up the country?—Not only that, it would give access to a country which is undoubted auriferous, and it would open up the country.

342. (Sir David Barbour.) Do you think that the beef produced on the savannahs would be equal to the beef produced in colder climates, North America, for instance?—Oh no, it would only be for home consumption, they might export hides and hoofs and horns. The kind of cattle that grow in this climate would never be able to compete with northern cattle.

Further, Mr. Harvey-Read, when land officer in the Rupununi, in a report dated the 26th May, 1930, stated:—

"Very little agricultural work is carried on in the district. One or two ranchers have 'fields' and grow a little corn and cassava, but never enough even for their own consumption. One rancher has just started experimenting with tobacco."

Numerous samples of pasturage grass from interior have been analysed and the general conclusion is that they are all of inferior quality as regards mineral constituents, such as phosphates and lime, but that Rupununi grasses are slightly superior to those of the Yawakuri savannahs, which, in their turn, are better than those of the Waranama savannahs. The number of pasture grasses taken were as follows:—

Takutu: 2 samples.
Yawakuri: 1 sample.
Waranama: 7 samples. (The results of this were published in *Agricultural Journal*, Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 142–159, 1930.)

It is possible that certain of the riparian lands of the Rupununi district are fairly fertile since a recent report, submitted by the chemist-ecologist on samples of soil collected by the commissioner from Bon Success, indicates that there is a certain area of calcarious (more desirable) soil on the banks of the Tabatinga Creek, Takutu River. It is possible that extended search would reveal other similar areas.

Summary.

Generally speaking, the district is considered to be suited to pastoral pursuits, but is not likely to be agriculturally promising. It is of interest to quote Myers:—

"The Hamilton Rice–Harvard Medical Expedition was very impressed by the wide prevalence of deficiency diseases and digestive troubles among the Brazilians of the Rio Branco savannahs. Thus Hamilton Rice writes that the 'deleterious effects of the present ill-balanced, malnutritious dietary are very apparent in the generally adynamic condition of the majority of individuals presenting themselves for medical examination, advice and treatment.' The regular diet consists almost exclusively of cassava farine and meat, chiefly in the dried form. I was particularly struck by the great contrast offered by the evident health of the savannah Indians, living under very similar conditions and on the same diet—with this difference, that the Indians consume vast quantities of cashiri, paiwari, parakari and other fermenting (rather than fermented) drinks, exceedingly rich in yeasts. The 'civilisados' largely scorn these concoctions, and, at the most, drink them only when they visit Indian settlements. Personal experience indicated immediate benefit from these drinks, whenever the above diet began to tell on the visitor. It seems eminently probable that their high vitamin content is a great factor in producing and maintaining the incomparably better health of the Indians."

If the medical expedition was so impressed by the wide prevalence of deficiency diseases and, if, as Dr. Myers states, the regular diet consists almost exclusively of farine and dried meat, then it is difficult to accept the statement of other visitors that the land is extremely fertile and capable of supporting almost any kind of fruit and vegetable. It must be remembered that few scientific officers have visited the district and that reliable information as to its potentialities is scanty.

(Confidential.)

9.—*Notes by Major T. Bone, Government Veterinary Surgeon.*

Your Excellency,

I have perused the file, and hope that the following notes will be of assistance:—

Seclusion.

1. The district is even more secluded than is stated, and, if necessary, could be entirely shut off from the Rio Branco district by means of patrols.

I have previously given consideration to this matter in case it was rendered necessary by outbreaks of animal disease in Brazil, and in light of experience in other countries with less well defined borders I could see no difficulty.

Communication.

2. At the same time, communication with the Amazon can be made easy.

3. Transport via Manaos to Boa Vista and thence to the Rupununi district should be an easy matter if there were no international complications.

Area.

4. There are 7,000 square miles (estimated) of chief savannahs—personally, I think the area is very much larger. There are also other areas in the mountains suitable for grazing, but at present difficult of access.

Pioneers.

5. I suggest that the first party should be chiefly a pioneer section, made up of carpenters, blacksmiths and similar artificers, but also containing a number of agriculturists or, preferably, pastoralists.

Self-supporting Families.

6. A family should be self-supporting when it has a house, garden, a number of cows, sheep, pigs and poultry.

Under these conditions, Mr. Orella, a rancher, now with the Boundary Commission, estimated the cost of living for a family of four at 10 dollars per month, the expenditure being on coffee, tea, sugar, salt, &c.

If cows, sheep, pigs and poultry are provided for settlers they should be self-supporting in two years, and if improved bulls are supplied they should be in a position to trade for profit in five years.

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Fruits and Vegetables.

7. Fruits and vegetables are grown by the present settlers near the homesteads.

On one of my visits to Dadanawa the supply of bananas was so great they were fed to pigs.

Rice.

8. Mr. Hart grows rice on the savannahs for sale in Brazil.

Tobacco.

9. Tobacco is grown in several places.

Lack of Interest of present Settlers for Agriculture.

10. Generally, the present settlers are not interested in agriculture because there is no market. The cost of transport to the coast under present conditions is prohibitive, and it is easy for them to obtain supplies of corn from Aboriginal Indians by barter.

By this I do not mean that the savannahs are good agricultural country, but rather that, had it been necessary, the settlers could have grown more crops.

Indian Gardens.

11. The gardens of the Aboriginal Indians on the savannahs are small, but apparently supply all the food required—cassava.

Hill Agriculture.

12. The valleys of the hills are fertile, otherwise the Indians would have nothing on which to live and could not use their produce for barter.

The Seven Day Adventist missionaries informed me that they had no difficulty in growing either rice or wheat. When in Georgetown, they were searching for hulling machinery for the use of Indians.

Grouping to avoid clash between Agriculturists and Pastoralists.

13. When and if close settlement is made, the settlers may divide into groups in the mountain valleys engaged mainly in agriculture, and groups on the savannahs growing tobacco or specialising in cattle or sheep.

14. It is noted that highland country is preferable. In many ways this may simplify settlement.

Small groups of settlers might be placed in the hills of the Pakaraima mountains, with grazing lands below, and also in the Kanuku mountains, with grazing on both the north and south sides.

Water Supply.

15. There are rivers and many creeks on the savannahs, and judging by the mountain valleys I penetrated there should be no lack of running water in the hills.

Mineral Deficiency in Human Beings.

16. Phosphorus deficiency: as I pointed out to the late Mr. Montgomery, Adviser on Animal Health, although there was a general phosphorus deficiency it was only in one area that one could definitely say the cattle suffered. This was in Mr. Hart's area. Mr. Hart had there five children, all of whom were well grown and strong. A diet of fish was common.

The Melville families reared on the savannahs are well grown. I saw no sign of mineral deficiency amongst vaqueros and other savannah Indians.

A deposit of lime has been discovered 2 miles from Bon Success.

The savannah Indians consume a tremendous amount of meat. The bones of the many carcases, as I've previously advised, could be burnt and used to provide the deficient phosphorus.

Sheep.

17. Mr. John Melville imported sheep from Brazil, and they did exceedingly well.

On the northern savannah, Mr. Orella imported sheep and had success.

But, for sheep, I think there are better prospects in the hills or about the foothills.

Pigs.

Pigs do well everywhere and forage for themselves.

18. No one has ever imported improved bulls on a commercial basis, nor, unless it has happened since my last visit, has an improved bull been given a fair chance. Yet, where dams have been properly herded the results have been excellent.

Pasture.

The pasture may not be ideal, but without improvement it is capable of carrying improved stock. I saw no pasture in Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa, the Union or South-West Africa to equal that of the Rupununi.

Improvement of Breed of Cattle.

19. For improvement of cattle I strongly recommend the Hereford. The cross will provide ample milk for local requirements, although the Hereford is a purely beef breed.

Cattlemen.

20. *Displacement of Cattlemen.*—I think the Rupununi Company will be glad to go. They have not the necessary capital for development. I do not think any other settler in the district has the necessary capital to develop their holdings. All of them would probably be in a better position if their holdings were one-tenth the size.

Barbed Wire.

21. Barbed wire and bulls are required.

22. It would probably be convenient to group the families in fives, allowing 5 miles per family group.

Close Settlement.

23. Guatemala grass will grow even on Wallaba sand, and its cultivation will allow of close settlement if necessary.

Type of Dwelling.

24. Temporary accommodation for families—the type of house to which they are accustomed is not known. If a plan could be procured these could be easily erected. Mr. Hart has machinery for sawing boards, &c., and a large workshop, but to expedite the work more machinery will be required.

25. *Transport to District.*—There need be no hardship.

1. *Main Base Camp.*—Mazaruni station or Tiger timber camp. I understand that there is no malaria at the timber camp.
2. *Embarkation Camp.*—Bartica, Mazaruni River side.
3. *Rest Camp A.*—At Mr. Pires rest camp (77 M ?).
4. *Rest Camp B.*—Tumatumari.
5. *Embarkation Camp Boat.*—Junction of Potaro and Essequebo Rivers.

Alternative Route.—Wismar base; Rockstone, embarkation point.

6. *Night Rest Camps.*—On Essequebo River, with mid-day halts.
7. *Main Rest Camp.*—Kurupukari.
8. *Advance Base.*—Annai, near river for water supply.

Convenient Advanced Bases.—Yupukari, Bon Success, Bara Bowk (near Whicherbai).

Transport of Settlers.—By river.

Transport of Rations.—By river.

Transport of Heavy Material.—Pack oxen by trail.

26. *Survey.*—1st Northern Savannah in blocks of 5 sq. miles; 2nd Pakaraima Range; 3rd Kanaku Range; 4th Southern Savannah, in blocks; 5th Out-spans and watering places.

27. *Land Required.*—Suggest grouping families in fives and allowing each group 5 sq. miles—this will be governed by water supply.

Allow 10 acres per animal under present conditions, or 64 to the square mile.

28. *Food Supply for Two or Three Years.*—Beef supply available, provided Government takes over all cattle or controls prices.

Rice from the coast.

Pioneer sections working in mountain valleys and selected areas of savannah should be able to supplement or take over supply of rice, corn, cassava, in one and a half years (Section (6)).

29. Home supplies of fruit and vegetables.

The present settlers and Indians, with very little work, can supply their households.

30. *Possible Markets.*—Tobacco has been grown and sold at a profit.

With improved transport facilities, export of sheep to the coast.

With improved beef cattle, West Indies.

Exploitation of hill valleys may reveal agricultural possibilities not yet known.

At the present time settlers can make themselves self-supporting, and can build up herds and flocks for export.

I have, &c.
T. BONE.

August 5, 1934.

10.—*Notes on Rupununi Colonisation.*

Areas Suitable.

Along the left bank of the "Ireng" River as far as where the river enters the "Pakaraima Mountains" within the Pakaraima Mountains in the creek valleys where there are small areas of suitable soil. But personally I think it would be advisable to leave all the country along the upper reaches of the Ireng River, starting from the mouth of the "Yurora Creek" as an Indian reserve.

Along both banks of the "Poiara Creek," except the low lands that flood during the rains. On the rolling lands between the Pirara Creek and the Moco Moco Creek, which is intersected by the Manari Creeks and the Tapatinga Creek. All the higher land between the Moco Moco Creek, the foot of the Kamuka Mountains, and the Takuta River up to the "Yumati Wau" Creek. The large tract of land between the Kanuku Mountains and the Takutu River, through which runs the "Sawari Wau" Creek.

Then along the banks of the Rupununi River, from where it comes out of the mountains, taking in the large area between the Rupununi and the Takutu, and between the Rupununi and the bush line of the Essequebo.

Water.

Throughout the above-mentioned areas there is ample water for stock and domestic purposes along the river and the following creeks, which do not dry out, but which in very dry years do not form running creeks, but form into a series of pools. The Pirara, Mauari, Nappie, Moco Moco, Coumoo, Yumati Wau, Sawari Wau and other creeks of which I do not remember the names. There are certain areas that have ample water for stock, supplied by ponds, but for domestic purposes wells would have to be bored or dug, but these would be comparatively shallow wells.

Soil.

The Rupununi Savannahs consist of large flats (which flood to a depth of from 1 to 4 feet in the rainy season, that is from the 15th May to the 15th September), and rolling high land, getting rougher as you get nearer the mountains.

The flat lands are made of more or less a sandy loam, and, in some places, a rich-looking black loamy soil.

The higher lands are mostly a brown sandy soil, which, with the aid of manure, has been proved to produce quite well.

There is also quite a lot of hilly country, made up of poor grade bauxite gravel very heavily iron stained, on which soil citrus fruits do very well.

Cultivation.

The large flat areas in the Rupununi, that flood over in the rainy season, have never been experimented with to find out whether crops could be grown after the water had taken off, but I see no reason why, with fairly deep ploughing and proper cultivation, it should not be turned into production land.

The rolling lands that are covered with sandpaper tree and other scrub trees, are, as a rule, found to be quite good soil, and, with the help of manure, produce vegetables, greens and fruits very well.

Products to Plant.

The mainstay of the Rupununi, as far as human food is concerned, is "Farinha," which is made from the bitter cassava, and this grows very well on the sandy soil. Sweet potatoes, beans, lettuce, cabbage, corn and all fruit trees do very well.

Stock.

Cattle are, of course, the main thing in the Rupununi, but sheep and chickens also do well, and hogs also thrive well, especially near the ite swamps, of which there are a great many in the Rupununi.

Trades.

Regarding the tanning of hides, there are several kinds of bark which have been tried and found to make very good leather, for which there is quite a good demand for saddlery purposes.

Straw hats made from ite palm is also an industry that should have good results. Carpenters and blacksmiths are also in demand and would be a great aid if the scheme goes through.

Housing.

The type of house mostly used and found to be cool and inexpensive to build is the adobe house with the ite palm roof. This type of house does not take very much lumber, which has always been a difficulty to get in the Rupununi, that is, at a reasonable price.

General Health.

The Rupununi is, in my opinion, the healthiest part of the colony, and in the years I have lived there there has been little or no sickness among the section of the community that have sense enough to take ordinary health precautions, which is just as well, as there is no such thing as a doctor in the district.

Regarding the lack of minerals in the soil, this seems to have no effect on the health of the human element, as I have seen some very healthy families born and raised in the district, and I think that, as far as the cattle are concerned, that *inbreeding* has more to do with the inferiority of some than has the lack of mineral in the soil.

My candid opinion is that the Rupununi district will never be developed any other way than by dividing it into small holdings, putting in a Government stock-breeding farm to improve the stock at present there, and I see no reason why, in the future, provided the settlers are prepared to work, they should not be able to make a comfortable living.

CYRIL C. KING.

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Estimate of Cost of District Administration in Rupununi.

Personal Emoluments.	Dollars.	Dollars.
District commissioner	4,800	
2 assistant district commissioners at 2,400 dollars	4,800	
(1) 4 clerical assistants at 360 dollars	1,440	
Wages—		
(1) (i) Boathands (5)	1,236	
(1) (ii) Temporary boathands	750	
Total personal emoluments		13,026
Other Charges.		
Commuted field, travelling and horse allowance to commissioner at 960 dollars	2,880	
Travelling expenses and subsistence allowance ...	990	
Ration allowance to temporary boat-crew ...	350	
Maintenance and running expense of boats and motors	650	
Uniforms for R.C. boatmen	50	
Miscellaneous	100	
Total other charges		5,020
(2)Special expenditure—		
Purchase of twelve horses...	420	
Total		5,440
		23,486

Total personnel, 12. Approximately, 24,000 dollars = £5,000.

The district commissioner and one assistant commissioner should be specially selected officers.

This estimate is subject to revision in light of discussion with mission which may visit district.

Copy of Memorandum from the Hon. J. Mullin, Commissioner of Lands and Mines, to the Colonial Secretary, dated August 18, 1934.

Subject: *Visit of Inspection to Rupununi District.*

With reference to the attached minute on the above subject,(3) the best and cheapest way would, I think, be via the Demerara River to Canister Falls, where the District Commissioner, Mr. Haynes, could arrange to meet the party with horses and droghers to convey them and their supplies to Kurapukari.

2. From Kurapukari they could go by road to Annai on the Rupununi River, where additional horses (riding and pack animals) could be held in readiness by the District Commissioner for the overland journey to Dadanawa. The heavy baggage, stores, &c., could go to Annai by the District Commissioner's boat.

3. After a look round at Annai the party would proceed on horseback and with pack animals and bullock-cart to Dadanawa, stopping at suitable intervals for excursions about the country. With Dadanawa as a centre, the party could make extensive tours of the southern savannahs.

4. The return journey should be made overland via the Ireng Valley to Kaieteur, as the possibilities for small cultivators in the valleys and on the laterite soils in the forest in this region are of prime importance.

5. A rough time schedule is attached, which indicates that the round trip could be done in sixty-four days. This should be subject to revision by

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(1) These might be Assyrians.

(2) It may not be necessary to purchase any horses.

(3) Not printed.

Mr. Haynes, who should also work out details of the excursions from the various stopping points; but I think it will suffice as a general guide.

6. The estimate of cost, which is also attached, presumes that the Lands and Mines launch, with a boat in tow for men and luggage, will be used for the journey from Wismar to Great Falls, but it must be distinctly understood that the launch and boat will return from that point immediately, as they are required for Lands and Mines and Commissary's work in the Demerara River district.

7. I have allowed for four boys to be taken from the coast, two personal attendants and two boat hands, who have been trained for work with the geologists in measuring lines by cyclometer, collecting specimens, &c. At Kurapukari Mr. Haynes will be able to supply any additional labour required.

8. Indian droghers will be required in the Ireng Valley and on the journey to Kaieteur Foot.

9. On the occasion of Major Bone's first visit to the district with Mr. Haynes, via Essequibo River, the amount paid to Garnet and Co. for boat hire alone was 1,130 dollars.

(Signed) J. MULLIN.

Time Schedule.

	Days.
Outward Journey.	
Georgetown to Wismar	1
Wismar to Mallali—including passing boats through rapids	1
Mallali to Appaparu or Kanaimapoo	1
Appaparu to Great Falls and transferring load over portage	1
Great Falls to Canister Falls (cattle trail)	1
Canister Falls to Kurupukari, by trail	1
At Kurupukari, examining camp site and rearranging loads	1
Kurupukari to Annai by trail—baggage and supplies by boat	3
At Annai, rest and examine surrounding country ...	2
Annai to Kwaimatta	1
Kwaimatta to Pirara (Hart's ranch)	1
At Pirara, examining surrounding country	3
Pirara to Bon Success	1
At Bon Success, visiting surrounding country, mountain foot, &c.	2
Bon Success to Swariwau (Shea village)	1
Swariwau to Dadanawa	1
At Dadanawa, visiting surrounding country—including new gold area	5
Allowance for rest and contingencies	4
	—31
Return Journey.	
Dadanawa to Pirara	3
At Pirara, arranging transport to Ireng Valley ...	2
Pirara to Karassabai	2
Karassabai to Echililar	2
At Echililar, inspecting surrounding country (Wandaik, &c.)	3
Echililar to Puwa and Kurikabaru, &c.	5
At Kurikabaru, inspecting surrounding country ...	2
Kurikabaru to Anandabaru, via Santa Maria ...	2
Anandabaru to Kaieteur	3
	—24
Kaieteur to Georgetown	5
Allowance for rest and contingencies	4
Total	64

Estimate of Cost.

(Subject to revision by District Commissioner.)

	Dollars.
Fares, &c. to Wismar	18·00
Fuel and oil for launch, Wismar to Great Falls and back, and ration allowance for boat's crew ...	56·00
Wages and rations—4 men for 64 days at 1·00 dollar ...	256·00
Hire of horses—10 for 60 days, or purchase and subsequent sale, as may be cheaper	600·00
Vacqueros—4 for 60 days	173·00
Ox waggon and team, Annai to Dadawana and back to Pirara	150·00
Droghers in areas inaccessible to horses—30 men for 15 days at 72 cents per day	405·00
Transport from Kaieteur to Garraway Stream ...	200·00
Contingencies, rations, medical stores, fares, &c. ...	200·00
Total expenses	2,058·00
Subsistence allowances—	
4 officers for 64 days at 2·75 dollars per day ...	702·00
Grand total	2,760·00

Copy of Executive Council Minute dated August 10, 1934.

Settlement of Assyrians in the Rupununi.—The Officer Administering the Government stated that he had asked members to attend this special meeting to consider the proposals set out in the Secretary of State's confidential despatch of the 13th July with regard to settling some thousands of Assyrians at present living in Iraq in British Guiana.

The Colonial Secretary outlined the proposals and pointed out that the Secretary of State is asking for a preliminary reply by telegram as regards the practicability of the scheme and the attitude the people of this colony are likely to adopt towards it.

His Excellency stated that he considered the Rupununi District the most suitable for the proposed settlement, and suggested that an area of about 13,000 square miles (shown on a map before Council) be set aside for this settlement. Access thereto might be by way of the Bartica–Potaro Road to Tumatumari, then by boat to Kurupukari, there joining the existing cattle trail to the Rupununi. An alternative route would be for the ocean steamer bringing the settlers to disembark them at a camp to be built at Wismar, whence they could be conveyed by suitable craft up the Demerara River, but there would have to be a portage at the Great Falls. From Cannister Falls passengers would travel by the Rupununi trail viâ Kurupukari. From the reports available at present, it appeared that tobacco, scientifically grown, might be established in the district as a crop, and that crops of vegetables, &c., can be grown at the foothills of the mountains. He proposed to ask the Secretary of State to approve of a commission, consisting of an agricultural officer, surveyor and the soil chemist, being appointed and despatched to the district, say, a month before Brigadier-General Browne arrives to inspect the area. It seemed to him desirable that some publicity be given to the scheme. The present residents of the Rupununi would then be aware of the proposals before the arrival of the brigadier-general and the commission in the district, and much additional useful information could be collected.

He would be glad of the advice of Council as to whether the people of this colony would be likely to offer any objection to this settlement, and as to whether members of Council were in favour of the matter being discussed in Legislative Council upon a message addressed to the Council followed by a motion.

After discussion, members of Council were unanimously, unreservedly and enthusiastically in favour of the project, and advised that the Secretary of State be informed that it is considered the scheme is a practical one and his approval sought by telegram to the matter being communicated to the Legislative Council with a view to a motion being passed welcoming the proposals in general terms.

They were of opinion that great advantage would accrue to the Colony from the settlement in many directions, *e.g.*, the increase in population, the provision of employment, publicity to the Colony and the money put into circulation. It was suggested that—

(*a*) Every effort be made to secure an equality of the sexes amongst the emigrants (one of the disadvantages of past immigration schemes had been an excessive proportion of males).

(*b*) It is stipulated that Brigadier-General Browne satisfy himself as to the suitablilty of the area for the settlement, especially in view of the fact that there is no possibility of any of the Assyrians being repatriated.

(*c*) It be made a condition that maintenance be provided for the settlers for the first two years after their arrival.

(*d*) Funds be provided for a definite number of years from which to meet all current expenses on services for the settlers, *e.g.*, hospital, police (the proximity of the Brazil boundary will necessitate smuggling prevention measures), prisons, &c.

(*e*) As an alternative route there be considered the desirability of continuing the Potaro Konawaruk trail to and along the left bank of the Essequebo River to join the Rupununi cattle trail and so avoid crossing the Essequebo River twice.

(*f*) Arrangements be made for all settlers to be recently vaccinated against small-pox (and inoculated against enteric to be considered) before arrival in British Guiana.

(*g*) The Surgeon-General consider the reports made by the medical officer attached to the British Guiana–Brazil Boundary Commission engaged in the district.

(*h*) That the Secretary of State be asked to consider sending out a civilian officer with full knowledge of the agricultural requirements and capabilities of the settlers, if it is not considered that Brigadier-General Browne is sufficiently acquainted with their requirements in this respect.

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Rainfall in the Rupununi District, 1928–34 (in inches).

Station.	Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total.
1928—													
Kurupukari	9·49	5·58	4·80	18·16	14·16	14·27	7·61	15·04	2·39	6·77	6·28	4·37	108·92
Great Falls	7·69	6·37	4·53	10·78	15·05	19·46	11·20	10·35	5·95	3·07	1·82	6·34	102·61
Annai Police Station	2·36	2·50	2·76	6·16	15·92	10·77	12·05	8·25	1·47	1·38	3·61	1·50	68·73
1929—													
Kurupukari	1·63	3·87	4·07	13·40	No record	No record	No record	No record	2·38	4·55	5·79	6·71	...
Annai Police Station	0·91	0·75	0·70	3·55	13·67	6·88	16·90	3·67	3·95	0·93	2·41	2·76	57·08
1930—													
Kurupukari	7·85	2·59	1·06	6·30	15·74	16·73	9·45	6·88	4·07	3·90	No record	No record	74·57
Annai Police Station	3·04	0·95	1·88	5·58	10·53	11·61	14·31	2·41	2·40	0·59	Nil	1·38	54·68
1931—													
Kurupukari	2·28	6·58	0·98	9·10	12·14	16·14	24·04	9·04	4·20	0·69	6·79	6·06	98·04
Annai Police Station	1·51	3·55	0·74	7·41	15·85	11·89	18·95	6·53	4·58	3·54	3·13	2·60	80·28
Bon Success ...	No record	1·85	Nil	11·90	16·19	13·06	20·84	10·87	5·46	0·53	3·24	No record	83·94
1932—													
Kurupukari	3·11	3·54	8·59	13·36	18·74	9·94	14·51	13·56	2·99	2·50	1·83	7·61	100·28
Annai Police Station	3·36	2·02	4·30	11·87	14·15	7·71	7·09	5·53	1·35	Nil	Nil	0·35	57·73
Bon Success ...	0·49	0·65	5·40	8·25	9·48	4·70	11·49	7·03	Nil	0·20	No record	Nil	47·69
1933—													
Kurupukari	6·92	4·03	3·68	3·65	14·86	15·56	12·47	7·82	1·86	1·46	12·50	7·12	91·93
Annai Police Station	2·86	2·93	1·96	2·34	13·01	12·19	21·25	7·63	1·91	1·70	8·85	2·23	78·86
Bon Success ...	0·82	1·05	0·52	No record	11·09	19·15	13·04	9·64	5·86	1·43	10·98	0·75	74·33
Isherton	1·21	0·62	4·82	2·00	16·76	16·62	18·03	6·51	5·40	1·86	6·43	0·81	81·07
1934—													
Kurupukari	10·57	3·28	2·66	2·26	15·83	10·65	...	...	...	...	...	...	35·25
Annai Police Station	2·96	0·15	0·86	2·46	4·67	13·90	...	...	...	...	...	...	25·00
Bon Success ...	2·14	0·77	0·10	0·39	5·89	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9·29

NOTE.—Kurupukari is in the intermediate forest belt, which has two rainy seasons and should not be included when calculating the average rainfall of the savannah country.

IDEXED

I.O.
India
MR

munications on this subject
e addressed to—
DER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
following number quoted:—
30804/1/34

P. Z.
6212
1934

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana.

pp 6066.
M.R 28/9

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 12th September

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the other departments concerned.

nial Office, Downing Street,
- October 1934.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 41 11 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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P. Z.
6212
1934

30804/1/34

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 7.0 p.m., 3rd October, 1934.)

No. 233.

On 28th September League of Nations Council approved recommendation of Assyrian Committee that mission should be despatched to investigate possibilities of settlement in Rupununi district. Mission will consist of Brigadier General Browne and Signor Giglioli. Browne is provisionally arranging to sail from Avonmouth on 16th October in S/S "Cavina". It is accordingly desirable that no time should be lost in making necessary preliminary arrangements and you are at liberty to despatch advance party of local experts as soon as you think fit. Please arrange for all expenses of this advanced party to be debited to special account "below the line" entitled say "Assyrian Settlement Suspense Account". There is of course no intention of departing from undertaking given to Legislature that expenditure will be met from external sources. League has provided funds to meet travelling and subsistence of Browne and Giglioli but other expenses incidental and proper to Browne's mission should similarly be debited to the suspense account and will be ultimately repaid.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 41 11 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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NDEXED

India 110

MD

n any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 5933/1/93.
nd address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6066
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
26 Sept., 1934.

pp. 6065.

Reference to previous correspondence: 6036

F.O. letter E5933/1/93 of Sept 24.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To. M. Olivan (League of Nations) 22 Sept.	Assyrian resettlement: British Guiana

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 40 -4 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
27 SEP 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O. W.O.
A.M. Treas.
D.O.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P.Z.
6066
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

September 22, 1934.

SECTION 1.

[E 5933/1/93]

No. 1.

Sir John Simon to M. Oliván, Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1934.

IN your letter of the 11th June last you addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, on behalf of the committee over which you preside, an appeal to reconsider the possibility of settling those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq in territory under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Government, in view of the breakdown of the scheme proposed for their settlement in Brazil.

2. I have the honour to inform you in reply that His Majesty's Government have every desire to facilitate to the best of their ability the important task with which your committee is faced, and have accordingly renewed their efforts to find a suitable destination within the Colonial Empire for the Assyrians of Iraq. In view of the fact that it is a case of finding not merely land which can be made available, but land on which, from the point of view both of physical and economic conditions, the Assyrians can be expected to prosper, and into which they can be introduced without creating new and difficult problems of a political, social or economic order, this is no easy matter.

3. The results of the examination which has been undertaken into the possibilities of settlement in various territories in the Colonial Empire have hitherto, with one exception, been unfavourable. That exception concerns an area in the Rupununi district of British Guiana, where the prospects seem to be *prima facie* such as to justify His Majesty's Government in bringing them to the notice of your committee.

4. The area is an extensive one, and should be sufficiently large to accommodate all the Assyrians who may desire to leave Iraq. At present it is for the most part unsettled. A considerable number of horses and cattle are grazed upon it, and it appears to have possibilities of further development as a stock-raising area. Its agricultural potentialities have not yet been properly tested, but it is thought that limited areas would lend themselves to cultivation sufficiently to meet the requirements of the Assyrian settlers and their stock. Much closer examination will, however, be necessary, with particular regard to considerations of health and climate and to pastoral and agricultural conditions, before the district can definitely be pronounced as suitable for Assyrian settlement, and an independent and impartial investigation conducted on the spot with this object, under the auspices of the League of Nations, appears to His Majesty's Government to be essential, for the satisfaction both of the Council of the League and of the Assyrians themselves, before any decision is reached. The Government of British Guiana estimate that a mission of investigation would require to spend three months in the colony for the proper accomplishment of its task.

5. A memorandum is enclosed giving such details as are immediately available regarding the area in question. The memorandum also discusses possible lines of communication with the area, and gives a general idea of the probable cost of settlement so far as this can at present be estimated.

6. The land concerned is the property of the Government of British Guiana, but certain parts of it are at present leased to private interests. The largest of these interests is the Rupununi Development Company, which holds approximately 1,500 square miles of what is probably the best grazing land. The Government of British Guiana have accordingly taken the necessary steps to secure an option, under which, if the League of Nations decide to proceed with the scheme, the entire assets of the above company could be purchased for the sum of 168,000 dollars, at any time prior to the 20th March, 1935. The assets

include, as the enclosed memorandum shows, not only land leases, but a quantity of cattle, horses and buildings, which should be a useful nucleus for any settlement operation.

7. There are in existence in the area certain well-defined Indian reservations which must be preserved and excluded from the land available for settlement. But these amount to only 855 square miles out of a total of some 13,000 square miles, and they are so situated as not to present, so far as can be foreseen, any likelihood of disturbance of Indians by the settlement of Assyrians in the adjoining areas, or *vice versa*.

8. The suggestion that the Assyrians of Iraq might be settled in the Rupununi district has been laid by the Acting Governor of British Guiana, with the approval of his Executive Council, before the Legislative Council of the Colony, and the Legislative Council on the 21st September unanimously passed the following resolution:—

> "This Council approves the proposal that His Majesty's Government should inform the League of Nations that there is land available in the Colony of British Guiana which appears *prima facie* to be suitable for settlement by the Assyrians, and is of the opinion that, as settlers, these people would be welcomed by the inhabitants of the colony; and agrees that the Government of British Guiana should co-operate in carrying such settlement into effect if it is decided to proceed with the project."

9. Until such time as the new community is successfully established as an integral part of the population of the colony and is in a position to make its due contribution to the general revenue, it will constitute a financial liability. I desire to make it clear that the Government of British Guiana are not in a position to accept any part of this liability. The possibilities of settlement in British Guiana are accordingly placed before your committee at this stage without prejudice to the question of the provision of the necessary finance, which can only be effectively considered when further investigation has proved the scheme to be a feasible one.

10. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance of the Assyrian problem, to which reference was made in your letter of the 11th June, and they are impressed by the great urgency of finding a satisfactory solution for it. They trust, therefore, that your committee will lose no time in taking the necessary steps to institute the independent enquiry in British Guiana which is recommended in paragraph 4 above, and it is scarcely necessary for me to add that His Majesty's Government and the Government of British Guiana will gladly place all obtainable information before any mission which your committee may send out to the colony, and will extend to such a mission all possible facilities and assistance.

I have, &c.
JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum on the Possibilities of Assyrian Settlement in the Rupununi District of British Guiana.

(A)—*General Description of Conditions in the Area from which Land for the Assyrians could be selected.*

Situation.—The region proposed, which is indicated on the attached sketch map, is bounded as follows:—

> On the north by latitude 5° north; on the east by longitude 59° west to latitude 4° north, thence along that latitude to the Rupununi River, thence along the Rupununi, Rewa and Kwitaro Rivers and longitude 59° west to the intersection with latitude 2° north; and on the west by the Brazilian boundary.

Area.—The total area of the region is 13,110 square miles. From this must be deducted certain well-defined Indian reservations, amounting to 855 square miles, which must be preserved for the Indians and excluded from the settlement area. This leaves 12,255 square miles, of which 7,875 square miles are forest and 4,380 square miles open savannahs.

Physical Features.—There are two hilly portions, the Pakaraima and Kanuku Mountains, forest-covered, and rising to heights of 2,000–3,000 feet above sea level. The remainder of the area is open savannahs. These consist for the most part of undulating park land, sloping upwards to the mountains, and of a mean height of 300 feet above sea level. The lower areas flood to a depth of from 1 to 4 feet in the rainy season.

Climate.—The temperature ranges from a maximum of 91·9° F. (33·3° C.) to a mimimum of 71·5° F. (21·9° C.). The nights throughout the year are uniformly cool.

Rainfall and Water Supply.—The rainfall ranges from 55 to 80 inches, two distinct seasons occurring, the wet, May–August, and the dry, September–April (see attached statement).

In the mountain regions rivers and streams give an ample supply of drinkable water all the year round.

In the open savannahs are rivers and creeks, which, when they dry up, leave ponds. There are indications that additional water can probably be obtained by boring shallow wells. Two ranchers have such wells, equipped with windmill pumps, which are understood never to have failed to give an adequate supply of water for domestic and irrigation purposes.

Health.—No detailed report on health conditions is at present available, but the climate in the area is reputed to be healthy.

Existing Population.—Apart from the Indians, for whom, as already indicated, well-defined reservations exist, the population consists of only a few settlers and ranchers. Grazing permits, some of which are annual, have been granted for 3,050 out of the 4,380 square miles of savannah.

The Rupununi Development Company.—The largest holding, which probably also comprises the best grazing land, is that of the Rupununi Development Company. It amounts to over 1,500 square miles, of which the company holds 300 square miles under grazing permits and the remainder on 99-year leases. The Government of British Guiana, considering it essential for the success of any scheme of Assyrian settlement, that this property should be available for inclusion in it, have taken the necessary steps to secure an option under which, if the League of Nations decide to proceed with the scheme, the entire assets of the company could be purchased for the sum of 168,000 dollars at any time prior to the 20th March, 1935. The assets include, in addition to the leases and grazing permits, 47,456 head of cattle, 1,282 horses, 32 miles of fencing, and buildings valued at 13,000 dollars. These assets would form a useful nucleus for the initial equipment of the settlers.

(B)—*Pastoral and Agricultural Prospects.*

Stock Raising.—The savannah area is essentially pastoral, and in addition to cattle and horses, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry are said to thrive. Cattle raising has, however, hitherto been left to private enterprise, and has often been carried out in a rather haphazard manner. The stock is of varying quality. It is reported to be reasonably good. There are, however, signs of phosphatic deficiencies, but any deterioration has probably been accentuated by inbreeding. This should be capable of remedy.

Agriculture.—Few scientific officers have visited the district, and reliable information as to its agricultural potentialities is scanty. It is, however, understood that the river valleys in the mountains are likely to prove the most suitable areas for agricultural settlement. In the savannahs little agricultural activity is at present carried on, except for the immediate needs of the few settlers who have established themselves.

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The principal crops are cassava (which produces farinha, the staple food of the district) and maize. Other crops reported to have been grown are beans, tobacco, dry-land rice, bananas, plantains, pulses, sweet potatoes, lettuce, cabbage and, according to one report, "almost any kind of fruit or vegetable." In the soil of the hilly country citrus fruits (*e.g.*, oranges, limes, grape-fruit) are said to do well. Experiments have been made with wheat, but apparently without success.

Reports of persons who know the district well and who are considered by the Government of British Guiana to be competent to form an opinion are that the Assyrians should have no difficulty in growing sufficient food-stuffs for their own maintenance if settlement is carried out on the basis of small holdings, and that they could build up herds and flocks for sale.

The agricultural possibilities of the savannahs, however, have not yet been properly tested. A certain number of samples of soil have been analysed, and the varying results suggest that, without extensive fertilisation, successful cultivation may be limited to the river valleys (which are, however, numerous). It is considered that these should be satisfactory for the cultivation of the majority of tropical food-stuffs.

The whole situation clearly needs closer investigation, particularly from the point of view of (*a*) the production of cash crops and (*b*) the particular requirements and qualities of the Assyrians.

Should the scheme be proceeded with, it is considered desirable that the settlers should be assisted by the establishment in their area of a stock farm, under the care of an experienced veterinary officer, and an agricultural experimental station.

(C)—*Communications.*

The only regular means of communication with the area at present is the Cattle Trail, which leads from the savannah area south of the Kanuku Mountains to Wismar on the Demerara River. To the west of the Essequibo River there is a motor road which goes in the direction of the area proposed for settlement, but at present ends near the Konawaruk River. Communication by water is somewhat difficult, owing to the fact that the navigation of all the larger rivers is impeded by rapids and waterfalls.

The Government of British Guiana have suggested, however, that arrangements might be made for dealing with parties of 1,000–1,500 persons, arriving at intervals of three or four weeks, on one of the following alternative routes:—

Route 1.—By ocean-going steamer to Wismar on the Demerara River; by river to the Great Falls (fifteen hours) where a transfer from one system of river boats to another would be necessary; by river to Canister Falls (twelve hours); by lorry along the Cattle Trail to Kurupukari; thence by lorry to any point on the savannahs during the months of September to April.

This route would require the establishment of a base camp for 1,500 persons at Wismar, smaller rest camps at Great Falls and Canister Falls, and a distribution camp at Kurupukari.

Route 2.—Involves the extension of the Bartica–Potaro–Konawaruk road in one of the following directions: (*a*) to Mowasi Landing on the Essequibo River, or some more suitable point higher up the river, and thence to a point on the Cattle Trail north of Kurupukari (the Essequibo River to be crossed by punt); (*b*) southward to a point just north of the junction of the Siparuni and Burro-Burro Rivers, thence southward to a point on the Cattle Trail south of Kurupukari (the Siparuni River to be crossed by punt or bridge).

Each of these extensions would be approximately 50 miles in length, and present information suggests that extension (*b*) would be the better.

The stages of the route would be as follows: by ocean steamer to Bartica on the Essequibo River; thence by motor lorry to Kurupukari. A base camp for 1,500 persons would be required at Bartica, rest camps at Garraway Stream and at some point intermediate between Garraway Stream and Kurupukari, and a distribution camp at Kurupukari.

The camps on this route would cost approximately the same amount as is estimated if the Demerara route were used, but no river transport would have to be provided, and the conversion of the Cattle Trail between Canister Falls and Kurupukari into a motor road would be unnecessary. All the work done, and

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [113r] (236/1206)

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the money spent, on the opening up of this route would be of lasting benefit. A permanent and dependable route to and from the district would be set up, and it might be economically the better policy to establish it at the outset, even at the greater cost, in preference to spending money on the Demerara route, which would be of no permanent advantage.

(D)—*Cost of Settlement.*

It would be out of place to attempt at this stage any close estimate of the cost of settlement, but the following factors in the probable expenditure involved may be mentioned. The cost of ocean transport would presumably not vary greatly from that contemplated in the Brazilian scheme (£120,000 for 10,000 persons). The cost of actual settlement in British Guiana will depend, in the first place, on the choice between the alternative routes described in the preceding section. The estimated cost of the establishment of camps on whichever route might be selected, and the provision at each camp of the necessary services and medical supplies is about 6,000 dollars (£1,250). In the event of Route 1 being chosen, the cost of providing the necessary river transport is estimated at not less than 7,000 dollars (say, £1,450), while the estimated cost of converting the Cattle Trail from Canister Falls to Kurupukari into a road suitable for motor vehicles is approximately 23,000 dollars (say, £4,800). If, on the other hand, Route 2 were chosen, the cost of the necessary road extension would, subject to close survey and on the basis of previous experience of road-making in the interior of the colony, probably be in the region of 150,000 dollars (£31,250).

The purchase of the assets of the Rupununi Development Company, if the option is exercised, will cost 168,000 dollars (£35,000). It is impossible to say at present what further outlay might be required for the provision of additional land, stock, buildings, seed and implements. Food will have to be provided during settlement, and, in the opinion of the Government of British Guiana, for the first two years after settlement, during which time the settlers should be becoming more and more self-supporting. An estimate, based on the cost, including transport, of the usual Government ration, is that the cost of food would be approximately £60 for a family of five persons for the first year, due allowance being made for the fact that some of the settlers, at all events, will possess cattle and will be able to catch fish, with which the rivers abound. The estimated cost of maintenance during the second year after settlement, when ground provisions, rice and other quick-growing food-stuffs become available in the district, is half that of the first year, *i.e.*, about £30 a family.

In addition to the expense of establishing the proposed stock farm and agricultural experimental station, funds would presumably be necessary for the provision of medical facilities, schools, churches, &c.

It is suggested that the administration of the area and of the settlers should form an integral part of the district administration of the colony. The cost of the necessary extra personnel would be about £5,000 a year.

September 1934.

Rainfall in the Rupununi District, 1928–34 (in inches).

Station.	Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.	July.	August.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total.
1928—													
Kurupukari	9·49	5·58	4·80	18·16	14·16	14·27	7·61	15·04	2·39	6·77	6·28	4·37	108·92
Great Falls	7·69	6·37	4·53	10·78	15·05	19·46	11·20	10·35	5·95	3·07	1·82	6·34	102·61
Annai Police Station	2·36	2·50	2·76	6·16	15·92	10·77	12·05	8·25	1·47	1·38	3·61	1·50	68·73
1929—													
Kurupukari	1·63	3·87	4·07	13·40	No record	No record	No record	No record	2·38	4·55	5·79	6·71	...
Annai Police Station	0·91	0·75	0·70	3·55	13·67	6·88	16·90	3·67	3·95	0·93	2·41	2·76	57·08
1930—													
Kurupukari	7·85	2·59	1·06	6·30	15·74	16·73	9·45	6·88	4·07	3·90	No record	No record	74·57
Annai Police Station	3·04	0·95	1·88	5·58	10·53	11·61	14·31	2·41	2·40	0·59	Nil	1·38	54·68
1931—													
Kurupukari	2·28	6·58	0·98	9·10	12·14	16·14	24·04	9·04	4·20	0·69	6·79	6·06	98·04
Annai Police Station	1·51	3·55	0·74	7·41	15·85	11·89	18·95	6·53	4·58	3·54	3·13	2·60	80·28
Bon Success ...	No record	1·85	Nil	11·90	16·19	13·06	20·84	10·87	5·46	0·53	3·24	No record	83·94
1932—													
Kurupukari	3·11	3·54	8·59	13·36	18·74	9·94	14·51	13·56	2·99	2·50	1·83	7·61	100·28
Annai Police Station	3·36	2·02	4·30	11·87	14·15	7·71	7·09	5·53	1·35	Nil	Nil	0·35	57·73
Bon Success ...	0·49	0·65	5·40	8·25	9·48	4·70	11·49	7·03	Nil	0·20	No record	Nil	47·69
1933—													
Kurupukari	6·92	4·03	3·68	3·65	14·86	15·56	12·47	7·82	1·86	1·46	12·50	7·12	91·93
Annai Police Station	2·86	2·93	1·96	2·34	13·01	12·19	21·25	7·63	1·91	1·70	8·85	2·23	78·86
Bon Success ...	0·82	1·05	0·52	No record	11·09	19·15	13·04	9·64	5·86	1·43	10·98	0·75	74·33
Isherton	1·21	0·62	4·82	2·00	16·76	16·62	18·03	6·51	5·40	1·86	6·43	0·81	81·07
1934—													
Kurupukari	10·57	3·28	2·66	2·26	15·83	10·65	...	...	...	...	...	...	35·25
Annai Police Station	2·96	0·15	0·86	2·46	4·67	13·90	...	...	...	...	...	...	25·00
Bon Success ...	2·14	0·77	0·10	0·39	5·89	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	9·29

NOTE.—Kurupukari is in the intermediate forest belt, which has two rainy seasons and should not be included when calculating the average rainfall of the savannah country.

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'Sketch map of British Guiana showing area suggested for Assyrian settlement'

[114r] (1/2)

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
SKETCH MAP OF BRITISH GUIANA
Showing area suggested for Assyrian settlement.
Scale (Approx.)
0 10 20 30 40 50 100 Miles
61° 60° 59° 58° 57°W.
9° 8° 7° 6° 5° 4° 3° 2° 1° N.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
VENEZUELA
BRAZIL
DUTCH GUIANA
GEORGETOWN
Cuyuni R.
Bartica
Mazaruni R.
Rockstone
Wismar
TIBOKU FALLS
PAKARAIMA MOUNTAINS
Potaro R.
Garraway Stream
Tumatumari
Konawaruk R.
Demerara R.
GREAT FALLS
Mowasi Landing
Siparuni
Kurupukari
Essequibo R.
CANISTER FALLS
Burro Burro R.
Berbice R.
Iéng R.
Annai
Rupununi R.
Yupukarri
Rewa R.
Takutu R.
Bon Success
KANUKU MTS
Kwitaro R.
Dadanawa
RUPUNUNI DISTRICT
Rupununi R.
Rio Branco
Boundary
Railways
Roads
" proposed
"The Cattle Trail"
Savannahs
Proposed Area
Indian Reservations

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India

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CONFIDENTIAL

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E6004/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6065
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
26 Sept., 1934.

pp
6036

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 5933/1/93 of Sept 24.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva Tels Nos. 84 and 85 25 Sept.	Assyrians: British Guiana

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 40 -4 OCT 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O. D.O.
A.M. Treas.
W.O.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P.Z.
6065
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. His Majesty's Consul (Geneva).
25th September, 1934.

D. 1.50 p.m. 25th September, 1934.

R. 3.00 p.m. 25th September, 1934.

No. 84. L.N. (R).

....

Following from Mr. Strang:

Assyrian Committee on September 24th considered the letter of September 22nd regarding British Guiana and subject to Council's approval of expense involved agreed in principle to send out mission of investigation at the earliest possible moment composed of Brigadier Brown if he is willing (as to which United Kingdom representative is approaching him direct) and non-British agricultural expert to be nominated after further consideration of possible candidates.

Suggestion that medical expert be added was deprecated on ground of expense by president of committee who expressed confidence that local British medical service would give every assistance and provide sufficient material for members of mission to form reliable opinion on health conditions.

Committee also had under consideration note from French Government concerning possibility of settlement in French West Africa within bend of River Niger. Note which is somewhat vague recognises risk that Assyrians may fail to adapt themselves to the climate and labour conditions and suggests mission of investigation to be followed if its report were favourable by experimental installation of a few families upon conclusive success of which any large scale settlement would be conditional. Committee evidently felt considerable doubt whether project was worthy of pursuing at all and asked French representative for further details before even considering despatch of mission of investigation.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 84, repeated to Bagdad.

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P.Z.
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1934

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. His Majesty's Consul. (Geneva).
September 25th. 1934.

D. 1.50.p.m. September 25th. 1934.

R. 3.00.p.m. September 25th. 1934.

No. 85. LN.

-------oOo-------

My immediately preceding telegram, paragraph 1.

Following ~~for~~ from Mr. Strang:

Proposal was made that mission should include both agricultural expert and medical expert in addition to Brigadier Brown and that to meet objection on the score of expense administrations of French or Dutch Guiana or Government of Venezuela should be asked to provide candidates. In view of known aversion of Colonial Office United Kingdom representative did not encourage this idea but it may be revived and it is difficult to resist.

Moreover opposition on our part seems scarcely compatible with policy of leaving entire responsibility of investigation to the League.

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 5933/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
6036
1934

India

PZ
25/9

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
24 Sept., 1934.

pp 5945.

17/16

Reference to previous correspondence :

✓

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
M. Representative Bagdad Tel no 168 of 22 Sept. — o Geneva Tel no 85 of 22 Sept.	Assyrian resettlement: British Guiana

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 39 27 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
25 SEP 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O. W.O.
H.M. Treas.
D.O.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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(E.5933/1/93.)

To IRAQ.

Code telegram to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes, (Bagdad),
Foreign Office, 22nd September, 1934, 1.20 p.m.
No.168. (R).

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No.163 (of September 5th) and Geneva telegram No.68 to Foreign Office (of September 14th, Assyrian question).

Option has now been secured and concurrence of local legislative council obtained in proposal to lay possibilities of settlement in British Guiana before League of Nations.

Memorandum containing all information at present available regarding area proposed and possible lines of communication and approximate estimates of various items of expenditure involved will accordingly be communicated to President of Assyrian Committee on September 24th under covering letter dated September 22nd stating that prospects seem prima facie such as to justify His Majesty's Government in bringing them to the notice of the Committee, but that much closer examination of the extensive area suggested (13,000 square miles) will be necessary before it can be definitely pronounced as suitable for Assyrian settlement. Letter expresses view that for satisfaction both of Council of the League and of Assyrians independent and impartial investigation under the auspices of the League of Nations is essential before any decision is reached. It is estimated that such investigation would take three months.

Copies of memorandum and provisional draft of covering letter went to you on September 21st by air mail. Paragraph 8 of covering letter should now be completed as follows:

Begins -

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(Begins:) and the Legislative Council on September 21st unanimously passed the following resolution:- "This "Council approves the proposal that His Majesty's Government should inform the League of Nations that there is "land available in the colony of British Guiana which "appears prima facie to be suitable for settlement by the "Assyrians, and is of the opinion that as settlers these "people would be welcomed by the inhabitants of the colony; "and agrees that the Government of British Guiana should co-"operate in carrying such settlement into effect if it is "decided to proceed with the project." (Ends).

You should transmit copies of memorandum and of covering letter amended as above to Iraqi Government as soon as possible. Meanwhile, you may at once communicate to them substance of this telegram explaining that negotiations for option and desirability of ascertaining views of Legislative Council of British Guiana have made it impossible for His Majesty's Government to make earlier statement regarding project as they would otherwise have wished to do.

Addressed to Bagdad No. 168; repeated to Geneva No. 84.

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(E.5933/1/93).

To SWITZERLAND.

Code telegram to His Majesty's Consul (Geneva).

Foreign Office, September 22nd 1934. 12.10 p.m.

No.85. (R).

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

IMMEDIATE.

Following for Mr. Strang:-

My telegram No.168 to Bagdad (of September 22nd. Assyrian question).

Please make suitable communication to Nuri Pasha, if possible, before he leaves Geneva tonight.

Addressed to Geneva No.85, repeated to Bagdad No.169.

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1934

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 5748/1/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
Sept 19, 1934.

P 5849 17/16

Reference to previous correspondence:
F.O. letter
E 5457/1/93
Sep. 1.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
gue of Nations C/min A50/62 Sep. 4.	Assyrian situation in Iraq

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 39 27 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

INDIA OFFICE
20 SEP 1934
MAILS BRANCH

Similar letter sent to WO
Do
Am

14—6130 10292 (2)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Committee for the
Settlement of
the Assyrians of Iraq.

P. Z.
5945
1934

C/Min.Ass/62.

Geneva, September 7th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter, dated September 6th, 1934, transmitting two Reports for the month of July 1934 addressed to him by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, September 6th, 1934.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to my letter No.581 dated 17th August 1934 (C.Min.Ass.55), I have the honour to send you herewith two reports (A and B) regarding the Assyrian situation in Iraq, for the month of July 1934.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) M.Shabandar,

for Head of the Permanent Delegation.

REPORT - A

(July 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS.

The security was perfect. The police continued patrolling between the Assyrian villages. Not the slightest incident occurred during the month of July. The police posts were the same as mentioned in the previous report. The guarantees taken from the heads of the neighbouring villages were maintained as before. The number of rifles in possession of the Assyrians remained the same as during the previous month.

REPORT - B

(July 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE ASSYRIAN FAMILIES.

Shaikhan:

The supply of agricultural instruments to the Assyrians

P.T.O.

was completed. These Assyrians are now busy with the transport of the crops to their villages. The amount paid for the agricultural instruments in question was I.D.40/435.

Dohuk:

The following sums were distributed to the Assyrians of Dohuk in order to meet their needs:

	Dinars
To the Assyrians in the villages of Hijarki, Rakawa, Hajsana, Kariban, Garmawa, Mahammad Aga, for the purchase of agricultural instruments	68/150
To the bishop Sarkis at Hajsana for personal assistance	5
	73/150

The sum of I.D.703/250 was spent during the month of July 1934 on the maintenance of Assyrians, including those in the Mosul camp.

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India

Io.

Mr Clay

P.Z.
5849
1934

Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject: Proposed settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana

PZ 5748

17/16

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~*to*~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 6th September, 1934

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Foreign Office
Treasury
Air Ministry
War Office
Dominions Office

MAILS BRANCH
13 SEP 1934
INDIA OFFICE

olonial Office, Downing Street,
2th September, 1934.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 38 . 20 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

1188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & Sp Gp 112

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1934

TELEGRAM from the O.A.G. of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 6 September 1934. Received 8.30 p.m. 6 September 1934.

No.185.Confidential.Your telegram No.207 Confidential.

In anticipation of request for earlier meeting of the Legislative Council than the 25th September I have (?group omitted) Legislative Council in session and I am adjourning meeting from week to week. This is in order to avoid any suspicion which might perhaps be caused by (corrupt group) calling special meeting without giving a reason. It will therefore be simple matter to arrange for the Legislative Council to meet 21st September in the ordinary course, but it will be necessary to convene Executive Council the day before to consider message to the Council an opportunity for which I have undertaken to give. I shall be glad therefore if you can approve draft of message sent to Parkinson or telegraph full text of message in the form you would wish it presented to the Legislative Council. I suggest ~~/~~ that Resolution following message might be as follows.

Be it resolved with reference to the message X this Council approves of proposal to settle Assyrians in British Guiana and is of the opinion that as settlers these people will be welcomed by the people of the Colony".

I am anxious to have option agreement executed prior to meeting of Legislative Council and arrangements are being made which I trust will obtain this. Until this is done the risk of Directors of the Company refusing to execute document on (?group omitted) pretext or other must not be ignored. This is now however only a possibility as I gather that on the whole the Company are satisfied at getting out on terms agreed upon but it needs very little to upset these arrangements. I will endeavour to have Resolution passed on the 21st but I anticipate that Unofficial Members may desire to talk. I can of course explain necessity to adopt Resolution that day in order that you may have text of it by the morning of the 22nd. I will offer further opportunity for fuller discussion of proposal.

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Telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 7th September, 1934. Received 11-35 pm 7th September.

No. 190 Confidential.

Assyrians. Shareholders of Rupununi Company at meeting held on 6th September agreed unanimously to terms of agreement.

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1934

30804/1/34.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 3.45 p.m., 11th September, 1934.)

No. 217.

Confidential.

Your telegram of 6th September No. 185. I regret inconvenience caused by exigencies of coordinating announcements at Geneva and in Colony and I much appreciate steps you are taking to deal with the situation. I trust that members of Legislative Council will appreciate urgency and that it will be possible to get Resolution adopted on 21st. If however it appears that attempt to do so would prejudice proper consideration in Council and successful issue I must leave matter to your discretion. You are at liberty to explain to members that it is important for His Majesty's Government to have immediate indication of views of Legislative Council as Assyrian question has to be discussed during forthcoming session of Council of League of Nations.

Main lines of your draft message suitable but owing to difficulty of indicating detailed amendments I have thought it desirable to telegraph in extenso following revised text prepared in consultation with Foreign Office. Begins. I have the honour to inform the Council that I have received from the Secretary of State a despatch enquiring as to the possibility of settling in British Guiana certain Assyrians at present living in Iraq.

2. The necessity of resettling these people has arisen in the following manner. The Assyrians are a

Christian

Christian community in a Moslem country. Some of them are Presbyterians, but, generally speaking, they belong to that branch of the Assyro-Chaldean race which constitutes the Nestorian Church. Before the war they lived for the most part in the highlands of Turkish Kurdistan. When Turkey entered the war, they were in a difficult position, and eventually they took up arms against Turkey in co-operation with Russia. On the collapse of the Russian forces, they were obliged to retire fighting through Persia, and eventually, with the assistance of British forces, they found refuge with their families in Iraq, where they were kept for a considerable time in refugee camps at the expense of His Majesty's Government. Attempts were made after the cessation of hostilities to repatriate them to their homelands, but those who returned were eventually again driven out by the Turks. An effort was then made by His Majesty's Government to secure in the Peace Settlement with Turkey that the Turco-Iraq frontier should be so drawn as to include within Iraq the old homelands of the Assyrians, but it was found impossible to obtain acceptance of this by the Turks. The present frontier as drawn by the League Council, to whom the final settlement was left, leaves the former Assyrian home in Turkey. Consequently the task had to be faced of settling the Assyrians in Iraq. It was a task of extreme delicacy, not only on account of racial and religious difficulties, but also because the necessary land to settle Assyrians in a compact community as they themselves would have preferred could not be made available without creating a serious political problem. Considerable progress was however made with settling the Assyrians in various parts of northern Iraq,

and

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and employment was found for them in an increasing degree in the Iraq Levies, a British military auxiliary force. But as the time approached for the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq, the Assyrians became apprehensive about their future position in the country, and made it clear that unless this could be safeguarded by settlement in a compact and organised community, they would prefer to leave Iraq for some other country. They petitioned the League of Nations in this sense and the position was considered by the Council of the League in December, 1932. The upshot was that the Council approved of a further attempt being made by the Iraqi Government to settle the landless Assyrians under suitable conditions, leaving the question of settlement outside Iraq for subsequent consideration, should the attempt be unsuccessful. Unfortunately, mainly owing to local political and religious difficulties inherent in the situation in Iraq, the attempt was unsuccessful, and only resulted in increasing friction, which in August, 1933 culminated in disorders in which the Assyrians suffered serious losses of life and property. In consequence the matter came once more before the Council of the League, who decided in October last that the only practical course was to facilitate the emigration to some other country of those Assyrians who desired to leave Iraq.

3. Investigations as to possible destinations began at once, and for some time it was hoped that settlement might be effected in Brazil on the property of a British company, Parana Plantations Limited. Unhappily, when negotiations were reaching a head, the Brazilian Constituent Assembly adopted a measure restricting immigration from foreign countries in general in a manner which made it impossible to proceed with the scheme.

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4. Owing to the unfavourable economic and social conditions prevailing generally throughout the world at the present time, it is a matter of great difficulty to find a suitable alternative. The Assyrian problem however, both on humanitarian and on political grounds urgently demands a solution. His Majesty's Government are most anxious to facilitate such a solution if practicable, and have made enquiries in several colonies, including British Guiana.

5. It has been suggested that the savannah country of the Rupununi district is deserving of special consideration in this connection, as sufficient suitable areas of Crown lands could be made available on which the Assyrians could be settled as a self-supporting community. I have caused a careful investigation to be made into this matter, and have laid it before my Executive Council.

6. From the point of view of development and colonisation, it seems likely that the Assyrians would be an asset to the colony as they are reputed to possess many qualities which mark them out as potentially successful settlers. They are not nomads. Neither are they town dwellers, but are an industrious and hardy people, accustomed to simple conditions of life. Owing to a similarity of name, there is often a tendency to confuse the Assyrians with the Syrians, but in fact they are quite different in origin, as well as in habits, mentality and occupation from the Syrian traders to be found in many British colonies. The Assyrians are occupied mainly in pastoral and agricultural pursuits, though their numbers include also craftsmen whose trades are essential to self-supporting village life. Very many of them have served, and some are still serving as soldiers in the Iraq levies, and the numerous British officers who have commanded them in the Levies have always spoken of

their

their courage, discipline and loyalty in the highest terms.

7. The total number of Assyrians in Iraq is estimated at 20,000, and it is difficult to estimate precisely the proportion of this number who will when the time comes wish to leave Iraq. The Committee of the Council of the League which is dealing with this matter has hitherto proceeded on the assumption that a minimum of 10,000 will have to be provided for.

8. The Secretary of State has intimated that if the settlement of the Assyrians in British Guiana is proceeded with, this Government would in no circumstances be required to undertake any financial liability in the matter until such time as the new community was fully established and in a position to take its share as an integral part of the population of the colony by making its due contribution to the general revenue. The cost of settlement would therefore be met from external sources, though it is impossible to indicate at present the manner in which the scheme would be financed, as the whole question is in the hands of the League of Nations.

9. The probable effect on the local labour market has been considered, and it is not anticipated that the influx of the Assyrians would have any adverse effect on the employment statistics of the people of this colony.

10. If the possibilities of settlement in British Guiana are placed before the Council of the League of Nations, the Council will no doubt think it necessary that investigations should in the first place be made on the spot by a League commission, composed of persons familiar with the requirements of the Assyrians to report whether, having regard more particularly to health and agricultural conditions the

Assyrians

Assyrians can be expected to thrive in the area in question, and whether the proposed scheme of settlement would afford a satisfactory solution of the problem. Such a report would, no doubt, be necessary to satisfy both the Council of the League of Nations and the Assyrians themselves, whose emigration from Iraq is to be absolutely voluntary, and whom it would therefore be necessary to satisfy that they would have a reasonable prospect of successful settlement in congenial conditions, since there can be no question of repatriation to Iraq.

11. It is desirable, if the scheme is approved, that the first batch of settlers should leave Iraq as early as possible in 1935.

12. My executive Council is unanimously in favour of His Majesty's Government informing the League of Nations that there is land available in British Guiana which appears prima facie to be suitable for settlement by the Assyrians, and considers that this Government should cooperate in carrying such settlement into effect if it is decided to proceed with the project.

13. In this message I have outlined the broad aspects of the scheme only. There are certain details of an administrative nature which will of necessity have to be left to this Government. I invite the Council to approve of a resolution being transmitted to the Secretary of State in the sense indicated in paragraph 12 above. Ends.

Text of draft resolution should be amended as follows

(1) for "Settle Assyrians in British Guiana" substitute "that His Majesty's Government should inform League of Nations that there is land available in British Guiana which appears prima facie to be suitable for settlement by the Assyrians".

(2)

(2) for "will" substitute "would".

(3) at end add "and agrees that the British Guiana Government should cooperate in carrying such settlement into effect if it is decided to proceed with the project".

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P.Z.
5849
1934

30804/1/34.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 4.20 p.m., 11th September, 1934.)

No.218. Confidential.

My telegram No.217.

I appreciate that in course of debate advantages of scheme from the point of view of development of Colony will undoubtedly be alluded to, but I should not wish this to be officially stressed in public in view of possible reactions on other nations who may be invited by League to contribute to a settlement fund.

Should it be necessary to say more as regards finance than in paragraph 8 of revised message you should bear in mind that His Majesty's Government are concerned primarily as a member of the League Council. They have informed the League that they are willing to pay their share of a League contribution to a settlement fund but that they can only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme.

If question is raised you should make it quite clear that the fact of such contribution being made would bear no relation whatever to the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in connection with the domestic financial situation of British Guiana. These two matters must be kept entirely separate.

When you report result of debate in Legislative Council please let me know numbers of unofficials voting for and against.

90.

India

INDEXED

P. Z.
5748
1934

ommunications on this subject
d be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
he following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana.

pp. 5640.

5612 17/1

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 30th August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Treas., F.O., A.M., D.O. & W.O.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 37 13 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

lonial Office, Downing Street,
8 SEP 1934.

MAILS BRANCH
7 SEP 1934
INDIA OFFICE

(1188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & SP Gp 112

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P. Z.
5748
1934

30804/1/34.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 8.0 p.m. 5th September, 1934)

No. 207.

Confidential.

Your telegram of 29th August No. 180. Steps are being taken which it is hoped will lead to postponement of Assyrian question at Geneva till after 20th September but most difficult if not impossible to defer announcement till after 25th. In view of desirability of consulting Legislative Council first would it be possible to convene meeting on 21st and so telegraph text of resolution same day?

Your despatch 20th August just received.

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INDEXED

(3)

India

n any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 5475/1/93.
nd address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
'The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
5640
1934

4/9

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
31 Sept, 1934.

PZ 5612 — M.D. 3/9

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O letter E 4158/1/93 of July 2.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C/Min.Ass./55 20 Aug.	Assyrian situation

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 36 6 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
3 SEP 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 10292 (2)

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P. Z.
5640
1934

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

unicated to the Committee
the Settlement of the
yrians of Iraq.

C./Min.Ass/55.

Geneva, August 20th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter, dated August 17th, 1934, transmitting three Reports for the months of May and June 1934 addressed to him by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, August 17th, 1934.

To the Secretary-General.

Referring to my letter No.441 of June 19th, 1934, (C.Min.Ass.44), I have the honour to send you herewith enclosed 3 reports (A, B, C) concerning the Assyrian situation in Iraq, for the months of May and June 1934.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) M. SHABANDAR.

for Head of the Permanent Delegation.

REPORT A

(May and June 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS.

Nothing new happened during the months of May and June 1934.

Security and tranquility were perfect in all the Assyrian villages. The police continued patrolling between them, and the guarantees taken from the heads of the neighbouring villages were maintained as before. The number of rifles in possession of the Assyrians has remained the same as mentioned in the previous reports. In addition, 4 rifles were given to the village of Bibos Sufla and Qasrun and 3 to the village of Nassriah in the Shaikhan Qadha, for the use of the Assyrians when they go out farming.

The Ashuti tribe has left Shaikhan for the summer pasturage in Amadiah in mid-May. 20 policemen under a sergeant accompanied them till they reached the summer quarters in safety.

The following Assyrian villages were in possession of police posts at the end of June 1934:

Qadha:	Village:
Shaikhan	Ain Hilwa
	Baibus Ulya
	Taftyan
	Birozawa
	Bibos Sufa (2 policemen are sent here every night)
	Dirstek " " "
Dohuk	Kori Kafan
	Bakir Sufla
	Mijilmakht
	Khershana
Amadiyah	Biri
	Daudiya
	Cham Sheriti
	Chelki
	Kani Balaf
	Kania
	Sar Sinak
El Zibar	Dinarta
	Kashkawa

REPORT B

(May and June 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE ASSYRIAN FAMILIES

The Assyrians in the Shaikhan Qadha have been supplied with all the necessary agricultural implements.

During the months of May and June 1934 the following quantities of cereals and cash were distributed to the Assyrians:

Qadha	Village	Dinar	Wheat taghars	Remarks
Shaikhan	16 families from Helmun		5	given to Rais Gorgis
"	Jarrahiya		6 1/2	" " Malik Nemrud and Vultan Kana.
"	Mehemdan		5	" " Mukhtar Ishak
"	Badriah		5	" " Tomu Mamu

Qadha	Village	Dinar	Wheat taghars	Remarks
Shaikhan	Birozawa		5	given to Domha Shahin
"	Ain Hilwa		5	" " Mukhtar Solawa
"	Msaria		3	" " the priest Kekrana
"	Bjurs Ulya		3	" " the Mukhtar Koshaba Bellu
"	Biboz		2 1/2	" " Shimun Tuma
"	Maknan		2	" " Malek Unan
"	Bibos Sufla		1 1/2	" " Mukhtar Warda
"	Qasrun	1/330	1 1/2	" " Shimun Somu
Dohuk	Bakir Sufla	13/400		" " Warda Ben Baku to buy cereals for destitute
"	" "	6		" " Ashur Ben Kamu to buy a mule
		20/730	45	

The amount expended on assistance to the Assyrians, including the refugee camp of Mosul, is I.D. 1,429/75 for the month of May 1934, and I.D. 945/85 for the month of June 1934.

Note: The difference in the sums spent during the two months is due to the fact that the amount shown for the month of May includes the expenses of the last 10 days of March, which could not be recorded in March. The actual expenditure for May amounts to I.D. 1,041/75.

REPORT C

(May and June 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO RECONSTRUCT DESTROYED VILLAGES.

All the villages to which the Assyrians returned having been completely reconstructed, as indicated in previous reports, there is nothing new to be mentioned in this respect.

A quantity of wooden pillars and 4 doors were given to the Malik Unan to build a house in the village of Maknan in the Shaikhan Quadha.

90.

(3)

P. Z.
5612
1934

ommunications on this subject
be addressed to—
NDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
e following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana

PB

4/ix

PM 5592

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 29th August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the other departments concerned

lonial Office, Downing Street,
30 August 1934.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 36 6 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

AUG 1934 INDIA OFFICE

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5612
1934

gram from the O.A.G. British Guiana to the Secretary of State for Colonies.

d 29th August. Received at 10-30pm 29th August 1934.

80 Confidential.

Your telegrams Nos 199 and my telegram No 179 ~~Con~~ idential. Approval of shareholders was obtained by cable. I regret unexpected delay but if announcement at Geneva cannot be avoided re 20th September I should have no power to hold the Company to sion taken at meeting on 6th September which I have every reason elieve will be favourable. It is essential that announcement should be made ~~before~~ after 20th September.

Great danger lies in Company obtaining outside ncial assistance when it is realised that their lease and assets of considerable interest to H.M.Government.

Apart from value of assets to the scheme fact settling large numbers of people in the district will have immediately urable effect on financial position of the Company.

Under the conditions of the lease following use 40 (7) and (8) of Crown Lands Regulations 1919 Government has er to resume possession of all land leased general powers of umption are qualified by proviso to sub clause (8). Although lease included it is other assets of the Company we are particularly ious to obtain. I am anxious to avoid any action which might be ~~con~~ strued as abbitrary and have effect of reducing value of the Company ets or of prejudicing any local person against the scheme. You will lise that without lease stock and other assets would be of little ue to the Company.

You will of course give me as long notice as ssible of date of announcement so that I can inform the Legislative uncil by message. Draft of what I propose went with my despatch by r Mail of 23rd August. Time is also required to permit of resolution

solution reaching you in time to communicate it to the League -
e your telegram No 195.

Date for local announcement that would suit me best is
h September.

(3)

INDEXED

P. Z.
5584
1934

Jo.

India
Mr Cl

Communications on this subject
uld be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana

P.A with file when available. 1/9

Reference to previous correspondence: pp 5554 MRW 29/8.

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 25th August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the other departments concerned

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 36 6 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
29 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

lonial Office, Downing Street,
28 August 1934.

88) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & Sp Gp 112

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1934

(3

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30804/1/34.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 3.45 p.m. 28th August, 1934)

No. 199.

Confidential.

Your telegram of 25th August No. 176. I realise difficulties of making enquiries without appearing overanxious, but in view of urgent importance of being able to form some opinion when it will be possible to make announcement at Geneva Foreign Office are anxious to learn whether communication with shareholders in England has been by mail or telegraph. Can you ascertain this without running risk of prejudicing acquisition of option at price proposed?

In view of the unexpected delay in the programme for the confirmation of the option you will realise that in certain circumstances H.M.Government might be obliged to make some announcement at Geneva before option is definitely obtained. If in that event company declined to proceed with option except at greatly enhanced price, would there be any means of compulsory acquisition at reasonable price?

Qatar National Library
Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [147r] (304/1206)
BRITISH LIBRARY

(3)

J.O.
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DEXED

P. Z.
5592

Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
20804/1/34

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana

Reference to previous correspondence: P.Z. 5584

Letter ~~*to*~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 29th August

Guiana 94

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Treas., F.O., A.M., W.O. & D.O.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 36 6 SEP 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
30 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

lonial Office, Downing Street,
29 Aug 1934.

88) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & Sp Gp 112

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August, 1934

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P. Z.
5592
1934

legram from the Officer Administering the Government of
itish Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

ted 25th August, 1934. Received 8.30.p.m.25th August.

176 Confidential.

Your telegram No.195 Confidential. I hope to be e to inform you of dates fixed for shareholders eting shortly. I gather that Sherlock who with members is firm has considerable share holding has been quested by the Company to obtain the approval of the areholders in England and to obtain their proxies. His ply is awaited.

It will be necessary to have 2 or 3 short etings of the Legislative Council to complete the work before esent Session is prorogued about the end of October. Unless erefore the dates on which announcement can be made nchronises with the meeting special meeting will be ranged of which 7 days notice should be given but in case emergency the Legislative Council can be summoned as soon is practicable.

from the Off
Guiana to the

26th August, 1

Confidential.

My teleg

Company.

of the Com

September.

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P. Z.
5592
1934

elegram from the Officer Administering the Government of
ritish Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

ated 28th August, 1934. Received 9.40.p.m.28th August.

o.179 Confidential.

My telegram No.176 of the 25th August Confidential. upununi Company. Shareholders in England having approved, meetings of the Company have been fixed for 6th September and 20th September.

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b

INDEXED

3

P. Z.
5554
1934

J.O. 150

India
Mr Cl.

Communications on this subject
uld be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~*to*~~ *from the Colonial Office of the* 24th August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the other departments concerned

No. 35 30 AUG 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

olonial Office, Downing Street,
25 August 1934.

27 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & SP Gp 112

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to the Secreta

August, 19

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Confidential

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Closer est
sport dollar
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P. Z.
5554
1934

legram from the Officer Administering the Government of British
a to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

ted 24th August, 1934. Received 5.26. p.m. 24th August.

portant.

. 174. Confidential.

My telegram No. 169 Confidential Assyrian paragraph
. 24. Closer estimate of cost of mission is as follows:-
) transport dollars 2,058 (b) subsistence allowance at
llars 2 75 per day per head for 4 officers for 64 days
uld be dollars 704. Pay of Cicerone say 2 months at
llars 80 per month is dollars 160. Total dollars 2,922.

(3)

F.O.

Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

P. Z.
5469
1934

Subject: Proposed Assyrian settlement in British Guiana.

P.Z. 5454 – ~~1934~~
w/S/S 27/8.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 23rd August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Treas., F.O., A.M., D.O. & W.O.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 35 30 AUG 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
25 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
24 August 1934.

(188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & Sp Gp 112

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P. Z.
5469
1934

30804/1/34

Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.
Sent 9.20 p.m. 23rd August, 1934.

No.195. Confidential.

Your telegram 18th August No.167. Apart from question of possible communication to Iraqi Government, Geneva programme somewhat complicated. League Council meets 7th September followed by Assembly 10th September and by further Council approximately 17th September. Assyrian question is on Agenda but endeavours will be made to postpone it as long as possible. In order to assist in formulating programme I should be glad to learn as soon as possible dates of the two shareholders meetings.

As regards Legislative Council do you contemplate summoning special session when option has been settled ? If so how many days notice are required ? Reason for this enquiry is that if Geneva programme permits and if local circumstances render practicable it would be preferable that Resolution suggested in your telegram No.169 should be passed before communication to League.

Question of terms of announcement at Geneva and of your communication to Legislative Council under consideration.

154

otes.

inute Paper.

Register No.
P.Z.
5454/34.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
193 .
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	27. 8.		**Proposed Settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana.**
Secretary of State....	28. 8		
Committee............	28.	S. H.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Copy of to

FOR INFORMATION.

The scheme for the settlement of Assyrians in Brazil having fallen through, the Colonial Office in their Despatch of the 13th July, 1934 (P.Z.4636/34 flagged) approached the Government of British Guiana asking them whether it would be possible to settle the Assyrians in the Rupununi District of British Guiana, and if so to consider the arrangements that would be necessary to this end. The emigration from Iraq is intended to be purely voluntary, and of the 20,000 Assyrians estimated to be in Iraq the number who would wish to be settled elsewhere is estimated at between 7,000 and 12,000. The Government of British Guiana will not be expected to contribute to the

cost/

Hope this will [illegible] scheme go through.
S.H. 28/8

Seems to promise well.
28/8

SEEN
AL COMMITTEE
4 SEP 1934

Previous papers :—

2730 1000 4.34

cost of the scheme, which it proposed to ask the League of Nations to pay. Should such an appeal to the League of Nations be unfruitful it will presumably devolve upon the British Exchequer to meet the cost,× with perhaps a contribution from the Iraqi Government. The Executive Council of British Guiana, to whom the proposal has been confidentially communicated, are stated to be enthusiastically in favour of it, and arrangements are already in train for the preparation of the site.

× I doubt if Treasury will be willing to contribute on any scale at all

The area in question is at present owned by the Rupununi Company, from whom a 7 months' option on the land has now been bought (subject to the confirmation of the shareholders of the Company). This will allow time for negotiations to be made with the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government and for the proposal to be put before the British Guiana Legislative Council for approval. Should all go well, the property will then be bought outright.

The [Colonial] Foreign Office fear the possibility of a fresh Assyrian crisis in the near future, and are therefore anxious to communicate the scheme to the Iraqi Government as soon as possible. This would entail a certain risk of publicity which it is obviously desirable to avoid before the transaction has been confirmed by the shareholders. This, apparently, cannot happen before the 10th September.

Dm. Cleary 25/8
J.G.L. 25/8

British Guiana is in need of settlers (schemes for further colonisation from India have been seriously considered). This colony therefore provides a fairly good chance of finding a solution of the Assyrian problem, and the prospects of a solution may now be regarded as much more hopeful. The Colonial Govt. is showing great energy in getting down to the practical details of a

scheme/

155

Minute Paper. Department.

I doubt if
Treasury will
be willing to
contribute on
scale of
all [illegible]

scheme of settlement.

There can be little fear that the scheme will be allowed to break down on account of finance. The C.O. have given the Colonial Govt. this assurance (para. 7 of Sir P. Cunliffe Lister's despatch of 13th July at P.Z. 4636/34).

J.G. Walton
27.8.34

3/9

3/9

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
4 SEP 1934

25/8

2621 6000 3/34

India Jo.
Mcle.

156

P. Z.
5454
1934

Communications on this subject
d be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1,
he following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject : Proposed settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana

pp 5424
mcl. 23/8.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 21st August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Treas., F.O., A.M., D.O. & W.O.

OSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
35 30 AUG 1934
SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
RET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

lonial Office, Downing Street,
23 August 1934.

23 AUG 1934

P.Z.
5454
1934

Telegram from the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 21st August, 1934. Received 1.53.a.m.22nd August.

No.169 Confidential.

Your telegram No.179 Confidential Assyrians.

(1) Legislative Council summoned to meet on 28th August and will probably sit 2 or 3 days. No reference will be made at this meeting to the proposal as this must be deferred until option on Rupununi Company's assets is settled.

May I suggest that information be communicated to the Legislative Council in the form of a simple message stating that the League of Nations anxious to find land upon which to settle some 10,000 Assyrians who are an agricultural and pastoral people and self ? contained - summarising briefly note on Assyrians.

That an area in Brazil had been selected as favourable but negotiations had fallen through (I suggest this because details of the Brazilian scheme have appeared in the local press on August 8th).

That it is fortunate that proposal has fallen through as through His Majesty's Government League of Nations have enquired whether it would be possible to find land in British Guiana and what the attitude of Colonists to such a proposal would be.

That the Colony will not be expected to bear any cost of settlement which is estimated to be between £300,000 and £600,000 for approximately 2,000 families until such time

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ime as it can be shown that the colonists are able to bear by ir contribution to general revenue of sufficient to cover the t of administration of the area.

ure to be followed by simple Resolution to the effect that the oil approves of the proposal that the possibility of settling Assyrians in British Guiana should be examined, and that as lers these people would be welcomed by the people of the Colony. mention need be made that other nations have hesitated to take e people nor I think to the difficulty experienced in milating them in Iraq community.

Copy of my Report goes by air mail 23rd August and the following ummary of it. Numerals refer to corresponding paragraphs of patch.

scribes area proposed see my telegram No.157 of the 10th August. two portions mentioned are north and south approximate latitude grees North.

vannah area has mean height of 300 feet above sea level rising mountainous portions to height of 2,000 to 3,000 feet.

leys in the mountains should be especially suitable for settle- t, as they contain fertile soil and ample supply of potable r all the year round.

ls can also be sunk in savannah area. Average rainfall 55-80 hes - two distinct seasons wet from May to August dry from tember to April. Temperature range is small from 71.5 degrees inimum to 91.9 degrees F. maximum.

of
alysis/soil samples not sufficiently comprehensive to form
efinite
X
ferent opinion as to suitability of area for ~~[illegible]~~ small hold- s.

rts of those who know the district are favourable.

that
osphatic deficiency - Surgeon General suggests/ordinary food icient in vitamin B., can be supplied by inclusion in diet of le meal bread cheese eggs fish and a number of vegetables.

f actual examination of area and routes to area prove it to be table no reason why arrangements should not be made for first ty to arrive January.

Settlers

Settlers should be vaccinated against small pox and possibly also against enteric fever.

that
9 suggests/administration can form part of the district administration. Estimate of cost is sent.

10 cost of settling families of five personsexclusive of ocean transport estimated at £280 in the first year this includes temporary housing of each family.

Settlers will require maintenance for about two years.

Cost of food per family approximately £60 for the first year and half for the second year.

11 suggests that it is essential to acquire assets of Rupununi Development Company. Suggests desirability of stock farm under experienced veterinary officer and also agricultural station.

14 asks for pioneer party of 250 young men including axemen sawers carpenters mechanics and if possible lorry drivers along with ordinary labourers as they will be useful in erecting base camp temporary houses and improving cattle trails for use by motor vehicles.

15 asks for description of accommodation these people accustomed to with photographs if possible.

16 asks for information as to foodstuffs the people are accustomed to.

17 presumes that people will be supplied with clothing for one year - warm clothing unnecessary. Hammocks blankets and mosquito nets for each person necessary can be obtained locally.

18 expresses opinion not necessary to seek assistance Nansen Office unless this may be condition attending financial assistance of other nations, nor would it be necessary if eventually people are required to repay part of the cost of settlement.

19 suggests desirability of discouraging denominated missions being established amongst settlers.

20/21 transport routes see my telegram No.157 . I am satisfied that Demerara River route the better. Will send estimate of cost of boats required later. Estimate of cost each concentration camp for 1,500 persons will cost approximately £500 rest camps approximately

approximately £200. Estimate to convert cattle trails from Canister Falls to Kurupukari to road for motor vehicles £5,000.

22 suggests that it may prove more economical immediately to extend road from Potaro to cattle trail in the vicinity of Kurupukari - distance as the crow flies approximately 50 miles, as route by which to take settlers to the district. On basis of estimated cost of Tiboku extension this would cost 150,000 dollars. As this will probably be permanent route of communication money spent on river transport would be saved.

23 expresses opinion that with choice of transport routes (?group omitted) difficulty in reaching the district - question is which is economically the better.

24 suggests that mission with knowledge of these people should visit the district as soon as possible and I suggest sending advance party of four officers to the district to collect information and data for examination by the mission. Cost of party for 64 days would be 2,760 dollars. Cost of visit of mission to the district would be approximately the same. The mission would require to be in the Colony approximately three months.

27 suggests that every effort should be made to expedite so as to have benefit of the coming dry season which will commence in September.

on this subject
ed to—
TARY OF STATE,
OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
number quoted :—
604/1/34

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5424
1934

Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Subject. Proposed settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana

PP 5400 — McCl 22/8

Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 20th August

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the ~~Treas.~~, F.O., A.M., D.O. & W.O.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 34 23 AUG 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

olonial Office, Downing Street,
21. August 1934.

MAILS BRANCH
22 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

1188) Wt 14425/2914 10,000(2) 10/32 H & SP Gp 112

TELEGRAM fr
Secretary o

No. 167. C
No. 188.
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(b) Purch
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(c) Opti
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5424
1934

TELEGRAM from the Governor of British Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Dated 18th August, 1934.

Received 1.5 a.m. 19th August, 1934.

No. 167. Confidential. Your telegram of the 17th August No. 188. Confidential. Rupununi Company.

(a) Directors agree seven months option is to run (?from) 20th August for 500 dollars.

(b) Purchase price 168,000 dollars for all assets in Rupununi District including termination of lease(s).

(c) Option will be in the name of British Guiana Government. Nothing can however be regarded as binding until confirmed by the shareholders at statutory meeting. Seven days notice required for first meeting, business at which has to be confirmed by second meeting 14 days later. It would be well therefore if no public announcement is made until after the second shareholders' meeting, date will be communicated later as soon as possible. If it is necessary to inform Iraqi Government prior to that date could not this be done without public announcement, as it is of the utmost importance in view of difficulties in obtaining option at figure given that no public announcement is made. Legislative Council will not in any case be informed until after directors' proposals are confirmed by the shareholders. I am authorising payment of option money.

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1934

E. & O. India
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Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1.
he following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Reference to previous correspondence :—

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 16th August

pp 5328.
mcc 21/8

Downing Street,
20. August 1934.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, copies of the papers noted below, on the subject of the proposed settlement of certain Assyrians on land in British Guiana.

P. & S. BRANCH
20 AUG 1934
INDIA OFFICE

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

~~S. H. WILSON.~~
J. L. MAFFEY.

Under Secretary of State,
India Office

Date.	Description.
1934	
th August	From the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.
h August	From ______do.______
h August	To ______do.______

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 34 23 AUG 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Copy also sent to Treas., F.O., A.M., D.O., and W.O.

Wt 47527/3095 5,000 9/33 H & Sp Gp 112

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1934

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1934

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elegram from the Officer Administering the Government of British
uiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
ated 5th August. Received at 1-25am 16th August 1934.

o 162 Confidential.

Your telegram No ~~179~~ 182 Confidential and my telegram o 160 Confidential Rupununi Company.

(a) Company should be bought out because they hold nder lease and permission approximately 1500 square miles of probably he best grazing land which area if left as enclaves within the area of ettlement would cause difficulty in administration. Acquisition of uildings will provide convenient accommodation for administrative centre. attle horses etc which could be handed over to settlers will give them immediate asset essential to settlement. Cattle and other livestock uld not be purchased for settlers on such favourable terms if acquired small lots from a number of sources. There is also possibility which annot be ignored -- and in regard to which the Company are taking steps of assets being purchased by interest outside of the Colony.

(b) Terms of lease. Lease No A.1830 190 sq:miles ight bank Rupununi river. Terms. 99 years from the 1st January 1919 ith right of renewal subject to revision of rent based on value of land part from improvements effected by lessees.

Rent. $2 per annum per square mile subject to evision up to $5 per annum per sq:mile at any time in the event of ailway being made between the coast and a point within 70 miles of the ea leased (N.B.rent reduced from time to time to 1 $).

Lease No A.1972. -- 1972 square miles both banks the Rupununi river (area being reduced to 1060 sq:miles).

Terms. 99 years from the 1st January 1920 with ght of renewal as in the case of lease A.1830.

Rent. $2 per annum per sq:mile subject to revision in the case of lease A.1830 (N.B.rent also reduced from time to time $1).

Condition 13 of this lease provides that if rent s in arrest ? arrears for 7 calandar months or for 30 days after demand therefor

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st December
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e of betwee
option for
Company for
e option whi

E. & O.
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1934

or it shall be lawful for the Governor, his agents and officers
er upon (?wrd omtd) and land and resume possession of the same.
tracts are situated South of Kanuku Mountainsand within block
sed in lease but excluded from area thereof are the following
g permission held by the Company:-

Within lease A.1830. Permission Nos 60 and 63 for 50
miles each. Last renewed to the 31st December 1933.

Within lease A.1972 Permissions No 59 No 61 and No 64
sq: miles each. Last renewed to 31st December 1933.

North of Kanuku Mountains Company holds grazing permissi
right bank of Takutu on which the Government station Bon Success
Area of 50 sq: miles, less that portion covered by station. Last
to 31st December 1933.

(c) If you will authorise negotiations on basis of
e price of between $150,000 and 200,000 dollars I feel confident
ining option for 12 months at say $1000. Option money is based
uping Company for rental payable to the Government during the
of the option which is $1325 per annum.

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1934

legram from the Officer Administering the Government of
itish Guiana to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
ited 16th August,1934. Received 7.50.p.m. 16th August, 1934.

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iority.

164, Confidential.

Further to my telegram No 162 I am informed that irectors of Company feel that it would be a mistake on heir part to grant so long an option as 12 months but ould at the end of the first six months give first refusal a further option if there were no building offers in ight.

This does not commend itself to me as by then details f scheme will have become public knowledge. Option should feel be obtained without delay and suggest trying to obtain ix months option from 1st October or failing that from st September for purchase at as much below $ 200,000 as ossible.

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30804/1/34.

TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.
(Sent 7 p.m., 17th August, 1934.)

Immediate.

No.188. Confidential.

Your Confidential telegram of 16th August No.164.

You are authorised to acquire option to purchase entire assets of Rupununi Company (i.e. including termination of leases) on following conditions:-

(a) Option to be for 12 months if possible, though you may agree to minimum of six months if longer period unobtainable.

(b) price of option not to exceed $1000 for 12 months and correspondingly less for shorter period.

(c) Option to be in the name of the British Guiana Government.

(d) Ultimate purchase price not to exceed $200,000. Hope that it will be possible to agree on figures substantially less having regard to Company's offer to sell at $216,000.

(e) If option is to run from 1st October or even 1st September is there not a danger of some other buyer stepping in in meantime, perhaps with object of putting up eventual price. If so it would seem preferable for option to begin to run immediately.

In order to restrain Iraqi Government from taking certain measures which they have under contemplation and which might precipitate fresh Assyrian crisis it may be necessary to inform them within next few days that there are possibilities of settlement in British Guiana. Such communication will be deferred as long as possible in order to avoid risk of publicity

which

Qatar National Library
Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [168r] (346/1206)
BRITISH LIBRARY

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which might hamper your negotiations with Company. You will however realise urgency of concluding these negotiations.

No expenditure beyond that authorised in this telegram should be incurred without instructions. This relates inter alia to preliminary investigation proposed in your telegram No.160.

Should be glad to have earliest possible information as to result of negotiations for option.

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1934

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ommunications on this subject
l be addressed to—
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
COLONIAL OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
e following number quoted :—
30804/1/34

Reference to previous correspondence :—

Letter ~~to~~ from the Colonial Office of the 13th July 34

Downing Street,

(1a)

PP 5037 15. August 1934.

17/16

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, copies of the papers noted below, on the subject of the proposed settlement of certain Assyrians on land in British Guiana.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

~~S. H. WILSON.~~
J. L. MAFFEY.

Under Secretary of State,
India Office

Date.	Description.
1934	
gust	From the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana
gust	To. ______do.______
gust	From ______do.______

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
34 23 AUG 1934
RY, POLITICAL AND

16 AUG 1934 INDIA OFFICE

Copy also sent to F.O., Treas., A.M., D.O., and W.O.

97) Wt 47527/3095 5,000 9/33 H & SP Gp 112

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1934

ELEGRAM from the O.A.G. of British Guiana to the Secretary of
tate for the Colonies.

ated 10 August 1934. Received 2.35 a.m. 11 August 1934.

PORTANT. No.157 Confidential. Your despatch of the 13th July
nfidential. Assyrians. With reference to paragraph 16, as I have
ittle doubt as to the practicability of settling these people in
upununi, I considered it desirable to ascertain as soon as possible
at the views of the public likely to be. I have therefore consult-
d the Executive Council confidentially who advise that you be
nformed :- (a) that the Executive Council are unanimously
nreservedly and enthusiastically in favour of the proposal (b)
at the proposal should be communicated to the Legislative Council
the earliest possible moment. The Council will meet towards the
d of this month. If you have no objection I should like to arrange
is as much useful information can be obtained from other than
fficial sources.

ssibilities and location. I consider (?group omitted) in Rupununi
istrict the one most readily available and suitable for the settle-
ent of these people.

rea suggested aggregates 13,110 square miles bounded as follows :-
the North by latitude 5 degrees North ; on the East by longitude
degrees West to latitude 4 degrees North , thence along that
titude to the Rupununi River , thence along the Rupununi, Rewa, and
rtwaro Rivers and longitude 59 degrees West to the intersection
ith latitude 2 degrees North ; and on the West by the Brazilian
oundary.

this area 7,875 square miles comprise forests, 4,380 square miles
pen savannah and 855 square miles Indian reservation which last
ened would have to be preserved and excluded from the area avail-
ble for the settlement. Remaining area 12,255 square miles should
e capable of accommodating numbers suggested and could conveniently

be

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divided into two portions each containing proportionate areas
savannah and forest land to meet the requirements of two groups.
might be possible to find other areas but these would probably be
ely forested involving considerable time and cost in selection
d clearing. In this connection western portion of the North West
istrict which is hilly and well watered suggests itself but is
itirely forest covered.

would not be wise to regard existing soil analysis reports as
the potentialities of the district for the production of food-
tuffs as sufficiently comprehensive and final. These reports were
ot the result of controlled soil survey. Harrison never visited
he district. Those who have and are in my judgment capable of
rming an opinion are satisfied that food crops can be successfully
rown in widespread selected areas,and the fact remains that people
w resident there do grow sufficient food crops to maintain them-
elves. District has been so far only seriously tested as a
astoral area on a large scale for profit by ? A. and has not been
xamined or tested from the point of view of small holdings. Reports
vailable ih this connection are being sent by mail.

is Majesty's Government may I consider safely inform the Committee
f the Council of the League of Nations that the prospectsof finding
n area in British Guiana for the settlement of these (?group
mitted) are favourable.

ransport. By ocean steamer from say Beirut to point on Mazaruni
iver on the side opposite to Bartica at the apex of the triangle
- see Gibson's chart sheet 2,783. Under normal conditions a vessel
drawing up to 15 feet can get right up to Bartica. At spring tide
every fortnight an extra one to one and a half feet of water may be
expected. Ship should not exceed 300 to 350 feet depending on
manoeuvring power. Base camp at this point. Thence by lorry to
Tumatumari thence by boats Essequebo to Kurupukari where distribution
camp can be established. Thence by motor lorry to any point on the
savannahs during the monthsof September to April .

Months

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Months of May to August wet season when portions of the savannahs are flooded. Time from Bartica to Kurupukari four to five days. Rest camps x will be provided at Tumatumari and at points on Essequebo reached at night.

Alternative routes. By ocean steamer via Demerara River to Wismar. Thence by river boat to Canister Falls. Thence by motor lorry over cattle trail 18 miles to Kurupukari. Base camp at Wismar and rest camps at intermediate points on the Demerara River. This would probably be the better route for women and children as the falls between the junction of the Potaro and Essequebo Rivers and Kurupukari are numerous and difficult. If parties of say ,000 to 1,500 arrive every three or four weeks it is possible ith adequate transport to clear either base camp between arrival f parties.

reliminary steps. I suggest that Brigadier General Browne and if ecessary.civil officer acquainted with agricultural requirements nd capabilities of these people should come out at once to xamine transport routes suggested and areas. I propose sending arty to Rupununi consisting of medical officer, agricultural fficer, soil chemist, and surveyor. Party will leave for the istrict as soon as I am advised that Browne is coming . On his rrival in the district party will have collected information ich he can examine. I propose that Browne should be accompanied om Georgetown by Bone - who knows the district well - also by rson who has resided there and will act as cicerone. Browne will met at Kurupukari or Canister Falls by Haynes District Commission- . If you agree to these proposals I shall require to be financed. regard it as essential that stock buildings and equipment of pununi Company should be purchased outright. Company's balance eet for 1933 shows assets at 433,000 dollars. I think that they uld be glad to accept less than half that sum for assets in pununi. Negotiations should be opened without delay because when oposals become public figure Company would be likely to ask ll increase.

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1934

I (?group omitted) that I may be authorised at once to obtain six months option to purchase the Company's assets at figure to be agreed upon with your approval. This will give time in the light of Browne's Report to decide upon feasibility of proposal to settle these people in Rupununi. Acquisition of Company's assets and perhaps those of one or two other ranches , which can be decided later are necessary to facilitate settlement. Full report will be sent by mail as soon as possible and report will be preceded by telegram detailing salient points. I would add that in my opinion proposal is perfectly feasible and there are no serious difficulties in taking the people to the district , question of actual settlement and distribution over the area must wait for later decision by officers to be sent in charge.

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TELEGRAM from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana.

(Sent 10.0 p.m., 14th August, 1934.)

IMPORTANT.

No.182. Confidential.

Your confidential telegram No.157.

Paragraph 1. I am most grateful for the promptitude with which you have considered my confidential despatch of 13th July and it is satisfactory that the result of your preliminary examination should be prima facie so favourable towards the settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana.

Paragraph 2. I entirely agree that proposal should be communicated to Legislative Council at first convenient opportunity. Terms of communication will require careful consideration and I will telegraph further in due course. In any case it should be deferred until question of option on Rupununi Company's assets is settled, see paragraph 5 below. When will Council session open and how long will it last?

Parakraph 3. Nature and occasion of communication to League of Nations and whole question of mission of investigation which is bound up with it are under consideration. In order to be able to furnish League with fullest possible information available I should be glad to receive as soon as possible telegraphic summary of fuller report promised in last paragraph of your telegram. In particular I should like details regarding physical characteristics of area concerned e.g. altitude climate range of temperature water so far as they can be furnished without special local investigation; also your views on question of cooperation of Nansen Office referred to in paragraph 14 of my Confidential despatch of 13th July.

Paragraph 4. You will realise from above that it is impossible at present to say whether mission of investigation will be entrusted to General Browne or what its composition will

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E. & O.
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1934

be; but on assumption that arrangements will be as suggested in your telegram please telegraph (a) estimated cost and duration of proposed preliminary investigation by local officers and (b) estimated local cost of visit of General Browne and one other officer divided into (1) transport (2) subsistence, also length of time they would have to spend in British Guiana.

Paragraph 5. Rupununi Company. Telegraph urgently (a) reasons for buying out Company, (b) information as to terms of lease, which I assume would be terminated as part of deal, (c) probable cost of option for twelve (not six) months, and on what basis this is estimated.

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gram from the Governor British Guiana to the Secretary of State
the Colonies.
d 14th August. Received at 8-30pm 14th August 1934.

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60 Confidential.

My telegram 18th August Confidential Assyrians.
tion of purchasing assets of Rupununi Company was not mentioned in
utive Council but in conversation with Francis Dias I gathered that h
Company are endeavouring to arrange sale of their assets. I requeste
ascertain without giving any indication of his purpose how far the
any had proceeded and what their opinion of price would be. Dias is
rmed now by letter Company trying to obtain sale of their assets and
Directors are prepared to give 6 months option for $500. They value
r assets in Rupununi as follows begins:- 47,456 head of cattle at
237,280 1282 horses at $10 = 12,820 Buildings etc 13,000 32 miles
encing 6400 total $269,500. They suggest option to purchase at
,000. Cattle are overvalued and number can only be regarded as
g approximate. Figures for horses buildings and fencing are
onable. I suggest that I may be authorised (1) to obtain 6 months
on for $500 (2) at a purchase price of between $150,000 and $200,000

Recommendations of Directors will require concurrence ofthe
eholders and this cannot be obtained unless concrete proposals are b
re them.

Your will realise of course that it will not be possible to
in assets at anything approaching so low a figure when once the
osed scheme becomes public and difficulty of settlement if the
any remains in possession of their lease and assets. If you agree
egotiations being opened I suggest that they be opened through
cis Dias on behalf of the Governor.

INDEXED

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5037
1934

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 4902/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

India
~~Aue~~
AMC
P.A.
7/8

P.4886

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2 Aug, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 4158/1/93 of July 2.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C/Min.Ass./48 25 July	Assyrian question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 32 9 AUG. 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 9785 (2)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Members of the Committee
for the Settlement of
the Assyrians of Iraq.

P.Z.
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1934

C./Min.Ass./48.

Geneva, July 25th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter dated July 21st, 1934 from the Permanent Delegate of Iraq, together with an annex.

Translation

Geneva, July 21st, 1934.

Sir,

With reference to my letter No. 430 of June 16th, 1934, (C./Min.Ass./43), I have the honour to submit below my Government's observations with regard to the seven points concerning the Assyrian question which are mentioned in your letter of June 11th, 1934.*

1. The general situation of the Assyrians of Iraq should cause no anxiety. My Government has already submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations full reports on this matter down to the end of April (C/Min.Ass./44). There is no change in the situation. The only difficulty is that as the question of emigration is still outstanding some of the Assyrians remain unemployed.

2. As explained in Major Thomson's reports and in the observations on the Mar Shimun's petitions (C./Min.Ass./45) the death-rate in the Mosul camp, which the Committee thought disturbing, was due to an epidemic of whooping-cough followed by measles among the children. There are still too many deaths due to the carelessness of the mothers who frequently refuse to carry out the doctors' instructions.

3. All the villages to which the Assyrians agreed to return have been completely repaired. The misunderstanding arising out of Report C for the month of February last (C./Min.Ass./27) is due to a mistake in translation. As a matter of fact, the Arab report actually stated: "As all of the destroyed houses have now been reconstructed, there is nothing new to be mentioned on this subject." You will find appended a full list showing both the villages completely repaired and those not repaired because their former inhabitants refuse to return to them.

---

*) See C./Min.Ass./43.

4. The fluctuations in the expenditure on the Mosul Camp do not affect the living conditions of the refugees. They are simply due to various payments: advances to contractors, assistance in money and compensation, transport, purchase of clothes, blankets etc., and wages of camp employees.

5. The Committee's message to the Assyrians was received in different ways:

(a) The Assyrians who are loyal to the Iraqi Government received this message with satisfaction, as they are not much in favour of emigration from Iraq.

(b) The Mar Shimun's supporters were somewhat discontented. They believed that emigration would take place during the summer, and the message was therefore a real disappointment to them. They showed their discontent by asking their chiefs to protest and to call on foreign powers to facilitate emigration, even at the expense of the emigrants. These people will not be satisfied with any solution which is not in accordance with their desires.

Generally speaking, the Committee's message had a good effect. Several Assyrians who were hesitating decided to return to their villages and to their agricultural work.

6. Up to the present the Iraqi Government has submitted observations on several petitions from the Mar Shimun. The latest observations (C./Min.Ass./45) relate to the Mar Shimun's letter of May 3rd (C./Min./Ass./33.) It has always been very easy to refute the baseless and erroneous allegations and assertions which are repeated over and over again in the Mar Shimun's letters.

With regard to the letters dated May 23rd and 30th and June 7th, my Government does not think any useful purpose would be served by making detailed observations, because they contain allegations already repeated several times, the mendacious character of which has been proved. If any definite facts deserving of serious consideration come to light, it will revert to the Mar Shimun's recent letters.

7. The Iraqi Government does not anticipate that the Assyrians who are dissatisfied with the delay in emigration will take any action which would call for exceptional measures. The measures already taken for the security and tranquillity of all the inhabitants, Assyrians and others, will remain in force as long as the Government regards them as indispensable.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) M. SHABANDAR.

For Head of the Permanent Delegation.

Geneva, July 21st, 1934.

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LIST CONCERNING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ASSYRIAN VILLAGES

Name of village	Reconstruction	Date of Reconstruction	Population
Birozaweh	Repaired	October 1933	Assyrians
Nasseirieh	"	" "	"
Djrahiey	"	September "	"
Ain-Hinweh	"	December "	"
Kassroun	"	November "	"
Bibouze	"	" "	"
Badrieh	"	" "	"
Meknan	Undergoing repair	-	Assyrians returned recently.
Bekkak	Not repaired	-	Assyrians having refused to return.
Grana-Souffli	" "	-	" "
Artukh	" "	-	" "
Dohkan (Petit)	" "	-	" "
Derston	" "	-	" "
Ain Bakra	" "	-	" "
Kerajek	" "	-	" "

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25.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th July, 1934.

(E 4449/1/93)

P.Z. 4636

My dear Wakely

I should have written before to thank you for your letter No. P.Z.4454/34 of the 7th July to Mounsey about the settlement of the Assyrians, which he passed on to me, but I am afraid that very heavy pressure of work here lately has kept me from all but the most urgent matters.

We are most grateful to you for all the trouble you have taken over this question, and fully appreciate the difficulties with which the Government of India have to contend. With regard to the suggestion in the last paragraph of your letter, we have already been and still are in close touch with the Dominions Office in connexion with a possible further approach to the Dominions.

Yours sincerely,

G.W. Rendel.

L.D. Wakely, Esq., C.B.

Mr. Patrick,

in the attac
deals more
the suggest
in Kashmir.

25th July

Mr. Patrick,

Would you mind saying whether you concur in the attached draft which, as you will see, deals more specifically than you do in your note with the suggestion about employing an Assyrian gendarmerie in Kashmir.

WDC

25th July 1934.

I concur
J G Patrick
25.vii

P/S
Mr. Amery has written to you about the Assyrians being settled in British India or in Kashmir.
This draft is based on the G of I's recent telegram as regards British India, & on the notes of Mr. Patrick & Sir R Glancy as regards Kashmir

WDC 25/7.

25th July 1934.

Dear Leo,

Like you, I have been a good deal worried about the unhappy plight of the Assyrians and I have been concerned about our obligations towards them. I have always supported their case whenever I had a chance and I therefore approach the suggestions in your letter sympathetically. Only a few weeks ago, as a matter of fact, I took up the question of their being allowed to settle in British India. But, though I put the idea to them as persuasively as I could, the Government of India could not hold out any hope of anything being done in that direction and I was bound to recognise the force of their arguments. They pointed out that the pressure of the increasing population on the land in India was one of the most difficult problems with which they were faced at present. In face, they have recently been trying to find land for Indian immigrants returned from South Africa and other Colonies and for people of the educated unemployed class in both cases without success. Moreover they said that

even

Rt.Hon. L.S. Amery, M.P.

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even if the practical difficulties could be overcome there would be very strong political objections. They would not be able to defend to Indian public opinion the influx of a community alien both in nationality and religion unless it could be proved that the scheme would have definite economic or political advantages to India, which obviously it would not.

My advisers feel, I am afraid, that an approach to the Maharaja of Kashmir would meet with equally little result. The State has become increasingly hostile to the entry of outsiders. There has been, as you know, a growth of fanatacism among the Moslem population and they would certainly resent the introduction of a community which, whatever the reasons may have been, have become unpopular with another Moslem community in Iraq. This would be especially the case if the object of introducing the Assyrians was that of keeping the Moslems in order and I am sure that the Maharaja would never take the risk of arousing their criticism. The Maharaja has, it is true, had to invoke our assistance lately in keeping order, but that was only temporary and we hope it will not be repeated.

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Assyrians
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to be no

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repeated. It would be quite another thing to su gest to him that he should being in outsiders such as the Assyrians for the purpose of keeping order as a standing arrangement.

Much therefore as I should like to follow up any suggestions that would help the cause of the Assyrians, I am afraid I can only say in conclusion that there seems to be no prospect of providing for them in India.

Yours sincerely,
S. H.

Sir R Glancy

Have you anything to add to Mr Patrick's note

WDC
23/7.

the Sec of State wd like to be able to say definitely that HH Kashmir will not entertain the proposition – it would be easy enough to get his reaction to the idea or if it is desirable to make good the facts & figures we have not got in this office, there are ex Residents & others who could no doubt supply the information. Col Neale was some years in Kashmir. Col Bannerman was Resident there I am sure there is "nothing doing" in Kashmir

RIRG
23/7

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Mr Clauson
[illegible]

P.Z. 4636

Mr Walton

I think we sent a telegram to India & got an unfavourable reply. Wd you leave the papers attached. May the file be sent along via Mr Patrick so that he may comment on the Kashmir suggestion.

JGL

1) Mr Patrick note below 20/7
2) Mr Croft P. 23.vii

Please see the Regt's letter of 28 June & the P.A.'s reply of 4 July flagged on the file [illegible]

The arguments used in G. of I. tel. of 4th July – though possibly not put forward with any direct reference to settlement of these Assyrians in an Indian State – seem to me in part at any rate to be conclusive against approaching Kashmir to find a home for these unhappy people.

There being no Admn. Report of Kashmir I can give no statistical data, but I do not think there is land to spare to house a surplus population there since otherwise it would have been available for settling the British-Indian landless people to which G. of I. refer.

But whatever may be physically the case, politically it would be useless to approach the Maharaja on behalf of this community. The State has become increasingly hostile to immigration, particularly of Europeans, and has made it clear to them already in in occupation that they are not wanted. Thus it is inconceivable that a welcome would be given to a poverty stricken Christian people from Iraq.

Further, the predominant religion in Kashmir is Islam and of recent years there has been a rapid growth of fanaticism, communal feeling and disturbance. If the Assyrians are unpopular in Iraq because they are Christians they could not fail to be so in Kashmir, and this would provide the Maharaja, whatever may be the physical facilities available, with an incontrovertible reason for refusing an asylum to this people. An Assyrian battalion would surely be regarded by Moslems as the last straw.

Actually, for lack of development, absence of rail-roads and capital, Kashmir may be under-populated (it is the largest state in India but its population is but a quarter of that of Hyderabad, the second largest State in area). But that does not justify taking in waifs.

I think it will be best to assume that the Govt. had taken the State into consideration when replying on the 14 July with a decisive negative.

P. Patrick 23.vii

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LOANE 1543.

112, EATON SQUARE,
S.W.1.

July 20th 1934

My dear Sam,

May I appeal to you, even in the midst of your immense preoccupations, to give a thought to the unhappy Assyrians?

You may be aware of the fact that all the plans for settlement in Brazil have come to naught because the Brazilians have recently embedded in their constitution a provision against immigration in excess of 2% per annum of previous settlement~~s~~, plus an additional provision against settlement in racial groups. It is pretty clear that the idea of getting the League to find a solution is a washout. In any case while it may have been convenient to use the machinery of the League I think I know of nothing more contemptible in recent history than our declining all responsibility for the Assyrians, except in so far as we might be willing to share with other members of the League in the cost of their resettlement. In other words we use the League as a sheer excuse for declining our own responsibility for people who after all served us well, saved us millions of money, and are in trouble largely because they were regarded as our own immediate agents and instruments. It seems to me that we really must face our responsibility and find British money and effort to settle them either in Iraq or somewhere else.

This brings me to a practical suggestion for your consideration. There is, I imagine, no larger area in the world of mountain country with a climate not too different from that of the Assyrian highlands than is to be found in India, and the impression I have received from a good many descriptions of mountaineering expeditions is that there are considerable patches at any rate which are pretty

SLOANE 1543.

112, EATON SQUARE,
S.W.1.

npopulated and where room for a settlement could be found.

There is another more specific possibility which has
ccurred to me. There has been a great deal of internal
uble in Kashmir, mainly Hindu-Moslem, and British troops
ve had to be used to restore order. Would it not be very
od business for the Maharajah to enlist a battalion of
syrians, or an Assyrian gendarmerie which would have the
vantage of being neutral in religious controversies?
shmir is, I fancy, anything but overcrowded, and an area
which the families of these men might settle could,
fancy, be found without too great difficulty. If the
heme caught on I do not suppose it would be long before
e Assyrians found a considerable scope for themselves
policemen etc. not only in Kashmir but in other Indian
ates, and indeed in British India as well.

Do give the matter your careful thought, and don't
rn it down offhand simple because the idea is rather
volutionary. Anyhow one way or another do exercise
ur influence with the Cabinet to get something done for
ese poor devils.

Yours ever,

PAR

Secretary......

tary Under Secre

d State......

Lord Hugh Cecil
make any stat
relief for their
permanent set

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28/7

Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
der Secretary.........		
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retary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Question by Lord Hugh Cecil

For Monday, 16th July 1934

*36. Lord Hugh Cecil, — To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he can make any statement in respect to the Assyrians in Iraq; first, as to the provision of relief for their present and proximate distress, and secondly, as to the prospect of their permanent settlement and relief by emigration. [*Monday* 16*th July*.]

Note reply,
"J. C. W."

MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

IRAQ (ASSYRIANS).

8. **Lord HUGH CECIL** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement in respect to the Assyrians in Iraq; first, as to the provision of relief for their present and proximate distress, and secondly, as to the prospect of their permanent settlement and relief by emigration?

Sir J. SIMON: The responsibility for providing for the security and relief of the Assyrians in Iraq rests with the Iraqi Government, who have undertaken to keep the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League of Nations informed of the measures taken by them to this end. I understand that the Iraqi Government have now set up a committee, including certain of their officials of British nationality, to deal with the whole question of the relief and maintenance of the Assyrians, pending a decision as to their ultimate future. With regard to the second part of the question, the Assyrian Committee of the League is still actively investigating the feasibility of arranging for the resettlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq, and recently addressed an appeal to a number of Governments inviting them to reconsider the possibility of accepting the Assyrians in any of the territories under their control. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who were among the Governments approached by the Council Committee, are giving the matter their earnest attention.

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ommunications on this subject
l be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1.
e following number quoted :—
0804/1/34

(4)

191
India
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P.Z.
4636
1934

Reference to previous correspondence :—

Letter ~~to~~ from the ~~Colonial~~ Foreign Office of the 21st June
(No. E 3973/1/93)

Downing Street,

Confidential

18 July 1934.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare, a copy of the papers noted below, on the subject of the suggested settlement of certain Assyrians on land in British Guiana.

P.Z. 4598

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

~~S. H. WILSON.~~

J. L. MAFFEY.

19/7

Under Secretary of State,
India Office

Date.	Description.
uly 1934 fidential)	To the Officer Administering the Government of British Guiana. (without enclosures)

MAILS BRANCH
14 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 29 19 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Copy also sent to F.O., A.M., D.O., W.O. & Treasy.

7) Wt 47527/3095 5,000 9/33 H & Sp Gp 112

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P.Z.
4636
1934

ISH GUIANA.
FIDENTIAL.

Downing Street,
13 July, 1934.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copies of a letter from the Foreign Office urging that an attempt should be made to find land somewhere within the Colonial Empire on which certain Assyrians, at present living in Iraq, could be settled. I also enclose copies of the memorandum referred to in paragraph 14 of the letter giving in brief outline the recent history of the Assyrian problem together with some notes on the origin, organisation and characteristics of the Assyrians.

m F. O.
. 6. 34.

emorandum.

2. It will be seen from the letter that a project for settling these people in Brazil, which has been under active consideration for some months by a Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, has now had to be abandoned. Having regard to the special relations of His Majesty's Government with Iraq, their past and present connections with the Assyrians, the very important British interests which would inevitably be involved in any further conflicts between the Assyrians and the Iraqis, the serious risk of such conflicts arising and the grave consequences which might follow from the imperial

point

HE OFFICER ADMINISTERING
THE GOVERNMENT OF
BRITISH GUIANA.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 29 19 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

point of view, His Majesty's Government consider that it has now become a matter of vital and immediate importance to find a place to which those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq can be removed.

3. There seems very little prospect indeed of an offer of accommodation being made by any foreign government, and I have accordingly been examining the possibility of settling these people somewhere within the Colonial Empire.

4. It appears that, with the possible exception of British Guiana, in every Colonial Territory where conditions might be suitable in some respects for the settlement of these Assyrians, there are special conditions (e.g. lack of available land or water, climate, health conditions or the existence of racial problems) which threaten to render their settlement impracticable. But Sir Edward Denham has now suggested that the savannah country in the Rupununi district of British Guiana is deserving of special consideration in relation to the physical requirements of the Assyrians, and that there are sufficient areas of unpopulated Crown lands available in that district, in which the Assyrians could be settled as a self-supporting community. Indeed from the point of view of the development of this remote district, Sir Edward Denham is inclined to the view that the Assyrians might be an asset to the Colony, the more so as they are a pastoral people accustomed to primitive conditions of life, and I understand from him that the

opening

opening up of this area would be in accord with the desire of the Legislature that the Colony should eventually be linked up with its southern neighbour.

5. In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding I would observe that the Assyrians whom it is now desired to settle, are essentially different in origin, habits, mentality and occupation from the Syrian traders whose presence in some British Colonies is often by no means welcome. The Assyrians are industrious and hardy people, whose pursuits are mainly agricultural and pastoral, although the community includes an adequate number of craftsmen, e.g. blacksmiths, carpenters, basket makers, weavers and tanners, whose trades are essential to self-supporting village life. It is true that large numbers of the Assyrians in Iraq have been (and in fact are still) employed in the Levies (a force with a military organisation) or the police. There is, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad, no reason to anticipate that these men, if given the opportunity, would not revert, contentedly, to their traditional agricultural or pastoral pursuits.

6. It will be observed that the total number of Assyrians in Iraq is estimated at 20,000, and it is anticipated that a considerable number will prefer to remain there. It is difficult to form any precise estimate of the number who would wish to leave Iraq, but His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad considers that it may be put at 7,000 as a minimum, with a possible maximum of 12,000. In view of the very difficult political

political situation in Iraq, time is very important and it is hoped that it will be possible to formulate a scheme of settlement in sufficient time to enable the first party to leave Iraq not later than January next if their settlement in British Guiana is regarded as practicable and action to that end is taken. His Majesty's Government would wish, if possible, to be in a position to inform the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations in the course of the next six weeks whether there are prospects of finding an area in the Colonial Empire where these people might be settled, of sufficient promise to justify closer examination. It is appreciated that it may be extremely difficult for you to form an opinion in so short a time; but I rely upon you to expedite consideration of the matter so far as may be consistent with adequate examination of the issues involved.

7. In view of the position of the finances of British Guiana, you will naturally desire to be aware in the first instance of the financial implications of the proposal that a home should be found for these Assyrians in the Colony.

I have reached the conclusion that in no circumstances can the Government of British Guiana be required to undertake any financial liability in regard to any scheme of settlement for Assyrians until such time as the new community is fully established, and is in a position to take its share, as an integral part of the population of the Colony, in contributing by way of taxation and otherwise to the general revenue.

The funds to meet such liabilities will accordingly

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accordingly have to be provided from external sources. It is proposed by the League of Nations to invite contributions from Member Governments, but in the event of adequate funds not being forthcoming as the result of such an appeal, you may rest assured that, if it were decided to proceed with a scheme for the settlement of Assyrians in British Guiana, the requisite finance would be provided in some other manner and that no liability during the 'settlement' period would attach to Colony funds, except to the extent to which the cost of administration and of providing necessary social services could eventually be met by taxation of the settlers themselves.

8. I shall be glad if you will report whether the Rupununi district (or any other district in the Colony which may suggest itself to you) would be physically suitable for settlement by these people, and whether there would be any serious objections to such settlement.

If it should be suitable and no serious objections are seen, an estimate should be furnished of the total numbers which could probably be accommodated. Your report should also indicate how many it is considered can be dealt with at a time, how many you recommend should be included in the first party; how long it would be likely to take for settlers to become self-supporting, and what it is estimated would be the total cost of settlement per family. It has been suggested that in any event, the first party should not exceed 200 families.

9. In considering the physical suitability of the area you will give consideration to the fact that as a highland race the Assyrians would prefer elevated hilly country though this is not absolutely essential, and that they would require reasonably accessible running water in adequate quantities. The Assyrians are essentially an agricultural and pastoral race, and according to Brigadier General J.Gilbert Browne, who was for eight years in command of the Levies in Iraq, cultivate mainly rice, cereal crops and tobacco. You will no doubt refer to Sir J.Harrison's report (1914 Combined Court No.744) on the analytical examination of samples of soils from the Rupununi savannah district. I would also invite attention to Major Bone's report enclosed in Sir Edward Denham's despatch No.415 of the 30th of September 1932. In these reports, definite indications of phosphatic deficiencies are shown to exist in the savannah country and you will doubtless consider whether medical opinion suggests that such a deficiency has brought about amongst the inhabitants nutritional disorders of a character similar to those which are reported to occur amongst the stock of the area. It would also be necessary that you should take into account the possible displacement of cattlemen at present operating in the area, and the question of the existing Indian reserves. Another point which will require consideration is the possible reception by the inhabitants of the Colony, and by the West Indian populations generally, of the idea of the colonisation of this area by a different race. I understand from Sir Edward Denham that since there is no prospect of the

early

early colonisation of the area except under a scheme such as this and since the area would not be likely to attract East or West Indian settlers, he sees no reason to anticipate opposition or resentment.

10. In formulating estimates of the cost of such a scheme the following factors should be taken into account:-

(a) Preparation (in the way of improvement of communications, the provision of temporary accommodation, an adequate water supply, etc.) would be essential before the first party arrived. Thereafter, however, each party could probably be employed to prepare for the next succeeding party.

(b) The Assyrians are accustomed to a very simple mode of life and nothing very elaborate in the way of accommodation would be required: more substantial houses could be left to be provided by the settlers themselves, if desired, as they "make good".

(c) It would be necessary to provide settlers with a sufficient nucleus of cattle and sheep, and also foodstuffs to which they are accustomed and other necessaries of life, for a period of two or even three years, pending the cultivation of their own land.

(d) It would be necessary to make some provision for the usual administrative and social services, though it might be found that a number of Assyrian doctors etc. might elect to join in the movement.

orandum.

11. In order to assist you in forming an opinion as to the practicability of settling some or all of these people, I enclose a memorandum giving some particulars (e.g. area of land to be allotted to each family, type of accommodation, numbers of stock and quantity of equipment to be provided) of the proposals which were formulated in

connection

connection with the project of settlement in Brazil.

12. If the Rupununi district is thought to be a possible area for Assyrian settlement, it will be necessary to consider what means would be available for transporting the refugees, who would include women and children, so as to make sure that they would reach their destination without undue difficulty or hardship. A carefully organised plan of transport and provisioning, and the construction of suitably located rest camps would obviously be necessary for the pioneer party; and it would be necessary to decide what would be minimum requirements for the future in the way of means of communication.

13. If your report on the possibilities of the proposal is _prima facie_ favourable, consideration would at once be given to the question of sending either a small commission or a single officer, under the aegis of the League of Nations, tovisit the area in order that the Council of the League might feel assured that settlement there would afford a satisfactory solution of the problem. In this connection it should be mentioned that the emigration from Iraq is intended to be purely voluntary and that when a scheme has been drawn up, it will be placed before the Assyrians in Iraq in order that they may individually make up their minds whether to take advantage of it or not. They would naturally be disinclined to commit themselves to the venture, more especially as there can be no question of repatriation for those who decide to move, unless they were satisfied, by the report of an impartial body or some person in whom they have confidence, that they have a

reasonable

reasonable prospect of successful settlement in congenial conditions. In the case of the Brazilian scheme, the Commission consisted of Brigadier General J.Gilbert Browne, Major Johnson, the Secretary-General of the Nansen Office, and the Counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Although the two former gentlemen are British subjects, they went out as servants of the League of Nations.

14. In the case of the Brazilian scheme it was contemplated that the movement of the Assyrians would be conducted under the management of the Nansen Office, who would, moreover, continue to be responsible for the general supervision of the settlements for a number of years. I take the view, however, that the responsibility for the settlement scheme in British Guiana must be undertaken by His Majesty's Government through the Colonial Government, and that in the event of effect being given to this scheme, the supervision of the settlement area will ultimately form an integral part of the district administration in British Guiana. I shall be glad however in the first instance to learn whether you think there would be advantage in having the assistance of the Nansen Office through a representative or representatives acting in an advisory capacity. In any event, I should consider it essential that the services of British Officers, (e.g. officers who have been in charge of the Assyrian Levies in Iraq), who are

familiar

familiar with the language and habits of these people, and whom they are accustomed to obey, should be made available both for the supervision of the movement and for the actual settlement. It would probably be desirable to retain the services of one or more such officers to serve as district officers under the Colonial Government for several years after the settlement has been carried out.

15. I should be glad to receive from you by telegraph as soon as possible a preliminary reply to this despatch giving any general opinion which, after confidential consultation with your advisers, you may be able to express as to the practicability of a scheme of settlement of Assyrians in the Rupununi district, or any other part of the Colony, and as to the probable attitude of the people of the Colony towards such a proposal.

16. It is hoped, on the basis of this preliminary report, that His Majesty's Government will be in a position to inform the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations in September whether or not there are prima facie prospects of drawing up a satisfactory scheme of settlement in the Colony. As however this project is one which cannot but affect the Colony as a whole it would clearly be desirable, before any public announcement were made to sound local opinion in the Colony. I should be glad to be informed whether, in your opinion, it would be sufficient for this purpose to consult only the unofficial members of the Executive Council (confidentially or otherwise), or whether it would be necessary or desirable for the proposal to be discussed in the Legislative Council.

17. If, after your preliminary consideration of the proposal, you are of the opinion that fuller examination would be justified, the necessary detailed enquiries should be immediately put in hand with a view to furnishing me as soon as possible with the specific information asked for in this despatch, and any further information or suggestions which you may wish to send. I should be glad to receive a summary of this detailed report by telegraph.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,

(Sgd.) P. CUNLIFFE-LISTER.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [203r] (416/1206)

Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34.

	Date.	Initials.
der Secretary.........		
rliamentary Under Secretary.		
cretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Question by Mr. Wedgwood

For Monday 2nd July 1934

37. Mr. Wedgwood, — To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he is still hopeful of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq; and, if not, what steps he proposes to take to afford them protection inside Iraq. [*Monday 2nd July.*]

MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

IRAQ (ASSYRIANS).

7. **Colonel WEDGWOOD** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is still hopeful of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq; and, if not, what steps he proposes to take to afford them protection inside Iraq?

The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir John Simon): With regard to the first part of the question, I have nothing at present to add to the reply given by my right hon. Friend, the Lord Privy Seal, to the hon. Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Rhys Davies) on 19th June. With regard to the second part, so long as the Assyrians remain in Iraq, responsibility for their protection devolves upon the Iraqi Government, who have on several recent occasions given assurances on the subject to the League of Nations.

Captain CAZALET: Is the statement in to-day's papers true that the Brazilian Government have definitely refused to accept these Assyrians in Brazil?

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. Member cannot ask questions on what appears in the papers.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Have we an Englishman resident among the Assyrian population, and does the right hon. Gentleman realise that England has a rather special responsibility for these people going beyond that of the League of Nations?

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India ✓

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P.Z.
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1934

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n any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3973/1/93.
nd address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
4 July . 1934.

Keep
17/7

P.Z. 4409

Reference to previous correspondence :

F.O. letter E 3260/1/93 of June 8. 3858

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To Colonial Office June 21. (enclosing League of nations letter of 11 June) (with encls.)	Assyrian resettlement

RECD. POL. DEPT.
5 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No 28 12 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to ~~Co.~~
D.O.
W.O.
A.M.
Treas.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [205r] (420/1206)

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P.Z.
4445
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

June 21, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 3973/1/93]

No. 1.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 21, 1934.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir John Simon to invite a reference to correspondence ending with Colonial Office letter of the 6th January last regarding the possibility of settling in the Colonial Empire those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq.

2. The Committee of the Council of the League, which was charged by the Council in October last with the task of investigating whether the settlement of these Assyrians outside Iraq was practicable, has hitherto concentrated on a plan for settlement in the State of Paraná in Brazil, but this plan has now had to be abandoned, owing to the recent adoption by the Brazilian Constituent Assembly of a restrictive measure on immigration in general. No suitable alternative destination has yet presented itself, but the Council of the League on the 7th June decided that a final effort to find one should be made, and accordingly instructed its committee to make fresh representations to the Governments of countries whose territories might lend themselves to Assyrian settlement, with a view to informing the Council definitely, and as soon as possible, whether the settlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq was realisable. The Council, in the same resolution, addressed an urgent appeal to the Governments to which the committee might make requests to give favourable consideration to such requests and to facilitate the committee's task in view of the great importance of the problem.

3. In pursuance of this decision the committee at once decided to address appeals to the Governments of the following countries in respect either of their home or of their overseas territories: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Australia, South Africa, Canada, Argentina, Colombia, Greece, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey.

4. A copy of the appeal addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is enclosed herein.(¹)

5. There is no indication at present that any of the Governments approached, some of which have already returned negative or discouraging replies to earlier enquiries, are likely to give favourable consideration to the appeal now addressed to them. Indeed, the majority of the Council Committee appear to regard the appeal as being in the nature of a necessary formality preparatory to measures for the permanent resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq.

6. The enclosed appeal draws attention, however, to the serious difficulties which are to be anticipated if the Assyrian problem cannot be solved by the settlement outside Iraq of those members of the community who wish to leave Iraq and have declared their inability to remain there under existing conditions. These difficulties would have a special importance for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who, in view of their past and present connexion with Iraq, might quickly find themselves in a position of great embarrassment and difficulty.

7. In the first place, the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be aware that there is a strong feeling, not only abroad, but also in certain circles in this country, that responsibility for the present plight of the Assyrians lies with His Majesty's Government. In point of fact His Majesty's Government are under no specific obligation towards the Assyrians and the statement made before the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1931 regarding the "moral responsibility" of His Majesty's Government in connexion with the termination of the mandatory régime can only be applied to the present case by distorting both the meaning of the statement itself and by ignoring the part which some of the Assyrian leaders played in bringing disaster upon the community. Nevertheless, in view of that statement and of the past and present connexion of His Majesty's Government

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(¹) June 16, 1934, Section 1.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 28 12 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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with Iraq, and with the Assyrians, and more particularly of the fact that a considerable number of Assyrians are still employed by His Majesty's Government as soldiers in the Iraq levies, which guard the Royal Air Force aerodromes in Iraq, His Majesty's Government have a special interest in the solution of the Assyrian problem and a total disclaimer of responsibility would be neither politic nor convincing. There is no doubt that the Assyrian troubles of last summer severely damaged the credit of His Majesty's Government in the eyes of States members of the League of Nations, and there is every reason to fear that that credit will suffer still further damage if His Majesty's Government fail to offer practical assistance towards the resettlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq. Were it possible to find land in some other foreign country or in one of the Dominions, this assistance might in certain circumstances be financial in character, but if no Dominion or foreign country is prepared to receive the Assyrians, there is no way in which His Majesty's Government can assist, except by finding land within the Colonial Empire in which the Assyrians can settle.

8. I am to point out that, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, it is a question not merely of prestige or credit, though that is important, but of the serious practical dangers which are to be anticipated if the Assyrians are compelled to remain in Iraq.

9. It may be thought that if it were demonstrated to the Assyrians that their settlement outside Iraq was not practicable, they would accept the situation and settle down in Iraq, forgetting gradually the massacre of last summer as similar massacres have been forgotten in the past in oriental countries. This, however, is not the view of qualified observers. It must be remembered that a certain section of the Assyrians, namely, the Upper Tiari and Tkhuma tribes, who constitute the immediate followers of the Mar Shimun, have never been willing to settle permanently in Iraq, except under conditions which are impossible of fulfilment, while the view of the remainder may be expected to be powerfully affected by the fact that, in the massacres and looting of last August, no distinction was made between those Assyrians who had taken part in the previous fighting and those who had remained peaceably in their villages as loyal supporters of the Iraqi Government. These events have inevitably left behind them a feeling of bitterness and consequently a certain tension. Moreover, they have reduced a proportion of the Assyrians to a state bordering on destitution.

10. While there appears to be no immediate prospect of a further massacre deliberately organised or encouraged by the Iraqi civil or military authorities, there is the constant danger of untoward results arriving from the rash or provocative acts of minor officials. The Assyrians still possess a number of British rifles earned during service in the levies, and if faced with the prospect of permanent settlement in Iraq—or even of long delay in settlement elsewhere—they may be driven to some act of desperation. In any case, further attempts to settle them permanently in Iraq are likely to lead to constant friction with their Kurdish or Arab neighbours or with the Iraqi authorities, which may at any moment produce an incident. His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, who is at present on leave in this country and has recently been consulted, feels strongly that every effort must be made to find a home for the Assyrians outside Iraq, and considers that it is necessary to remove from Iraq at least 7,000 of the Assyrians at the earliest possible moment if a very critical and dangerous situation is to be avoided.

11. Further bloodshed might have very far-reaching consequences. When the massacre took place last summer, there was reason to fear that in certain circumstances it might spread to other Christians and develop eventually into an anti-British and anti-foreign movement. This danger will be present in any future disturbance, whether its origin is some act of desperation on the part of the Assyrians, or whether it begins with some outrage against them; for the Assyrians are looked upon as the special protégés of His Majesty's Government, and, together with the other minorities of Iraq, are, in a sense, protégés of the League of Nations in virtue of the guarantees given by Iraq in return for the termination of the mandatory régime.

12. It is clear that, in view of the special position which His Majesty's Government occupy in Iraq, quite apart from the complicating factor that the guarding of the Royal Air Force aerodromes is largely in the hands of the Assyrian members of the levies, this country would inevitably be involved in

any fresh disturbance. As a member of the Council of the League, which is responsible for supervising the execution of the Iraqi Declaration of Guarantees, as the ally of Iraq under the treaty of 1930, and as the employer of a considerable number of Assyrian troops in Iraq, His Majesty's Government would be in a position of the gravest embarrassment and difficulty. The reactions could hardly fail to affect the whole position of this country in Iraq and the many and important British interests there, and even the prospect of some form of military action, if only to ensure the safety of existing air establishments, cannot be ruled out.

13. In view of the extremely serious issues involved, Sir John Simon feels strongly that it is in the interests of this country that a further attempt should be made to find land in the Colonial Empire on which the Assyrians could be settled, and he is glad to learn that, following a discussion with Sir Francis Humphrys, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is prepared to investigate the possibilities afresh. Sir John Simon fully realises the difficulties involved, but trusts that every effort will be made to overcome them. In this connexion, I am to observe that while it has hitherto been the aim of the Council Committee to find a destination where all the Assyrians of Iraq, estimated at some 20,000 persons, can be settled together if they so desire, the possibility of settlement in two separate groups—not necessarily far apart—has had to be envisaged in view of reports that the Assyrians are at present divided into two approximately equal groups, one of which is said to be dissatisfied with the policy of the Mar Shimun and to be unwilling to be settled under his ægis. Sir John Simon suggests, therefore, that, though desirable, it should not be regarded as essential, to find a place within the Colonial Empire within which the Assyrians can, if necessary, be settled in a single compact group, and that His Majesty's Government should not be deterred from putting forward even a scheme for settlement in more than two separate groups, in different territories, if this is the best that can be devised.

14. For convenience of reference I am to enclose a memorandum(¹) giving in brief outline the recent history of the Assyrian problem together with some notes on the origin, organisation and characteristics of the Assyrians.

15. Finally, I am to emphasise the urgency of a decision in this matter. The Council Committee, prompted by growing concern regarding the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq and the possible effect upon it of delay, is anxious to report definitely to the Council in September next whether their settlement outside Iraq is practicable or not. The committee's concern does not only relate to the question of the security and welfare of those Assyrians who have remained in or returned to their villages. Some 1,500 dependants of those who were killed last summer or who fled to Syria are still being maintained by the Iraqi Government in a camp at Mosul, but it is understood that funds for the maintenance of this camp are only available until September. Any proposal to allocate further funds for this purpose is sure to meet with opposition from Iraqi nationalists. An even more serious problem is raised by the presence in Mosul, outside the refugee camp, of a large number of Assyrians, who fled there from their villages during the disturbances ten months ago. Efforts have been made to induce them to return to their villages and to resume their normal life pending emigration, but distrust has rendered such efforts only partially successful. These Assyrians have hitherto been maintained chiefly by their friends and relations, whose resources are, however, dwindling. The situation is thus likely to become increasingly precarious as time goes on, and as the hope of settlement elsewhere is deferred. If no progress can be made with resettlement before the winter, the prospect is a serious one. It is most desirable, therefore, that His Majesty's Government should be in a position before September to inform the Council Committee whether they are prepared in principle to find a place of settlement for the Assyrians in the territories under their jurisdiction, even though it should prove impossible before that date to work out a concrete scheme in all its details.

16. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Air Ministry, India Office, Dominions Office, War Office and Treasury.

I am, &c.
C. F. A. WARNER.

(¹) Not printed.

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P.Z.
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EASTERN (IRAQ). June 16, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 3973/1/93] No. 1.

M. Oliván to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 16.)

League of Nations,
Geneva, June 11, 1934.

Sir,

THE Government of the United Kingdom will be aware of the efforts made by the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, on which they are represented, to fulfil the task laid upon it by the Council on the 14th October, 1933.

In its report to the Council of the 5th June, the committee was obliged to record the failure of a scheme for settlement in Brazil on which it had hitherto concentrated its main efforts. I enclose a copy of this report(¹) and of the report(²) upon it by the Council's *rapporteur* and of the resolution(²) adopted by the Council on the 7th June, 1934.

In pursuance of this resolution the committee now addresses an appeal, among others, to the Government of the United Kingdom.

The committee believes that the Government of the United Kingdom have already had under consideration, but so far without favourable result, the possibility of settling the Assyrians in the overseas territories under their jurisdiction. It ventures, however, to urge that this question may now be reconsidered in the light, not only of its urgent humanitarian aspect, but also of the difficulties which are to be anticipated if the Assyrian problem cannot be solved by the settlement outside Iraq of those members of the community who wish to leave that country and have declared their inability to remain there under present conditions. The Government of the United Kingdom, in view of their specially close relations with Iraq, will certainly realise the importance of this problem.

The enclosed documents show the concern of the committee and of the Council regarding the situation of the Assyrians of Iraq if the search for a place of settlement elsewhere should be prolonged, and I venture to draw attention in particular to the fourth paragraph of the Council's resolution of the 7th June, and to express the hope that the Government of the United Kingdom will be good enough to facilitate the committee's task by giving urgent consideration to the present appeal.

I have, &c.
J. LÓPEZ OLIVÁN,
President of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

(¹) June 11, 1934, Section 1. (²) June 12, 1934, Section 1.

[131 q—1]

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

June 11, 1934.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 3858/1/93]

No. 1.

[C. 244.1934.VII.]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by the Committee to the Council.—(*Received in Foreign Office, June* 11.)

THE Committee of the Council has thought it necessary to submit the present report to the Council at its current special session because a new fact has supervened which seriously affects the problem as a whole, and which it considers essential to lay before the Council forthwith, in order that the latter may be able in due time to take such action as the new situation may necessitate.

In its last report to the Council, dated the 15th May (C. 196.1934.VII), the committee reviewed the efforts it had made to perform the task which the Council had entrusted to it in October 1933, and which consisted in examining to what extent the settlement outside Iraq of the Assyrians who might wish to leave the country might be practicable. It will be remembered that this task was entrusted to the committee in order to help the Iraqi Government, and at the latter's express request.

The report dealt mainly with the plan for settlement on land situated in the State of Parana, in Brazil. In January the Brazilian Government declared its willingness, subject to certain conditions, to authorise the settlement of the Assyrians on this land, and the Council, in its resolution of the 19th January, 1934, warmly thanked it for this authorisation. Before discussing the conditions of settlement in detail, the committee thought it necessary to satisfy itself first of all that the Assyrians would adapt themselves to the conditions existing in the Parana and would become a useful element for Brazil. Accordingly, with the Brazilian Government's consent and with the Council's approval, a mission was sent to the region in question. The committee's report to the Council, dated the 15th May, summarised the conclusions reached by this mission.

But while the mission's report was absolutely favourable as regards its technical conclusions, it confirmed and supplemented the information already received by the committee with regard to growing opposition in Brazil to the arrival of the Assyrians. A press campaign, which found ardent supporters and propagandists, and which had serious repercussions, even in Parliament, developed in Brazil, and seemed to compromise seriously the final success of the plan.

Nevertheless, the committee still retained the hope that the Brazilian plan might finally be adopted. In any case, it realised that, apart from the above-mentioned campaign, the transfer of the Assyrians raised numerous delicate problems, and in its report to the Council of the 15th May it informed the Council that it could not say at that moment whether the plan would eventually be carried out. The report also said that as soon as circumstances permitted detailed negotiations would have to be entered into with the Brazilian Government in order to draw up a plan which would be acceptable to that Government. The committee had already taken unofficial steps to discover the most favourable moment for opening official negotiations, and had adjourned to await a reply. One week later, however, on the 25th May, 1934, the committee learnt that the Brazilian Constituent Assembly had voted the insertion, in the draft Constitution which it was examining, of a provision stipulating that immigration from any particular country should not exceed in any one year 2 per cent. of the total number of nationals of that country who had settled in Brazil during the last fifty years, and that the concentration of emigrants in any part of the national territory would be prohibited. As this measure seemed to remove all hope of settling the Assyrians in Brazil, the committee immediately met to study the new situation.

The committee decided to ask the Brazilian Government whether the offer made last January was really to be regarded as impracticable and as having been withdrawn.

The committee learnt on the 2nd June, 1934, that the Brazilian Government considered the arrival of the Assyrians as impossible in view of Parliament's decision.

During the long meetings which have recently been held, the committee has considered whether there were serious reasons for still hoping that land could be found for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq elsewhere than in Brazil.

We may recall here what was said in the report of the 15th May:—

> "In its search for a suitable destination for the Assyrians the committee felt bound to explore a wide field, and there is no continent in the world in which it has not considered possibilities."

But, as was to be expected, in view of the universal depression and unemployment and of the laws restricting all immigration, and as, indeed, the Council itself had anticipated, the committee encountered considerable difficulties. In certain cases it received definitely negative replies; in others the replies were not absolutely negative, but very discouraging; in other cases, again, it has not yet received a definite reply.

During the committee's deliberations on the steps that should now be taken, two views were discussed. One was that the committee might forthwith, without undertaking any further consultations, say that it was impossible, at the present juncture, to find any countries that were prepared to accept mass immigration on such a large scale. The contrary view was that, until it had exhausted every possibility and made every effort, the committee could not say whether it was possible to find lands or not. In support of this latter opinion it was observed that, from the outset of its work, the committee had concentrated its attention on the Brazilian plan, on account of the prospects of a speedy solution which it offered, and that, from the moment when, in its report to the Council, the committee had announced that the possibility of a settlement in Brazil was being thoroughly investigated, the other Governments consulted probably regarded themselves as thereby less bound to pursue their examination of the problem until a decision should have been reached as to the Brazilian plan. According to this view, the committee ought to make a fresh attempt without delay, because the attitude of the Governments so far consulted might be influenced if they knew that the Brazilian plan had failed, and if they could be convinced of the urgency of the question.

In any case, if a fresh effort were to be made to find lands, a fairly long period must be expected to elapse before the settlement of the Assyrians could actually take place. The committee sincerely trusts that this circumstance will have no unfortunate influence on the situation in Iraq. It felt that the Council should be fully informed of the present state of affairs.

The committee desires to remark that, when setting up the committee and defining its terms of reference, the Council expressed the hope that "until it has been possible to put into effect the arrangements" for the emigration of the Assyrians, "the Iraqi Government will be good enough to keep the committee regularly informed of the measures taken to ensure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist the families left destitute in consequence of those events, and to rebuild those villages which have been wholly or partially destroyed through the same events." The Iraqi Government has sent reports, which the committee has carefully studied, and regarding which it has asked the Iraqi Government for further information and details.

Clearly, however, the committee can in no case be responsible for any consequences the Assyrians might suffer owing to the delay in discovering a suitable site for their settlement or the impossibility of finding such a site.

When, at a recent meeting, the committee informed the representative of Iraq of the new situation created by the Brazilian Government's negative decision, it nevertheless felt bound to remind him of the solemn undertakings entered into by the Iraqi Government with regard to the safety and well-being of the Assyrians.

Geneva, June 5, 1934.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

June 12, 1934.

SECTION 1.

P.Z.
4445
1934

[E 3873/1/93]

No. 1.

[C. 245.1934.VII.]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by the Representative of Spain.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 12.)

MY colleagues on the Council will no doubt have learnt with regret from the report which the Committee of the Council has just submitted to us, that the hope of settling in Brazil the Assyrians of Iraq wishing to leave that country can no longer be realised.

I feel it my duty to point out incidentally that the Brazilian Government's decision is not directed against the settlement of the Assyrians in particular, but is a general measure, a new law which restricts all immigration into Brazil from whatever country it may come. The laws restricting immigration, which are almost universally adopted nowadays, have been one of the most serious obstacles, but not the only one, which our committee has encountered in the performance of its task. Its report gives us the details, and describes a situation which, in my opinion, calls for the Council's most serious attention.

It will be seen from this report that the committee's efforts—and we all know how great and unremitting they have been—have had no success up to the present; that, even assuming it to be possible, it will be very difficult to find land at the present time; and that, in the most favourable hypothesis, the Assyrians will have to remain in Iraq for a much longer time than had been anticipated.

What will be the consequences as regards the situation of the Assyrians of Iraq, who had conceived great hopes, and had for many months been living in expectation of an early departure? The Council has not yet forgotten the tragic events of last year; nor has it forgotten the guarantees, the pledges, and the solemn declarations of the Iraqi Government, and it cannot doubt that Government's good faith and its ability to observe these pledges. When the mandatory régime came to an end on the 30th May, 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq made a declaration at Bagdad containing the guarantees given to the Council by the Iraqi Government. In chapter I, paragraph 2, article 1 of this declaration reads: "Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of Iraq, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion."

Moreover, at this same Council table, as well as in the committee, the representatives of Iraq have repeatedly made formal declarations and assumed a definite undertaking on behalf of their Government, not only to guarantee the security of the Assyrians, but to succour them and provide for their welfare during the whole of the time they may still have to remain in Iraq.

It will be incumbent on the Governments to which the committee may apply to assist it in its task, and on the Iraqi Government to abide by its undertaking regarding the security and welfare of the Assyrians. If you accept this report and the resolution your *rapporteur* is submitting to you, the Council will confine itself to making a last effort through its committee to find land, and if it succeeds, to preparing a plan in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government for the settlement of the Assyrians who may express the desire to emigrate.

I propose that the Council adopt the following resolution:—

The Council,

1. Takes note of the report of the Committee of the Council for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq;
2. Approves the report of its *rapporteur*, the representative of Spain;

[131 m—1]

3. Instructs the Committee of the Council to persist in its efforts, and to make fresh representations to the Governments of countries the territories of which might lend themselves to the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq who express the desire to leave that country, in order that it may be able, as soon as possible, to inform the Council definitely whether the settlement of these Assyrians elsewhere than in Iraq is at present realisable;
4. Addresses an urgent appeal to the Governments to which the Committee of the Council may make requests, to give favourable consideration to such requests, and to facilitate the committee's task in view of the great importance of the problem;
5. Draws the Iraqi Government's special attention to its declaration made at Bagdad on the 30th May, 1932, on the occasion of the expiration of the mandatory system in Iraq, and containing the guarantees given to the Council by the Iraqi Government, in pursuance of which it formally pledged itself, among other things, to afford all inhabitants of Iraq full and complete protection of life and liberty, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion;
6. Notes that the representative of Iraq has on several occasions given assurances to the Committee of the Council that Iraq would take measures in favour of the Assyrian population, more particularly in the matter of security, health and assistance, while the efforts to arrange an emigration plan were in progress.

Geneva, June 5, 1934.

Jugtia 210

INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3856/11/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
4598
1934

E & O.
4571
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Keep

Foreign Office,
11 July, 1934.

13/7

MAILS BRANCH
12 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 3749/1/93 of July 6.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva No 80 of 10 June	Record of 232nd meeting of June 8 of Assyrian Committee

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 29
19 JUL. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
12 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

June 11, 1934.

SECTION 4.

[E 3856/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 80.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirty-second meeting of the Council Committee on the 8th June, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, June 10, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of Thirty-Second Meeting of the Council Committee held on June 8 at 10 A.M.

THE meeting was attended by Mr. Johnson of the Nansen Office.

The President explained to Mr. Johnson that in pursuance of the Council's resolution of the previous day the committee now proposed to make further efforts to find a place of settlement for the Assyrians, and they would be grateful for any suggestions which the Nansen Office could make regarding possible destinations.

Mr. Johnson said that he had only just received the committee's report to the Council and the *rapporteur's* report upon it. He himself was in a somewhat difficult position as the president of the Nansen Office was at present ill in a nursing home and it had been specially requested that he should not be troubled with business during the whole of the present week. He had not, therefore, felt justified, until he knew what exactly the committee wished, in discussing the question of Assyrian settlement with him since the breakdown of the Brazilian scheme. He himself was instructed by his governing body to help the Council Committee in regard to the Brazilian scheme, but his instructions were at present limited to that. He did not wish in any way to suggest that the governing body would not be prepared to co-operate in finding an alternative solution. He could not, however commit them, and he suggested if the committee desired this co-operation they should address a communication in that sense to the governing body. With that reservation, Mr. Johnson observed that he knew there were other possibilities which appeared worth consideration.

The President said that his request was so simple that he did not think it necessary to address a formal communication to the Nansen Office. Naturally, he did not wish Mr. Johnson to go beyond his instructions or to commit the governing body in any way. But the committee merely desired to have an indication of possibilities elsewhere than in Brazil in the light of the Nansen Office's experience. He did not wish to press Mr. Johnson, however, if the latter did not think he could go even so far as this.

Mr. Johnson said that, on the contrary, he was perfectly ready to indicate certain possibilities. He observed that while the Brazilian scheme was under consideration he had submitted an alternative proposal for settlement in Missiones in the Argentine. In addition to this, there were other prospects in the Argentine which, at first sight, seemed attractive. The Nansen Office also knew of possi-

[131 l—4]

bilities in Bolivia and in Paraguay, and from the purely technical point of view, at all events, the prospects were good in these two countries. Moreover, Mr. Johnson understood that several countries had recently indicated their willingness to take fairly large bodies of Jewish refugees from Germany. His information was to the effect that offers had been received from Mexico, British Honduras, Angola, Tanganyika, Kenya, South-West Africa, Ecuador and Colombia. He would be glad to obtain more detailed information about these offers and to see whether they could, if necessary, be adapted to the case of the Assyrian refugees. He suggested that three other countries deserving of consideration were Abyssinia, the Belgian Congo and Mozambique.

The President asked two questions. When Mr. Johnson said that these areas were possible, did he mean that they were possible merely from the technical point of view, or that the countries concerned were prepared to authorise Assyrian immigration? The president recalled that in Brazil the technical possibilities had been good, but that the scheme had broken down because of the failure of the Government to authorise immigration.

Mr. Johnson said that in the Argentine, Bolivia and Paraguay, the prospects were good from the technical point of view. Moreover, the Nansen Office had already sent Russian refugees to these countries. As regards the other countries which he had mentioned, he was not aware of the attitude of the Governments concerned. He understood, however, that they were willing to accept Jewish refugees from Germany.

The President took note of what Mr. Johnson had said, and added that the committee would begin the necessary exploration and if it found the Governments concerned ready to consider Assyrian immigration, it would probably take the same course as in the case of Brazil of inviting the co-operation of the Nansen Office.

The Danish Representative asked whether, when Mr. Johnson said that certain schemes were suitable from the technical point of view, he was to be understood as meaning that they were climatically suitable.

Mr. Johnson replied that in his opinion the countries mentioned were suitable both from the climatic point of view and from the point of view of general settlement.

He asked whether he was to understand that it was still the desire of the committee that the Nansen Office, in exploring possibilities, should not approach the Governments concerned. In this connexion he wished to point out that direct approach to Governments was not necessarily the best method of procedure. His experience had suggested that approaches to private interests offered the best prospect of success. The Nansen Office in its early days had begun by sending out broadcast appeals to Governments. These had been without result, and it had had to proceed on other lines—namely, to interest private concerns in certain proposals and work through those private concerns. Governments, if approached direct, were apt to return negative replies, as no Government really wanted refugees. On the other hand, if the Nansen Office were in a position to inform private interests that it had certain refugees for settlement who were likely to be satisfactory, influence could be brought to bear on the Governments concerned.

The Danish Representative asked whether this was not a question of history rather than actuality. Was it possible, under present conditions, to ask private interests to take as many as 20,000 immigrants? In any case, recent experience in Brazil had shown the disappointments which were likely when working through private interests.

The President said that the committee would bear in mind Mr. Johnson's observations, and, when it had decided how to proceed, it would no doubt ask the Nansen Office for further assistance.

(Mr. Johnson then withdrew.)

The President then asked the committee to consider what Governments should now be approached in pursuance of the Council's resolution of the 7th June. The Secretariat had prepared a list of possible countries, and these were grouped according to varying conditions. It was proposed to send a letter

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in the first place to certain members of the committee, namely Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. In the case of Canada and the Argentine, from whom so far no reply had been received, a rather different form of letter would be required. Again, it would be necessary to press Australia, South Africa, and possibly New Zealand, to reconsider their previous decisions, and it was proposed that appeals should be made to certain countries not hitherto approached, namely, Turkey, Greece, Holland and Portugal. In view of Mr. Johnson's remarks, the committee should perhaps consider also Bolivia and Paraguay. As certain members of the committee could spare little time in view of other meetings, he suggested that the meeting should merely agree upon the general lines of the drafts to be sent out, leaving it to the president to approve the actual text.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had discussed possible drafts with the League Secretariat. So far as the countries represented on the committee were concerned, there was no difficulty. The Governments knew the facts and the importance and urgency of the problem. A simple appeal was all that was required. As regards other Governments, however, there was a point of principle on which the committee should take a decision. The original intention of the Secretariat had been to send out short letters, simply containing a collection of documents leading up to the proceedings of the Council on the 7th June, and enquiring whether the Governments concerned were now prepared to consider favourably the possibility of receiving the Assyrians. In his view, this was not enough. The committee ought now to make a great final effort. He thought that if a mere enquiry and a number of documents were sent to Governments, the enquiry would not be very seriously considered. He thought that the letters ought to contain a recapitulation of the problem, so as to bring its importance and urgency at once to the attention of Governments.

There was general agreement with the proposal of the United Kingdom representative, and it was decided that drafts should be circulated during the day, and that, if possible, the members of the committee should inform the president on the same day of any observations which they wished to make. In the absence of such observations by 7 P.M., the president would assume that the drafts were approved.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had been thinking over the question whether it was worth while approaching Australia and New Zealand again. He understood that, in the case of Australia, even if the political difficulties could be overcome, the only territory which might be made available was in the north-west. It was undeveloped territory, and settlement there would be a long and gradual process, even if investigation showed it to be practicable. The possibility could not, of course, be ruled out on that account, and he thought Australia ought to be approached once more. In the case of New Zealand, however, he did not think any useful purpose would be served by a fresh approach.

It was agreed to approach Australia, but not New Zealand.

The President then raised the question of communicating to the Assyrians the terms of the Council's resolution of the 7th June. His view was that it would be most appropriate for the position to be explained to the Assyrians by the Iraqi Government, and, if the committee agreed, he would suggest to the Iraqi representative that his Government should take this course through the medium of the local committee under Major Thomson's presidency.

The president was authorised to act accordingly.

The President then referred to the request which the French representative had made at the previous meeting regarding an approach to the Nansen Office, in order to have instructions sent to M. Burnier to co-operate with the French authorities in Syria in regard to the transfer to Syria of the families now in Iraq of those Assyrians who fled to Syria last summer.

The president suggested that the committee should take note of the present position of this question, and should send a letter to the Nansen Office on the lines desired by the French representative.

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The French Representative said that he would like the letter to the Nansen Office to mention the French Government's letter of the 9th January (C.Min.Ass.18), and he hoped that the Nansen Office might be approached urgently and asked to send telegraphic instructions to M. Burnier.

M. Arocha questioned the advisability of sending the French Government's letter of the 9th January to the Nansen Office. The first condition laid down in that letter was that the French Government should act under a mandate from the Council of the League, and it was not within the power of the committee to decide upon such a mandate.

The French Representative said that the important points were the third and fourth conditions laid down in the French Government's letter of the 9th January. The French Government were particularly anxious to have the assistance of the Nansen Office representative in certain aspects of the question. They attached particular importance to the accounts being kept by a neutral person.

It was agreed that the French representative and M. Arocha should draw up the terms of a draft letter to the Nansen Office for the president's approval.

The Danish Representative referred to a proposal which had been made at an earlier meeting, that a letter should be addressed to the Spanish Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, thanking him for the work he had done on behalf of the committee in connexion with the Brazilian scheme.

The President suggested that the drafting of this letter should be left to him.

The Danish Representative said that he would like the letter to be more than a mere formality. He thought that the Spanish Ambassador had had a very difficult and disagreeable task, and had made great efforts on behalf of the committee. Moreover, his judgment throughout had been justified by events, and he would like the letter of thanks to be a very warm tribute to the Ambassador.

The United Kingdom Representative associated himself with this suggestion.

M. Arocha raised the question whether the letters which it was proposed to address to various Governments should be communicated for information to the Iraqi representative.

It was agreed that this should be done.

The President observed that certain explanations which the Iraqi representative had been asked to obtain regarding the situation reports of his Government had never been received. He thought that the Iraqi representative ought to be reminded, and while he was perfectly prepared to do this orally, he preferred to do it by letter.

It was agreed that this would be preferable in order to mark the importance which the committee attached to the matter, though the letters should, of course, be worded very courteously.

A further short discussion took place regarding the appeals to Governments, and it was agreed that, in present circumstances, it would be preferable not to approach Bolivia or Paraguay. It was decided, however, to approach Belgium in relation to the Belgian Congo.

The President said that, as regards future procedure, he did not think it was necessary for the committee to meet again unless serious difficulties arose regarding the draft appeals to various Governments. The next meeting must therefore depend on when replies were received to these appeals. It might not be necessary for the committee to meet until all the replies were received. If, however, within a reasonable time of the Council meeting in September—say, one month previously—replies were still outstanding, the president would consider himself justified in calling a new meeting of the committee, in order to bring further pressure to bear on the Governments concerned.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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Reg.
Pl. send copy of the letter
to India
Sent 9.7.

Mr. Walton

We might, I think let the G/I know what action we took on their telegram. Wd. there be any objection to sending them a copy of Mr. Wakely's lr. to Sir G. Rounsey?

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Name and Date

Delegation

Geneva

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3749/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

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1934

India 214
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NC

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
6 July, 1934.

P.Z. 4445
M'L 5/7

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 3260/1/93 of 9 June

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva	Assyrians: records
No 71 of 4 June	of 28th meeting of 31 May
72 .. 4 ..	29th .. .. 31 ..
73 .. 4 ..	30th .. .. 1 June.
76 .. 6 ..	31st .. .. 4 ..
	of League Assyrian Committee

REGD. POL. DEPT.
17 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 28 12 JUL. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
W.O
A.M.
Treas.

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1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

June 6, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 3737/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 71.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the twenty-eighth meeting of the Council Committee, on the 31st May, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, June 4, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on May 31, 1934, *at* 3·30 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to give his personal impressions on the situation which had now arisen.

He first drew attention to the memorandum circulated by the Secretariat (C.Min.Ass.39), describing the approaches made to various Governments, and the replies received.

M. Arocha intervened to say that a negative reply from Mexico had just come in.

The President continued that, in addition to the telegram of the 25th May from the Spanish Ambassador, which had already been circulated, he had received a private letter from the Ambassador, dated the 17th May, which did not bring out any fresh facts, but which made it quite clear that there was no hope of the Brazilian scheme being put into effect. The letter said that the situation had become worse since Brigadier Browne's return, and that opinion expressed both in the press and in Parliament was almost unanimous against accepting the Assyrians. The president felt that, while the Brazilian Government's attitude was not definitely known, there was evidently much less hope than before as regards the Brazilian scheme—in fact, there was practically no hope. The Secretariat's memorandum showed that all countries approached, except the Argentine and Canada, had returned an unfavourable reply. He thought it was fairly clear that no favourable reply could be expected from the Argentine, and the United Kingdom representative at an earlier stage had referred to the difficulties in Canada. He wondered, therefore, whether as the Council was now meeting, the committee ought not to take the opportunity of referring the whole question back to it. They could say that they had done their best to fulfil the task given to them by the Council; that, although the attitude of the Brazilian Government was not yet officially known, the position there was not hopeful; that the committee had no indication that any other Governments would return a favourable reply; that the situation of the Assyrians meanwhile gave rise to anxiety; and that the committee thought it necessary, therefore, to submit the whole problem to the Council for the latter to take a decision as to further action.

The president added that the position of the Assyrians was evidently getting worse every day, and the months ahead were the most dangerous in the year. The committee, therefore, could not take the heavy responsibility of delaying a report until September. It was possible, of course, to object that, so long as the Brazilian Government had not definitely declared their attitude, it was

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ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 28 12 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

unnecessary to do anything. This was no doubt partly right, but he thought it was inadvisable to be too juridical and formal. The basis of the despatch of the Mission of Investigation to Brazil was a message from the Spanish Ambassador indicating that the Brazilian Government would accept the Assyrians under certain conditions. A message from the same source, indicating that settlement was now impracticable, seemed to him good enough.

The Italian Representative said that the main point was the urgency of the problem. It had always been realised that a quick solution was necessary. Now that the Brazilian scheme was obviously hopeless and the prospect of obtaining replies from other Governments was remote, to continue the process of obtaining formal replies from every Government, in order to say that every possibility had been exhausted, would only prolong the delay. He shared the president's view, therefore, and thought that as the Council was in session, it was the duty of the committee to place the problem once more before it. The responsibility of not doing so was one which the committee could not take.

The Mexican Representative could not see any prospect of a solution between the present time and September. The committee's last report to the Council would have created a somewhat optimistic view regarding the possibilities of the Brazilian scheme, and he thought it really urgent to let the Council know the position.

The Danish Representative said that he fully shared the president's anxiety about delaying a report, but he thought that the committee must make up its mind as to what could be expected from the Council if the question was referred to that body. It seemed to him that the Council would first ask certain questions. They would ask why the committee had not pursued negotiations with the countries which had been approached. In this connexion he asked whether the countries mentioned in the League Secretariat's memorandum were really all that had been approached by the committee. His impression was that more had been approached, and that other possibilities suggested by the Nansen Office had also been considered. In the second place, he expected that the Council would ask whether the committee could not make some definite proposal. It was not enough merely to tell the public through the Council that the committee had failed in its task. The only result would be to create depression among the Assyrians and in the League.

The United Kingdom Representative said he realised the necessity of reporting to the Council that the Brazilian scheme had broken down once this fact had been definitely established. He could not agree, however, that the committee would be justified in reporting in that sense to the Council at present. Since the Spanish Ambassador's telegram of the 25th May, certain more detailed information had been received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Rio. It appeared, in fact, that what had been passed by the Constituent Assembly was not a special measure, but a provision for insertion in the Constitution which had been under elaboration for some time and which was expected to be completed in some ten days' time. It was not entirely clear what the effect of this provision would be or when it would come into force, but it was clear that it was not yet actually in force, and he did not think that the committee was yet in a position to assume that the Brazilian Government would now withdraw the offer made in January. In this connexion he referred to the president's statement that Brigadier Browne's mission had gone out to Brazil on the strength of a message from the Spanish Ambassador. That was not entirely correct. The Spanish Ambassador had reported a definite offer made to him by the Brazilian Government. Moreover, this offer had been confirmed, he thought, to other Governments. Certainly, it had been confirmed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by the Brazilian Ambassador in London under instructions from his Government. It was, therefore, perfectly definite. It was an offer from the Brazilian Government, and he thought that the committee could not assume that that offer was withdrawn or impracticable of fulfilment until the Brazilian Government said so. He thought, therefore, that the first step must be to get a definite statement from the Brazilian Government regarding their attitude. But even if that attitude were unfavourable, he could not agree that the committee had exhausted its task and that it was in a position to tell the Council that there was little prospect of finding a destination elsewhere. The committee had so far

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not made a serious effort to find a destination elsewhere. They had merely addressed an enquiry to certain Governments, and had meanwhile investigated a scheme which happened to be available in the archives of the Nansen Office. That scheme had been found suitable, and the committee had not therefore, followed up the search for alternatives. He felt strongly that, if the Brazilian scheme failed, it would be necessary for the committee to approach once more those Governments which had either not yet replied finally or had returned an equivocal reply, and also to consider whether any other Governments should be approached. For instance, no official request had yet been addressed to the Governments represented on the committee itself, though the various members had undertaken at an earlier stage to find out whether their Governments would be prepared to accept the Assyrians. He could not, of course, say whether it would be possible to find an alternative, but, at all events, the Governments concerned would probably view the matter in a different light once the Brazilian scheme was definitely out of the running. He did not think that the committee needed any fresh mandate from the Council to continue this further search, and, indeed, it need not necessarily await a definite reply from the Brazilian Government before beginning it.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom representative strongly supported the view which had been expressed by the Danish representative that, before referring the question to the Council, it was necessary to consider what action the Council could take. The question of the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, if there was long delay, had been raised, and he thought this needed very careful consideration by the committee before anything was said to the Council. It was true that the terms of reference of the committee laid upon it no specific task in relation to this aspect of the question. The *rapporteur's* report of last October had merely expressed the hope that the Iraqi Government would keep the committee regularly informed of the position. That, of course, implied that the committee was to concern itself to some extent with the situation of the Assyrians, and it could not shirk this task. It had, of course, no power to take any special measures, but, at all events, the United Kingdom representative thought that, before any reference was made to the Council, the committee ought to see the Iraqi representative and ask him what measures the Iraqi Government proposed to take in view of the delay which must now be anticipated.

The French Representative, who had entered the meeting rather late, expressed himself, after the position had been explained to him, as being in favour of reporting to the Council that the committee had exhausted the possibilities and asking for fresh instructions.

The President said that he would answer the remarks made by the Danish representative first. If the committee did not report the position to the Council, and if anything were to happen in Iraq between now and September, the committee would be responsible. The Danish representative had intimated that, by referring the matter to the Council, the latter might be placed in a difficult position and would ask certain questions of the committee. The president said that this prospect did not worry him. The Council was the proper organ to take the necessary decisions. It might ask the committee to continue its work and to press other Governments to accept the Assyrians. If so, he was perfectly prepared to continue the committee's task. If he recommended a report now, it was because the Council was sitting. Had that not been the case, his action might have been different, but it must be realised that this was not a mere question of whether this Government or that had returned a definite reply. In the present economic situation of the world, it was obviously a most difficult problem to settle so many people, and he did not think there was any prospect of any country accepting the Assyrians. He would be glad to take all responsibility for any course which offered a solution, but he had the conviction that it was going to be extremely difficult to find a solution. The more delay there was, the more danger to the Assyrians. He did not attach too much importance to the Mar Shimun's petitions, or to the press campaign which was being carried on, but the Assyrian situation was obviously delicate. He did not think it would be necessary to say definitely that there was no hope of settling the Assyrians, but at least the committee ought to say that they feared settlement in Brazil would be impossible, and that, while they had no reply from certain Governments, *e.g.*, Canada, they had no reason to hope that these countries would be willing to accept the Assyrians. He admitted that this was all hypothetical, but he thought it necessary to give the Council a true picture of the situation.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he did not think the alternative lay between an immediate report and a report to the Council in September. It would be open to the committee at any moment to report to the Council if it thought that the situation required it.

The President interjected that it would be difficult to expect the Council to meet for the Assyrian question alone.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought that that would be for the Council to decide, and they would have to do so with due regard for the seriousness of the situation. In any case he thought that the committee ought to be guided chiefly not by considerations of its own responsibility, but by what was going to be in the best ultimate interests of the Assyrians. He felt himself that to rush matters at the moment was not going to be in the best interests of the Assyrians. The whole question obviously needed the most careful consideration before any action was taken.

The Danish Representative asked of what utility the Council could really be in protecting the Assyrians between now and September. The action of the Council would in any case depend to a large extent on the proposals which the six Governments represented on the committee could bring to the Council. If these six Governments, with their knowledge of the problem, failed to make any proposal, surely the prospect of a useful decision by the Council was small. When it was known that the Brazilian scheme had failed, the juridical point whether there was an official Brazilian reply to this effect or not might not matter very much; but while the committee need not take too juridical a view on that matter, let it beware of taking too juridical a point of view regarding the necessity of reference of the question at this stage to the Council. It was necessary to think out what the Council could do. If the Council were to meet to-morrow and receive a negative report, what would happen the day after in Iraq? The present proposal to refer the matter to the Council was a negative one. It contained no positive suggestion. He agreed that it was not so much the responsibility of the committee that was involved as the interests of the Assyrians.

The President agreed that it was inadvisable to take too juridical an attitude; at the same time the committee must not go beyond its mandate. It was not bound to make proposals to the Council. The Council might certainly ask the committee to take on a further task. If the Assyrians could not leave Iraq, the Council might ask what the committee proposed. They might ask the committee to consider the question of resettlement in Iraq, or they might set up some other body for that purpose. In any case, with or without a report to the Council at this stage, the news of the failure of the Brazilian scheme was bound to become public, and his desire was to report to the Council at once in order to clear up an equivocal situation. He was quite ready to meet the United Kingdom representative to the extent of intimating that the prospects of settlement, though doubtful, were not yet exhausted, but he was opposed to letting the matter drag on without any report to the Council until September. Even a report, say in a fortnight's time when the Council had risen, would not be sufficient. He must adhere to his intention of reporting to the Council at its present session. He hoped that the committee would be able to agree unanimously on this course. So far the committee had proceeded by unanimity, and he did not wish to have to resort to a majority vote. He himself had unfortunately to leave the committee in order to attend another meeting. He suggested that the members of the committee should, in his absence, continue to discuss the matter in private, in the hope that the Danish representative, at all events, would be able to change his opinion.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought there was much more to be done before a report could be presented to the Council. The latter would naturally be anxious about the situation in Iraq, and would want to know how the committee proposed to deal with this. It was impossible for the committee, at short notice and without giving the Iraqi Government any chance to consider the situation, to go to the Council and to report that the situation of the Assyrians was precarious. The committee certainly had no power to ask the

Iraqi Government to adopt any particular measures, but at least they ought to consult with the Iraqi representative and allow him time to refer to his Government as to whether any particular measures for safeguarding the Assyrians were practicable.

The Danish Representative agreed that the position of the Government of Iraq in the event of an immediate report to the Council ought to be taken into consideration.

The Italian Representative suggested that the report should be merely an objective one describing what the situation was at the moment.

The United Kingdom Representative again urged that for this the committee ought to try to find out definitely what the attitude of the Brazilian Government was. It was quite possible to send a telegram immediately, and the reply should not be long delayed.

The President said that he might consider a telegram to the Brazilian Government, but in any case he must insist on a report to the Council at the present session.

The Danish Representative asked whether the Iraqi delegate was aware of the Spanish Ambassador's latest telegram.

M. Arocha replied in the negative. The Iraqi permanent delegate was on leave and M. Shabandar was at present in charge. He had merely informed M. Shabandar that the prospects of the Brazilian scheme were at present poor.

The Danish Representative said that this raised the whole question of the relation of the committee with Iraq. It was the duty of the committee, under its terms of reference, to keep in touch with the Iraqi representative about the situation of the Assyrians, and he thought the Iraqi representative must certainly be approached before a report was made to the Council.

The President said that this was not, of course, excluded.

The president then left the meeting and a private discussion followed between the remainder of the members. Discussion was somewhat confused and it is unnecessary to report it in detail. It was eventually agreed that it would be an advantage to clear up the Brazilian Government's attitude if possible before reporting to the Council, and that it would be necessary to consult the Iraqi representative.

The United Kingdom Representative made it clear that he would have no objection to reporting to the Council that the Brazilian scheme had failed once this was definitely established. In his view, the report ought to go on to say that the committee was naturally pursuing other alternatives, but that it had considered it necessary to report the situation to the Council in view of the delay involved. Reference might also be made to the anxiety which the committee felt regarding the situation of the Assyrians during this delay, and the report might say that the committee—although not invested with any powers in this matter under its terms of reference—had nevertheless taken it up with the Iraqi Government and would report again to the Council if need arose.

It was agreed that a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro should be drafted for consideration at a meeting at 9 P.M.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

June 6, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 3738/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 72.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the twenty-ninth meeting of the Council Committee, on the 31st May, 1934, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, June 4, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on May 31, 1934, *at* 9 P.M.

THE meeting had before it a draft telegram (Annex A) to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro, which had been prepared by the United Kingdom representative and M. Arocha.

The President said that he was ready to send this telegram, subject to two observations: Firstly, if, when the final moment arrived for putting the question on the agenda of the Council during its present session, no reply had come from the Spanish Ambassador, he reserved the right to raise the question again of referring the matter to the Council. Secondly, if a reply were received which was indefinite, he also maintained his wish to refer to the Council, unless, of course, the reply showed that real hope of carrying through the Brazilian scheme still existed, in spite of present expectations.

The Italian, Mexican and French Representatives agreed to the text with the same reservations.

The Danish Representative agreed to the text and to a fresh meeting to consider reference to the Council in the cases contemplated by the president.

The President then suggested that a draft of a report to the Council should be drawn up, and that it should be worded in such a way as to try to meet the difficulties of those members of the committee who did not at present agree to a report to the Council. He thought that it should be very concise, and should simply report to the Council that the Brazilian scheme had failed, and that, though the prospects of settlement elsewhere had not been exhausted, no suitable alternative was at present feasible.

The Danish Representative asked whether it was not proposed to put anything in the report about the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq.

The President replied that on this point he had not yet made up his mind.

The Danish Representative said that, if the situation of the Assyrians were to be mentioned, the committee ought to consider first, with the Iraqi representative, the situation created by the decision of the Brazilian Constituent Assembly.

Furthermore, there were points in the latest situation reports (C. Min. Ass. 36 and 38) submitted by the Iraqi Government which required comment. The state of health in the refugee camp at Mosul was alarming.

The President agreed that the situation would have to be discussed with the Iraqi representative before a report were made to the Council. If, however, the matter were to be discussed with him, the committee must prevent him from disclaiming responsibility and placing it upon the committee.

The Danish Representative said that it would, of course, no doubt be necessary for the Iraqi representative to refer to his Government before he could say anything definite.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this would certainly be the case if the committee intended to make any specific suggestion to the Iraqi representative.

The President asked what suggestions the United Kingdom representative would propose.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this would very largely depend on what the committee decided to do with the latest petitions from the Mar Shimun (C. Min. Ass. 37 and 40). An earlier petition of the 3rd May had been referred to the Iraqi Government for observations. Was it proposed to follow the same procedure with the new petitions, and was it proposed to make any reference to these petitions in reporting to the Council?

The President expressed the view that the committee ought to follow the ordinary minorities procedure. In reply to an observation by M. Arocha, that if the Council had removed the question from the ordinary minorities procedure, it might perhaps be supposed to have left liberty to the Assyrian Committee to deal with further petitions, he said that, naturally, the committee had a wide discretion, but the Iraqi Government, on their side, could not be expected to do anything which they would not be required to do under the ordinary minorities procedure. He thought that the best course for the committee to take was to act precisely as though it was a Committee of Three. It would be guided by the Minorities Section as to whether the petitions were receivable and what procedure should be adopted regarding them.

M. Arocha said that the usual course was for the secretariat to decide whether the petitions were receivable. In the affimative case, they were referred to the Government concerned for observations, and usually were not circulated to the Council until the observations of the Government concerned had been received.

The President said that he was quite prepared to follow the same procedure in this case. He agreed that if a report were made to the Council it would be necessary to mention the Assyrian situation, and he would like to summon the Iraqi representative, and ask him what the Iraqi Government proposed to do if settlement in Brazil proved impossible.

M. Arocha suggested that the report should mention that the committee understood its task to be only to find land for settlement, and not to include any responsibility for the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. Also, the committee might profit by the present occasion to try to send out some sort of independent observer to Iraq.

The President said that as regards the first point he did not think it was necessary for the committee to point out that it had no responsibility for the situation of the Assyrians, as that was implicit in its terms of reference. As regards measures to be taken for the security and well-being of the Assyrians pending settlement, the responsibility lay with the Iraqi Government, and it was undesirable to have that responsibility placed either on the committee or on the Council. If a neutral observer were sent to Iraq, that would be the beginning of entailing responsibility on the League. One could, of course, consider this question from the juridical point of view, and also from the point of view of public opinion. Juridically, no responsibility lay with the committee. For the purpose of public opinion he wished to remove any impression that responsibility lay with it by laying the situation before the Council.

The Mexican Representative said that the committee was clearly not responsible for what might happen in Iraq, as it had no means of supervising the situation there. He suggested that the report should refer in quite general terms to the situation of the Assyrians. He thought, in particular, that it might allude to the unsatisfactory situation at present existing in the camp in the matter of health. The number of deaths which had recently taken place was much too high.

In the somewhat confused discussion which followed, mention was made of the possibility of the committee proceeding with the task of resettlement in Iraq if the prospects of settlement outside Iraq were unfavourable.

The President said that the problem of settlement in Iraq could only arise when the possibility of settlement outside had definitely been ruled out. The two tasks could not be pursued simultaneously, but so long as the question of settlement outside Iraq was under consideration, a certain responsibility would rest upon the committee if it did not draw the attention of the Council to the dangers involved in delay.

M. Arocha took the view that if the committee's work were suspended pending a definite reply from Brazil and in the meantime something happened in Iraq, the committee could hardly escape responsibility for having left the Assyrians to the mercy of the Iraqi Government, if they had taken no special steps to satisfy themselves that the situation of the Assyrians was satisfactory. The report to the Council might make it clear that neither the committee nor the Council had, in fact, any responsibility. At the same time, it might be a useful preventive measure to have some independent observer in Iraq to watch affairs.

The President said that he agreed as regards the report to the Council. The question of an independent observer, however, was an extremely difficult one, and would be best left until the question of resettlement in Iraq arose.

The Danish Representative said at the same time it would be extremely useful if the Iraqi Government could be induced to offer some form of independent investigation.

General agreement was expressed with this view.

The President then repeated that his idea was that the report to the Council should be purely objective and confined to facts. It should be left to the *rapporteur* to express any opinion. It might be that the *rapporteur* would wish to suggest that the Council should decide whether the committee should proceed further in its search for a destination, or whether the idea of settlement outside Iraq could now be abandoned. In the latter case, it might be necessary to contemplate immediate measures for settlement in Iraq and to appoint a special League Committee to consider this matter, or to give the present committee further powers. Alternatively, of course, the matter might be left entirely in the hands of the Iraqi Government. The drafting of the *rapporteur's* report would naturally be a matter of some difficulty, and would have to take into account the views of all concerned, but he thought it was best that the committee's report should be confined entirely to facts, and that the conclusions should be left to the *rapporteur*.

The Danish and United Kingdom Representatives expressed some doubt whether they could agree entirely with this procedure.

The United Kingdom Representative, in particular, urged again that the committee should not abandon the idea of settlement outside Iraq at the present stage, or encourage the Council to do so. Every effort must be made to find a new destination. The committee had no right to shirk this duty simply because it would take time. The real question which they had to face was whether they were honestly prepared to leave the Assyrians under present circumstances in Iraq without further effort.

Various possible destinations were then discussed. It was pointed out that the Mar Shimun had suggested Canada, Turkey and Syria.

M. Arocha said that he had ascertained from a Turkish colleague on the secretariat that there was definitely no chance of the Turkish Government agreeing. M. Arocha pointed out that the Mar Shimun had also suggested Syria.

The French Representative indicated that this was a very difficult question.

The United Kingdom Representative asked whether the possibility of settlement in the Lebanon had been considered by the French Government, and whether it was possible to hope for anything in that direction. He understood that the Lebanon was predominantly Christian, and naturally suggested itself therefore.

The French Representative feared that the Lebanon was quite impossible, mainly for economic reasons. In reply to a question, he said that it was not a matter of finding the necessary finance for settlement. It was rather a question of general economic and labour conditions in the Lebanon.

The President said that he was quite prepared unofficially to sound the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether settlement in Turkey was possible. He was also prepared to sound the Greek representative as to whether there was any hope in Crete, which had been tentatively suggested in general discussion. As regards the *rapporteur's* report, he hoped to get a unanimous report on the basis of facts as they were. He must, however, reserve his liberty as *rapporteur* regarding the contents of the report which he would have to furnish to the Council as *rapporteur*.

It was agreed that a meeting should be held with the Iraqi representative on the following day to ask questions about the latest situation report from the Iraqi Government. It was also agreed that the Iraqi representative should be informed of the position in Brazil.

Meanwhile, *the President* asked the United Kingdom representative, in spite of the fact that the latter was not at present in favour of a report to the Council, whether he would assist the committee by preparing the draft of a report which might be presented to the Council if the Brazilian attitude were cleared up.

The United Kingdom Representative said that, in all the circumstances, he hardly felt able to accept this task, and on his proposal it was entrusted to M. Arocha.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Annex A.

Draft Telegram to Spanish Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro.

Your telegram of 25th May. With a view to report to Council now sitting, committee desires to know definitely attitude of Brazilian Government. Committee would be grateful, therefore, if you would ascertain urgently whether January offer must be considered as impracticable of fulfilment and withdrawn.

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P.Z.
4482
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

June 6, 1934.

SECTION 3.

[E 3739/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

(No 73.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirtieth meeting of the Council Committee on the 1st June, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, June 4, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Council Committee held on June 1, 1934, at 3·30 P.M.

THE members of the committee first met in private to decide on the line to take with the Iraqi representative, who had been asked to attend.

The President and the majority of the committee were at first opposed to speaking to the Iraqi representative at this stage about the responsibility of the Iraqi Government during the period of delay which must be anticipated if the Brazilian scheme definitely failed. They were inclined to leave this until after a report had been presented to the Council. The United Kingdom and Danish representatives, however, urged that it was necessary to take this question up before the committee reported to the Council, and that it might save time to speak to the Iraqi representative now on a hypothetical basis rather than call a further special meeting for the purpose before reporting to the Council. Eventually, it was decided to follow this course.

The question was also discussed of suggesting to the Iraqi representative for his Government's consideration that they should take the initiative in offering some form of independent investigation into the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. It was decided that while some such suggestion might be opportune, it would be better for the president to make it privately rather than in a full meeting of the committee.

(M. Shabandar then joined the meeting.)

The President said that he had invited M. Shabandar in order to explain to him the present situation, and to ask certain questions arising out of the recent reports of the Iraqi Government. M. Shabandar would be aware of the agitation which had for some time past been carried on in Brazil against the Assyrian emigration scheme. The committee had recently received reports which showed that the situation in Brazil was now worse. A law had been voted which affected the problem, in the sense of making emigration more difficult. The attitude of the Brazilian Government towards the Assyrian scheme in the light of these developments was not yet known, and the committee had taken steps to clear up the position. Meanwhile, they wished to tell M. Shabandar that the prospects of the Brazilian scheme were unfortunately bad. As regards other countries, the prospects were not at present very favourable either. Various alternatives remained to be considered, and it was too early to say that they would not offer a solution, but at present no concrete solution was visible. The committee therefore feared that there might be a longer delay than had hitherto been anticipated,

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or what would be worse, it might even be found impossible to put any scheme of settlement outside Iraq into effect, in which case it would be necessary to contemplate the continued residence of the Assyrians in Iraq. The committee thought that the Iraqi Government would wish to prevent either of these eventualities from having unfortunate repercussions by taking special measures for the security and welfare of the Assyrians. The committee would like to know what measures the Iraqi Government would take. M. Shabandar was probably not in a position to reply at present, but he would, no doubt, wish to refer the matter to his Government.

M. Shabandar said that he was not in a position to give a definite reply, though he could indicate certain probabilities. The Iraqi Government had long known the difficulties in Brazil, and he knew that if a long delay were to be anticipated before the Assyrians could be settled outside Iraq, the Iraqi Government might find it difficult to maintain the refugee camp at Mosul. Provision for that camp had only been made up to September next, and he believed the Iraqi Government had under consideration the idea of distributing the refugees among various villages under the care of the headman of the village and with some financial provision for their maintenance by the headman.

The President said that M. Shabandar would no doubt wish to consult his Government before going into further details.

As regards the present situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, *M. Oliván* recalled that at a recent meeting with the Iraqi permanent delegate, the committee had referred to an apparent contradiction in previous Iraqi Government reports regarding the reconstruction of villages destroyed in the events of last summer. Was M. Shabandar yet in a position to reply on this point?

M. Shabandar replied that the point had been referred the Iraqi Government immediately after the last meeting which Taufiq Beg had attended. So far, no reply had been received, and he thought that the Iraqi Government must be waiting for Major Thomson to deal with the matter on his return. Major Thomson was furnishing a number of reports, and no doubt the question of the villages would appear among them.

The President then turned to the Iraqi Government's report of the 16th May —C. Min. Ass. 36. The committee had noted that Major Wilson reported a heavy mortality, namely, thirty deaths in 112 days, or an average of one in four days. A further report by Major Thomson—C. Min. Ass. 38—was rather more grave, and recorded a death-rate of one a day. The committee was rather alarmed by these figures.

M. Shabandar thought that there was a general epidemic in the region, not confined to the Mosul camp.

The President said that this might be the case, but the committee was rather puzzled by a statement in Major Wilson's report to the effect that "the general health of the camp is excellent." This did not appear to square with the high death-rate.

The Iraqi Representative said that he would gladly refer the points raised to his Government for further observations.

The President then referred to the recent petitions by the Mar Shimun, which had been forwarded to the Iraqi delegation for the observations of the Iraqi Government.

M. Shabandar made no comment on these petitions, but said that they had been referred to the Iraqi Government.

(M. Shabandar then withdrew.)

The President said that he would like to take the opportunity in the few minutes that remained of sketching the general lines of what he contemplated saying in the *rapporteur's* report which it would be his duty to present to the Council when the committee reported to the Council. The *rapporteur's* report was, of course, his own responsibility, and must express his own views, but he would like to discuss it informally with the committee so that, if possible, it might be of a nature which all the members of the committee could accept.

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He proposed, first of all, to summarise the facts as they would be stated in the committee's report and to draw the conclusion that the prospects did not seem good. He would then go on to say that in these circumstances, so long as the committee's deliberations were continuing, the life of the Assyrian population was, so to speak, suspended, and its normal activities inevitably interfered with; and the Council must, from the point of view of the *rapporteur*, approach the question as one of urgency. Unless the Council thought that the task of the committee was finished, he would suggest instructions to the committee to make every effort to arrive at a quick solution on the settlement problem by examining as speedily as possible what prospects offered themselves. He did not propose to set a time limit to this task, but he would suggest that if, after a reasonable time (he thought himself about the beginning of September), the committee arrived at the conclusion that there was no suitable prospect of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq, they should—without waiting to refer to the Council, but in time to present a report to the Council at its September meeting—examine with the Iraqi Government what conditions the latter would envisage for the resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq, in accordance with the Council's resolution of December 1932.

M. Oliván said that he was considering a report on these lines in the hope of providing a compromise between the two views which had been expressed on the committee. The committee would still be free to exhaust the possibilities elsewhere than in Brazil, and, of course, if any good prospect offered itself, they would naturally pursue it in preference to entering into the question of resettlement in Iraq; but he wished to avoid the necessity of the committee waiting to consider resettlement in Iraq until the September meeting of the Council, if before then they came to the conclusion that this was the only course to take.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he would like time to consider this suggestion, which he realised was put forward in the hope of compromise. At first sight his only comment would be to ask the committee to consider the possible effect on the Assyrians of referring at this stage to resettlement in Iraq. It was desirable not to do anything which would encourage those Assyrians who felt they could not stay in Iraq to take the law into their own hands and stage another exodus. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the Council's resolution of December 1932 was apparently not acceptable to, at all events, a section of the Assyrians. It had been their opposition to the execution of that resolution which had led directly to the troubles of last summer.

The President objected that this difficulty was bound to arise sooner or later if settlement outside Iraq were impossible. The committee could not delay indefinitely because of that.

The United Kingdom Representative emphasised that he was not opposing M. Oliván's suggestion at the present time. He would like to reflect on it. His only object for the time being was to put forward at once certain considerations which the committee ought to bear in mind.

The President said that the question of a report to the Council did not now appear to be quite so urgent, as he had ascertained from the President of the Council and the Secretary-General of the League that the Council would certainly last until Wednesday next, the 6th June, and might even go on longer. He thought, therefore, that it would be sufficient if the committee met again on Monday, the 4th June. This would give time for a reply from the Spanish Ambassador in Rio, and would also give time for M. Arocha to complete a draft report.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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EASTERN (IRAQ). June 7, 1934.

P.Z.
4482
1934

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

[E 3749/1/93] No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 76.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirty-first meeting of the Council Committee on the 5th June respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, June 6, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of Thirty-first Meeting of the Council Committee held on June 5, 1934, *at* 3·30 P.M.

THE meeting had before it a draft report to the Council prepared by the Secretariat.

The President said that before considering this draft he wished to inform the committee of conversations which he had had with the Iraqi representative and the Persian delegate. He had seen the Iraqi representative on the 3rd June and had suggested unofficially the advisability of allowing an opportunity for some neutral observer to see what was the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. M. Shabandar could not, of course, commit himself, but appeared to understand the advantage of this suggestion and to be personally in favour of it. M. Shabandar had then asked M. Oliván for his opinion as regards the prospects of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq. M. Oliván had told him frankly that in his personal opinion the prospects were very poor. He made it clear, however, that, whereas he had first of all been speaking as the interpreter of the committee, he was on this latter point expressing his purely personal views, which were not necessarily those of the committee as a whole.

The president said that he had also spoken to the Persian delegate about the prospects of the Assyrians being settled in Persia. The Persian delegate had been most emphatic. He had said that not only was he authorised to say that his Government were not ready to admit the Assyrians, but it was their desire that the Assyrians should be settled outside Iraq as far away as possible from Persia. !

The president added that he would as opportunity offered speak to the representatives of Turkey and Greece.

The meeting then considered the draft report to the Council. On the suggestion of the *Danish Representative*, the paragraph which referred to divergent tendencies in the committee was redrafted so as to show that two courses of action had been discussed in the committee but without implying that there was a conflict in the committee between two opposing parties. With this and certain minor textual amendments, the report was adopted.

The President then said that he wished to discuss informally with the committee the draft of the report which as *rapporteur* he would have to present to the Council and the draft resolution which that report would propose. It was agreed to strengthen that section of the draft resolution which referred to an appeal to Governments to consider favourably further approaches which might be made to them by the Assyrian Committee. The members of the committee indicated that, with this modification, they were in complete agreement with the draft report and the draft resolution.

[131 g—1]

The French Representative asked leave, before the meeting rose, to draw attention to a difficulty regarding the transfer from Iraq to Syria of the families of those Assyrians who had fled to Syria last summer. The French High Commissioner had authority to settle this matter with the Iraqi Government, but M. de Martel desired the co-operation of the local Nansen representative, M. Burnier, who, however, was not *au courant* with the question. The French representative recalled that the French Government, in their letter of the 9th January to the committee (C. Min. Ass. 18), had laid down certain conditions under which they were prepared to accept the families in question. These conditions had been formulated at the instance of the High Commissioner, who thought it necessary to have a mandate from the League of Nations in the matter in order to enable him to meet nationalist opposition in Syria. The High Commissioner also required the good offices of the Nansen Office to supervise the emigration and to make sure that Assyrians in Iraq, who had, in fact, no relatives in Syria, did not take the opportunity of slipping into Syria. The High Commissioner also wished the Nansen representative to be responsible for keeping the accounts relating to the maintenance of the families in question. The French representative, therefore, wished to request the committee to take the necessary action with the Nansen Office in Geneva to ensure that M. Burnier should be informed of the question and instructed to put himself in touch with M. de Martel, to assist in its solution.

The President proposed that at the next meeting of the committee M. Werner of the Nansen Office should be invited to attend. His presence would, in any case, be useful as the committee would have to discuss what countries were to be asked to reconsider the question of receiving the Assyrians, assuming that the Council adopted the resolution now proposed.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he would like to draw attention to one point. In the Mar Shimun's petition of the 30th May (C. Min. Ass. 40), it had been alleged that a further massacre had been attempted at Diana on the night of the 29th–30th April last and that it had been prevented only by the intervention of the British vice-consul. The Foreign Office had at once sent a telegram to His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad to ascertain the facts and had now received the following reply:—

> "Your telegram of 31st May.
>
> "Facts are as follows:—
>
> "On date mentioned Iraqi authorities wished to round up and arrest about twelve Assyrians from Persia, who had secreted themselves in Diana; police sergeant request the aid of the military, who searched and probably occupied some old trenches around the village. Six Assyrians were caught and are serving sentence of one month's imprisonment, pending return to Persia. Action of police and military, naturally, alarmed the villagers, and gave rise to charge and counter-charge that both sides were digging trenches with a view to hostilities. No undue violence was used, the vice-consul did not intervene and life returned to normal. Police sergeant has been punished for his panicky conduct."

The President observed that the Mar Shimun evidently gave a very free interpretation to the word "massacre."

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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8A
617

U.S.S. 6.vii
S.of S.

Please see note at Flag A and the G.of I's reply to our telegram of 28 June, which, unfortunately, is what we feared. The G.of I. have evidently considered the question sympathetically but are unable to suggest any plan. They point out the practical difficulties, which are, by themselves, insurmountable, and also certain political difficulties.

In sending a copy of the correspondence to Sir G. Mounsey, we might ask whether the F.O. are in touch with the D.O. in regard to the possibility of any tactful suggestion being made to the Dominions Governments, since we share the F.O. view that H.M.G. cannot afford to leave any possible solution unexplored.

5.7.34

Draft Paper. (6) P.Z. 4454/34 Department.

DRAFT LETTER.

7 JUL 1934

Sir G.Mounsey, KCMG.,CB.,OBE.,
F.O.

Dear Mounsey

I am writing in reply to your letter of the 21 June, E 3976/1/93, to Kershaw, who is on leave from the Office, regarding the problem of resettling the Assyrians of Iraq.

Our S.of S. is completely in accord with what you say as to the urgency and importance, from the point of view of Imperial interests, of getting this problem settled. The question had already occurred to him whether it would be worth while to address an enquiry to the G.of I. in case they might be able to help in any way, and on receipt of your letter we sent the telegram of 28 June, of which I enclose a copy.

J 28.6.34

Unfortunately, as you will see from the G.of I's reply, of which a copy is enclosed, practical as well as political difficulties are such as to render any plan for ~~a~~ settl~~ement~~ing the ~~of~~ Assyrians in India impossible. I think you will agree, after reading the G.of I's telegram, that the ~~practical~~ obstacles are real and insurmountable, in view especially of India's enormous and rapidly increasing population and its pressure on the land.

J 4.7.34

(It is going up at the rate of about 3 millions a year)

Since/

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 28 12 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

2531 5000 2.34

Since it is certainly desirable to leave no stone unturned in seeking a solution of this problem, would you consider approaching the D.O. in order to ascertain whether they would be willing to take any sort of action with the Dominions Governments, by way of consulting them on the Imperial interests (in their widest sense) which are involved, and supporting the appeal which has been addressed to Canada, Australia and South Africa by the League Committee? In a matter of this importance to H.M.G. and the Empire one would suppose (though of course it is a matter for the D.O.) that it might be possible, and worth while, to address a tactful communication to the Dominions Governments without undue risk of offending their well known susceptibilities in regard to any suspicion of intervention by H.M.G. ~~and~~ in the U.K.

But possibly you have done all this already

Yours sincerely.

(Sgd) L. D. Wakely.

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FILE COPY

SECRET

P.Z.
4454
1934

LJC/AW. (119 groups) 3814.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

From Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India.

(COPIES CIRCULATED)

Dated Simla, 4th July, 1934.

Received 4th July, 1934, 4.0 p.m.

XXX

1480. First of Two Parts.

Your telegram of the 28th ultimo, 1647. Assyrians.

2. We fully appreciate the difficulties of His Majesty's Government and the desirability of finding a home for Assyrians, but regret that we can suggest no plan for settling them in India. One of the most difficult problems with which we are faced at present is that of pressure on land of increasing population. We have recently been trying to find land for (a) Indian emigrants returned from South Africa and other colonies; (b) educated unemployed; in both cases without success. No free land is available, and to settle anything like the number of Assyrians you propose would involve prohibitive expenditure, apart from the many practical objections of climatic and other kinds, which will be obvious to you.

REGD. POL. DEPT.
5 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

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SECRET

CWP/WB (93 groups) 3819.

DECYPHER OF TELEGRAM.

From (COPIES CIRCULATED)	Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State for India.
Dated	Simla, 4th July, 1934.
Received	4.15 p.m., 4th July, 1934.

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1480. SECOND AND LAST PART.

Even if practical difficulties could be overcome, we consider that the proposal must be ruled out on political grounds. The wholesale influx of a community, alien both in nationality and religion, would be quite impossible to defend to Indian public opinion. It would be represented as cynical sacrifice ~~portrayed~~ [illegible] of Indian to imperial interests and could only be justified if it could be proved that the scheme would be of economic or political advantage to India which it is ~~(? strongly)~~ obviously not. Such a proceeding at present moment would present our political opponents with a very dangerous weapon and would arouse bitterest feeling against His Majesty's Government. We therefore regret that we cannot entertain the proposal.

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(3)

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 4158/11/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
4409

Copy to India

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2 July, 1934.

P.Z. 4386
3/7

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 2218/11/93 of 11 April

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C/min Ass/44 of 20 June	Assyrians in Iraq

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 27 5 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
3 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

3 *Similar letter sent to*
W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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P.Z.
4409
1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Committee for the
Settlement of the
Assyrians of Iraq.

C./Min.Ass/44. 1934.

Geneva, June 20th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter dated June 19th, 1934, together with two Reports for the months of March and April 1934 and an Abstract of sums spent by the Iraqi Government from August 1933 to the end of March 1934, addressed to him by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, June 19th, 1934.

To the Secretary-General.

With reference to my letter No.208, dated March 26th, 1934 (C./Min.Ass/27), I have the honour to send you herewith enclosed:

1. Two reports for the months of March and April 1934, concerning the Assyrian situation in Iraq;
2. Abstract of sums spent by the Iraqi Government from August 1933 to the end of March 1934 on account of assistance and maintenance of Assyrian families, amounting to I.D. 10,603/243.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) M. SHABANDAR,

for Head of the Permanent Delegation.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 27 5 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT.

REPORT - A.

(March 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS

All measures taken in this respect and mentioned in previous reports were still maintained during the month of March. Nothing has been changed as regards the police posts, except for Shaikhan Kada where 35 men of the auxiliary police forces were dismissed during the second half of the month. This was the cause of abolishing some of the minor police posts in the Assyrian villages, but the police patrols continue to carry out regularly patrols between these villages.

Thanks to the administrative measures and the guarantees taken from the chiefs of the tribes, nothing happened which might have caused the least complaint.

The necessary measures have been also taken in the Alkush district which belongs to the Shaikhan Kada, when groups of the Ashuty tribe gathered there during this month in order to take the cattle to pasture. No complaints were made either by or against the Ashuties.

REPORT - B.

(March 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE ASSYRIAN FAMILIES

The following aid was given to the Assyrians:

Malek Jeko and his followers in Kory Kafan village ..	Dinars 8
The village of Rakawa	" 4
Paid in cash to different Assyrians	" 23
	Dinars 35

A sum of I.D. 583/558 was paid to the settlement expert during March 1934 on account of feeding expenses of the Assyrian families existing in the Camp of Mosul under his supervision.

REPORT - A.

(April 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS

Nothing has been changed as regards the measures taken during the previous month.

The police posts, patrols, guarantees taken from the chiefs and heads of neighbouring villages and the number of arms were all as previous, except for the Shaikhan Kada where the police posts have been suppressed, owing to the reduction in the number of the auxiliary police forces. But, on the other hand, the number of patrols between these villages have been increased. Not the least trouble has occurred during the month of April in the above mentioned district.

REPORT B.

(April 1934)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE ASSYRIAN FAMILIES.

During the month of April, the following assistance was given:

	Wheat taghars	Dinars
2 destitute families in the villages of Shikhan Kada	64¼	
13 Ashutiyeh families in Shikhan who came from Halon	4½	
Bakirat village		4
Kaflesen "		2
Mejelmekht "		1
Nafdareh "		2
Kory Kafan "		1
Rekaweh "		1
Some of the Assyrians in Dohuk		2
Keribahan village		1½
Kharshaneh "		-/500
Some destitute families in Amadia Kada		10
Some destitute families of Tikhubiyin		7
	68¾	31/500

A sum of I.D. 912 was paid to the settlement expert during April 1934 for feeding the Assyrian families living in the camp under his supervision.

ABSTRACT OF SUMS SPENT BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FROM AUGUST 1933 TO THE END OF MARCH 1934 ON ACCOUNT OF ASSISTANCE AND MAINTENANCE OF ASSYRIAN FAMILIES.

	Dinars
1. Assistance in cash	415/-
2. Furniture including its transport	331/734
3. Reconstruction of destroyed villages and houses	1367/253
4. Transport of Assyrian families ..	291/331
5. Feeding and food transport	5833/958
6. Clothes and blankets	792/208
7. Rents paid for the Assyrians	119/174
8. Expenses incurred by the local Committees on hotels, transport and salaries	373/836
9. Miscellaneous - oil, electricity, water, etc.	117/871
10. Animals	247/435
11. Cooks and assistants	364/853
12. Tents and their reparations	317/270
13. Burial expenses	32/320
Total .... Dinars	10.603/243

INDEXED

India 230

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3694/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
4386
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2 July, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence: 3142 4306

F.O. letter E 2825/1/93 of May 9.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad No 288 of 18 May	Sir F Humphrys' tour of Assyrian settlements

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 27 5 JUL 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
3 JUL 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
C.O.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

June 6, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

P.Z.
4386
1934

[E 3694/1/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 288.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 18, 1934.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 94 of the 3rd May, I have the honour to inform you that I carried out an extensive tour of the Assyrian settlements in Northern Iraq from the 21st to the 29th April.

2. I visited about twenty villages in all, some by car and some of the more inaccessible villages on horseback, and was accompanied by an interpreter who was thoroughly conversant with the Syriac language. I also saw representative gatherings of Assyrians, including the three bishops, Mar Yusuf, Mar Sergis and Mar Yoalaha, at half a dozen convenient centres. Nights were spent at Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Diana, and I was enabled, through the courtesy of the Iraqi authorities and the unusual clemency of the weather, to accomplish the two main objects of my tour. These were to listen patiently to what Assyrians of all shades of opinion had to say about the present position and to give them sound advice as regards the future.

3. In my many talks with the Assyrians I was at pains to observe an attitude of strict impartiality. I never referred to the Mar Shimun or to the factions into which the community was divided, or to the possibility of settlement in two separate batches. Nor did I mention Brazil as the country provisionally selected by the League of Nations for a new home.

The advice that I gave to all was to continue their normal occupations, either by working on the fields or plying their trades as before, until the time came for them to leave Iraq, if they decided to do so after hearing what the local committee had to offer. This committee, I told them, would tour the Assyrian villages when a new country had been definitely selected by the League for Assyrian resettlement. In the meantime, I urged them to be patient and law-abiding; to avoid panic and mass movements, which would invite pillage by their neighbours and give rise to misunderstandings with the Government; to bring freely to the notice of the local Iraqi authorities, or to the British Administrative Inspector (Major Wilson), or the Settlement Officer (Major Thomson), any reasonable requests to enable them to continue a normal life. Above all, to do their best to cultivate the goodwill of the Iraqi Government and the neighbouring tribes of Kurds, Arabs and Yezidis, which I explained to them was the only practical means of guaranteeing the future happiness and security of those who elected to remain in Iraq. I assured them that it was the definite policy of the Iraqi Government to afford them all reasonable protection and assistance, and that when the committee visited them every Assyrian who was an ex-Ottoman subject would be given a free choice whether to stay in the country or leave. They must understand, however, that such a large emigration scheme was inevitably complicated by political and financial considerations and would take a long time to complete. In the meanwhile, it was their plain duty to carry on and work as best they were able and at all costs to avoid pauperising themselves. I said that whatever new country accepted them would expect to receive workers and not loafers or temporary settlers; in other words, the Assyrians should make up their minds to abandon the rôle of refugees and settle down as permanent citizens of the State of their adoption.

4. Although the advice which I gave to the Assyrians was the same for all, the comments which they made to me on the present situation were widely different in the various districts which I visited. They were unanimous on two points, viz., their anxiety to be acquainted as soon as possible with the offer of the League in regard to a new home, and their unabated confidence in Great Britain to show them sympathy and support.

[131 f—4]

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 27 5 JUL 19
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFI

The Assyrians of the Shaikhan district professed undisguised apprehension as to their future security. They complained that nearly all their villages had been looted and partially destroyed in one week following the 11th August. They admitted, however, that the Iraqi Government had satisfactorily repaired those villages which they had agreed to reoccupy and had offered to provide them with the means for sowing their crops. On the other hand, very little had been paid to them in compensation, and they were so disgusted at the treatment that they had received from their neighbours and so apprehensive of the future that they declined to do any work in the fields and were merely awaiting the signal to leave Iraq. In one village which I visited, however, I found that the headman, who was an ex-levy officer, had courageously followed Major Thomson's advice and had persuaded the villagers to accept the Iraqi Government's assistance and to till their fields as before. In this village there was no distress and a bumper crop was confidently expected. This solitary exception serves to emphasise the wrong-headedness and obstinacy of the inhabitants of the other villages in declining to move a finger to help themselves. They were frankly living on their savings and the charity of friends still serving in the levies, and, when these resources fail, they must either work or become destitute. It should be noted that the villages in this area were pillaged only after they had been evacuated, and that not a single Assyrian man, woman or child was killed or even wounded throughout the disturbances.

5. In the southern part of the Dohuk district, where the number of Assyrian casualties from the disturbances are now estimated at forty killed, the Assyrians took much the same line as their brothers in Shaikhan, though there was less apprehension to be observed and less reluctance to work in the villages which bordered on the Amadiyah district, while confidence was expressed in the kaïmakam and the local police to afford them the necessary protection. Nevertheless, I formed the impression that practically the whole of the Assyrian population of the Shaikhan and Dohuk districts, numbering perhaps 12,000 souls, were eager to accept any reasonable offer of a home in another country.

6. In the Amadiyah district, where there was no destruction of life or property during the troubles in August, I found that the Assyrians had complete confidence in their Kurdish kaïmakam, and a marked disinclination to leave their prosperous villages, provided that they could feel assured of security and fair treatment in the future. They had nothing to complain of in regard to past treatment by the Iraqi Government, but all, including the followers as well as the opponents of the Mar Shimun, were unanimous in condemning the exodus to Syria as a political move entirely unconnected with land settlement, which was engineered by the Patriarch for his own selfish ends. They vehemently accused those who took part in this exodus of being the cause of all the troubles which had befallen the Assyrian community in general, not so much for the exodus itself as for their senseless and criminal behaviour in returning to Iraq with their arms and making a treacherous attack on the Iraqi army. They emphasised that if these malcontents, many of whom had gone from their own villages, had remained in Syria all would have been well, and they made an interesting point about the Simel massacre that if the victims had been men who had returned from Syria to fight they would have condoned the slaughter. What had shaken the confidence of the whole Assyrian community was the tragic fact that the victims in nearly every case were the loyal supporters of the Government. This fact, they said, made it very difficult for them to decide what answer to return to the committee after the League's offer had been explained. On the one hand, they were loath to abandon villages which were close to their old homes and gave them everything they could reasonably want; on the other hand, they feared that a less competent and determined kaïmakam might not be able to protect them from the depredations of the Kurds in the future.

7. In the Rowanduz district, which includes the Shemsdinan Assyrians of the Harir Plain and Diana, there was, similarly, no loss of life or property last August. It will be recollected that his late Majesty King Feisal and Nuri Pasha expressed their thanks to me on more than one occasion for the restraining influence exerted on the Assyrians by the British vice-consul at Diana, Mr. Chapman-Andrews, during the crisis. When I interviewed at Harir a representative gathering headed by the uncle of the Mar Shimun, Bishop Mar Yusuf, the exodus to Syria was strongly condemned as being the unnecessary cause of all their troubles, and the bishop requested me to press the Iraqi

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Government to allow Assyrians domiciled in Russia and Persia to enter Iraq. When I enquired the reason for this request, I was informed by the meeting that the conditions in Persia and Russia were becoming so intolerable that the Assyrians there would much prefer to live in Iraq, where in normal circumstances they could be assured of good treatment. I replied that I could not see any way to invite the Iraqi Government to receive more Assyrians from outside at a time when many Assyrians in the country were pressing the League to be sent to a new home. The bishop told me privately that, if cant and prejudice were eliminated from the discussion of this question, and the Assyrians were allowed to live their own lives, without interference, under their tribal leaders, there was little doubt that Iraq offered them a convenient and sufficiently comfortable home. This fact was thoroughly appreciated by the less fortunate Assyrians, who were exposed to every form of oppression and misery under the Soviet and Persian Governments. The trouble was that some of the Assyrians in Iraq had been misled and had compromised the security and happiness of the remainder. When he asked for my advice, I told him that I did not wish to discuss the past, and that the prosperity of the Assyrians who elected to remain in Iraq must depend on the goodwill established between them and their neighbours and the Iraqi Government. Each individual would have to decide for himself, when the time came, whether he would stay or go.

8. I do not think it can be predicted with any certainty which way the Assyrians of Amadiyah and Rowanduz areas, numbering perhaps 8,000 souls, will decide. Their instinct is to stay, but their confidence in the fairness of the Iraqi Government, or, rather, the Government's ability to keep the army under control, has been shattered by the tragedy of Simel. They still seem to have a blind faith in the sympathy and ability of His Majesty's Government to protect them, and this faith, taken in conjunction with their fondness for their present homes, may well be the deciding factor when it comes to the point. Present indications point in two directions. Many have sold their cattle at ridiculously low prices in the hope apparently that emigration will be started at once. Others have renewed their leases with their Kurdish landlords. The contiguity of the Iraqi battalion lines to the village of Diana, which contains a number of armed Assyrians, is a potential source of danger, which I took the opportunity of impressing on His Majesty's vice-consul and the Kaïmakam of Rowanduz, with a view to their acting in co-operation to prevent a stampede should a panic again occur.

9. What impressed me most in my conversations with the Assyrians was the pathetic eagerness with which information about the new home was awaited by those who had downed tools and had given up all hope of settling permanently in Iraq; the wistfulness with which those who were obviously attached to their present homes enquired about future prospects in this country, and the unanimous condemnation of the policy of the Patriarch which had inspired the exodus to Syria. The conclusion I formed was that a large number of Assyrians will have to be moved from Iraq as soon as possible if further troubles are to be avoided, and that the remainder would be willing to serve the Iraqi Government loyally if they were assured of a fair deal. This brings me to the subject of guarantees.

10. I have noticed two lines of criticism in the European press, both of which seem to betray a lamentable ignorance of the essential facts of the Assyrian problem. The first is that His Majesty's Government were gravely to blame in proposing the termination of the mandate for Iraq before the Assyrian question had been finally settled. The answer to this criticism is that successive Governments in Great Britain, from 1927 onwards, had pledged themselves to propose the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations in 1932, while the Assyrian Patriarch had consistently refused, on behalf of himself and his immediate followers, to accept any settlement in Iraq which did not involve the continuance of a mandate. If His Majesty's Government had acted on the advice of these critics, they would have broken a solemn pledge and handed over the political destinies of Iraq to a self-seeking adventurer. The result would have been a repetition of the 1920 troubles, which cost the British Treasury more than £100 million. The refusal of the Patriarch to accept the League's decision and co-operate with the Iraqi Government was due to political and not to economic causes. It is important that this fact should be understood, as it vitally affects the whole question of Assyrian settlement.

11. The second criticism is that the guarantees for the protection of minorities which were given by Iraq to the League were inadequate, and that, in any case, paper guarantees are futile. The answer to this is that the guarantees, which included permission, unprecedented in a Moslem country, for religious, educational and medical missions to practise freely in Iraq, are based on the stiffest available model, and that the only alternative to paper guarantees is resident force; in other words, the location of sufficient foreign ground troops in the country to ensure the protection of minorities by force. This solution, and the proposal for a League commissioner to reside in Mosul, are equally fantastic and impracticable. The fact must be faced that in this modern world, which has witnessed, especially in the East, the growth of national aspirations and the consolidation of the authority of central Governments, a minority must conform to the laws of the State, abandon all claims to exclusive privileges and exhibit goodwill towards its rulers if it is to maintain a happy and prosperous existence. It is my conviction that the Assyrian rank and file, if left to themselves, would have settled contentedly on the excellent lands that have been allotted to them by the Iraqi Government. They have been misled by their leaders into a blind pursuit of an impracticable political ideal, and it is mainly the innocent who have suffered, while the guilty, including the real villain of the piece, the Patriarch himself, who is believed to be battening on the contributions intended for the relief of his victims, are posing as martyrs to credulous well-wishers in Europe and America. Finally, I would emphasise the necessity for making a start with the emigration of at least 2,000–3,000 souls before the Paraná season terminates in September.

12. I enclose a memorandum giving a brief outline of the recent troubles,(¹) based chiefly on reports received from Assyrians; also a copy of a curiously-worded letter(¹) which I have received from the Iraq Tiari Association of America.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

(¹) Not printed.

233

Mr. Walton
Sir F. Stewart

28.vi

Send
S.H.S.
28/6

U.S.S.,
~~S. of S.,~~

A draft telegram to the G. of I. regarding the Assyrian question is submitted.

It is noticeable that, while Sir G. Mounsey's letter states that the Colonial Empire is being combed once more, he does not say that the F.O. have made any suggestions to the Dominions Office that H.M.G. should solicit help from the Dominions, or even support the appeal which the League Committee has decided (P.Z. 4045) to address to Australia, South Africa and Canada (but not to India). As these are countries with large empty spaces for settlement and H.M.G. cannot afford to leave any possible solution unexplored, it would seem an obvious step to make some special attempt to bring the urgency of the problem from the imperial point of view to the notice of these other members of the British Commonwealth who are also members of the League. In dealing with a problem of urgent imperial importance, in regard to which H.M.G. cannot afford to leave any stone unturned, a communication of this character to the Dominions ought not to be ruled out by fear of their well known jealousy of intervention (which does not preclude consultation

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suggestion) or of the special touchiness which they at one time felt on the subject of their immigration policies. At any rate, the F.O. might put the matter to the D.O., if they have not already done so.

Perhaps we might, in sending an interim reply to Sir G. Mounsey (which could enclose copy of our telegram to India), ask whether anything is being done in this direction.

28. 6. 34

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DRAFT TELEGRAM.

P Z. 4306/34.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO 1647.
1st of 3 parts

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, FOREIGN AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

(Retamilla)

Cypher xxx

Part 1 sent xxx 6.45 pm 28/6/34

SEEN BY Zf
	DATE	TIME
RECD. IN TEL. BCH.	28/6/34	5.25 P.M
CODE, X or XX	xxx	
DESPATCHED	28/6	— M
No. OF WORDS	346	
SENDER'S INITIALS		

Scheme for settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in Brazil has fallen through, and it is necessary to find some other solution of this problem. Unless a large proportion at all events can be transferred from Iraq in the near future, there is real danger of further disturbance which might develop into an anti-British movement. H.M.G. would be placed in an almost impossible position between duty as a member of the League Council (which is charged with supervision of execution of minority guarantees given by Iraq) and ~~obligations as~~ alliance with Iraq~~'s ally~~ under 1930 Treaty. British position in Iraq might be shaken and military action might be found necessary. Discovery of a home for Assyrians is therefore a matter of urgent importance to Imperial interests (including India's interests, in view of importance of British connection with Iraq to our position in the Persian Gulf).

2nd Part →

2. In these circumstances F.O. have appealed to me to ascertain whether India can help, and I agree with them that we cannot afford to leave any possible solution unexplored. Number of persons for whom it will be necessary to find fresh homes cannot be definitely stated, but League Committee concerned with the question has hitherto worked on

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Sent 28.6.

1744 1000 3.33

Draft Paper. Department.

Pt 2
XXX
Sent 6.45pm 28/6

the assumption that between 10,000 and 15,000 will have to be transferred. C.O. has again been approached but probably would not be able to do more (at best) than parcel out emigrants between several colonies, whereas Assyrians appear to wish to cling together.

3. Letter from F.O. follows by air mail of 30th June, but in view of urgency I should be grateful if you could ~~institute immediate enquiries with a view to~~ report~~ing~~ by telegraph whether there is any ~~it is~~ practicable ~~to consider any~~ plan for settling Assyrian community in India, or alternatively some part of it if it has to be dispersed. If you were able to consider any such plan I should make it a condition of its acceptance that the cost of transport and settlement, so far as it was not recovered from the settlers or defrayed by Iraq or the League, would be a charge on British funds.

1647 3rd [illegible] Part

3rd pt Sent XXX
28/6 4.25pm

4. Assyrians, though many of them are Presbyterians, are generally Nestorians by religion (having this in common with Jacobite Church in Southern India). They are a highland population of agricultural or pastoral pursuits, or following other occupations connected with village life. They cultivate mainly rice, cereal crops and tobacco,

and/

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Draft Paper. Department.

and have the reputation of being courageous, disciplined, loyal, thrifty and industrious. Under fair treatment they are peaceable, though also providing good military material.

2531 5000 2.34

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Although I cannot help feeling that it will be quite useless, perhaps it would be only civil to send the F.O. letter d.o. to the G. of I. for their views.

J.S. 26/6

Sir F. Stewart
Secy of State

SDS 27/6

Sir L. Kershaw,

The file is attached.

It is of course true that India has an interest in the solution of the problem. The papers flagged A on last year's file below indicate some of the serious consequences it may have, if left unsolved, on the stability of our position in Iraq.

The F.O. letter shows that it is desired to avoid parcelling out the Assyrians. Unfortunately, it seems clear that it is only if the problem has to be solved by parcelling them out that there can be any question of India being able to help at all. If the Assyrians have to be dispersed she might conceivably be able to absorb a small number (though even this is doubtful).

Mr. Patrick has considerable knowledge of the Syrian church in Travancore and elsewhere on the Malabar coast. I understand from him that they have no connection with the Assyrians, except that both appear to be Nestorians. The connection of the Indian Syrians is with Antioch. I understand from him also that the Travancore Christians are a very poor community, so

that/

As the question is very urgent, I think that we should telegraph and make it clear that if India [illegible] them we should press for a separate funds from the League or the [illegible] telegram [illegible] them the telegram should be as [illegible] and [illegible] as possible

S.A. 27/6

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that it is unlikely that they would be able to help financially in settling the Assyrians, and the country is of course already populated to the full.

Since we have received this letter from the F.O., however, you may think that we cannot do less than forward ~~the~~ enquiry to the G. of I., asking (what reply should be returned & whether there ~~is~~ would be any chance of settling a small number of Assyrians on the Malabar coast or elsewhere in India if they ~~have~~ had to be dispersed?

25.6.

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India ~~(AM)~~

INDEXED

Mr. Walton

P.S. to S.S.

You have, I think, some papers about this. Could you let me have them again?

23/6

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

21st June, 1934.

(E 3976/1/93)

Confidential

P.Z.
4306
1934

Dear Sir Louis Kershaw,

In Oliphant's absence I am writing to you about the problem of resettling the Assyrians of Iraq, since it has been suggested to us that a home might be found for these unfortunate people in India. You have a number of their co-religionists already in Malabar, I believe, and there may be other areas more suitable and congenial. The northern frontier for instance has been suggested - no doubt on account of the military qualities of the Assyrians - though I should have thought it doubtful myself whether the present inhabitants would take kindly to Christian newcomers.

2. Your natural reaction to this suggestion, like that of everyone else whom we approach on the subject, will be, I fear, that it is quite impossible, but I hope/

Sir Louis Kershaw, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 27
5 JUL. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

COPY SENT BY AIR MAIL
of 29/6/34

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hope that you will at least consider seriously whether India cannot help. We cannot afford to leave any possible solution unexplored, and I shall try to show that the Government of India like ourselves has a strong interest in getting this problem settled as soon as possible.

3. You will be aware already, from the papers we have sent to you from time to time, of the way in which the problem has arisen, of the efforts made by the League Committee set up last October to find a home for the Assyrians and of the recent failure of a scheme for settlement in Brazil on which great hopes had been set. But it may be useful to you to have the enclosed memorandum which gives the whole story in outline, together with a number of details about the Assyrians.

4. After the troubles of last summer which made it necessary to consider the removal of the Assyrians from Iraq, we got the Colonial Office to explore the possibility/

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possibility of settling them in the Colonial Empire. They then came to the conclusion that there was no suitable area available. Now that the scheme for settlement in Brazil has broken down, and the problem has meanwhile lost nothing in urgency or importance, they are combing the Colonial Empire once more. It is really a matter of great difficulty, however, to find a good place, and the Colonial Office, even if any place at all can be found - which is still doubtful - do not hold out hope of being able to do more than parcel out the Assyrians between several Colonies whereas the Assyrians appear to wish to cling together. It is true that they are reported to be at present divided into two factions, one of which is not satisfied with the policy of the Mar Shimun, the spiritual head of the community, and these two factions may in any case have to be settled in separate areas - though not necessarily far apart - but any further splitting up than this would involve many difficulties.

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5. What I do want to emphasise is the importance, from the point of view of imperial interests, of getting the problem settled. Reference to the difficulties which may otherwise be anticipated is made in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the enclosed memorandum. You know what a lot of talk there has been about the responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the Assyrians. There is of course no legal responsibility, and if there is a moral responsibility, it arises not from any pledges in the past, but from our general connexion with the Assyrians, and in particular from the fact that we are still employing a number of them as soldiers in the Iraq Levies, which form the guards for our aerodromes in Iraq. In view of the services which the Assyrians are rendering and have rendered in the past in the Levies, we cannot simply wash our hands of them. But there is more in it than this. If those Assyrians who do not feel able to settle down in Iraq are not removed from the country we may be

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involved in far-reaching practical difficulties. Humphrys feels that there is real danger of further trouble unless a large proportion at all events of the Assyrians can be moved in the near future. The Assyrians themselves, who still possess a number of British rifles earned during service in the Levies, may be driven to some act of desperation, and in any case any further attempt to settle them permanently in Iraq is likely to lead only to constant friction between them and the Kurds and Arabs, which may at any moment produce an incident. If further bloodshed took place no-one can say where it would lead to. When the massacre of last summer took place there was reason to fear that it might spread to other Christians and develop eventually into an anti-British and anti-foreign movement. This danger will be present in any future disturbance. In view of the special position which we occupy in Iraq, and particularly in view of the presence of the Royal Air Force, we could in any

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case scarcely avoid being involved in such disturbance, quite apart from the complicating factor that Assyrians guard the aerodromes. Our credit suffered severely from the last affair and if there were any repetition, we should, on the one hand as a Member of the Council of the League, which is responsible for supervising the execution of the minority guarantees which Iraq gave in return for the termination of the Mandatory régime, and on the other hand as the ally of Iraq under the 1930 Treaty, be in a most unpleasant, if not an impossible situation. British interests in Iraq would certainly be seriously threatened and our whole position there might be shaken. Indeed we should be lucky if we did not at some stage have to take military action of some sort.

6. This menacing prospect is one which closely affects the Government of India as well as ourselves, not only because of India's general concern in what goes on in a Moslem country at the head of the Persian Gulf and the importance of Iraq as a link in air

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communications, but also because of the possibility of a call for troops from India, if an emergency necessitated the use of ground forces in Iraq. For these reasons I feel sure that you will be as anxious as we are to avert the dangers and this is my excuse for begging you to consider most seriously whether the settlement of the Assyrians in India is a practical possibility.

Yours sincerely

George Mounsey.

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P.Z.
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1934

ASSYRIAN SETTLEMENT

Notes on the Assyrians.

This question concerns some 20,000 Christians of ex-Ottoman nationality now resident in Iraq. Exact statistics are not available, and the number who will wish to leave Iraq cannot be definitely established until a concrete scheme of re-settlement can be put before them. Some of them whose pre-war homes were in what is now Iraq, may elect to stay there, but the Committee of the Council of the League which is concerned with this question has hitherto worked on the assumption that between 10,000 and 15,000 will have to be transferred.

2. The origin of these people is not absolutely clear. They themselves claim to be the descendants of the ancient Assyrian Empire. Now, however, they constitute a religious rather than a racial minority, and it would be perhaps more correct to refer to them as Nestorians. In fact, though many of them are of the Presbyterian faith, they belong generally to that branch of the Assyro-Chaldean race which constitutes the Nestorian Church. They are hillmen and before the war most of them lived in the highlands of Turkish Kurdistan. Their spiritual head, who under the Ottoman régime appears to have had also a certain measure of temporal power, is the Mar Shimun, called the Patriarch of the East. This office has been held by the Mar Shimun family for some 500 years. The Patriarch may not marry and the office passes from uncle to nephew. Under the Patriarch are the

Metropolitans....

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Metropolitans and Bishops. The Tribes have at their head a Malik or Chief, in some cases hereditary and in others elective. They are leaders and judges in tribal affairs.

Recent History.

3. At the outbreak of the Great War, the Assyrians of Turkey, owing to the relations between the Nestorian and Orthodox Churches, were inevitably suspect and identified with Russia. At Russian instigation they took up arms against Turkey in 1915 and, on the collapse of the Russian forces, with whom they were co-operating, they were obliged to retire and eventually with the assistance of British forces they and their families found refuge in Iraq. For a considerable period they were kept in refugee camps in Iraq at the expense of His Majesty's Government. Attempts were made after the cessation of hostilities with Turkey to repatriate them to their old home lands in the Hakkiari district of Turkey, but those who returned were eventually again driven out by the Turks. The Assyrians desired to settle in Hakkiari under a British Protectorate. His Majesty's Government could not contemplate so serious an extension of their responsibilities but did their best in the frontier negotiations which followed the peace settlement with Turkey to secure the incorporation in Iraq of the Hakkiari territory so that the Assyrians might be established there as an autonomous community under the sovereignty of Iraq. On this point, negotiations with Turkey broke down and the matter came before the Council of the League. His Majesty's Government then made it abundantly clear that

unless ....

unless the Hakkiari territory were included in Iraq the hopes of a separate and homogeneous settlement for the Assyrians would be destroyed as it would be impossible to find in Iraq suitable territories for the settlement of the Assyrians as a compact and organised community. The Council of the League however in spite of the consideration and of the pleadings of His Majesty's Government, decided that the Hakkiari territory must remain Turkish.

4. The task of settling the Assyrians in Iraq had thus to be faced once more. This task and that of attempting to make the Assyrians Iraqi nationals in fact as well as in theory, without arousing racial animosities, was one of extreme delicacy and difficulty, the more so as it was impossible to settle the Assyrians in a homogeneous community as they themselves desired without the wholesale dispossession of existing Kurdish landowners - a proceeding which His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government were not prepared to contemplate. Nevertheless, very considerable progress was made in settling the Assyrians in various parts of northern Iraq, and by 1930, there remained only some 300 to 400 families for whom suitable homes had not been found.

5. It may be mentioned in passing that the Assyrians were employed to an increasing extent by His Majesty's Government in the Iraq levies, a British auxiliary military force, which has performed good service in Iraq. It is still two battalions strong, provides guards for the British aerodromes in Iraq, and contains a majority of Assyrians.

6. When the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq was under consideration, the League received a number of

petitions.....

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titions from Assyrian sources expressing apprehension regarding the future position of the community in Iraq, and asking either for some form of administrative autonomy within Iraq or for transfer to some other territory. These petitions were considered by the Council of the League in December 1932 and the Council, in a Resolution passed on December 15th,1932,rejected the demand of the Assyrians for administrative autonomy, and took note of the intention of the Iraqi Government to make a further attempt, with the help of a foreign expert, to settle the landless Assyrians in Iraq under suitable conditions. The Council expressed its confidence that if these measures did not provide a complete solution of the problem and there remained Assyrians unwilling or unable to settle in Iraq, the Iraqi Government would take all possible measures to facilitate the settlement of such Assyrians elsewhere.

7. The Iraqi Government appointed Major Thomson as Settlement Expert, but unfortunately this further attempt at settlement within Iraq led only to increasing friction between the Iraqi authorities and the Assyrians and eventually in July 1933, a certain number of the Assyrians left Iraq and crossed over into Syria. Shortly afterwards, they returned to Iraq, but unfortunately became involved in fighting with units of the Iraqi army. The situation in northern Iraq got thoroughly out of hand, and the fighting was followed by excesses against the Assyrian population which the Iraqi representative publicly admitted and deplored when the Council of the League met to consider the situation on October 14th,1933.

8. The Council took the view that what had happened was so confused and complicated that it was impossible to form an accurate idea on which to base an estimate of the respective responsibility of the parties, and that the only course was to

seek.....

seek an honourable and lasting peace for the future. The Council decided in dealing with an exceptional situation to adopt exceptional measures. The Iraqi Government had come to the conclusion that the necessity foreseen in the Council's Resolution of December 15th, 1932, of attempting to settle outside Iraq those Assyrians who wished to leave the country had arisen, and they asked for the assistance of the League in finding suitable lands for this purpose. As this solution evidently corresponded with the wishes of a large section of the Assyrian community, the Council decided to facilitate it and for this purpose, set up a Committee whose main task was to consider the practicability of settlement outside Iraq, and if such a solution were found practicable, to take all necessary steps to prepare and execute a detailed scheme.

9. The Committee has explored various possibilities but the only concrete scheme which has so far held out real prospect of success was one for settlement in Brazil. This has been pursued for some time, but has now broken down owing to new immigration legislation passed recently by the Brazilian Constituent Assembly.

10. The Council of the League considered the situation again on June 8th 1934 and requested its Committee to make a further effort to find a destination elsewhere and urged Governments to which the Committee might address appeals to give favourable consideration to such appeals, and to facilitate the Committee's task in view of the great importance of the problem.

11. The above summary of past events will give an idea of the serious difficulties which are to be anticipated if the Assyrian problem in Iraq cannot be solved by the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who wish to leave

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the country. Perpetual friction between the Assyrians and the Iraqis is to be expected, leading to incidents and perhaps even to further hostilities and massacres. His Majesty's Government, in view of their special position in Iraq, cannot avoid becoming involved in the question. This may place them in a situation of great difficulty, vis-à-vis both of the League of Nations and of the Iraqi Government, and react on the whole position and policy of this country in Iraq.

12. There is also, every reason for anxiety if the search for a place of settlement elsewhere is prolonged. The events of last summer have inevitably left behind them bitterness and consequently a certain tension, and the danger is increased by the fact that delay threatens a certain number of the Assyrians with destitution.

Characteristics of the Assyrians.

13. One of the main difficulties in finding a home for the Assyrians arises from the fact that they are little known and even regarded as an inferior coloured race. It should be clearly understood therefore that the Assyrians are a white race with many excellent qualities. They are not nomads. Neither have they any desire as a rule to settle in towns; they are, in fact, "children of the soil". The difficulties in which they have been hitherto involved have been principally due to the fact that they have lived among somewhat turbulent and lawless populations of different race and religions, and, in more recent times, mainly as refugees in unsettled conditions. For the most

part....

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part they are agriculturalists and shepherds and certain of them have experience of cattle-raising. A considerable number follow other occupations, mostly however connected with village life. Very many of them have served and some are still serving as soldiers in the Levies, or as police. They are accustomed to military discipline on British lines and the numerous British officers who have commanded them in the Levies have always spoken of them in the highest terms. In spite of all difficulties, they have maintained their Christian religion. They have the reputation of being courageous, disciplined, loyal, thrifty and industrious and there appears to be no reason why they should become a social or economic burden to any country which may receive them. Indeed, those who have been established on the land in Iraq during the last 13 or 14 years have rapidly become self-supporting. They save their money, generally with the object of becoming landowners and are reputed to be very honest in their dealings. As a highland race it is preferable that they should be settled in high lying country and their type of agriculture or pastoral employment makes it desirable that running water should be available in adequate quantities. They are used to settlement in villages of fifteen to twenty houses and the proposed scheme for settlement in Brazil aimed at providing each family (averaging 5 persons) with about 30 acres of land. It was proposed in that case that settlement should be carried out under the auspices of the Nansen Office, and that the Assyrians should over a period of years reimburse the cost of land, settlement and transport.

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14. It may be useful to append the following extracts from a memorandum drawn up recently by Brigadier-General J. Gilbert Browne, C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., who was for 8 years in command of the Levies in Iraq, and who recently, at the request of the Council Committee went out to Brazil, to investigate the proposed scheme for settlement there. The memorandum from which the extracts are taken, was prepared for communication to the Brazilian authorities.

"The Assyrian as a soldier.

"It is erroneous to consider the Assyrians as a body "merely of fierce fighting men. The Assyrian has fought "and obtained his reputation for fighting simply because "he has had to fight for his very existence for centuries. "If he had not fought he would by now be extinct, but given "fair treatment, and the prospect of being able to live "and develop on normal lines, he will prove a loyal and "useful and not a troublesome citizen. Another important "point to recall in this connexion is that it is against "the ideas and teaching of the Assyrians to fight against "another Christian people.

"As soldiers in the levies General Browne always "found them very amenable to discipline and very little "trouble in the ranks or in the field. They are capable of "very hard work and do it willingly.

"The Assyrians as a citizen.

"General Browne states they are among the most strictly "moral people he has ever met, and he knows of only one "case of disease among them from immorality during his "eight years' command. They are very clean in person and "in their houses. They conform to sanitary laws, thanks to their respect for discipline.

"The...

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"The Assyrian as a farmer.

"The Assyrians are essentially an agricultural and "pastoral race and cultivate mainly rice, cereal crops and "tobacco. But there are a number who follow other occupa- "tions. They have, however, a traditional love of the land, "and as a general rule their great ambition is to become "landowners. A large number are shepherds, whilst others "follow allied occupations such as weaving and skin-pressing. "In addition there are builders, blacksmiths, basket- "makers, railway and road workers, whose experience and "services might be usefully employed in connexion with the "development of the proposed colony, without detriment to "the national labour market.

"The Assyrian as a colonist.

"There are Colonies of Assyrians in the United States "of America, particularly in Wisconsin and Chicago, and as "far as General Browne knows they make good citizens.

"Sport.

"It may be of interest to mention that the Assyrians "take readily to games, and play football especially well. "Their national games are putting the stone and rifle- shooting, whilst some have learned baseball in America."

J. C. Sterndale Bennett

June 14th 1934.

Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.........		
Parliamentary Under Secretary.		
Secretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

P.Z. 3858

Question by Mr. Mander

For Wednesday, 20th June 1934

*13. Mr. Mander, — To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, if he will state the present position with regard to the future of the Assyrians from Iraq; and whether the proposal to send them to Brazil has been abandoned. [*Wednesday 20th June.*]

A copy has also been sent to the Economic & Overseas Dept.

MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

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PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.........		
Parliamentary Under Secretary.		
Secretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Question by Mr. Rhys Davies

For Tuesday, 19th June 1934

*55. Mr. Rhys Davies, — To ask the Prime Minister, whether a definite plan of re-settlement of Assyrian Christians in Brazil has been worked out; and whether, in the event of its proving acceptable, His Majesty's Government will participate financially in this scheme. [*Tuesday* 19*th June.*]

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Political Committee

to see paper flagged.

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MINUTE OR SUGGESTED REPLY.

ASSYRIANS (RESETTLEMENT).

36. **Mr. RHYS DAVIES** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a definite plan of resettlement of Assyrian Christians in Brazil has been worked out; and whether, in the event of its proving acceptable, His Majesty's Government will participate financially in this scheme?

The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Mr. Eden): The Committee of the Council of the League which has this matter in hand reported to the Council on the 5th June that the scheme for resettling in Brazil those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq had broken down owing to the recent adoption by the Brazilian Constituent Assembly of a restrictive measure on immigration in general. The second part of the question therefore does not arise. I should add that on the 7th June the Council instructed its Committee to persist in its efforts and to make fresh representations to the Governments of countries whose territories might lend themselves to the settlement of the same Assyrians. The Council in the same resolution addressed an urgent appeal to the Governments to which the Committee of the Council might make requests, to give favourable consideration to such requests and to facilitate the Committee's task in view of the great importance of the problem. The Committee has, I understand, since addressed appeals to a considerable number of Governments.

Mr. MANDER: Is it proposed to continue the negotiations with the Brazilian Government?

Mr. EDEN: No; they have passed restrictive measures of immigration

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Political Department.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 1933-34

	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary.........		
Parliamentary Under Secretary.		
Secretary of State.........		

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

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P.Z.
4045
1934

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3822 / 1 / 93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P.A.
JL 18/6

P. 3858 / 1
USS 16/6

Foreign Office,
15 June . 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence :

F.O. letter E 3636/1/93 of June 7.

MAILS BRANCH
16 JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva Tels no 28 Saving of 6 June 51 L.N. of 8 June 56 of 9 June	Assyrians

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 25 21 JUN, 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
16 JUN
INDIA O.

Similar letter sent to A.M.
C.O.
D.O.
W.O.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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From SWITZERLAND.

P. Z.
4045
1934

Telegram (en clair) from H.M.'s Consul (Geneva).
D. (By Air Mail) 6th June, 1934.
R. 7th June, 1934.

No. 28 Saving.

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Confidential.

My telegram No. 40 (of June 3rd).

Following from Mr. Strang.

Committee has adopted report to Council recording failure of Brazilian scheme. As regards future action, document is not very clear cut, being in fact compromise between two opposing views. No mention is made, however, of re-settlement in Iraq and while showing that Committee is at present without indication of suitable alternative destination, report contemplates further effort to find one. It is suggested that Governments hitherto approached may view matter in different light now that Brazilian scheme has broken down, if urgency of problem is represented to them. Report goes on to show Committee's concern regarding effect of fresh delay on situation of Assyrians in Iraq and, while disclaiming all responsibility in this respect, since Committee's task is simply to investigate practicability of settlement outside Iraq, informs Council that it has nevertheless thought it its duty, when acquainting Iraqi representative of the new situation, to remind him of undertakings of his Government regarding protection and welfare of Assyrians.

This report will come before Council June 7th.

Rapporteur's report as at present drafted, after expressing disappointment at failure of Brazilian scheme and pointing out that decision of Brazilian Government is not ...

FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL ... SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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not directed against Assyrians in particular but relates to measure restricting immigration in general, asks what will be effect on situation of Assyrians in Iraq of long delay which must now at best be anticipated. It states that the Council has not forgotten tragic events of last summer but neither has it forgotten the guarantees, undertakings and solemn declarations of the Iraqi Government and cannot doubt that Government's good faith and ability to fulfil them. The report proposes final effort to find land for those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq and suggests adoption of following resolution:-

The Council,

1. Takes note of the report of the Committee of the Council for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq;

2. Approves the report of its Rapporteur, the representative of Spain;

3. Instructs the Committee of the Council to persist in its efforts and to make fresh representations to the Governments of countries, the territories of which might lend themselves to the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq who express the desire to leave that country, in order that it may be able as soon as possible to inform the Council definitely whether the settlement of these Assyrians elsewhere than in Iraq is at present realisable.

4. Addresses an urgent appeal to the Governments to which the Committee of the Council may make requests, to give favourable consideration to such requests, and to facilitate the Committee's task in view of the great importance of the problem;

5. Draws the Iraqi Government's special attention to its declaration made at Bagdad on May 30th, 1932, on the occasion of the expiration of the mandatory system

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in Iraq, and containing the guarantees given to the Council by the Iraqi Government, in pursuance of which it formally pledged itself, among other things, to afford all inhabitants of Iraq full and complete protection of life and liberty, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

6. Notes that the representative of Iraq has on several occasions given assurances to the Committee of the Council that Iraq would take measures in favour of the Assyrian population, more particularly in the matter of security, health and assistance, while the efforts to arrange an emigration plan were in progress.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 28 Saving; repeated to Bagdad No. 12 in code.

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P.Z.
4045
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. H.M.'s Consul. (Geneva)
8th June, 1934

D. 11.30 a.m. 8th June, 1934.

R. 11.15 a.m. 8th June, 1934.

No. 51 L.N. (R).

****

My tel. No. 28 Saving.

Following from Strang. Council considered Assyrian question on June 7th.

Iraqi representative expressed regret at breakdown of Brazilian plan and thanks for efforts which were being made to find solution. He added that Iraqi Government would continue to look after security and welfare of the Assyrians.

The Council without discussion took note of this statement and adopted resolution by rapporteur whose report was unchallenged.

Addressed to Foreign Office, repeated to Bagdad.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 25 21 JUN 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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P.Z
4045
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. H.M's Consul (Geneva),
9th June, 1934.

D. 2. 7 p.m. 9th June, 1934.

R. 2.45 p.m. 9th June, 1934.

No. 56. (R).

My telegram No. 51.

Following from Mr. Strang.

Assyrian Committee decided June 8th to address appeals to Governments of the following countries, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Australia, South Africa, Canada, Argentina, Colombia, Greece, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey. This list which is not being published is capable of extension if soundings by the League Secretariat and Nansen Office reveal prospects elsewhere.

Committee have now adjourned to await results.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 56, repeated to Bagdad.

ENCLOSURE IN [illegible]
No. 25 21 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRET[illegible]
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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P.Z. 3858
34

The G. of I. would, I think, find it quite impossible to receive any large number of families; and would probably object to receive any, though they might be asked. But as the disposal of a few families only would merely touch the fringe of the problem I would be inclined to do nothing.

Sir L. Kershaw
Sir F. Stewart

Under Secretary of State.

18/6

I agree
S
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Private Secretary.

SK
18/6

The Assyrian problem.

With reference to the S. of S.'s note on P.Z.3609, please see Mr.E.J.Turner's note at flag A and the departmental note below.

The aim of the solutions of the Assyrian problem hitherto explored appears to be to settle them, or a large number of them, as a community en bloc outside Iraq. India does not offer a field for such a solution, and if we made an enquiry of the G. of I. they would almost certainly reply to the effect that India already has an excessive population, and is in fact a "country of emigration"; that any new lands that can be brought under cultivation are required for the existing surplus population, and that it is consequently impracticable to consider any question of finding a home in India for the Assyrian community.

In the case of the Jewish and other Russian European refugees who are flocking into Afghanistan, the G. of I. have been unable to agree to their reception in/

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in India, except in individual cases where such refugees have definite prospects of being able to establish themselves there without becoming a charge on public funds. A certain number of Russian refugees from Sinkiang have been allowed to enter India, but only on urgent humanitarian grounds, and in the hope that it may be possible to arrange through the League of Nations for their ultimate disposal elsewhere, as there is no means of absorbing them in India itself.

16. 6. 34

P.Z. 3858/34

Mr. Walton.
Private Secretary.

Please see the Secretary of State's note on P.Z. 3609 and Mr. E.J. Turner's note at flag A.

The settlement of half a dozen Assyrian families in India, even if this could be arranged, would be no solution of the Assyrian problem which is one of trying to find a home for 2,000 or 3,000 families, say 12,000 souls, and the difficulties experienced by the Government of India in dealing with the comparatively small influx into India of about 100 White Russian refugees from Afghanistan and Sinkiang make it seem improbable that the Government of India could ever contemplate accepting the Assyrians. In the case of the White Russians, the Government of India stated that there was practically no chance of the refugees being absorbed into the economic life of India, that many of them were without any technical skill or indeed desire to earn a living, and that even in cases where these essentials were present, language difficulties were a great handicap. Most of the Assyrians are no doubt competent agriculturists,

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but it would probably be difficult to find a sufficient area of suitable land in India.

The latest telegrams on the file confirm that the Brazilian scheme has broken down.

J.E. Crombie
13/6/34

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No. E 3260/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3858
1934

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P. when available
[illegible]

P.Z. 3847 11/6

Foreign Office,
8 June, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence :

F.O. letter E 2308/1/93 of June 2. 3702

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Records of Meetings of Assyrian Council Committee:- 23rd meeting of 7 May 24th " " 7 " 25th " " 8 " 26th " " 8 " 27th " " 14 " — Report of Committee to League Council 15 May.	Assyrian question

MAILS BRANCH
9 JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE
No. 24
14 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
W.O.
A.M.
Treas.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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P.Z.
3858
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

May 15, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[E 3148/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 37.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the twenty-third meeting of Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 7th May, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
May 12, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-third Meeting of the Council Committee held on May 7, 1934, *at* 10·30 A.M.

THE committee met at first in private to consider Brigadier Browne's report.

The President said that there was also the question of a report to the Council. The committee would have to decide whether to make a report or not. M. Oliván, for his part, thought that the committee ought, in any case, to draw the attention of the Council to the reports which had been received since the last Council meeting from the Iraqi representative on the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, and he was inclined to think also that it might be well to make a progress report on the work of settlement, in view of the criticisms which were appearing on the slowness of the committee's work.

The question of inviting the members of the Commission of Enquiry and the Iraqi representative to attend was then discussed.

The general feeling of the committee was that it might be embarrassing to have the Iraqi representative present at the outset, as he was not aware of the present position *vis-à-vis* of the Brazilian Government and was not even aware of the three conditions which the Brazilian Government had laid down.

It was agreed, therefore, to decide later on the time at which the Iraqi representative should be summoned, and, meanwhile, to ask Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson and the president of the Nansen Office to attend later in the morning.

In reply to an enquiry from the Danish representative, the *President* said that he had received no news from the Spanish Ambassador since the last session of the committee.

The United Kingdom Representative said that nothing further had been received from His Majesty's Ambassador. The despatch to the Spanish Ambassador had only been sent off on the 14th April and would not have been for long in the possession of the Spanish Ambassador. It was perhaps unlikely that he would have been able to make much progress as yet, particularly in view of the impending presidential election. The United Kingdom representative understood that this election had now been fixed for the 14th May, and it seemed difficult to make any progress until it was over. He thought, however, that at its present session the committee might usefully examine Brigadier Browne's report from the point of view of the modifications which it might necessitate in the despatch to the Spanish Ambassador.

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The President agreed and thought that the committee might endeavour to send off as soon as possible a supplementary despatch in the light of its interview with Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that the committee should forthwith go through Brigadier Browne's report and the subsidiary report from Major Johnson in order to gain a preliminary idea of the points which might have to be mentioned to the Spanish Ambassador. These points could form the subject of questions to Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson when they appeared, and the committee could subsequently, on the basis of the discussion, consider a draft to the Spanish Ambassador.

The President suggested that, in addition to taking up these points with the mission, the latter might be asked whether they had anything to add to their written report, more particularly regarding the agitation in Brazil.

The Mexican Representative having referred to the file of press cuttings which the mission had brought back, M. Arocha said that he did not think anything would be gained by examining the file in detail. There was a great deal of repetition in the articles, which were concerned with three main points:—

(*a*) A diatribe against imperialism, and more particularly against British imperialism;
(*b*) A criticism of the Assyrians as being Levantine undesirables; and
(*c*) Protests against Asiatic immigration in general.

The Danish Representative suggested that it might be useful to ask Brigadier Browne for his opinion on the position of the Mar Shimun. It was quite evident that Brigadier Browne and Major Thomson held contradictory views on that subject. Brigadier Browne indicated in his report that the split between the two branches of the Assyrians was not likely to last long in Brazil. Major Thomson, on the other hand, had tended to take the view that the split was fundamental. Furthermore, Brigadier Browne had put forward a suggestion that the Mar Shimun ought to go to Brazil with the first party of Assyrians. M. Borberg was inclined to wonder whether this was, in fact, a wise suggestion.

The United Kingdom Representative doubted whether Brigadier Browne was in a position to give an authoritative opinion regarding the present position of the Mar Shimun. He had been away from Iraq for some time and could not be expected to be *au courant* with the latest developments. He could only be expected to offer observations on the Mar Shimun's position in the future in Brazil. The exact position of the Mar Shimun in Iraq was a matter of opinion and it would probably be impossible to gauge the extent of the split between the two factions of Assyrians until a scheme for immigration could be put before them. It was alleged in some quarters that it was natural for the Assyrians to split up into factions and that even in the old days in Turkey they had not been united and had only united in the face of a common danger. The Mar Shimun, on the other hand, always claimed that the Assyrians were a single united people under his leadership. The United Kingdom representative thought that the committee could only, in the first place, put the Brazilian scheme before the Assyrians as a scheme under which it was proposed to settle all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq together. It might be that, if this were done, the Assyrians might forget their differences and agree to go together. On the other hand, a certain section might say that they wished to leave Iraq, but would not go with the Mar Shimun. In that case the committee would have to fall back on the idea of a dual settlement.

The President said that, although Brigadier Browne had not been recently in Iraq, he appeared to have a profound knowledge of the Assyrians, and it might, nevertheless, be useful to ask him about the Mar Shimun's position.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he merely wished to point out that it was doubtful whether anyone was able to estimate exactly the Mar Shimun's position at present, and that Brigadier Browne's opinion, though interesting and possibly helpful, could not be taken as authoritative, owing to his absence for some time from Iraq.

In reply to a request from the President for suggestions as to points which ought to be raised with Brigadier Browne, the *United Kingdom Representative* said that he had been through the reports of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson for the purpose of seeing what modifications they might entail in the despatch of the 10th April to the Spanish Ambassador. It would be remembered that that despatch had taken the line that it would be necessary to negotiate with the Brazilian Government on three points. The first concerned the three conditions laid down by the Brazilian Government, the second the treatment which the Assyrians would enjoy in Brazil, and the third the physical details of settlement. There seemed to be little in the reports of the mission which affected that part of the despatch which concerned the Brazilian conditions, except that a suggestion was made that arrangements might be made for non-agricultural Assyrians to serve an approved period of apprenticeship with qualified agricultural families or in an experimental agricultural station which would be established in the settlement. The committee might wish to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to put a suggestion of this sort before the Brazilian Government in connexion with the first of the Brazilian conditions. The two reports did not appear to affect the despatch so far as it concerned the future treatment of the Assyrians. As regards the physical details of settlement, it had been stated in the despatch that any necessary indications would be offered after consultation with Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson. The United Kingdom representative thought that there was not a great deal in the two reports on this aspect of the matter which need be taken up with the Brazilian Government at this stage, but the committee might wish to consider the following points :—

(1) A suggestion had been made by Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson that a Brazilian Commission should be sent to Iraq to make a selection of the Assyrians.

(2) Some special arrangement would no doubt be necessary for allowing those Assyrians who were old and infirm to proceed to Brazil. It was obviously undesirable that such persons should be left in Iraq if their relatives went to Brazil and, in fact, their relatives would be unlikely to leave Iraq without them. The Brazilian Government, however, might be reluctant to accept people in this category, and it might be necessary to satisfy them that the people in question would be adequately maintained in Brazil by their relatives.

(3) Major Johnson had suggested that the Brazilian Government should be urged to make special arrangements for the customs examination of the baggage of the Assyrians on board ship between Rio and Santos, so as to facilitate disembarkation at Santos.

(4) It might also be necessary to warn the Brazilian Government that two separate settlements might be required.

(5) As regards the eventual operation of the settlement scheme, Major Johnson had made three alternative proposals :—

(*a*) That the Nansen Office should make a contract with Paraná Plantations (Limited), under which, in return for a lump sum payment which would cover the cost of land and all administrative costs, the company would carry out the whole work of settlement.

(*b*) That the Nansen Office should merely purchase the necessary land from the company and that the company should then carry out the settlement work as the agents of the Nansen Office, at cost price.

(*c*) That the Nansen Office should purchase the land from Paraná Plantations (Limited) and should itself assume full responsibility for carrying out the settlement plan.

The first of these alternatives might involve the presence of a Nansen representative in Brazil in a consultative capacity only, the second would mean that the work of settlement would be executed by the company but directed on the spot by a commissioner of the Nansen Office, the third would place the whole work of settlement in the hands of a Nansen Office commissioner and a special Nansen Office staff. It might be doubted whether it was necessary to mention these alternatives to the Brazilian Government at the present stage, but the reason why the United Kingdom representative thought it necessary to raise the point was that the alternative ultimately adopted might, to some extent, depend upon the solution of the question of the future national status of the Assyrians. It was conceivable that, if the Assyrians were to become Brazilian

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nationals at once, the Brazilian Government might object to their administration being placed in the hands of an outside organisation like the Nansen Office. On the other hand, if the Nansen Office purchased the land outright, they would presumably have the right to administer it if they wished to do so. At all events, it might be advisable to draw the attention of the Spanish Ambassador to the three alternatives and to ask him to find out whether any of them woul be likely to lead to special difficulties with the Brazilian Government.

The Mexican Representative suggested that the mission should be asked for further information regarding the interview which M. Redard had evidently had with the "Society of the Friends of Alberto Torres."

The Danish Representative agreed, but thought it important to have the views of the mission on the whole question of the agitation against Assyrian immigration, on the press campaign, and on the forthcoming election in so far as it was likely to concern the Assyrian question. The committee needed information on these points for its own guidance in the matter of publicity.

As no further suggestions were forthcoming, *the President* proposed that the committee should, before the arrival of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson, take the opportunity of examining the Mar Shimun's letter of the 3rd May. He observed that that letter gave an account of the situation in Iraq which did not correspond with the reports received from the Iraqi Government. It demanded the despatch to Iraq of a commission of enquiry to ascertain the true facts and it asked that destinations other than Brazil should be considered before the Brazilian scheme was proceeded with. M. Oliván thought that, for the time being, the committee must continue to depend on the Iraqi Government's reports regarding the internal situation. At the same time, the committee ought to do its best to find out the truth, and would no doubt wish to consider whether it would be advisable to suggest to the Council (though it was an extremely delicate matter) that a special representative should be despatched to Iraq to make enquiries. Unfortunately, the press was beginning to reproduce the Mar Shimun's allegations. There had been articles that morning in the *Journal de Genève* and in the *Journal des Nations* which had clearly been inspired by the Mar Shimun's allegations. The settlement question was sufficiently difficult without this press campaign. Even if the local agitation in Brazil disappeared, the discussion of technical details was bound to lead to delay. Meanwhile, the committee must think of the Assyrians. It had been definitely given this task by the Council and M. Oliván was anxious that neither the Council nor the committee should, by failing to find out the true position of affairs, become directly responsible for a situation for whose origin they were not responsible.

M. Oliván noted that the Mar Shimun suggested that settlement in Syria, Canada or Turkey might be preferable to settlement in Brazil. As regards Syria, however, he recollected that the committee had already considered this possibility, and his impression was that the French representative had indicated that settlement in Syria was virtually impossible. At the same time, the committee might wish to confirm this by a direct enquiry of the Mandatory Government. As regards Canada, M. Oliván believed that the Canadian Government had already refused to consider Assyrian settlement.

M. Arocha corrected the President on this point. He said that the United Kingdom representative had, he thought, indicated that settlement in Canada was unlikely to be realisable.

The United Kingdom Representative reminded the committee that he had several times said that it was impossible for him to speak on behalf of any of the Dominion Governments. In the early days of the committee's life he had indicated, however, that he believed that existing Canadian immigration laws would prevent Assyrian immigration, and that, if the Canadian Government were willing to take the Assyrians, an amendment of their legislation would be necessary. He had also informed the committee that there had been at one time an Assyrian settlement at Port Arthur; that he believed that the settlement no longer existed, and that the experience had shown that the Assyrians were unlikely to be successful settlers in Canada. He had suggested, however, that the League should approach the Canadian Government direct in order to ascertain

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their attitude, and a letter had been sent by the League Secretariat to the Government of Canada on the 30th November. So far no reply had been received, and it seemed possible that the Canadian Government, being aware from the committee's last report to the Council that the Assyrian scheme was under active consideration, had thought it unnecessary to reply.

M. Arocha then read Nuri Pasha's letter to the Secretary-General of the 26th October last. In this letter Nuri Pasha had expressed his regret that the Mar Shimun's letters of the 24th and 25th October should have been accepted and communicated to the League Committee. The letter had pointed out that the Mar Shimun was, in the eyes of the Iraqi Government, guilty of "the criminal instigation of the recent revolt," and that the admission of undue intervention by him could only prejudice the prospects of a satisfactory result.

The President observed that this was, perhaps, the opinion of the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he himself could not share it. The committee could not ignore the Mar Shimun's letter of the 3rd May, or any letter from any other source containing similar allegations. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs evidently assumed that the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq was not within the competence of the committee and on that point he was wrong. The League had specifically asked the committee to concern itself with this aspect of the matter.

The Danish Representative recalled that the question of the treatment of the Mar Shimun had been discussed by the committee once before. It had then been agreed that the committee must receive the information forwarded by the Mar Shimun and make the best use possible of it. The Mar Shimun's letter made the Danish representative wonder whether the committee was proceeding on the right lines with the Mar Shimun. As an agitator the Mar Shimun could do very great harm, but he could also be very useful, and in the reports of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson he was evidently cast for an important rôle in Brazil. The Danish representative was not convinced that any change in the relations of the committee and the Mar Shimun was actually necessary, but he thought that the committee had to consider the point very carefully.

The President said he was quite prepared to ameliorate relations with the Mar Shimun. He was not clear, however, what could, in fact, be done. He had always seen the Mar Shimun when the latter had requested an interview. The secretariat had also seen him. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had, he understood, also been in contact with him during a recent visit by the Patriarch to England, and certainly unofficial circles in England had been in close touch with him. To give the Mar Shimun more official recognition might lead to serious difficulties with the Iraqi Government. The president thought that, while nothing should be done to antagonise the Mar Shimun, it was difficult not to leave things as they were.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he entirely agreed that it was necessary for the committee to carry the Mar Shimun with it. Whatever might be the exact truth about his position, it was clear that he could exercise very considerable influence for good or ill. At the same time it was no easy matter to deal with him, as he appeared unfortunately bent on making trouble. Furthermore, to give him an official status would certainly antagonise the Iraqi Government, whose co-operation was essential if a settlement scheme was to be put into successful operation. The United Kingdom representative did not think, therefore, that there could be any change in the relations between the Mar Shimun and the committee as a whole, though members of the committee might individually do what they could to secure his willing co-operation. As regards his report on the situation in Iraq, it was for consideration whether this ought not to be sent to the Iraqi Government for observations. The protest of the Iraqi Government of the 26th October last, which M. Arocha had read, referred to letters in which the Mar Shimun had persisted in going over the same ground as had already been covered by the Council at its session in the first half of October. In so far as this was the case, the Iraqi Government certainly had some justification for their attitude. The present letter, however, concerned new facts and made new allegations and the United Kingdom representative doubted whether the committee could take the responsibility of doing otherwise than asking the Iraqi Government for a report on these allegations.

The President said that what offended him was not so much the Mar Shimun's letter as the press campaign which it had evidently inspired, and which it was difficult not to attribute to the Mar Shimun himself. The same tactics had been employed on the occasion of previous meetings of the committee. A letter had been received from the Mar Shimun and immediately a unanimous press campaign in the Geneva papers had followed. It was really intolerable that the Mar Shimun should be allowed to act in this way and to hamper the work of the committee. He wondered whether any influence could be brought to bear upon him, and he asked whether His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were in a position to exert such influence, or, if not, whether those ecclesiastical circles with which the Mar Shimun was in relation in England could not do something to help.

The United Kingdom Representative agreed that the Mar Shimun's activities were regrettable, but unfortunately he was something of an agitator. It was, of course, quite useless for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to attempt to exert any influence over him. They had no means of doing so, and the Mar Shimun, unfortunately, owing to the past history of the Assyrian question, unjustifiably held His Majesty's Government responsible for the plight of his people and regarded with suspicion any advance which British officials might make to him. The United Kingdom representative had himself endeavoured in the early days of the committee's work to enlist the willing co-operation of the Mar Shimun and had endeavoured to prove to him that His Majesty's Government were anxious to do their best to facilitate a solution of the troubles of the Assyrian people. The Mar Shimun, however, had proved incapable of concentrating on the future and had always insisted on raking up the controversial past. Any intervention by His Majesty's Government, therefore, or by any British official would probably have quite the opposite effect to what was intended. As regards the ecclesiastical circles in Great Britain, the United Kingdom representative believed that everything possible had been done by them to exert a calming influence on the Mar Shimun, but unfortunately he was liable to break out at intervals, as in the present case.

The discussion was suspended at this point owing to the arrival of Brigadier Browne, Major Johnson and M. Werner.

The President welcomed the mission and thanked them for their report. He wished also, on behalf of the committee, to thank M. Redard. The committee had examined Brigadier Browne's report and the supplementary report by Major Johnson. Apart from any questions which members of the committee might wish to put, he asked whether the mission had any supplementary information which they wished to give—for instance, any observations on the political atmosphere in Brazil not recorded in the report, which might be of interest now that the political situation in Brazil was in a state of flux. The main question was whether the Brazilian Government would keep a promise which they had made, or whether political changes might produce a change of attitude. What was the view of the mission on this point?

Brigadier Browne replied to the thanks which the president had expressed and hoped that the thanks to M. Redard would be conveyed by the committee. M. Redard had been of the greatest possible assistance. Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson had read his earlier report on the Paraná estates, and, while they had gone there with open minds, they had not been prepared to find the place as good as M. Redard had represented it to be. They had, however, found it even better. As regards the political situation, the mission, when they went to Brazil, had had no idea that they would be called upon to do more than to examine the area proposed, to answer the various points raised in the *questionnaire* examined by the committee before their departure from Geneva, and to decide, in the light of Brigadier Browne's personal knowledge of the Assyrians, whether they were fit people to put into Paraná. The press campaign in Brazil had come as an entire surprise to the mission. The spearhead of the agitation was the "Society of the Friends of Alberto Torres." This society was, in the first place, scientific, but it had become the chief antagonist of Assyrian immigration. The press had drawn conclusions from the criticisms of self-styled experts. These experts had been uniformly ill-informed. The press had produced a number of illustrations said to be of Assyrian life, but with one exception, *i.e.*, a picture of the Mar Shimun, these illustrations had been concerned with various races of people,

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but certainly not with Assyrians. As regards the value to be attached to the agitation, Brigadier Browne felt it difficult to form an opinion. At first he had thought it to be simply intended as an embarrassment to the Government. At the close, however, he was not absolutely sure that there was not behind it some kind of anti-Asiatic agitation. It was difficult to judge whether the agitation had upset the scheme for Assyrian settlement, but Brigadier Browne was not at all inclined to think that this was the case. It was very possible that the agitation would die down once the election was over, but, of course, one could not say at this stage. The mission had not answered the press campaign. In the first place, it had no facilities for doing so; in the second place, as it was about to proceed to Paraná, it could not have continued to meet the campaign. In any case, it seemed undesirable to become embroiled with the press, and the mission had thought it preferable merely to draw up an aide-mémoire about the Assyrians and to hand it to various influential persons.

The Mexican Representative observed that M. Redard had had an interview with the secretary of the Society of Friends of Alberto Torres. Was Brigadier Browne in a position to say more about that interview?

Brigadier Browne said that it was true that M. Redard had been to see the secretary of the society, but the latter had been in an extremely excited frame of mind and had, in fact, done all the talking. The interview was not satisfactory and led nowhere, although he believed that M. Redard and the secretary had parted on the best of terms.

Brigadier Browne then read to the committee a letter, dated the 19th April, which had been sent by the local representative of Paraná Plantations (Limited) to his headquarters in London and forwarded by the chairman of Paraná Plantations (Limited) to Major Johnson. This report was to the effect that Mr. Thomas had been informed, unofficially, but by two reliable official sources, that the Federal Government had decided to proceed with the Brazilian scheme and that the Commission of Enquiry had been set up merely to allay the existing agitation and to tide over the period until the election was finished.

Brigadier Browne then asked leave to make two small corrections in his report. On p. 13, regarding the visit of the mission to Guatambu, the following sentence occurred: "Here are 375 families." This was a typing error and should read: "Here there is room for 375 families." On p. 14 it was stated that the title-deeds of Paraná Plantations (Limited) had been found in order. Brigadier Browne asked leave to add at the end of that sentence, "as far as the mission could judge." He explained that he and Major Johnson were naturally not experts in the matter of title-deeds, but they had gone into the matter very carefully and had every reason to suppose that they were in order. Paraná Plantations (Limited) had themselves taken the greatest care in this matter, and it was a point on which to beware in Brazil, as, in certain cases, title-deeds were invalid, as, owing to bad maps and faulty surveying, they had sometimes been duplicated.

The President then asked whether any member of the committee would like to put specific points to the mission.

The United Kingdom Representative raised the question of the possibility of passing non-agricultural Assyrians through agricultural centres. Was it practicable in this way to overcome the difficulty created by the first Brazilian condition?

Major Johnson replied that it was probably too costly to put all the Assyrians through agricultural stations. He had, therefore, in his report made an alternative suggestion about attaching such Assyrians to agricultural families for a certain period. The fact that the Assyrians could not all be described as agriculturalists had been raised in the aide-mémoire which Brigadier Browne had handed to various persons in Brazil. It had there been shown that, although some of the Assyrians followed callings which were not strictly agricultural, they were all in a way connected with agricultural life and should not prove to be an embarrassment to the national labour market. This section of the aide-mémoire had raised no opposition from the Brazilian authorities and Major Johnson hoped that it would be possible for non-agricultural Assyrians to be absorbed in one of the two ways which he had mentioned, *i.e.*, either by attachment to agricultural families or by training in an agricultural station.

The President asked whether the mission had considered the third Brazilian condition concerning the repatriation or resettlement elsewhere of those Assyrians who did not settle down in Brazil.

Brigadier Browne said the mission had certainly considered it, but had found no answer.

The President, after individual consultation with members of the committee, then informed the mission that, at its last session, the committee had considered it useful to address a despatch to the Spanish Ambassador, in order to invite him to clear up certain points by means of informal discussions with the Brazilian Government. This despatch was of a very confidential nature. The committee now wished to complete it in the light of the additional information which the members of the mission might be in a position to furnish. He accordingly proposed to communicate a copy of the despatch to them and to ask them to furnish comments on it, if possible on the following day.

The Danish Representative said that in his report Brigadier Browne had made mention of tribal jealousy among the Assyrians. Apart from the controversial question of the position of the Mar Shimun, was it likely that this tribal jealousy would give trouble in Brazil?

Brigadier Browne said that the jealousy existed among the Lower and Upper Tiari. Originally it arose, apparently, out of a dispute regarding precedence after the election of the present Mar Shimun. Prior to that time, the Lower Tiari had been considered as the senior tribe. Apart from this it had been found in the levies that the Upper Tiari provided better officers and there were consequently more officers in the levies from that tribe than from the Lower Tiari. The Upper Tiari had, until recently, been considered as rather "wild men of the mountains," and the ascendancy which they had now gained was somewhat resented by the Lower Tiari. The Mar Shimun owed his election principally to the influence of the Malik Ismail of the Upper Tiari. Whether this tribal jealousy would last, Brigadier Browne could not say. At the end of his time in Iraq it had been somewhat accentuated, as the Malik Khoshaba had taken employment under the Iraqi Government, which other chiefs had refused to do.

Before adjourning, *the President* asked the president of the Nansen Office whether he had any observations to make.

M. Werner, after expressing his appreciation of the work done by the Mission of Enquiry, said that he would like to make some observations on a rather different aspect of the matter. There had been a meeting of the governing body of the Nansen Office on the 22nd April and he had been asked to draw the attention of the committee to what had then passed. The governing body had not been at all enthusiastic about the scheme for the transfer of the Assyrians to Brazil, as this scheme appeared to some of them to be fantastic, and it was certainly tragic that the Assyrians should be separated from that part of the world to which they belonged. The governing body had wished M. Werner to express the view that it was essential that the Assyrians should be absolutely free to decide whether to leave Iraq or not. M. Werner recalled that he had already taken up this point at a previous meeting of the committee and had then received satisfactory assurances from M. Oliván. He had informed his governing body accordingly and his statement had been received with satisfaction. The governing body realised that it belonged to the Council Committee to take decisions as regards the destination of the Assyrians and the method of their settlement and of their eventual repatriation in case the experiment was not a success, but the governing body thought it most desirable that the sum necessary for financing the settlement should, if possible, be available before a Nansen representative went out to Iraq to join the local committee which had been set up there to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians as regards the Brazilian scheme. The question of finance was a capital one and, if the Nansen Office were to accept responsibility for the operation of a scheme, they would like to obtain precise information on this point. They would, in particular, be glad to know whether the Assyrians themselves would be asked to contribute. The governing body had merely wished him to put these observations before the committee for consideration. The governing body was quite ready to co-operate with the committee in settling the Assyrians, but would like that co-operation to be dominated by the principles to which he had referred,

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namely, the voluntary nature of the emigration and the ensuring of adequate financial support to guard against unduly raising the hopes of the Assyrians. M. Werner wished to refer to one other point. Under present arrangements the Nansen Office would cease to exist in 1938. He observed, however, from Major Johnson's report that the repayment of the sums advanced for settlement would take at least eight years. He would like the committee to consider, therefore, what organisation was to deal with this matter when the Nansen Office had disappeared. He had himself several times been asked for assurances that the office would, in fact, be wound up by 1938, and he had given such assurances, as he was bound to do under the decisions reached by the League, but the committee must obviously ensure continuity.

The President assured M. Werner that emigration would be voluntary. The committee had always been anxious to ensure this. As regards the place of settlement, that naturally had to depend on available possibilities. If the committee had had a great choice, it was conceivable that it would have chosen a place other than Brazil, but the choice was restricted. As regards finance, once the Brazilian Government had agreed to take the Assyrians, and the technical aspect of the matter had been studied and settled with that Government, he thought M. Werner could rest assured that the committee would take matters in the order which he had suggested, namely, that it would feel bound to assure itself that the necessary finance would be forthcoming before it authorised the local committee to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians. The question of the prolongation of the life of the Nansen Office was, he feared, outside the scope of the present committee, and was a matter which would have to be referred in due course to the Council.

The President said that he had made these observations without prior consultation with the members of the committee. They expressed his own personal views and he would be glad to know whether they were adopted as the views of the committee.

The United Kingdom Representative said he felt bound to make one reservation to avoid possible misunderstanding, on the question of finance. He entirely appreciated M. Werner's desire that finance should be assured before any scheme was put before the Assyrians. If this could be done, it would be all to the good, but it might not be practicable to take matters in this order. At all events, he thought it premature for the committee to enter into any commitment on the point. M. Werner would realise that, until the Assyrians had been consulted, it would not be known how many of them wished to go to Brazil and consequently how much money would have to be found. Until this stage was reached, Governments might have some difficulty in promising a contribution. On the other hand, the risk of reversing the order might not be very great. If, for instance, the area in Brazil had been shown to be satisfactory, if the Brazilian Government had consented to receive the Assyrians and the details had been satisfactorily settled with them, and if the Assyrians had declared that they were willing to go, the United Kingdom representative felt that the members of the League could scarcely afford at that stage to let the scheme fail and that means would be found of overcoming any difficulties about providing the necessary finance.

The President regretted that, so far as he personally was concerned, he could not agree with the United Kingdom representative. He felt that it was absolutely necessary, before any scheme was put before the Assyrians, to make sure that the necessary finance would be forthcoming. That was, however, his personal opinion and, in expressing it, he had hoped that he had been expressing the opinion of the committee. But, no doubt, the committee would consider the matter further at a more advanced stage.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it was perhaps premature to go further into the point at this stage. It might be that matters would work out as M. Werner and the President desired. On the other hand, that course might prove impracticable and what he had desired to guard against was a premature commitment. He had felt bound to make his reservation to guard against any misapprehension in M. Werner's mind. He repeated, however, that he fully appreciated and sympathised with M. Werner's desire to have the

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question of finance settled, if possible, before any scheme was put before the Assyrians.

M. Werner expressed his appreciation of the replies given by M. Oliván and by the United Kingdom representative, and intimated that he was content to leave the matter to be discussed by the committee at a later stage.

The Mexican Representative asked Brigadier Browne whether the Assyrians were likely to become part and parcel of their new country or to try to remain as a minority.

Brigadier Browne said that it would have to be explained to the Assyrians that they would have to assimilate with the inhabitants of the new country and serve in the army, &c. He thought that this would raise no difficulty with the Assyrians, but it would certainly have to be made quite plain to them. It would be wrong to send them to Brazil with any false idea that they would remain a nation apart. The Brazilian Government would certainly never tolerate this.

Brigadier Browne felt bound to comment on one remark which had been made by M. Werner. M. Werner had referred to the tragedy of separating the Assyrians from the part of the world to which they belonged. It must be remembered, however, that it was not a case of the transfer of the Assyrians from their own lands. They were not, in fact, in their own lands now, though they were almost in sight of them. They were already refugees.

M. Werner said that he realised that they were not, for the most part, in the country of their origin, but they had belonged from time immemorial to Asia Minor, and he adhered to the view that it was regrettable that they should have to be removed from there.

It was agreed that a further meeting should be held at 5 P.M. to continue the study of the Mar Shimun's letter and that the question of a further despatch to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio should be considered on the following morning. A decision would then be taken as to meeting the Iraqi representative and arrangements would be made for seeing the film of the Paraná area which the Mission of Enquiry had prepared.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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P. Z.
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EASTERN (IRAQ).

May 15, 1934.

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SECTION 1.

[E 3149/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 38.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the twenty-fourth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 7th May, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
May 12, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on May 7, 1934, *at* 5 P.M.

THE president proposed that the committee should continue at this meeting its consideration of the issues raised by the Mar Shimun's letter of the 3rd May. It was also necessary to consider the question of a report to the Council. If it were decided to present a report, M. Oliván wished to make the suggestion that a *rapporteur* should be appointed. He himself would have to act as the Council's *rapporteur* and had many other questions to attend to, and he thought there would be some advantage in entrusting the preparation of a report to another member of the committee. If Brigadier Browne's report were to be presented to the Council, some explanation regarding it would be necessary. It was a long document, and it might be advisable to bring out the salient points in the covering report of the committee. This might result in difficulties. On the other hand, it would perhaps be odd to pass over the report on the Brazilian scheme in silence, in view of the report which the committee had made to the Council at its last session. The alternatives seemed to be (1) to present a brief progress report outlining what the committee had done since the last session of the Council, or (2) to prepare a much more detailed report with Brigadier Browne's report attached. The nature of the report would, to some extent, depend on the decision which the committee might arrive at with regard to the Mar Shimun's letter. The League was committed to a certain responsibility in regard to the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. M. Oliván did not necessarily believe all the statements made by the Mar Shimun. On the other hand, the committee had at present to rely solely on reports from the Iraqi Government, and these reports could not be considered impartial. The Mar Shimun's letter contained a suggestion that an independent investigation should be made, and the committee might wish to inform the Council that its existing means of ascertaining what was the situation in Iraq were inadequate, and might wish to suggest that the Council should consider the despatch to Iraq either of a commission or of a special representative to make enquiries. It was for the committee to decide whether it was satisfied to continue to receive information from the Iraqi Government or whether it should propose to the Council other means.

The Mexican Representative said that, while the committee ought to do everything possible to watch over the situation of the Assyrians until their emigration took place, he was in favour of treating the Mar Shimun's letter merely as a source of information in the same way as one would take a press report. The committee ought to take steps to prevent the recurrence of anything like the events of last August, but he thought that it should act through the Iraqi Government, with whom sole responsibility lay.

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The President said that this was, in effect, what the committee had hitherto done. It was evident that the Iraqi Government were responsible, and, in the Council's resolution of October last, that Government had been asked to keep the committee informed about the situation of the Assyrians. The committee had hitherto been content to rely on such reports, but the President wondered whether it would not be wise to try to obtain other sources of information.

The Mexican Representative suggested that the committee should send the gist of the Mar Shimun's letter to the Iraqi representative, as though it were information received from press sources which the committee desired to verify.

The President felt that the committee could hardly deal in this way with a Government. He thought that, if the possibility of an independent enquiry on the spot was ruled out, there were no adequate means of progress.

The Danish Representative pointed out that in Iraq we were dealing with a young sovereign State. The proposal for a special investigation must be considered from that point of view, and one must remember that a special commission of investigation might give rise to agitation and trouble between the Assyrians and the Iraqis.

The President said that he fully realised the delicacy of the matter. He remembered how difficult it had been to get the Iraqi Government to agree even to the establishment of the local committee set up in the Council Committee's resolution of the 31st October last. He felt, in fact, that a suggestion for the despatch of a special commission would almost certainly meet with a blank refusal from the Iraqi Government. At the same time, he thought there might be some advantage in inserting in the report to the Council a paragraph showing that the present means of information were inadequate. He had always felt that the committee was in a false position. The Council had entrusted it with the task of watching over the plight of the Assyrians, but had not given it the means of doing so. He was anxious that the committee should not be saddled with an unfair responsibility, and it might be well to draw the Council's attention to the lack of means of checking reports on the situation in Iraq.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this was probably the most difficult question which the committee had so far attempted to discuss. For his part, he did not wish, without the fullest consideration of the advantages and disadvantages, to pronounce on the proposal to ascertain the facts by means of an independent investigation. He would, therefore, only, for the moment, put before his colleagues some of the practical difficulties and dangers which would have to be taken into account. The Iraqi Government had hitherto refused to consider anything in the nature of a Commission of Enquiry, and it was not, he thought, entirely a case of *amour-propre*. The position in Iraq was an extremely difficult one, owing to the mixture of races, and, if a Commission of Enquiry went out, it would certainly arouse many passions and would be a focus for all sorts of complaints from the Assyrians. This might easily arouse inter-racial difficulties, and, by sending out such a commission, the League might quite well risk stirring up the very troubles which it wished to avoid. The United Kingdom representative did not say that this ruled out the idea, but it was necessary to consider the risk. Furthermore, he could not help feeling that the despatch of a Commission of Enquiry might be a kind of red herring across the trail of the settlement work which was the main task of the committee. The great thing was to get the Assyrian problem solved by the removal of the Assyrians from Iraq as soon as possible, and the committee should be careful to do nothing which might hamper rather than help this work. The risks were serious ones to take unless the allegations of a single interested party were supported by reports from other sources. It was easy for the Mar Shimun to make somewhat irresponsible accusations and then to claim that, if there were any doubt about the truth of these accusations, a certain course should be adopted which the Mar Shimun must know perfectly well would be liable to cause serious trouble. The committee must beware of being influenced by the Mar Shimun to play his game. The United Kingdom representative was not, of course, in a position to pronounce on the truth of many of the statements made in the Mar Shimun's letter, but some of these statements were obviously exaggerated and tendentious. On the other hand, some of the allegations were serious and disquieting, and the committee certainly could not afford to leave the letter on one side without taking any action. But he asked the committee to bear in mind that Iraq was now a fully independent State and that no measures should be suggested which the committee would be unwilling to suggest in the case of any other fully independent State. A recommendation that some special machinery be set up for ascertaining the facts would indicate, after all, that the committee placed no reliance on the reports of the Iraqi Government, and this was a serious reflection to make without even giving the Iraqi Government a chance to answer the Mar Shimun's charges. It seemed to the United Kingdom representative that responsibility must be placed on the Iraqi Government, and that there was perhaps some advantage in treating this matter on purely normal lines. The committee had received certain accusations, of the truth of which it was not in a position to judge. The natural course, therefore, seemed to be to forward the letter to the Iraqi Government and to ask for their comments. The committee had the right to do this, and the United Kingdom representative thought that it was its duty also, and that the committee should not be deflected from taking this course by the fact that the Iraqi Government had protested in previous cases. He suggested, however, that the letter should not merely be sent to the Iraqi representative with a formal request for observations, but that the president should see Taufiq Beg Suwaidi and explain to him the anxiety which the committee felt and their desire to get at the truth of the situation. The president might also impress on Taufiq Bey that the committee relied upon the Iraqi Government to prevent any recurrence of the events of last August.

The United Kingdom representative repeated that he did not wish to press this course if the committee desired to consider further the question of some independent investigation, and his remarks were simply made as a contribution to a general objective discussion. He did not wish to suggest that there was no cause for anxiety regarding the present situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. He reminded the committee, indeed, that he had constantly referred to the risks involved if settlement were long delayed and to the ease with which a dangerous situation could be produced. He wished to emphasise these points again, but such information as was in his possession inclined him to believe that the present situation was not so serious as the Mar Shimun's letters would lead one to suppose. Naturally, His Majesty's Government were not in a position to give an authoritative report on the situation, and they could not accept the responsibility of keeping watch over it or of guaranteeing it. Nevertheless, they did what was possible to keep in touch with it, as they were naturally anxious that nothing should go wrong if it could be avoided, and, if the committee wished, the United Kingdom representative, although not authorised to do so by his Government, would be willing, by way of indication, to communicate to the committee, orally, the substance of certain recent reports made by His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

The President repeated that he fully realised the difficulty of proposing an independent commission. Juridically, of course, Iraq was fully independent. There were perhaps *nuances* in the matter of independence, but he did not wish to pursue this point. He was sure that the committee would be glad to receive any information which the United Kingdom representative could give, and he wondered whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to supply further information in the future. He did not suggest that they should take any official responsibility in this matter, but it would naturally be of interest to the committee to have any information which His Majesty's Government felt in a position to supply.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he would submit this suggestion to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. He could not, of course, encourage the hope that they would be willing to furnish information regularly. There were many difficulties, and His Majesty's Government might well feel that they could not assume responsibility for keeping the committee informed in this matter. At the same time he felt sure that they were anxious to help the committee as much as possible, and, in the absence of serious objection, they might conceivably be willing to communicate to the committee such information of interest as they might receive. Meanwhile, he was prepared, on his own responsibility, to give confidentially the substance of certain recent reports received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

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About the middle of March the Ambassador visited the Assyrian refugee camp at Mosul and received two deputations of Assyrians at the British consulate. The following were extracts from a letter written by him at the time :—

"I went round every tent and living-room in the camp and asked the women whether they had any complaints or suggestions to make for the health and comfort of themselves or their children. The answer was almost the same in every case. They expressed gratitude for the abundant food and excellent arrangements which had been made for their accommodation, but enquired anxiously how long it would be before they could be removed to another country approved by the League of Nations. I have seldom seen such healthy-looking children, and no trace of the eye disease with which they are so commonly afflicted in their own homes was noticeable. The Assyrian doctor in charge of the medical arrangements in the camp informed me that there had been practically no sickness among the refugees since the 1st January, and that the very few deaths which had occurred were among sickly new-born infants who had no chance of surviving. Dr. McLeod, the civil surgeon of Mosul, who has had a long experience of medical work in this country, told me that he had no hesitation in saying that these Assyrian refugees enjoyed far better conditions of health and general well-being than they were accustomed to in their own villages.

"The two deputations of Assyrian men whom I interviewed complained chiefly of the delay which had occurred in finding a new home for those Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. They informed me that practically the whole Assyrian community was anxious to go, if a suitable country could be found elsewhere. I explained to them that it was no easy matter to transplant 20,000 refugees to a distant country. The League had set up a special committee, which had held several meetings at Geneva and had despatched a committee of experts to South America to make enquiries and report. I impressed on them once more that they should do everything to prevent able-bodied Assyrians from leaving their cultivated lands and crowding into the towns. It was likely that whatever Government agreed to receive them would require that the new settlers should be agriculturalists.

"The warm clothing that had so kindly been purchased by Lord Lugard and the 'Save the Children Fund' was unfortunately despatched by the long route via Basra, in spite of the instructions sent from Bagdad, and the bulk of it arrived in Mosul on the day of my visit. Although this clothing arrived too late to be of use during the winter, it is a very welcome reserve for future emergencies. The Iraqi Government made a liberal provision of warm clothes and bedding for the refugees during the past cold season, and I did not receive a single complaint on the score of insufficiency of clothing during my visit to the camp.

"The plight of the refugees who have come in from the villages to Mosul gives no cause for serious anxiety at present, as there is still plenty of money in the possession of the Assyrian community, and the well-to-do are notoriously generous in assisting their less fortunate fellow-tribesmen. Every effort, however, is still being made by British and Iraqi officials in the service of the Iraqi Government to induce these refugees to return to their villages and work in the fields until arrangements have been made to accommodate them in a new country."

That was in the middle of March, but the Ambassador had, towards the end of April, made a further tour in the north of Iraq, in the course of which he had had the opportunity of visiting a number of Assyrian villages and of discussing the situation with all shades of Assyrian opinion.

In Mosul and the villages in the Dohuk and Shaikhan areas he formed the impression that the state of security was good, but that there was a definite apprehension about the future—particularly as regards the attitude of the Kurds if re-settlement were long delayed. The Assyrians in these areas were living chiefly on their savings and on the charity of their friends, and had so far refused, with few exceptions, to sow their crops, in spite of the readiness of the Iraqi Government to repair their houses and to provide the necessary means. Sir F. Humphrys estimated the numbers in these areas at about 12,000, and gained the impression that the majority would wish to leave.

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On the other hand, the majority of the 8,000 Assyrians living in the districts of Amadiya, Harir and Rowanduz showed signs of wishing to remain in Iraq if security remained as at present. In these areas there had been practically no losses of property or rifles. No fears were expressed to Sir F. Humphrys about security and the Assyrians were generally prosperous, though some were chafing under the burden of supporting the families of men who had gone to Syria.

These reports appeared to show that there was at present no need for exceptional measures. On the other hand, Sir F. Humphrys emphasised the dangerous situation which was likely to arise if there were delay in resettlement. In March he had said that the general attitude of the Assyrians was one of restless expectation. They still possessed some 4,000 to 5,000 rifles, and serious trouble might easily develop out of any incident. In his last report Sir F. Humphrys said that he had urged the Iraqi Government to do everything possible to provide adequate security, and, if they fulfilled their promises, he did not anticipate trouble from either Assyrians or Kurds during the summer. But he feared that destitution might assume serious proportions unless some emigration could start in the next five months. Frustrated hopes would engender feelings of despair and would lead to thefts and clashes with their neighbours. Once this happened the situation would rapidly become dangerous, and Sir F. Humphrys urged that, if possible, emigration should start in July and continue in August and September, as this would not only relieve the pressure, but would stimulate the patience of those left behind.

The President expressed sincere appreciation for this information. He confessed himself anxious, however, about the suggestion that emigration ought to begin so early. He did not himself see how this was to be brought about. The negotiations were bound to take a long time and it would be necessary to submit the whole scheme to the Council for definite approval before it could be put into effect, and, if this could not be done at the forthcoming Council, which was obviously impossible, there was no other Council until September.

The Danish Representative said that he disagreed with the president's view. The Council had purposely delegated wide powers to the committee and his view was that, unless a question arose of engaging the financial responsibility of the League, he did not think that any further reference to the Council was necessary before a scheme could be put into operation.

The President admitted that the Danish Representative was right. On the other hand, would the committee be able to settle the difficult question of finance itself, even though the responsibility of the League was not engaged? So far there was an offer from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to pay their share of a League contribution. There was a somewhat vague offer from the Iraqi Government and the prospects of that offer being implemented presumably diminished as time went on. There was, further, an appeal made by the League to Governments and private institutions which had so far remained entirely without answer.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he felt obliged to take up this point about finance. He regretted that during the morning's meeting he had had to express his disagreement with the president in M. Werner's presence. He was bound to recall, however, that the committee in its last report to the Council had clearly contemplated that the question of finance could not be settled until the number of the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq was known. The report had actually said that the Iraqi Government could not decide their contribution until this stage had been reached. Furthermore, the appeal which the Council had made had been based on a passage in the committee's report which had suggested that Governments and private institutions might be asked to make up the balance when the size of the contributions of the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians themselves was known. Obviously, therefore, the appeal was not intended to be taken immediately into consideration and very probably no Government had even considered it yet. He himself very much doubted whether it was practicable to expect a response to the appeal until the Assyrians had been consulted as regards their wishes, and it was for that reason that he had felt bound to intervene during the morning's meeting.

The President agreed that the committee's report at the last Council did suggest that the question of finance could only be settled after the Assyrians had been consulted, and that the committee could only proceed with its work in the hope of getting through the various stages in time to allow of emigration during the summer. Meanwhile, he thought that the committee had sufficiently discussed the question of sending out a special commission of enquiry to Iraq and that any such idea might be withdrawn for the time being. He proposed that the committee should proceed to consider the nature of its report to the Council.

The Danish Representative said that, on this question, committee must consider the political situation in Brazil and particularly the fact that the election was due to take place on the 14th May. It might be well to postpone any discussion in the Council until after that date.

The President pointed out that it was not only the date of the report that was in question, but whether any report should be rendered to the Council at all.

The French Representative asked whether the matter could not be dealt with in a private session of the Council. It was pointed out, however, that this would really offer no advantage. The question at issue was not really what the committee could report to the Council, but what could be published at this stage.

The Danish Representative suggested that an attempt should be made to get a telegraphic report from the Spanish Ambassador in Rio as to whether publicity after the 14th May was likely to be dangerous.

The President expressed the view that the election was, according to press reports, not likely to proceed entirely normally. It might, in fact, give rise to some disturbances and trouble. Also, it would take some time for the new Government to settle down, and he did not think that the 14th May could be regarded as a decisive date. There was likely to be a period of some uncertainty after that. He then asked for the opinion of other members of the committee on the question of presenting a report.

The United Kingdom Representative said that to present no report at all might give rise to fresh rumours and might produce a bad effect, not only in Brazil but among the Assyrians and their sympathisers, who were expecting some definite decision at the forthcoming Council. It might be, therefore, that to present no report could create more trouble than a report which referred to the Brazilian scheme. In any case, the last report of the committee had dealt extensively with the Brazilian scheme and it would be extremely odd if the next report were entirely silent about it. His own view was that the committee must inform the Council briefly of the state of its work, but any report would naturally have to be a meagre one as there were many details which could not be published at present.

The President said that he was inclined to share this view. The members of the Council who were not represented on the Council Committee could be informed orally and privately of the reasons for which it had been necessary to present a meagre report.

After further discussion, it was agreed that there was little reason not to mention the Brazilian scheme and the difficulties which prevented its immediate application. After all, those difficulties were already to a large extent common property, and it was perhaps desirable that the committee should refer to them briefly, rather than by silence invite a charge of slackness and lack of energy itself.

The United Kingdom Representative was ultimately invited to act as the *rapporteur* of the committee and to draw up a report for consideration at the opening of the Council meeting. It was suggested that this report should annex Brigadier Browne's report and, possibly, Major Johnson's report, and also the correspondence which had passed with the Iraqi Government since the last meeting of the Council. It was agreed that Brigadier Browne's report and Major Johnson's report should be carefully edited for this purpose, so as to remove any passages which might give rise to press controversy at this stage, and it was decided that the report should mention that the committee had discussed the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq with the Iraqi representative. It was agreed that no mention should be made of the Mar Shimun's letter of the 3rd May.

The committee then turned to further consideration of the Mar Shimun's letter.

The President said that he was inclined to agree with the United Kingdom representative in suggesting that the letter should be communicated officially to the Iraqi Government. At the same time, if the committee agreed, he would speak to Taufiq Beg Suwaidi and explain the anxiety of the committee to have the Mar Shimun's allegations thoroughly investigated. He proposed to have an interview with the Iraqi representative for that purpose on the following day.

The president then invited the committee to consider the second part of the Mar Shimun's letter, which advocated steps to settle the Assyrians in Canada, Turkey and Syria. He asked whether the committee thought it worth while to send a reminder to the Government of Canada.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed doubt as to the advisability of this course. What he had himself envisaged was that, if the Brazilian scheme broke down, the Canadian Government, and any other Government which had not replied to the League's enquiry, might be approached with a good deal more insistence than was now possible. They could then be urged to consider the matter favourably. If, however, a mere reminder were sent to them at this stage, they would almost certainly, so long as the fate of the Brazilian scheme was unknown, take up a negative attitude from which it might be very difficult to dislodge them at a later stage.

It was agreed that it would be preferable not to remind the Canadian Government at the moment.

It was also agreed that there was little purpose in approaching the Government of Turkey and, in fact, it was undesirable to do so, since, in the unlikely event of their agreeing to take the Assyrians, it would certainly be impossible to get them to agree to special safeguards for them.

The President then asked the French representative whether he saw any objection to a request to the mandatory Power to consider settlement in Syria.

The French Representative said that this was a difficult question. His own view was that it was better not to chase two hares at the same time, and that to approach other Governments might be bad policy in the dealings of the committee with Brazil. Apart from this, the question of settlement in Syria was, he thought, likely to be one of some difficulty, judging by the difficulties which the French Government were experiencing in the matter of other immigrants.

It was agreed that, for the time being, at all events, no note should be addressed to the French Government, but that the committee should continue to concentrate on the Brazilian scheme.

After a discussion on future arrangements, M. Arocha informed the committee that a request had been received from the International Labour Office asking for a collection of documents concerning the Assyrian settlement scheme to assist the International Labour Office in its study of questions of colonisation.

It was agreed to defer consideration of this request until it had been decided to what extent Brigadier Browne's and Major Johnson's reports should be modified. It was felt that, if these reports were communicated to the International Labour Office, they should be communicated in the same form in which they might ultimately be presented to the Council of the League.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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Section 2.

[E 3150/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 39.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the 25th meeting of Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 8th May, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
May 12, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Assyrian Question.

Record of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on May 8, 1934, *at* 10 a.m.

THE President invited Brigadier Browne to comment on the despatch to the Spanish Ambassador of the 10th April, which had been communicated to him on the previous day.

Brigadier Browne observed that, in the first paragraph of the despatch, reference was made to the authorisation which was sent to him to communicate the first part of his preliminary report to the Brazilian authorities. In point of fact, the mission had doubted whether this was opportune, and had not communicated the document. They had simply informed interested Ministers of the gist of the report.

Major Johnson suggested that, if it was the intention of the committee that the preliminary report should be communicated to the Brazilian authorities, the Spanish Ambassador might now be authorised to communicate it.

It was agreed to leave this point until a decision had been taken as to what circulation should be given to the final report of the mission.

Brigadier Browne observed that, in paragraph 4 of the despatch of the 10th April, it was said that the committee understood that the conditions would only be favourable for settlement operations until September. The mission had, however, come to the conclusion that some settlement might be possible this year even after that date. It was true that, after September, clearing would be difficult on account of the rains, and special arrangements would have to be made for the maintenance of those immigrants who went out after September. At the same time, if it was necessary for a certain number to go after September, there would be no insuperable difficulty.

It was agreed to reserve this point for future consideration and not to say anything about it to the Spanish Ambassador at the present time.

As regards the suggestion in paragraph 7 that the Spanish Ambassador could count upon the support of the local representatives of the Governments represented on the Council Committee, Brigadier Browne said that he thought that the Spanish Ambassador would appreciate the help of all these representatives. When the mission had been in Rio, the Spanish Ambassador had appeared to doubt whether he was able to call upon them for help, and their co-operation might strengthen his position.

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The President said that it might be well for the members of the committee to ask their Governments to instruct their representatives in Rio to assist the Spanish Ambassador, if necessary.

The Danish and Italian Representatives intimated that this had already been done in their case, and that the representatives in Rio of their respective countries had been kept informed of what had passed in Geneva, and had been supplied with documents other than the actual instructions sent to the Spanish Ambassador on the 10th April, which it had been thought inappropriate to communicate, as this was perhaps better left to the Spanish Ambassador to do.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that, whatever the position might have been when Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson were in Brazil, it would presumably now have been remedied by the despatch of the 10th April, which specifically told the Spanish Ambassador that he could count upon the support of the other representatives and, particularly, on that of His Majesty's Ambassador. There had, of course, already been close co-operation between the Spanish Ambassador and His Majesty's Ambassador, as telegrams from the two Ambassadors showed.

The President recalled that earlier instructions sent to the Spanish Ambassador in January last had made much the same point. He thought matters might be left as they were for the present, though each member of the committee would no doubt consider whether any fresh instructions to the representative of their country in Rio were necessary.

Brigadier Browne then referred to the statement of the Brazilian conditions in paragraph 9 (1) of the despatch. The second condition stated that the settlement must occasion no expense to Brazil. In this connexion he would like to point out that, if immigrants were transported on the Government railways, free passages could be requisitioned for them. This did, in effect, involve expense to the Brazilian Government. In reply to a question by the Danish representative, Brigadier Browne added that he thought the committee was justified in assuming that this concession would be granted, even in the case of a large number of immigrants like the Assyrians. The mission had certainly been given to understand this by the Brazilian authorities.

The question was raised whether anything on these lines should be said to the Spanish Ambassador. The United Kingdom representative observed that the point had already been dealt with to some extent in paragraph 27 of the despatch, where the hope was expressed that the Brazilian Government would accord railway facilities similar to those which were given to immigrants in general. The general view of the committee, however, appeared to be that it might be well to point out to the Spanish Ambassador that the commission had received an assurance on this point.

Major Johnson said that the assurance came from Dr. Bandeira de Mello, who had informed him that any immigrant was entitled to free transport. This did not apply to small numbers only, but to any number of immigrants. It was given in the case of the Japanese, and there was no reason why the committee should not request the Brazilian Government to give the same concession to the Assyrians.

Brigadier Browne said that this completed his observations on the despatch of the 10th April.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that the committee should now consider whether to draw the attention of the Spanish Ambassador, in a supplementary despatch, to particular points arising out of the reports of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson which might at some stage require discussion with the Brazilian Government.

The President asked Brigadier Browne whether he thought this necessary or desirable.

Brigadier Browne said that the Spanish Ambassador was already in possession of a copy of his report, but not of Major Johnson's report, which had been completed since the commission left Brazil. It would, no doubt, be necessary

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to send to the Spanish Ambassador a copy of the latter report, but he doubted whether the despatch that had already been sent needed any addition. The Spanish Ambassador had already been given a formidable task, and it would perhaps be better to send no further details until after the election in Brazil, when the prospects would be easier to judge.

The President said that this corresponded with his own ideas. He thought that the task of the Spanish Ambassador should at present be political rather than technical, and he was not anxious for him to be drawn too closely into technical details. He thought that the committee should wait until the general questions of principle explained in the despatch of the 10th April had been cleared up before doing more.

The United Kingdom Representative explained that he had no wish to go outside the framework of the despatch of the 10th April, but that despatch had been specifically subject to modification in the light of consultation with Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson. It had pointed out that the negotiations with the Brazilian Government must cover (*a*) the conditions laid down by that Government, (*b*) the future treatment of the Assyrians, and (*c*) the physical details of settlement. The committee had refrained in the despatch from entering into the third of these points, and the Spanish Ambassador had been informed that they would send any necessary indications after Brigadier Browne's return to Geneva. All he had in mind was to complete the despatch, as promised.

The President agreed that that was the position, but doubted whether it was necessary to enter into further details at present. He thought that the best course would be merely to ensure that the Spanish Ambassador was in possession of the same information as the committee, *i.e.*, that he had both Brigadier Browne's and Major Johnson's reports. He did not think that any further progress on this point could be made until the question had been settled whether these reports should remain in their present form or be modified. If the reports were presented to the Council in a modified form, he thought that the originals ought to be suppressed and the modified copies only circulated to all concerned, including the Spanish Ambassador.

Major Johnson then drew attention to the varying rates of exchange current in Brazil. The official rate was 60 milreis to the pound, but on the so-called Black Bourse a very much better rate could be obtained. The point was one of importance in connexion with the total cost of the scheme. The contract would have to be drawn up in milreis, and the League might effect a considerable saving if it could obtain a better exchange rate than the official one. Naturally, the League could not deal on the Black Bourse, but there was also what was known as the Grey Bourse, where, for the purpose of certain transactions and with governmental authority, the rate of 72 milreis to the pound was obtainable. Major Johnson suggested that the committee might comment on this fact to the Spanish Ambassador, and recommend the latter to bear it in mind and to endeavour to find out whether governmental facilities for dealings on the Grey Bourse could be put at the League's disposal.

Discussion took place between the Danish representative and Major Johnson as to whether it could not be left to Paraná Plantations (Limited) to obtain this favourable rate of exchange, the rôle of the League being to support their application with the Brazilian Government.

It was decided to consider this question further at a later stage.

The President thanked Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson for the assistance which they had given, and asked them to keep in touch with the United Kingdom representative for the purpose of helping him to draw up the proposed report to the Council, and of deciding what modifications, if any, were necessary in the two reports which they had presented, if those reports were to be communicated to the Council and published.

(*Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson then withdrew.*)

The President then asked the committee to consider what was to be said to the Iraqi representative, who had been invited to attend at 4·30 that afternoon. He proposed, before that meeting, to hand to the Iraqi representative, with a personal explanation, the official letter asking for the observations of the Iraqi

Government on the Mar Shimun's letter of the 3rd May. The next question was how much should be said to the Iraqi representative about Brigadier Browne's report. It was obviously not possible to furnish Taufiq Beg with a copy of the report in its present state, if it were subsequently to be modified. The president proposed, therefore, that he should simply give the Iraqi representative a general outline, and should say that the reports of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson would be communicated to him in due course.

This led to a further discussion of how far the reports could be communicated to the Council and published.

The French Representative suggested that the committee should merely extract and communicate to the Council that part of Brigadier Browne's report which referred to the questionnaire which had been considered before the mission left for Brazil. The rest of the report might be left aside.

The United Kingdom Representative said that a hurried examination which he had made of Brigadier Browne's report from the point of view of publicity had made him doubtful whether it would be possible to communicate to the Council more than a very small part of the report. Apart from references to the political situation in Brazil, there were a number of references to individual Ministers and officials, and it might be extremely embarrassing for those officials to bring them into prominence and to indicate the line which they had taken. He thought that it might save time if the committee forthwith ran through the report from this point of view.

After some discussion, it was evident that the other members of the committee felt that it was better that the committee should only undertake this examination with definite recommendations before it. Without a draft or alternative drafts of a report to the Council, the examination was bound to be much too long and discursive. The United Kingdom representative was therefore requested to proceed as originally proposed, and to endeavour to make recommendations to the committee at a further meeting on the 14th May.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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EASTERN (IRAQ). May 15, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 3.

[E 3151/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 40.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the twenty-sixth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 8th May, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, May 12, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Council Committee held on May 8, 1934, *at* 4·30 P.M.

IN addition to the members of the committee the Iraqi representative attended. The members of the Commission of Enquiry were not present.

The President, addressing the Iraqi representative, said that the previous meetings of the committee at its present session had been employed in examining information supplied by the members of the Commission of Enquiry which had gone to Brazil, and in obtaining additional information from them. The results would be communicated to the Iraqi representative as soon as this work was finished. Meanwhile, the president recalled that, at the last meeting which the Iraqi representative had attended, the committee had agreed with him upon the text of a message to the Assyrians, which the committee had sent to the Iraqi Government to help them in preserving tranquillity. The committee would be very glad to learn what had been the result. Had the message actually been communicated and, if so, what impression had it created among the Assyrians? At a previous meeting the committee had also examined the monthly situation reports of the Iraqi Government and had asked Taufiq Beg for supplementary information on two points. One of these referred to the monthly expenditure on the refugee camp at Mosul; the other concerned the reconstruction of villages. On the first point, the committee had enquired what was the reason of the apparently large fluctuations in the amounts spent in different months on the refugee camp. On the other point, it had desired to find out whether all the villages wholly or partially destroyed last summer had been repaired or only those villages to which the Assyrians had declared their willingness to return. The committee would be glad to know whether the Iraqi representative was yet in a position to reply to these queries.

The Iraqi Representative thanked the committee for the information which he had already received regarding the work of the Commission of Enquiry in Brazil, namely, the preliminary report which had been furnished by Brigadier Browne. He would be equally glad to have as soon as possible the supplementary information to which the president referred. As regards the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, this remained unchanged. The Assyrians were always in contact with the local authorities and with the local committee, under Major Thomson's presidency, which had been set up in agreement with the Council Committee. All the information available was contained in the periodical reports which he had communicated to the Council Committee. Of the two specific points which the president had mentioned, he would first take the question of expenses. He thought that Major Thomson had already explained the monthly fluctuations. Before January there had been expenses connected with Major Thomson's own movements and those had disappeared when he left Iraq on leave. The normal expenditure on the camp was in the region of £800 a month (*i.e.*, £200 a week), and this did not change. In the circumstances he had not thought it worth while to ask his Government for any special explanation. On the other hand, he had referred to them the question raised by the committee about the villages; but, allowing for the delay in his letter reaching Bagdad and in its communication to the local authorities for a report, he thought there had been scarcely time for a reply. He ought to receive the reply in about a fortnight's time and would, of course, at once pass it on. As regards the message to the Assyrians, he had been informed by the Iraqi Government that this had been sent to the Provincial Governor of Mosul with instructions to communicate it to the Assyrians. The date of his information was the 25th April. He thought, therefore, that he ought shortly to be receiving an account of the impression which the message had created on the Assyrians.

The United Kingdom Representative asked Taufiq Beg whether he would be prepared to remind his Government so as to make sure that he would receive information on this point. It was a matter which naturally interested the Council Committee considerably.

Taufiq Beg replied that he was sure that the Iraqi Government would inform him of the result of the communication of the message, as he had asked them to do so when sending it to them. He would, however, certainly remind them, so as to make sure that this was done.

The committee then adjourned to see a film of the Paraná area, which had been prepared during the visit of the Commission of Enquiry. The committee was joined for this purpose by Colonel Gaelzer-Netto, the representative in Berlin of the Brazilian Ministry of Labour, who had apparently been instructed by his Government to interest himself in the question of the immigration of the Assyrians to Brazil, and had taken the opportunity, while passing through Geneva, to establish contact with the Council Committee.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

May 18, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 3256/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 44.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a record of the twenty-seventh meeting of the Council Committee on the 14th May, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, May 16, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the Council Committee held on May 14 *at* 3·30 P.M.

THE committee considered a draft report to the Council.

The United Kingdom Representative said that, since drafting the report, a certain number of suggestions had been made to him, and he had prepared amendments to meet these. The general object of the amendments was to guard against giving too optimistic an impression as regards the possibility of putting the Brazilian scheme into effect and to make it clear that, although the Brazilian scheme seemed entirely suitable from the physical point of view, the difficulties were greater than generally realised.

The amendments proposed were agreed to and the report adopted.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that, before the present session of the committee ended, it would be advisable to send to the Spanish Ambassador a copy of Major Johnson's report for confidential information, and also to authorise the Ambassador to communicate to the Brazilian Government a copy of the committee's report to the Council. Furthermore, although the committee had decided at a previous meeting not at this stage to address the Spanish Ambassador on a number of details raised by Brigadier Browne's and Major Johnson's reports, there were one or two points to which it had been thought advisable to draw his attention. The United Kingdom representative had drawn up the draft of a despatch to the Spanish Ambassador to give effect to what he believed to be the committee's wishes.

The draft despatch was adopted.

The President then informed the committee that, after its last meeting, he had had a conversation with Colonel Gaelzer-Netto. The latter had explained that he represented the Brazilian Ministry of Labour in Europe in regard to questions of immigration, and he was then, in fact, on his way to Marseilles in order to inspect a party of emigrants on their way from China to Brazil. He had taken the opportunity to establish contact in Geneva with the Council Committee.

The President had said that, had he had notice of the visit, he would, of course, have arranged for Colonel Gaelzer-Netto to meet the committee. He had then tried to find out what exactly Colonel Gaelzer-Netto's position was and in what manner he proposed to concern himself with the Assyrian question. Colonel Gaelzer-Netto had said that before leaving Brazil recently to return to Europe he

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had received orders from the President of Brazil to concern himself with the Assyrian question and even to go to Iraq to make a selection of the Assyrians. He stated that he had not carried out these instructions owing to the political situation in Brazil. He mentioned that a commission had been set up there to enquire into Assyrian immigration, and he said that two members of this commission would certainly be against immigration. He also intimated that, unless he himself went to Iraq to select the Assyrians on the spot, it was quite useless for the League to suppose that they would ever be allowed to enter Brazil. He further said that it would have been easier for the Brazilian Government to admit the Assyrians before the presidential election rather than afterwards, as the Government had hitherto had dictatorial powers and these, after the election, would be much modified and no decision would be possible without the consent of Parliament.

Towards the end of the interview Colonel Gaelzer-Netto had appeared to take the line of suggesting that it would be to the committee's advantage to arrange with the Brazilian Government that he should be sent to Iraq. From this and from his general manner, M. Olivan felt some doubt whether he had, in fact, received specific orders to concern himself with the question or to go to Iraq. It seemed possible that, being concerned with emigration questions in general and having heard of the proposal to settle the Assyrians in Brazil, he had rather wished to be concerned with the question. The President had, therefore, while expressing readiness to maintain contact with him, intimated that a good deal yet remained to be done before the question of a visit to Iraq could be usefully considered.

Mr. Walters said that the League had heard of Colonel Gaelzer-Netto previously, as the colonel had some weeks ago informed the Nansen Office, from Berlin, that he had been instructed to concern himself with the Assyrian question and had asked for certain information concerning it. A collection of official documents had been made, and the Nansen Office had sent it to Colonel Gaelzer-Netto with an intimation that they would be glad to supply any further information which he desired.

The President observed that it was not at all clear what Colonel Gaelzer-Netto's position was, and he simply wished for the moment to bring to the committee's notice the conversation which he had had with him.

It was agreed that it should be left to the President to decide the date of the next meeting, it being realised that no further progress could be made until after the presidential election in Brazil and after the receipt of a report from the Spanish Ambassador on the prospects of making progress.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva, May 16, 1934.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

May 18, 1934.

SECTION 1.

Z. 3858 1934

[E 3260/1/93]

No. 1.

[C.196.1934.VII.]

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by the Committee to the Council.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 18.)

THE committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has continued actively to pursue its task since the last session of the Council with an acute sense of the seriousness of the issue involved and of the desirability of reaching a speedy solution. The committee believes that the exceptional nature of the task and the difficulties involved were fully realised by the Council when it set up the committee, in an endeavour to help the Iraqi Government, at the latter's request, by considering to what extent it was practicable to solve the problem of the Assyrians of Iraq by means of their settlement outside Iraq, in accordance with what was understood to be the desire of that population itself.

The early stages of the committee's work have already been described in the report submitted to and approved by the Council on the 19th January last, but, at the risk of some repetition, it may be useful now to give a general review of the problem which has faced the committee and the steps which it has so far taken, in order that the Council may appreciate the present position.

The duties assigned to the committee when it was set up on the 14th October last were two-fold :—

(*a*) To consider whether the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who might wish to leave that country would be possible in practice. If so, the committee was to take, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government, all such steps as it might think fit with a view to the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme.

(*b*) Eventually to examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government and on the basis of reports furnished by the latter, the measures taken by that Government in order to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, so far as concerned those Assyrians who might wish to remain in Iraq.

Furthermore, until the arrangements contemplated above had been put into effect, the Iraqi Government was asked by the Council to keep the committee regularly informed of the measures taken to ensure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist the families left destitute in consequence of the events of last summer, and to rebuild those villages which had been wholly or partly destroyed in the course of those events.

The committee conceived its work to be (1) to endeavour to find land suitable for the accommodation of all the Assyrians of Iraq who might wish to emigrate; (2) to satisfy itself that the necessary finance would be forthcoming; (3) to ensure that the emigration should be entirely voluntary.

The first two of these tasks were bound to take time in view of the unfavourable economic and social conditions generally prevalent at the time throughout the world. It seemed to the committee necessary, therefore, in order to prevent misapprehension among the Assyrians, that the position should be explained to them. With this object and also with that of eventually ensuring the voluntary nature of the emigration, the committee in October last entered into negotiations with the Iraqi Government which resulted in the constitution by that Government of a local committee in Iraq, consisting of officials of the Iraqi Government and Assyrian village headmen, under the presidency of Major Thomson, who had,

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previous to the events of last summer, been engaged as settlement adviser to the Iraqi Government, in pursuance of the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, and, since those events, has been responsible for the organisation and administration of the Assyrian refugee camp at Mosul. The duties of this committee were, in the first place, to explain the position to the Assyrians and subsequently, as soon as possible after a place of settlement had been definitely fixed, to ascertain which of the Assyrians desired to leave Iraq, and to take all necessary measures in connexion with their departure. The Iraqi Government agreed that, in the second and third of these tasks, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees should proceed to Iraq to collaborate with the local committee and with the local authorities.

According to information supplied to the Council Committee by the Iraqi Government, the local committee completed the first phase of its work between the 28th November and the 9th December of last year. Its procedure was to visit each of the qadhas in the north of Iraq in which the Assyrians are resident and to interview, assembled together in some convenient centre, leading Assyrians and the headmen of all the Assyrian villages in the qadha. At each interview the resolution passed by the Council on the 14th October last and the task of the committee set up in virtue of that resolution were explained, and the Assyrians were informed that a place of settlement had not yet been found and that a considerable period might elapse before the necessary arrangements were completed. In the meanwhile, they were advised to resume their normal life and to continue their agricultural activities, and they were assured that, when the time came, every head of a family would have perfect liberty to say whether he wished to go or not, and that those who wished to stay in Iraq would be free to do so, on the understanding that they would be bound to obey the laws of Iraq and to be loyal to the Iraqi Government.

The second and third tasks assigned to the local committee in collaboration with a representative of the Nansen Office cannot, of course, be undertaken until a place of settlement has been finally decided upon.

As regards the all-important question of finance, the committee drew the attention of the Council to the position in its report at the last session. It recalled that the Iraqi Government had declared itself ready to make as generous a contribution as its resources permitted, and that the question of the extent to which the Assyrians could themselves participate financially would be examined at the proper time; but it pointed out that, should the funds supplied by the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians prove inadequate, it would be necessary to seek other sources. The committee, further, drew attention to the fact that the United Kingdom Government had declared its willingness to pay its share of a League contribution, and the committee accordingly referred to the Council the question of the possibility of a League contribution.

The Council decided that a League contribution was, immediately, at all events, not practicable, and it took what appeared to be the only course open to it and appealed, in its resolution of the 19th January, to the generosity of Governments and private organisations to consider participating in the financing of an eventual settlement scheme, having regard more especially to the humanitarian aspect of the problem. Here again, however, it is unlikely that further substantial progress can be expected until a concrete scheme can be placed before the Governments and institutions concerned.

In its search for a suitable destination for the Assyrians, the committee felt bound to explore a wide field and there is no continent in the world in which it has not considered possibilities. It has approached those Governments whose territories appeared to offer favourable prospects, but in no case so far have the prospects proved on examination to be so promising as those held out by a scheme, brought to the notice of the committee at the very outset of its work, by the Nansen Office, for settlement in Brazil on lands belonging to Paraná Plantations (Limited) in the State of Paraná. These lands had already been the subject of a report by M. Redard, counsellor of the Swiss Legation at Rio de Janeiro, who had been authorised by his Government, at an earlier date, to inspect them on behalf of the Nansen Office in connexion with the settlement of other refugees.

This report and preliminary discussions between the Nansen Office, acting on behalf of the Council Committee, and the company concerned showed that the area was sufficiently large to accommodate all the Assyrians of Iraq, and

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that, *prima facie*, the scheme offered the necessary elements of success. Before any progress could be made, however, the first step was to obtain the consent of the Brazilian Government. That Government was accordingly approached and, after considering the representations made to it by the committee regarding the urgency and humanitarian nature of the problem, generously declared itself ready in principle to accept all the Assyrians of Iraq in groups of 500 families at a time, as and when Paraná Plantations (Limited) was able to provide for their settlement.

Before discussing with the Brazilian Government the conditions of this settlement, there was a preliminary step which the committee felt bound to take. The transfer of a population from the north of Iraq to a region so different as the south of Brazil was naturally not an operation which the committee could embark upon without the greatest precaution. It was necessary to establish in the interests of all concerned, not only of the Assyrians themselves, but also of Brazil and of the League of Nations, that the climate and physical conditions were such that the Assyrians could be expected to adapt themselves and to settle down as a useful element in Brazil.

As the Council was informed at its last session, the committee accordingly decided to send out Brigadier-General Browne to the area in question with the object of advising the committee, in the light of his special knowledge of Assyrian needs and characteristics, whether the scheme proposed offered good prospects of success. Brigadier Browne was accompanied by Mr. Johnson, Secretary-General of the Nansen Office, and, by the courtesy of the Swiss Government, he was also assisted after his arrival in Brazil by M. Redard.

Brigadier Browne and Mr. Johnson were in Brazil from the 12th February to the 8th April, and the committee desires to record its high appreciation of the thorough and conscientious manner in which they and M. Redard carried out their task. After contact had been established with the Brazilian authorities in Rio de Janeiro, a preliminary visit was made to the land owned by Paraná Plantations (Limited) in North Paraná. The mission first inspected settlements already established in the neighbourhood of Londrina, where Paraná Plantations (Limited) has its headquarters, and satisfied itself by means of interviews with existing settlers of various nationalities (*e.g.*, Austrian, Czechoslovak, German, Italian, Japanese and Polish) that, in general, these settlers had succeeded in becoming self-supporting within about eight months of their arrival. The area which the company had offered for Assyrian settlement was some 66 kilom. south-west of Londrina. Most of it is still virgin forest, but by means of personal investigation, so far as the existing forest tracks would permit, and from information obtained from various sources, the mission satisfied itself that the conditions obtaining there were in all essential respects similar to those obtaining in the areas already cleared and settled, and it arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the area in question was suitable in all respects for Assyrian settlement. Having reported accordingly to the Council Committee, the mission proceeded to consider the scheme in detail. It paid a further visit to the area proposed and examined also a neighbouring area, which it found equally favourable. A film was taken to show the type of land and vegetation and the conditions under which existing settlers live.

An alternative area belonging to the same company in the Jangada region of the State of São Paulo was also examined and the conditions there were found in many respects similar to those in North Paraná.

The mission has furnished the Council Committee with a number of reports, accompanied by detailed annexes, dealing with all the aspects of the settlement, and has supplemented these reports orally at recent meetings with the committee in Geneva. The committee is still studying the various technical details and proposals involved, which it considers unnecessary, or at all events premature, at this stage, to bring to the notice of the Council. The committee thinks, however, that the Council will be interested in the extracts from certain of the reports which form annexes 1 and 2(¹) to the present report. The first is a chronological description by Brigadier-General Browne of the mission's journeyings in Brazil, while the second is taken from a technical report by Mr. Johnson and consists of a general description of the conditions in the proposed settlement area, together with a note on the results obtained by various existing settlers.

Before the mission left for Brazil a *questionnaire* had been drawn up for its guidance as regards the scope of its work. In coming to its conclusions, the

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(¹) Not printed.

mission followed closely the points of the *questionnaire*, and the following is a summary of its opinion under each heading :—

(1) *Climate.*

That the temperature, while not liable to violent extremes as in Iraq to which the Assyrians are accustomed, yet has a sufficient variation to be healthy. The rainfall is more than in Iraq and ensures that there are no droughts.

(2) *Cultivation.*

That the crops most easily cultivated in Paraná can be cultivated by the Assyrians.

(3) *Cattle and Sheep Raising and Pig Breeding.*

That a certain number of Assyrians have experience of cattle raising, while practically the whole nation is well acquainted with sheep and goat raising. So far in the Londrina area sheep raising has only been tried to a limited extent, but goats are plentiful and do well. The Assyrians should find no difficulty in pig breeding.

(4) *Agricultural Settlement Conditions.*

The mission was asked to enquire into the possibility of village settlements under conditions similar to those to which the Assyrians are accustomed. Settlement under these conditions is not excluded, but the mission, for a variety of reasons, recommends that the Assyrians should be settled, at the outset at all events, in groups of four families, each family to be allotted 5 alqueires of land, with a house for the four families at the point of contact of the four blocks of land. Each group of four families would thus be separated from the surrounding similar groups by about 750 metres. There would be ample opportunity and material for individual families to construct separate houses for themselves, should they desire to do so later.

The mission was asked whether 5 alqueires (roughly 12 hectares or 30 acres) a family was sufficient for the reasonable requirements of an Assyrian family. Its opinion was that 5 alqueires were sufficient in the first instance. Settlers, as they became more proficient and affluent, might extend their area, but any smaller amount in the first instance was not advisable.

Basing itself on the experience of existing settlers the mission considers that the Assyrians should become self-supporting on their land in eight months, and should have no difficulty in repaying the expenses of land purchase, settlement and transport in twelve years.

(5) *Occupations other than Agriculture.*

The first endeavour will be to put settlers on the land irrespective of their abilities in other directions. In their conversations with the competent Brazilian officials, as well as in their aide-mémoire, to which reference is made later in this report, the mission explained that, although the majority of the Assyrians were agricultural or pastoral people, there were, nevertheless, a certain number who followed other occupations—such as carpenters, blacksmiths, builders and weavers of cloth—whose services could be usefully employed on the spot in the development of the proposed settlement without detriment to the national labour market.

The mission suggests that such of those Assyrians as cannot be so employed should pass a period of apprenticeship in an agricultural experimental station to be maintained in the settlement, or with qualified Assyrian agricultural families, before being definitely allotted their own holdings.

(6) *Food.*

The mission was asked to ascertain whether the reasonable food requirements of the Assyrians could be satisfied at reasonable prices. It reported that, until the Assyrians were obtaining food from their own lands, their food requirements could be satisfied at reasonable prices.

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(7) *Medical Attention.*

Satisfactory arrangements for medical attention can be made, and the general health throughout the area is satisfactory.

(8) *Religion.*

The mission was asked to ascertain whether the Assyrians would be allowed facilities for the practice of their religion. It replied that there is complete religious freedom throughout the country.

(9) *Schools.*

The mission was asked to ascertain whether the Assyrians would be allowed to establish their own schools. The reply was in the affirmative on condition that Portuguese was taught.

While the mission was in Brazil a certain opposition to Assyrian immigration manifested itself in the Brazilian Parliament and press. For the most part the opposition was clearly based on erroneous information regarding the Assyrians. The mission could not, of course, enter into public controversy, but it at once drew up an aide-mémoire for personal communication to those interested, with the object of dissipating the misconceptions which were being so unfortunately spread. This aide-mémoire contains so useful a description of the qualities of the Assyrians that the committee has decided to bring it to the notice of the Council and attaches it as annex 3(¹) to this report.

The Brazilian Government set up a commission of enquiry into the objections raised to the reception of the Assyrians. Brigadier Browne's mission was received by this commission on the 6th April, and had the opportunity of drawing attention to some of the prevalent misconceptions regarding the Assyrians. A copy of the above-mentioned aide-mémoire was handed to the commission.

To sum up, the position as regards the scheme for settlement in Paraná is that the Brazilian Government, when made aware of the grave problem with which the Council of the League is faced, declared, in January last, its readiness in principle to accept the Assyrians. Before proceeding further, the committee felt it necessary to assure itself that the Assyrians could be expected to adapt themselves to conditions in Paraná and to develop into an element useful to Brazil. As a result of Brigadier Browne's mission it is now satisfied that given goodwill, initiative and energy on the part of the Assyrians, which there is no reason to doubt, there is every cause to believe that they would thrive in the area concerned. The transfer of so large a population raises, however, problems more difficult than is generally realised, and it is yet too early for the committee to express an opinion whether the scheme for settlement in Brazil can be put into effect. The next step will be to enter into detailed negotiations with the Brazilian Government as soon as circumstances permit, in the hope of working out a plan acceptable to that Government.

The committee is mindful of the need of the earliest possible solution in view of the present unsettled condition of the Assyrians in Iraq. Some 1,500 persons, mostly women and children who were rendered destitute by the events of last summer, are still being maintained by the Iraqi Government in the refugee camp at Mosul, but, in addition, a large number of Assyrians who fled to Mosul have so far shown themselves unwilling to return to their villages, and are at present living mainly on the charity of their relatives and friends. The committee has received from the Iraqi Permanent Delegate the two letters which form annexes 4 and 5(¹) to this report dealing with the measures of security and relief taken in the months of December, January and February by the Iraqi Government in the case of those who have returned to the villages which they had previously abandoned. The committee has several times discussed the situation with the representative of Iraq, whom it has asked to furnish further information on certain points arising out of the reports, notably as to whether the statement regarding the reconstruction of villages referred to all villages which had been occupied by Assyrians prior to the events of last summer, or only to those villages to which the Assyrians had since declared their willingness to return. This point

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(¹) Not printed.

appeared to the committee to be of considerable importance in connexion with a request which the Iraqi representative made that the committee should help to relieve the situation by issuing a message to the Assyrians. The committee decided to accede to this request, and it has the honour to submit to the Council as an annex to this report (annex 6([1])) a copy of a note addressed on the 9th April to the Iraqi representative after a meeting with him, which was attended also by Major Thomson, then on leave from Iraq and on the eve of returning to his post. This note enclosed a message to the Assyrians recommending them to pursue their normal life and not to dispose of their goods, but, on the contrary, to proceed with the cultivation of their lands pending emigration. The note made it clear, however, that in authorising the communication of this message to the Assyrians the committee relied implicitly on the Iraqi Government to take all possible measures for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians and for the maintenance of stability and order in the areas where they might reside until emigration should be possible.

The committee has now been informed by the Iraqi representative that the Iraqi Government has arranged for the communication of the message to the Assyrians.

Geneva, May 15, 1934.

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[1] Not printed.

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India ✓

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No. E 3636/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3844
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MC

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
7 June, 1934.

3439
3661

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3703?
P.P. 3706

Ex'd 6/6

Reference to previous correspondence :

F.O. letter E 3439/1/93 of 29 May

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva desp. nos 36 L.N. of 1 June 22 Saving of 1 " 40. L.N. of 3 "	Assyrians: Brazilian scheme.

MAILS BRANCH
8 JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 24 14 JUN, 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
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Bagdad No.

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P. Z.
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1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. His Majesty's Consul. (Geneva).
June 1st. 1934.

D. By Bag. June 1st. 1934.

R. June 2nd. 1934.

No. 22. (R).

SAVING.

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Addressed to Rio de Janeiro No. 10.

Following from Mr. Strang:-

With reference to telegram from Spanish Ambassador at Rio on lines of first paragraph and last half sentence of your telegram No. 83 (of May 25th), Assyrian Committee despatched following telegram to Spanish Ambassador, May 31st.

Begins:-

"With a view to report to Council now sitting, Committee desires to know definitely attitude of Brazilian Government and asks you therefore to ascertain urgently whether January offer must be considered as impracticable of fulfilment and withdrawn".

Ends.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 22 Saving and Bagdad No. 8.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 24 14 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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P.Z.
3844
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. His Majesty's Consul, (Geneva),
1st June, 1934.

D. 9.55 a.m. 2nd June, 1934.

R. 11.55 a.m. 2nd June, 1934.

No.36.L.N. (R).

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Confidential.

Following from Mr. Strang.

In Assyrian committee May 31st President and majority of committee urged immediate report to Council that Brazilian scheme had failed; that no alternative was visible; and that meanwhile situation of Assyrians in Iraq was uncertain. United Kingdom and Danish representatives deprecated this suggestion pending definite declaration of Brazilian Government's attitude and fuller consideration both of possible course of action and of repercussions of proposed report. At later meeting it was agreed to send telegram to Spanish Ambassador to clear up Brazilian Government's attitude (see Geneva telegram No.10 to Rio) subject to reconsideration of proposal to report to Council at present session in case of unfavourable or in the absence of definite reply.

Majority of committee are reluctant to embark on fresh effort to find alternatives to Brazil without specific instructions of the Council thus relieving the committee of responsibility should delay result in harm to Assyrians. There is also tendency to scout prospects of settlement outside and to prepare the way for re-settlement inside Iraq.

In spite of two new petitions from Mar Shimun containing further allegations against Iraqi Government idea of pressing for independent investigation into the present situation of Assyrians has unexpectedly receded into the background. The Committee would evidently welcome such investigation if offered by Iraqi Government but is inclined to place upon that Government the whole onus of the safety and welfare of Assyrians.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.36, repeated to Bagdad.

No. 24
FROM SECRETARY, POLIT
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE
14 JUN. 1934

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P. Z.
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1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. H.M's Consul. (Geneva).
June 3rd. 1934.

D. 2.40.p.m. June 3rd. 1934.

R. 4.35.p.m. June 3rd. 1934.

No. 40.L.N. (R).

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My telegram No. 10 to Rio de Janeiro.

Following from Mr. Strang:-

Following is translation of reply from Spanish Ambassador June 2nd.

Begins:-

"Yesterday I again visited Minister of Labour who declared that arrival of Assyrians impossible in view of decision of Parliament. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of the same opinion".

Ends.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 40; repeated to Bagdad.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 24
14 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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Mr. E.J. Turner,

Assyrian question.

Please see the Secretary of State's note on the docket of P.Z.3609/34, flagged below. We should be grateful for your advice on the point which he raises. It does not appear to be one for the Political Department.

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1934

J.G. Laithwaite
5.vi.34

So far as I know, the question of receiving foreign refugees in substantial numbers has never been considered by any Government of India, so that I cannot say with complete confidence what they would say if they were asked to take these Assyrians.

I think however that it is extremely unlikely that they would agree, as all colonisable tracts in India are presumably wanted for Indians.

In the ordinary course foreigners of good character wishing to settle in India can get visas if they can show that they have the means of keeping themselves in India; and it is quite conceivable that a very small number of Assyrian families might get into India in this way if persons in India, e.g. their co-religionists if any, were willing to look after them. A number of German Jews have recently gone to India in this sort of way, and at least one has been given some sort of Government employment (in an Indian State, I think I was told). But even if India were willing to take half a dozen Assyrian families, I suppose it is quite likely that it would be impossible to find half a dozen willing to be separated from the rest.

From the sources of information available to the Department I have not been able to discover whether there are Assyrian Christians in India acknowledging Mar Shimun. The 1921

Census Report classes all Christians not being Catholics or Protestants as "Syrians;" but some of these, e.g. the "Chaldeans" of Malabar may really be co-religionists of the people now in question. The total number of Chaldeans is given as 100. The 1931 Census Report throws no light on the question.

But even if it were otherwise feasible to settle some of these Assyrians in Malabar, there would apparently be a serious difficulty arising out of the climatic conditions.

I can only suggest that if it is desired to pursue the question further, it should be referred to the Viceroy.

E J Turner
11.6.34

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and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2 June, 1934.

P.Z. 3702

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 2308/1/1934 2 June.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva No 31 of 10 Apl — No 53 of 18 May — Tel No 17 Saving 18 May	Assyrian question

RECD. POL. DEPT.
4 - JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN [illegible] LETTER
No. 23
7 JUN. 1934
FROM [illegible]
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Do.
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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

April 13, 1934.

SECTION 2.

P. Z.
3706
1934

[E 2307/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate, Geneva, to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 31.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a letter from the president of the Assyrian Committee to the Spanish Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro, respecting the Assyrian question.

Copies have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Rio.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
April 10, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

President of the Assyrian Committee to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro.

(Confidentiel.)

avril

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Genève, le* 10 *août* 1934.

LE Comité pour l'Établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak, institué par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, a reçu la lettre du Général de Brigade Browne, en date du 10 mars, à laquelle était joint son rapport, en deux parties, concernant l'établissement envisagé des Assyriens sur les terres de la "Paraná Plantations Limited," dans l'État de Paraná. Après avoir pris connaissance de la première partie de ce rapport (laquelle, sur l'autorisation du comité, a été communiquée confidentiellement par le Général de Brigade Browne aux autorités brésiliennes sous réserve de certaines modifications), le comité constate que le Général de Brigade Browne et ses deux conseillers, M. Redard et le Major Johnson, sont arrivés à la conclusion unanime que les terres de la compagnie conviennent, à tous égards, pour l'établissement des Assyriens.

2. Ayant ainsi établi par une enquête indépendante et impartiale, faite sur place, que le plan proposé est matériellement réalisable, le comité doit maintenant procéder avec le Gouvernement brésilien à un examen plus approfondi des conditions auxquelles ce dernier a subordonné son consentement à l'établissement des Assyriens au Brésil et de tous les détails de l'opération d'établissement. La communication que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser au Gouvernement brésilien, le 16 janvier dernier, par l'intermédiaire de votre Excellence, portait que cette démarche suivrait la réception d'un rapport favorable du Général de Brigade Browne.

3. Toutefois, depuis l'envoi de cette communication, un mouvement sérieux d'agitation contre le projet d'établissement des Assyriens s'est malheureusement produit au Brésil, et le comité, se demandant s'il était opportun, dans ces conditions, de faire actuellement une démarche auprès du Gouvernement brésilien, a autorisé l'envoi du télégramme que j'ai expédié à votre Excellence le 27 mars.

4. Le comité, à la lumière de la réponse de votre Excellence, en date du 29 mars, a maintenant recherché quels nouveaux progrès pourraient être réalisés actuellement. Le Gouvernement brésilien se rendra certainement compte de la situation très embarrassante dans laquelle la Société des Nations se trouverait si ce Gouvernement, après avoir formulé une offre précise, n'y donnait pas suite. Par ailleurs, il est certain qu'on peut faire valoir de sérieux arguments en faveur d'un ajournement de l'ouverture des négociations avec le Gouvernement brésilien, dans l'espoir que, dans l'intervalle, l'agitation hostile au plan en question se calmera. D'autre part, pour la solution du problème que le comité est appelé à résoudre, le facteur temps est essentiel. Aussi longtemps que l'avenir

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No. 23 7 JUN. 1934
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des Assyriens ne sera pas réglé, on risquera de voir se produire de nouveaux troubles dans l'Irak et par conséquent le comité désire vivement que l'émigration commence le plus tôt possible. Toutefois, il reste encore à prendre de nombreuses mesures avant que le plan d'établissement dans l'État de Paraná puisse être mis à exécution. Il importe, en premier lieu, de régler les détails avec le Gouvernement brésilien et ce n'est qu'ensuite qu'il sera possible de soumettre aux Assyriens un plan précis et de connaître leurs vœux. Lorsqu'on aura déterminé ainsi le nombre de personnes qui désireront quitter l'Irak, il sera nécessaire de prendre des arrangements financiers avant qu'un contrat définitif puisse être conclu avec la Paraná Plantations Limited. Enfin, lorsque ce contrat aura été signé, la compagnie aura, semble-t-il, besoin de deux mois pour prendre toutes dispositions utiles en vue du mouvement d'émigration. Le comité croit savoir que les conditions pour les opérations d'établissement ne sont favorables que jusqu'en septembre. Il est donc évident que, si l'émigration doit s'effectuer cette année-ci, il faut éviter tout retard inutile, aussi court soit-il.

5. Tout en reconnaissant, par conséquent, que le rythme des négociations avec le Gouvernement brésilien doit nécessairement dépendre de la situation locale, le comité désire vivement qu'il n'y ait pas perte de temps; il s'est donc demandé quelle procédure serait à la fois la plus appropriée et la plus en harmonie avec les conseils contenus dans le télégramme de votre Excellence, du 29 mars. Les difficultés auxquelles on se heurte inévitablement en négociant une question d'une telle complexité à une distance aussi considérable, se trouveront naturellement accrues par suite de l'existence, au Brésil, d'un mouvement d'opposition. Il est difficile à un comité siégeant à Genève de rester en contact avec l'opinion brésilienne et de juger de l'opportunité d'une proposition ou d'une démarche particulière. De même un représentant brésilien, négociant à Genève, se heurtera également, dans une certaine mesure, à des difficultés. Ou bien il sera obligé de consulter fréquemment son Gouvernement, ce qui entraînera des retards, ou bien s'il négocie un accord sans consulter son Gouvernement, mais en réservant l'approbation ultérieure de ce dernier, cette approbation pourra, finalement, faire défaut. En outre, des négociations à Genève seraient inévitablement entourées d'une certaine publicité, que votre Excellence juge essentiel d'éviter.

6. Si un accord officiel entre le comité et le Gouvernement brésilien devenait nécessaire, il serait peut-être souhaitable qu'il fût finalement conclu à Genève; toutefois, pour éviter les divers inconvénients que je viens de mentionner, le comité estime qu'il y aurait en tout cas lieu de préparer sérieusement la voie par des conversations préliminaires de caractère officieux et rigoureusement confidentiel à Rio de Janeiro.

7. Le comité, qui désire qu'en ma qualité de président, je vous exprime sa profonde gratitude pour les mesures que vous avez déjà si efficacement jugé possible de prendre en son nom, vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir continuer à lui prêter votre concours en vous chargeant de ces pourparlers préliminaires confidentiels.

Au cas où des négociations d'un caractère plus officiel que celles qui sont présentement envisagées deviendraient, par la suite, nécessaires à Rio de Janeiro, le comité sera obligé de reprendre l'ensemble de la question de la procédure à employer en tenant compte de diverses considérations dans lesquelles il est inutile que j'entre maintenant. Il n'a nullement le désir, même pour les conversations officieuses qu'il propose aujourd'hui, de faire tomber toute la responsabilité sur l'envoyé d'un seul des Gouvernements représentés au comité et, tout en priant votre Excellence de bien vouloir continuer pour le moment d'être son porte-parole, il est persuadé que vous pouvez compter dans toute la mesure où vous aurez besoin sur l'appui des représentants des Gouvernements qui font partie du comité et il vous recommande notamment d'agir dans la plus étroite liaison avec l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique, étant donné les renseignements spéciaux sur la question assyrienne que ce dernier possède probablement.

8. Le comité apprend que le Général de Brigade Browne et le Major Johnson élaborent un nouveau rapport plus détaillé sur les résultats de leur enquête, et il est hors de doute que l'opinion du comité, sur des points de détail, est susceptible d'être modifiée par la teneur de ce rapport et par les impressions dont, très certainement, le Général de Brigade Browne et le Major Johnson feront part oralement au comité après leur retour en Europe.

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Si la question ne présentait pas un tel caractère d'urgence, le comité serait disposé à attendre le retour de la mission avant de prendre de nouvelles mesures. Toutefois, il estime qu'une telle procédure ferait perdre un temps précieux et qu'il y aurait avantage à vous faire connaître immédiatement ses conceptions générales sur la nature du règlement qui doit intervenir avec le Gouvernement brésilien, afin que, connaissant les principaux desiderata du comité, vous soyez en mesure d'engager sans retard des pourparlers officieux dès que vous le jugerez opportun. Ces pourparlers devraient toutefois, pour l'instant, se borner à explorer le terrain et ne comporter aucun engagement, étant entendu que l'exposé ci-après est susceptible d'être modifié et complété d'après l'examen de la situation auquel le comité procédera avec le Général de Brigade Browne et le Major Johnson, à leur retour à Genève.

9. Les négociations avec le Gouvernement brésilien porteront notamment sur les points ci-après :

(1) Les conditions suivantes posées par ce Gouvernement :

(*a*) Les Assyriens émigrant au Brésil devront être des agriculteurs; (*b*) ils ne devront occasionner aucune dépense au Brésil; et (*c*) la Paraná Plantations Limited devra s'engager à les rapatrier ou à les établir ailleurs, à ses frais, s'ils ne s'adaptent pas au Brésil.

(2) Le régime auquel les Assyriens seront soumis au Brésil, pour ce qui est des questions civiles et religieuses.

(3) Les détails matériels de l'établissement.

10. Toutefois, avant d'examiner ces questions en détail, il convient de régler une importante question de principe.

Le comité s'abstiendrait naturellement d'engager le Gouvernement brésilien à accepter les Assyriens s'il n'avait pas des raisons de croire que ces derniers seront probablement de bons colons. Les rapports dont dispose le comité indiquent que ceux-ci possèdent nombre d'excellentes qualités. Leurs difficultés antérieures ont été principalement dues au fait qu'ils ont vécu parmi des populations quelque peu turbulentes, de race étrangère et de religion différente, qui ne connaissaient guère de lois et, en grande partie, parce qu'ils ont vécu, ces temps derniers, comme réfugiés dans des conditions d'instabilité. Malgré toutes les difficultés, les Assyriens ont conservé leur religion chrétienne. Ils ont la réputation d'être courageux, disciplinés, loyaux, économes et travailleurs, et il n'y a, semble-t-il, aucune raison de croire qu'ils deviennent une charge sociale ou économique pour le Brésil s'ils y sont établis.

11. D'autre part (quoiqu'il soit nécessaire de n'entretenir le Gouvernement brésilien de ce point qu'avec la plus grande précaution et la plus grande discrétion), il faudra tenir compte du sentiment national qui s'est développé parmi les Assyriens en raison de la situation qu'ils ont occupée depuis longtemps et prendre les précautions appropriées. Il semble donc utile que je m'efforce d'expliquer, pour la gouverne de votre Excellence, quelle a été cette situation.

12. L'origine des Assyriens de l'Irak, dont il s'agit maintenant de régler l'avenir, n'est pas absolument claire, comme il ressort de l'extrait ci-joint du rapport soumis à la Société des Nations en 1925 par la Commission de Délimitation de la Frontière de Mossoul.(1) Toutefois, ils constituent, en réalité, une minorité religieuse plutôt qu'une minorité ethnique. Il serait plus exact de les désigner sous le nom de Nestoriens. En effet, quoique quelques-uns soient maintenant presbytériens de religion, ils appartiennent, en général, à la branche de la race assyro-chaldéenne qui constitue l'Église nestorienne. Il semble, toutefois, qu'ils se considèrent comme les descendants de l'ancien Empire assyrien, et cette revendication a jusqu'à présent imprimé un certain caractère nationaliste à leurs aspirations. La plupart d'entre eux sont primitivement venus de Turquie, où ils vivaient sous le régime dit des "millet." Sous ce régime, les sujets ottomans qui n'étaient pas mahométans étaient organisés en communautés religieuses dont l'existence était reconnue par le Gouvernement ottoman; ces communautés étaient dirigées par leurs chefs spirituels, sous la surveillance de la Sublime Porte. Les Assyriens ont conservé, sous ce régime, leur indépendance religieuse et ils étaient régis par leur législation synodique, qui était tolérée par le Gouvernement ottoman pour autant qu'elle n'était pas contraire aux lois de

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(1) Not printed.

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l'Empire. Leur Patriarche avait les mêmes droits, privilèges et dignités que les chefs des autres communautés non mahométanes, y compris le droit de juridiction exclusive sur les membres de la communauté en matière de statut personnel. En outre, le paiement du tribut dû au Sultan par les tribus exemptes des impôts ordinaires était versé par l'intermédiaire du Patriarche. Il semble donc que les Assyriens, comme les autres communautés de l'Empire ottoman, aient joui, en fait, d'une certaine autonomie dont l'étendue variait de temps à autre, mais qui contribua à maintenir un certain sentiment " national."

13. Il n'est donc pas surprenant de constater que dans l'Irak, où les Assyriens se sont réfugiés pendant et après la guerre, ils se soient également efforcés d'obtenir une certaine autonomie administrative. Vers la fin du régime du mandat, ils ont, en fait, présenté des revendications plus étendues et ont demandé la création d'une enclave autonome homogène. La Société des Nations, se rendant compte qu'une telle idée était difficilement conciliable avec l'organisation d'un État moderne unifié, ne s'est pas montrée favorable à cette idée et a finalement déclaré, dans une résolution adoptée le 15 décembre 1932 par le Conseil, que la demande en faveur d'une autonomie administrative à l'intérieur de l'Irak ne pouvait pas être acceptée.

14. Dans l'intervalle, la Société des Nations avait, toutefois, négocié avec le Gouvernement de l'Irak au sujet de certaines garanties destinées à sauvegarder, après la fin du régime du mandat, les aspirations culturelles, linguistiques et religieuses de toutes les minorités ethniques et religieuses de l'Irak en général, y compris les Assyriens. Ces garanties ont fait l'objet d'une déclaration formulée au nom de l'Irak le 30 mai 1932. Cette déclaration, dont copie est jointe,(²) suivait les grandes lignes des traités ou déclarations de minorités antérieurement en vigueur entre certains pays et la Société des Nations.

15. Le danger existe, incontestablement, que les Assyriens, en raison de leur passé historique, s'attachent à l'idée d'une existence nationale séparée, alors que le comité estime que, si un plan prévoyant leur établissement dans un État moderne doit être couronné de succès, les Assyriens doivent être amenés à accepter l'idée de l'assimilation dans cet État.

16. Le comité a étudié longuement ce point et il doute que le problème puisse être réglé d'une façon satisfaisante si l'on ne résout pas la question du statut national futur des Assyriens. Le rapport du Général de Brigade Browne et ses communications antérieures font ressortir qu'au Brésil également on se rend pleinement compte de l'importance capitale de ce point et que des questions ont constamment été posées à ce sujet au Général Browne. En outre, d'après les rapports parvenus au comité, l'agitation contre l'immigration des Assyriens semble revêtir dans une large mesure un caractère nationaliste et paraît due à la crainte que les Assyriens ne restent un élément étranger et ne s'assimilent pas aisément aux habitants actuels du pays.

17. Le statut national actuel des Assyriens est assez obscur. Quelques-uns possèdent la nationalité irakienne; d'autres ne semblent pas avoir réuni les conditions nécessaires pour l'acquisition automatique de cette nationalité en vertu des dispositions du Traité de Lausanne et n'ont fait aucune démarche, depuis lors, pour obtenir cette nationalité par voie de naturalisation. Quel que soit l'aspect technique du problème, il n'est guère probable que le Gouvernement turc reconnaisse aussi tardivement comme ressortissants turcs les personnes appartenant à cette seconde catégorie et, pratiquement, celles-ci doivent donc être considérées, à l'heure actuelle, comme des réfugiés apatrides dans l'Irak. Il est naturellement impossible d'estimer dès à présent quelle proportion des Assyriens qui se décideront finalement à émigrer au Brésil rentrera dans cette catégorie. Mais les Assyriens apatrides sont précisément ceux qui n'ont jamais voulu s'établir en Irak dans les conditions actuelles, et il est donc extrêmement probable que ce sont eux qui montreront le plus d'empressement à saisir l'occasion de quitter ce pays.

18. Au Brésil, la situation semble être la suivante : tous les enfants nés au Brésil sont de nationalité brésilienne, même si leurs parents sont étrangers; les étrangers peuvent acquérir la nationalité brésilienne par voie de naturalisation au bout de deux ans de résidence dans le pays, ce délai étant supprimé si l'étranger en question possède des biens fonciers au Brésil ou a épousé une Brésilienne; si les conditions ci-dessus mentionnées sont toutes deux remplies, l'étranger est automatiquement considéré comme ressortissant brésilien de droit.

(²) See " Eastern " Volume, Part XXX, p. 247.

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19. Tant que le statut national des Assyriens ne sera pas fixé, ils considéreront vraisemblablement leur nouvel établissement au Brésil comme une expérience purement temporaire et ils garderont au cœur la chimérique idée de conserver une existence nationale distincte. Il serait extrêmement regrettable qu'ils se rendissent au Brésil en se faisant des illusions sur ce point, et le meilleur moyen d'empêcher tout malentendu à ce sujet sera peut-être de prévoir dans le plan d'établissement une clause stipulant que les Assyriens acquerront la nationalité brésilienne le plus tôt possible.

20. La question se pose de savoir si l'acquisition de cette nouvelle nationalité doit être obligatoire ou facultative. Le comité ignore si le Gouvernement brésilien pourrait légalement abréger le délai dans lequel les Assyriens pourraient acquérir volontairement la nationalité brésilienne, et, en tout cas, il y a lieu de se demander si de simples facilités permettant d'acquérir volontairement la nationalité constitueraient une sauvegarde suffisante contre le danger prévu ci-dessus, étant donné qu'il n'existe aucune garantie que les Assyriens se prévaudraient de ces facilités.

21. En conséquence, quelque radicale que puisse sembler la proposition, le comité est enclin à penser que la méthode qui semble la mieux appropriée aux circonstances et la plus susceptible d'éviter les troubles futurs qui pourraient surgir de la survivance du sentiment national, est l'acquisition automatique de la nationalité brésilienne dès l'arrivée au Brésil. Il existe à cet égard une sorte de précédent—qui peut être cité à titre d'exemple—dans la convention entre la Turquie et la Grèce, signée à Lausanne le 30 janvier 1923, pour l'échange obligatoire des ressortissants turcs de religion grecque orthodoxe, établis sur les territoires turcs, et des ressortissants grecs de religion musulmane établis sur les territoires grecs. L'article 7 de cette convention stipulait ce qui suit : "Les émigrants perdront la nationalité du pays qu'ils abandonnent et ils acquerront celle du pays de destination, dès leur arrivée sur le territoire de ce pays." Une solution s'inspirant de ces principes pourrait présenter un avantage réel pour le Gouvernement brésilien, en ce sens qu'elle tendrait à éviter des inconvénients d'ordre administratif et à faciliter l'assimilation; or, en raison de la nature exceptionnelle du cas envisagé, cette procédure semblerait constituer une sage et utile garantie, car elle tendrait à assurer que seuls choisiraient de se rendre au Brésil les Assyriens disposés à s'y établir.

22. Les Assyriens pourraient évidemment prendre prétexte de cette solution pour repousser le projet brésilien dans son ensemble et leur attitude à cet égard dépendra de la manière dont cette solution leur sera exposée. Il est essentiel qu'on leur montre qu'il s'agit là d'un privilège que le Gouvernement brésilien a décidé de leur accorder. Dans l'idée du comité, le Gouvernement brésilien pourrait déclarer, que, compte tenu des circonstances spéciales du cas envisagé, il estime qu'il serait de l'intérêt de toutes les parties en cause que les Assyriens dès leur arrivée au Brésil vivent en citoyens brésiliens et que, par conséquent, le projet d'établissement devrait comprendre une disposition stipulant qu'ils acquerront la nationalité brésilienne dès leur arrivée dans le pays.

23. Peut-être le Gouvernement brésilien hésitera-t-il à adopter la solution proposée sans avoir pu s'assurer par lui-même que les Assyriens remplissent les conditions requises pour devenir citoyens brésiliens et il serait assez naturel qu'il proposât que l'acquisition de la nationalité brésilienne fût obligatoire, non pas immédiatement, mais au bout d'une certaine période, par exemple, d'un ou deux ans. Le comité, tout en reconnaissant la force d'une telle suggestion, ne pourrait s'y rallier si elle impliquait que le Gouvernement brésilien se réserve le droit, à l'expiration de ladite période, de refuser la nationalité brésilienne à l'un quelconque ou à tous les Assyriens et d'inviter les personnes auxquelles cette nationalité serait refusée à quitter immédiatement le Brésil. Cette solution risquerait de rouvrir toute la question du nouvel établissement des Assyriens à l'expiration de ladite période (qui serait vraisemblablement courte) et pourrait aboutir à de graves difficultés d'ordre pratique.

24. La solution proposée de l'acquisition automatique de la nationalité brésilienne dès l'arrivée au Brésil affectera essentiellement, si elle est adoptée, la troisième, tout au moins, des trois conditions fixées par le Gouvernement brésilien, ainsi que la question du régime dont seront dotés les Assyriens aux points de vue civil et religieux, mentionnée au paragraphe 9 (2) ci-dessus.

25. Je passe maintenant à l'examen des trois conditions du Gouvernement brésilien.

26. En ce qui concerne la première de ces conditions le comité croit savoir que le Général de Brigade Browne a déjà expliqué aux autorités brésiliennes que, si les Assyriens sont essentiellement des agriculteurs et des pasteurs qui, par tradition, aiment la terre et ont l'ambition de devenir propriétaires fonciers, un certain nombre d'entre eux se livrent à d'autres occupations. Le Général Browne a signalé que, dans de nombreux cas, ces occupations ont des rapports avec les métiers d'agriculteur et de pasteur et que ceux qui s'adonnent à d'autres occupations pourraient être utilement employés au développement de l'établissement proposé, sans porter préjudice au marché de la main-d'œuvre nationale. On peut même souligner que ce marché tirera probablement profit de l'établissement d'une population de l'importance numérique envisagée. Il faut donc espérer que cette condition ne soulèvera aucune difficulté, dans la pratique, et que le Gouvernement brésilien ne l'interprétera pas d'une manière tellement stricte qu'elle devienne un obstacle à l'immigration en masse des Assyriens.

27. En ce qui concerne la deuxième condition, le comité n'a jamais envisagé que les Assyriens devaient constituer une charge financière pour le Gouvernement brésilien. Les méthodes par lesquelles l'établissement sera financé ne pourront être arrêtées dans le détail que lorsque le coût de cette entreprise sera plus exactement connu, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'un plan concret aura été présenté aux Assyriens et qu'on aura déterminé le nombre exact de ceux qui désirent en profiter. Vous observerez, en prenant connaissance des débats du Conseil du 19 janvier dernier dont vous trouverez copie ci-jointe,(³) que, pour les dépenses qui ne sont pas couvertes par le Gouvernement de l'Irak et par les Assyriens eux-mêmes, le Conseil a adressé un appel à la générosité des Gouvernements et des organisations privées pour leur demander d'étudier la question de leur participation financière, eu égard à l'aspect humanitaire du projet. Il n'entre pas dans les intentions du comité de demander au Gouvernement brésilien d'apporter sa contribution financière. Toutefois, le comité croit savoir que, dans le passé, le Gouvernement brésilien a eu l'habitude de faciliter l'immigration en assurant, dans une certaine mesure, la gratuité du transport par chemin de fer. Si le Gouvernement brésilien croyait pouvoir accorder des facilités analogues pour le transport des Assyriens, le comité lui en serait naturellement très reconnaissant.

28. C'est la troisième des conditions posées par le Brésil qui suscite le plus grand problème. Le comité apprécie pleinement les considérations de prudence qui l'ont dictée, mais il voit de graves difficultés qui s'opposent à sa réalisation satisfaisante. En premier lieu, la responsabilité qui, en vertu de cette condition, incomberait à la Paraná Plantations Limited est d'une nature telle que cette société ne saurait l'accepter et que la Société des Nations ne saurait guère l'assumer elle-même sans avoir au préalable la certitude qu'un autre pays serait disposé à recevoir ceux des Assyriens qui ne s'établiraient pas définitivement au Brésil et sans que des dispositions satisfaisantes aient été prises pour faire face aux dépenses éventuelles que nécessiterait leur nouvelle installation dans un autre pays. Abstraction faite de ces graves objections d'ordre pratique, cette condition ne manquerait guère de produire sur les Assyriens un effet psychologique regrettable. Elle les inciterait à se considérer comme des colons purement temporaires et les découragerait de tout effort en vue de surmonter les difficultés qu'en leur qualité de pionniers, ils ne sauraient manquer de rencontrer dans une certaine mesure. Depuis que cette condition a été posée, le risque qu'entrevoyait le Gouvernement brésilien s'est révélé moindre à la suite des investigations faites par le Brigadier Browne, qui ont montré que le plan offrait de bonnes perspectives de succès. Ce risque serait diminué encore davantage par l'adoption de la solution suggérée plus haut pour la question du statut national. En effet, si cette suggestion était adoptée, la troisième condition cesserait probablement d'avoir sa raison d'être et serait abandonnée. En tout état de cause, le comité estime que tous les efforts possibles devraient être faits pour agir dans ce sens, étant donné qu'en raison des complications sur lesquelles j'ai attiré l'attention, il n'est pas enclin à entreprendre les mesures nécessaires pour remplir cette condition sans avoir acquis du moins la conviction qu'il n'existe aucune autre solution plus pratique.

29. En ce qui concerne le régime des Assyriens en matière civile et religieuse, il ne saurait être naturellement question, au Brésil, d'un traité de

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(³) See January 23, Section 1.

minorité ou de tout instrument qui encouragerait les Assyriens à espérer le maintien au Brésil de l'ancien système turc des " millet " ou le renouvellement de la situation à laquelle ils se sont accoutumés en Irak. Comme je l'ai déjà signalé, le comité estime que le succès du projet dépendra de la mesure dans laquelle les Assyriens s'assimileront dans l'État qui les recevra. Il est évident qu'ils ne peuvent espérer jouir d'une situation privilégiée dans tout État moderne qui leur offre un foyer, et ils doivent être disposés à obéir aux lois nationales, exactement comme les autres résidants du pays. En cherchant à obtenir des renseignements quant au régime dont jouiront les Assyriens, le comité n'a donc nullement l'intention de demander des privilèges spéciaux. Il désire simplement s'assurer de la nature du régime qui sera, en pratique, accordé aux Assyriens et il désire obtenir, de source sûre, tous les renseignements disponibles qui peuvent être communiqués aux Assyriens de manière que ceux-ci puissent se décider en connaissant exactement les droits et les obligations qui seront les leurs en tant que résidants au Brésil.

30. Ce qui est d'une importance primordiale, c'est d'établir que les Assyriens, qu'ils deviennent ou non ressortissants brésiliens, auront toute liberté pour pratiquer leur religion et gérer leurs affaires religieuses dans la mesure compatible avec le maintien de l'autorité du Gouvernement. Au surplus, si les Assyriens doivent devenir immédiatement ressortissants brésiliens, le comité sera heureux de savoir dans quelle mesure ils seront encore autorisés à se servir de leur langue maternelle et à diriger des écoles privées. Si, d'autre part, la question du statut national doit demeurer en suspens, il est souhaitable qu'une communication émanant d'une source autorisée fasse connaître si les Assyriens, jusqu'au moment où ils acquerront la nationalité brésilienne, peuvent être assurés d'être traités comme les ressortissants du pays en matière de protection de la vie et des biens (y compris le libre accès aux tribunaux), d'instruction publique, d'imposition et de prévoyance sociale.

31. Le comité est certain que les lois actuelles du Brésil donnent des assurances suffisantes sur tous ces points. Il a, notamment, pris acte des dispositions libérales de l'article 72 de la Constitution brésilienne, amendé le 3 septembre 1926. Toutefois, le comité croit savoir qu'une nouvelle Constitution est à présent en cours de discussion et il désire simplement obtenir des renseignements précis et sûrs au sujet de la pratique actuellement suivie ou des intentions du Gouvernement brésilien en ce qui concerne les points que j'ai mentionnés.

32. Par la suite se posera la question de la forme du document où figureront les résultats des négociations avec le Gouvernement brésilien; sera-ce un accord bilatéral ou un échange de notes entre le Brésil et la Société des Nations ou une sorte de déclaration unilatérale du Gouvernement brésilien où seront exposés en détails les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement brésilien acceptera les Assyriens ainsi que le statut dont les Assyriens peuvent espérer bénéficier? Au stade actuel des négociations, cette question de forme semble prématurée.

33. En outre, il est possible qu'un accord bilatéral entre le Brésil et l'Irak devienne en définitive nécessaire, par exemple au sujet du point particulier de la nationalité, si la solution ci-dessus proposée par le comité est adoptée; mais cette question pourra de même être examinée ultérieurement.

34. Je ne me propose pas, dans la présente communication, de m'arrêter au point (3), mentionné au paragraphe 9 ci-dessus, à savoir les détails matériels de l'établissement, puisque le comité doit, dans une très large mesure, s'en remettre à l'opinion du Général Browne et du Major Johnson en ce qui concerne les questions techniques de cette nature. Les indications complémentaires qui pourront être nécessaires seront donc envoyées à votre Excellence aussitôt que possible après le retour de la mission à Genève.

35. J'espère que la présente communication aura fourni à votre Excellence une documentation suffisante pour les conversations préliminaires non officielles qu'envisage le comité. Celui-ci sera naturellement heureux de fournir, si possible, à votre Excellence toutes les autres informations ou indications que vous pourriez désirer. Je tiens à répéter que le comité, pour le moment, envisage uniquement des conversations préalables d'un caractère tout à fait confidentiel et sans engagement d'aucune sorte. Le comité n'a pas l'intention de donner aucune publicité au fait que vous êtes engagé dans ces conversations ou même que la présente communication vous a été adressée, et il présume que, de votre côté, vous prendrez également toutes les précautions possibles pour assurer que

toute publicité sera évitée, au Brésil. En adoptant cette procédure, le comité s'est efforcé de donner effet à l'avis que contenait le télégramme de votre Excellence en date du 29 mars. Il vous prie de bien vouloir l'informer, de préférence par télégramme, lorsque vous considérerez que le moment est venu de prendre des mesures plus précises ou de caractère plus officiel. Il va sans dire que tous les renseignements que vous croirez pouvoir entre-temps adresser au comité, en ce qui concerne les progrès réalisés et les perspectives de règlement, seront reçus par lui avec reconnaissance.

36. Le comité se rend pleinement compte de l'amplitude et de la difficulté de la tâche qu'il prie votre Excellence de bien vouloir entreprendre. Il est naturel que le Gouvernement brésilien n'aborde la question de l'immigration d'un grand nombre de personnes appartenant à une race éloignée et peu connue qu'en s'entourant de grandes précautions, mais le comité est persuadé que votre Excellence saisira toutes les occasions pour souligner auprès du Gouvernement brésilien le côté humanitaire de la question. Quelques fautes qu'aient pu commettre les Assyriens, la cruauté du sort qui les a poursuivis depuis le début de la guerre mondiale les rend dignes de sympathie. En leur donnant la possibilité de refaire leur vie dans un nouveau foyer, parmi des habitants qui sont chrétiens comme eux, le Gouvernement brésilien agira dans l'esprit des traditions les plus libérales et rendra un réel service à l'entente et à la paix internationales.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
LÓPEZ OLIVAN.

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P.Z.
3706
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

May 22, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 3303/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 53.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from the President of the Assyrian Committee to the Spanish Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro, dated the 15th May, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Rio de Janeiro.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
May 18, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

President of Assyrian Committee to Spanish Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro.

(Confidentiel.)

Société des Nations, Genève,
le 15 *mai* 1934.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

COMME suite à ma dépêche du 10 avril dernier, relative à l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Comité du Conseil a discuté avec le Général de Brigade Browne et le Major Johnson les conclusions de l'enquête récente à laquelle ils ont procédé, avec M. Redard, au sujet du projet d'établissement sur des terres appartenant à la Paraná Plantations Limited.

2. Je crois savoir que le Général Browne, avant son départ du Brésil, vous a communiqué copie du rapport définitif de la mission et le Comité du Conseil me prie maintenant de vous transmettre l'exemplaire ci-joint(¹) d'un rapport supplémentaire (avec copie de l'annexe 1(¹) à ce rapport) que le Major Johnson a rédigé, depuis lors, sur les aspects techniques, administratifs et financiers de la question. Ce rapport ainsi que le rapport définitif de la mission ne sont pas destinés, pour le moment tout au moins, à être publiés et doivent donc être considérés comme confidentiels.

3. Votre Excellence se rappellera à cet égard que, dans le premier paragraphe de ma dépêche du 10 avril, il était indiqué que le Général Browne avait été autorisé à communiquer aux autorités brésiliennes la première partie du rapport préliminaire qu'il avait transmis au Comité du Conseil sous couvert de sa lettre du 10 mars. Le Général Browne vient de faire savoir au comité qu'il avait cru judicieux de ne pas utiliser cette autorisation et qu'il s'était borné à porter à la connaissance des Ministres intéressés la substance du rapport préliminaire, sans leur en laisser copie. C'est là un fait que sans doute votre Excellence n'ignore pas, mais, afin d'éviter tout malentendu, le Général Browne a demandé qu'il soit mentionné dans la présente communication. Il ne semble pas nécessaire, au stade actuel, de communiquer au Gouvernement brésilien le rapport préliminaire.

4. Le Comité du Conseil me charge, toutefois, de vous demander de bien vouloir communiquer au Gouvernement brésilien copie du rapport, en date du 15 mai, qu'il a lui-même présenté au Conseil. Un exemplaire de ce rapport(¹) est joint à la présente dépêche et vous constaterez qu'il renferme des extraits du rapport définitif de la mission et du rapport du Major Johnson.

5. Après avoir examiné les divers rapports fournis par la mission et après avoir discuté personnellement le problème avec le Général Browne et le Major Johnson, le comité ne croit pas qu'il soit nécessaire de modifier en aucune façon ma dépêche du 10 avril. Son attention a naturellement été attirée sur

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(¹) Not printed.

[106 y—1]

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SECRET. DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

divers détails qu'il y aura peut-être lieu de discuter plus tard avec le Gouvernement brésilien, mais, pour la majeure partie, il préfère ne pas entrer dans ces détails avant que les négociations engagées avec le Gouvernement brésilien ne soient entrées dans une phase plus officielle. Il se borne, en conséquence, pour le moment, à attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur les deux points suivants :

6. En ce qui concerne la première des conditions stipulées par le Gouvernement brésilien (voir paragraphe 26 de ma dépêche du 10 avril), votre Excellence pourra faire savoir que le comité est prêt à examiner la suggestion de la mission, suivant laquelle les Assyriens qui ne se livrent pas à l'agriculture ou à l'élevage et dont les services ne peuvent être utilement employés pour le développement de la colonie projetée devraient faire un apprentissage dans une station agricole expérimentale qui serait organisée dans la colonie ou auprès de familles d'agriculteurs assyriens qualifiées, avant qu'on leur octroie définitivement des terres.

7. Le paragraphe 27 de ma dépêche du 10 avril déclarait, à propos de la seconde condition brésilienne, que le comité serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement brésilien si celui-ci croyait pouvoir accorder aux Assyriens certaines gratuités de transport par chemin de fer. Le comité vient d'apprendre que le transport gratuit sur tous les chemins de fer brésiliens est, d'une manière générale, accordé aux immigrants et qu'en fait les autorités compétentes ont laissé entendre à la mission que les immigrants avaient droit au transport gratuit par voie ferrée jusqu'à leur lieu de destination et qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de supposer que cette faveur serait refusée aux Assyriens.

8. Le comité reconnaît pleinement qu'il ne peut être réalisé que peu ou point de progrès dans la voie de l'établissement des Assyriens au Brésil avant l'élection présidentielle. Il serait, toutefois, reconnaissant de tout ce que votre Excellence pourrait faire ultérieurement pour hâter la solution de la question et il serait heureux de recevoir, à une date aussi rapprochée que possible, vos observations sur les points soulevés dans ma dépêche du 10 avril, et d'être informé par télégramme dès que vous considérerez que le moment est favorable à l'ouverture officielle des négociations avec le Gouvernement brésilien.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Président du Comité pour l'Établissement
des Assyriens de l'Irak,
LÓPEZ OLIVAN.

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P. Z.
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From SWITZERLAND.

Telegram (en clair) from H.M.'s Consul (Geneva).

D. (By Bag) 18th May, 1934.

R. 19th May, 1934.

No. 17 Saving.

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Addressed to Rio de Janeiro No. 9, 17th May.

Following from Mr. Eden.

Assyrians.

Council today approved progress report of Assyrian Committee and copy goes to you by air mail. It does not mention nature of conditions attached to Brazilian offer or informal discussions now proceeding in Rio de Janeiro. It recalls generous decision in principle of Brazilian Government and fact that, before discussing conditions of settlement, Committee felt bound to assure itself that Assyrians could be expected to adapt themselves to Paraná and to develop into element useful to Brazil. Hence General Browne's Mission, which has now reported prospects favourable. After summarising conclusions of Mission, report adds caveat that transfer of so large a population raises problems more difficult than generally realised and that Committee cannot yet express opinion whether Paraná scheme can be put into effect; next step being to enter into detailed negotiations with Brazilian Government as soon as circumstances permit in hope of working out plan acceptable to that Government.

Copy of report is being sent to Spanish Ambassador for communication to Brazilian Government.

Mission's various reports have not been communicated to Council or published. Certain extracts only, describing itinerary, procedure and nature of areas visited, were attached to Committee's report.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 17 Saving.

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 2308/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3702
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for ~~the~~ India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2 June, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E2609/1/93 of 11 May.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Record of 22nd meeting of Assyrian Committee 9 April	Assyrian question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 23 7 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
4 JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
A.M.
D.O.
W.O.
Treas.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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P. Z.
3702
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

April 13, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 2308/1/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-second Meeting of the Council Committee, held on April 9, 1934, *at* 4 P.M.—(*Communicated by United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva; Received April* 13, 1934.)

AT the request of the president, the *United Kingdom Representative* read out to the committee the text of two telegrams received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro (see Annexes A and B).(1)

The President then proposed that the committee should consider what further progress, if any, could be made pending the return to Europe of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson, and that it should take, as a basis, the draft of a letter to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro which had been prepared by the United Kingdom representative (Annex C(1)). Before the committee considered this draft in detail, however, the president wished to make a statement as the representative of Spain. The committee would recall, he said, that at first it had asked the Spanish representative in Rio to use his good offices to persuade the Brazilian Government to modify a decision which would have made a solution of the Assyrian problem in Brazil impossible. The committee was aware of the negotiations which had followed. By a kind of "automatisme" the Spanish Ambassador had come to play a preponderant rôle, and the committee was now considering a draft letter instructing him to take further action on its behalf. For his part, M. Oliván was ready to facilitate matters, but he must enter a reservation against sole responsibility being placed on the Spanish Ambassador, at all events, when the stage of formal negotiations was reached. He was bound to consider this matter from the point of view of Spain, although he did not wish to insist too much on that point of view. But, in any case, it was not altogether fair to the Spanish Ambassador, who had no special knowledge of the problem, to place the whole responsibility on him. If the committee approved the draft letter, he was prepared to facilitate matters by sending it to the Spanish Ambassador, provided that it was in the nature not of instructions but of suggestions or indications. The Spanish Ambassador could not, in fact, receive instructions from the League. M. Oliván had at first felt that it would be necessary for him to refer the whole matter to his Government before anything further was addressed to the Spanish Ambassador. If, however, the proposed letter was sent in the form which he had suggested, he did not think it was necessary at this stage to bring in his Government. He was prepared to consider the matter as merely a continuation of the unofficial discussions which the Spanish Ambassador had already been conducting. But if the Ambassador was now charged with the task of making certain soundings, it must not be treated as a precedent or taken to mean that the Spanish Ambassador should always be responsible for acting on behalf of the League in this matter. If, when the purely preliminary stage now contemplated was over, formal steps were necessary, he would be obliged to ask the committee to reconsider the whole question of the channel of negotiations. M. Oliván repeated that he had no wish to make difficulties, but had thought it right to put the position quite clearly to the committee.

The members of the committee indicated that they perfectly understood M. Oliván's difficulties and were grateful to him for agreeing to facilitate matters to the extent of asking the Spanish Ambassador to conduct the informal discussions now proposed.

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(1) Not printed.

[81 n—3]

ENCLOSURE IN [illegible]
No. 23 7 JUN. 1934
FROM
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

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The Danish Representative thought it important that the Spanish Ambassador should emphasise in all that he might do that he was acting solely on behalf of the League.

The President said that he proposed to accompany the letter from the committee, if approved, with a purely personal letter from himself making this suggestion, and also explaining the position quite clearly to the Spanish Ambassador.

The committee then proceeded to discuss the draft letter. The modifications suggested, in so far as they were not purely formal, chiefly aimed at making the draft more objective, as it was felt that it would be best at this stage merely to discuss the various courses open, and the advantages and disadvantages of each, without definitely committing the committee to any particular solution until the ground had been prepared and the reaction of the Brazilian Government was known.

The draft despatch having been accepted, the president said that he would send it to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio by the next air mail. It was agreed that it should be sent in French, and that the text in that language should be circulated in due course to the members of the committee.

A discussion followed on future procedure. It was felt desirable that the committee should hold a meeting as soon as possible after the return to Europe of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson, subject to the convenience of Brigadier Browne in particular, who might wish to go to England before coming to Geneva. The president asked the United Kingdom representative to find out what date would be convenient for Brigadier Browne to come to Geneva, and it was left that the president should fix the date of the next meeting when he had this information from the United Kingdom representative.

In the meantime, it was decided to regard the despatch to the Spanish Ambassador and the fact that he was engaged in discussion with the Brazilian Government as strictly confidential.

The question was raised whether the substance of the proposed message to the Assyrians should be given to the press. The secretariat were in favour of doing this at once. It was felt, however, that it was scarcely possible to give any publicity to the message, at all events until the note to the Iraqi representative had reached the Iraqi Government, particularly in view of the fact that that note stated that the committee were not in a position to address a direct message to the Assyrians and were merely offering to assist the Iraqi Government by authorising them to communicate such a message. It was eventually decided to say nothing to the press except that the committee had that day discussed the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq with the Iraqi representative and with Major Thomson, who was on the point of returning to Iraq, and that the committee would next meet on the return to Europe of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson.

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IMMEDIATE. India

CONFIDENTIAL ~~4.1~~

MC

P. Z.
3661
1934

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E3542/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name,* but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
31 May, 1934.

P.Z. 3609

3609

Uss 31/5

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 3439/1/93 of May 29.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad Tels No ~~130 & 131~~ 112 & 113 of 29 May	Assyrian Question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY
No. 23 7 JUN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
1 - JUN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
W.O.
A.M.

14—6130 9785 (2)

301

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FROM IRAQ

P. Z.
3661
1934

Decypher. Mr. Ogilvie Forbes (Bagdad).
29th May 1934.

D. 11.55 p.m. 29th May 1934.

R. 8.30 a.m. 30th May 1934.

No. 112.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 97.

News that Brazilian scheme is off will be received with disappointment both by Iraqi Government and by many Assyrians. I hope every effort will be made to find another country as soon as possible.

I see no present prospect of Iraqi Government consenting to commission of investigation into state of Assyrians especially in view of Mar Shimun's recent accusations. Moreover creation of special machinery would as you suggest lead to deadlock and only make matters worse.

Following are my observations in reply to your questions in paragraph 8.

A. If emigration is impossible this year steps must be taken for (one), maintenance of refugees camp for which provision exists only until September 30th; (two), support of indigent Assyrians in Mosul Town; (three), support of Assyrians in the country who have neither adequately sowed nor made sufficient provision for coming year.

I am advised that distress in above categories is likely to increase and further relief measures will be necessary.

B. Despatch of League Commission in the present

circumstances...

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circumstances would certainly create a deadlock with the League.

C. None.

D. I suggest I be authorized to explain the present situation fully and frankly to the King and Government omitting reference to Mar Shimun, see my immediately following telegram, and to point out grave consequences which may arise if Assyrians cannot tide over the coming year and also to suggest to Iraqi Government that if they are not prepared to shoulder all the expense involved by practicaly certain continued presence of Assyrians for another year, either League might be induced to offer monetary initiative or Iraqi Government themselves should make representations to the League to that end.

I quite appreciate objection to suggesting to Iraqi Government that others should help to shoulder a burden which should be mainly theirs. I make this proposal with a view to giving the League an opportunity for sending a representative to this country in a manner which should be unobjectionable to Iraqi Government, to administer relief and incidentally report privately to the League on other matters.

Cannot Major Thomson who is already here be confidentially used to the purposes of reporting?

Cornwallis has been consulted and agrees.

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P. Z.
3661
1934

From IRAQ.

Decypher. Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes (Bagdad).
29th May, 1934.

D. 11.50 p.m., 29th May, 1934.

R. 8.30 a.m., 30th May, 1934.

No. 113.

::::::::::::::

IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

I suggest that it is important in considering this problem entirely to dissociate Mar Shimun's propaganda which is a red rag to Iraqi bull from situation created by failure of Brazilian scheme.

If Iraqi Government gain the impression that Council are influenced by Mar Shimun, matter will be much more difficult to handle.

Cornwallis feels strongly on the above.

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE

Committee to see

P.Z. 3609/34.

12/7

12/7

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
12 JUL 1934

12/7

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Notes.

Minute Paper.

Register No.
P. Z.
3609/34

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 1934.

To	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	31.v.34	[illegible]	
Secretary of State...	1.6	S. H.	Assyrians.
Committee............	1.6.		
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Suppose that we could not [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] could we [illegible] assyrian [illegible] are [illegible] far as mostly [illegible] different but [illegible] residence [illegible] [illegible]

SA 1/6

(See PZ 3858/34)

Previous papers :—

Copy of to

FOR INFORMATION.

Please see the previous submission on P.Z. 1587/34.

In spite of very favourable reports from the Commission which the League sent to Brazil, on the technical aspect of the scheme for settling the Assyrians in that country, the latest Foreign Office information from Rio shows that local opposition in Brazil has now rendered the scheme hopeless, though the Brazilian Government have not yet formerly withdrawn their offer. The Assyrian Committee of the League Council is meeting again at Geneva to-day, (31st May) and unless the French Government can be induced to accept the Assyrians in Syria or Lebanon, a long delay is inevitable before they can be removed from Iraq. N.P. His Majesty's Minister, Baghdad, who recently made a tour of the Assyrian country

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(P.Z. 3142/34)

in Iraq found that security was ~~given~~ good for the present but that there was a definite apprehension for the future in some areas, chiefly from the Kurds, if the resettlement scheme should be long delayed, and that ~~the~~ destitution among the Assyrians and the frustration of their hopes might lead to dangerous clashes with their neighbours. The difficult question of the attitude to be adopted by the United Kingdom representative on the question of the despatch to Iraq of a Commission of Investigation for relief, which, in view of the admittedly unsatisfactory position of the Assyrians in Iraq, is sure to be revived and strongly pressed at the meeting of the Council Committee, is discussed in the Foreign Office telegram to Baghdad below.

The present position is most unsatisfactory and there is a considerable danger of serious further trouble arising.

R.E. Crombie
G.L. 31/5/34

Seen
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SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
12 JUL 1934

INDEXED

IMMEDIATE India 306

CONFIDENTIAL Mr L

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 3439/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3609
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
29 May, 1934.

P.Z. 3784

Mr Bly 9/5

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To H.M. Representative Bagdad. Tel no 97 of May 28.	Assyrians

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 22 31 MAY 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
30 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
C.O.

14-6130 9785 (2)

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(E.3439/1/93).

TO IRAQ.

P. Z.
3609
1934

Cypher telegram to Mr. Ogilvie Forbes. (Bagdad).

Foreign Office. 28th May. 1934. 10.40 p.m.

No. 97.

IMMEDIATE.

--------oOo--------

MOST CONFIDENTIAL.

Assyrians.

Latest reports from Rio show that local opposition has now rendered Brazilian scheme hopeless, though Brazilian Government have not yet formally withdrawn their offer. Council Committee will now have to make further effort to find destination elsewhere when they meet on May 31st, but unless French Government can be induced to accept Assyrians in Syria or Lebanon long delay is inevitable before they can be removed from Iraq.

In view of admittedly unsatisfactory position of Assyrians in Iraq, Committee will naturally seek all possible means of guarding against dangers of this delay. Idea of despatch to Iraq of commission of investigation or relief, or at least of independent observer has already been raised and is sure to be revived and strongly pressed. Committee while not accepting Mar Shimun's allegations at face value are nevertheless not altogether convinced by Iraqi Government's periodical reassurances, and President favours suggesting to Council desirability of immediately setting up machinery for ascertaining facts and ensuring against further trouble. ...

3. United Kingdom representative, while not actually opposing this suggestion, has pointed out risks such as possible excitement of racial animosities, undue raising of Assyrian hopes, or development of serious difficulties with Iraqi Government, which might hamper Committee's main task.

4.......

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4. Best hope of solution being early migration, proposal could thus be shelved while Brazilian scheme was in being, especially in view of Sir F. Humphrys' reports that Assyrian situation, though potentially dangerous, was not immediately critical.

5. His Majesty's Government must now decide whether United Kingdom representatives on Committee and eventually on Council would be justified in opposing or discouraging any special measures of investigation or supervision which may now be proposed. If proposal would merely complicate problem or lead to deadlock between Iraqi Government and League, matters would only be made worse especially for Assyrians. Question of responsibility for carrying out Commission's recommendations might also lead to great difficulty. On the other hand, despatch of commission or observer might nevertheless avert or reduce certain dangers, e.g. of renewed massacre. Opposition to proposal might therefore involve impossible responsibility for future safety of Assyrians, and subsequent incident or serious destitution would be most damaging to His Majesty's Government.

6. In event of dispute between Iraq and League Council, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government, in view of third paragraph of Article 1 of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance to support suggested investigation if Iraq's opposition were based on reasonable grounds. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government have a duty as member of Council, and Iraqi Government's general attitude particularly towards Assyrian question has not been such as to justify His Majesty's Government in shielding Iraqi Government at the expense of their own reputation, still less of supporting them in obstruction.

7. If issue is not to arise in acute form, it would

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be best for Iraqi Government, in their own interest, to take initiative by inviting some form of investigation when replying to allegations in Mar Shimun's letter of May 3rd.

8. Please telegraph your views on

a. Necessity of special measures for security and welfare of Assyrians if emigration is impossible this year,

b. Seriousness of risks which would attend despatch of League Commission in present circumstances,

c. Possibility of inducing Iraqi Government to invite or accept League Commission,

d. If c. is out of the question, possibility of devising some other acceptable method of independent investigation.

9. Eventual consultation with Iraqi Government may be necessary in virtue of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty before His Majesty's Government can take definite line, but you should not consult them without further instructions. You may, however, consult Sir K. Cornwallis and other British advisers unofficially before replying.

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Minute Paper. Department.

"Times" of 18th May, 1934.

THE LEAGUE AND ASSYRIANS

A SOUTH AMERICAN HOME

SUITABILITY OF BRAZIL

FROM OUR LEAGUE CORRESPONDENT

GENEVA, MAY 16

The League Council Committee which has been studying the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in a foreign country has issued its report to the Council. This is concerned mainly with the investigations made by Brigadier-General Browne and Mr. Johnson, of the Nansen Office, on the Parana plantations in Brazil, into the suitability of that land for the settlement of the Assyrians. The Committee reports that as the result of Brigadier-General Browne's mission it is now satisfied that, given good will, initiative, and energy on the part of the Assyrians, there is every cause to believe that they would thrive in the area concerned. The transfer of so large a population raises, however, difficult problems, and it is too early for the Committee to express an opinion whether the scheme can be put into effect. The next step will be to enter into detailed negotiations with the Brazilian Government in the hope of working out a plan acceptable to that Government.

Annexes to the report show the position of various settlers who have recently arrived in Brazil under conditions "inferior, if anything, to those contemplated for the Assyrians." The conclusion arrived at is that in the absence of unforeseen circumstances the Assyrians should experience no great difficulty in becoming self-supporting within eight months and of repaying the cost of land purchase, settlement, and transport within 12 years.

The League mission learned that in the event of the Assyrians settling in Brazil there would be no obstacle to the practice of their own faith, as there is complete religious freedom throughout the country. They would also be allowed to establish their own schools, on condition that Portuguese was taught.

An *aide-mémoire* published as an annexe to the League Committee's report declares that the Assyrian has obtained a reputation for fighting simply because he has had to fight for his existence for centuries. Given fair treatment he will prove a loyal and useful and not a troublesome citizen. Brigadier-General Browne states that the Assyrians are in the full sense "children of the soil," thrifty and very honest in their dealings. They take well to sport. The *aide-mémoire* dispels the notion that 20,000 families are to be transported; the number contemplated is between 2,000 and 3,000 families.

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E2602/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3284
1934

India
MCA

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
15 May, 1934.

P.Z. 3200.
Mr [illegible] 16/5

Reference to previous correspondence:
F.O. letter E 2049/1/93 of May 11.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations (Brigadier Browne) Comm^d^ April 25.	Assyrian Settlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 20 17 MAY. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
16 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to C.O.
D.O.
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Treas.
A.M.

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ASTERN (IRAQ).

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P.Z. 3784

EASTERN (IRAQ).

April 30, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 2602/1/93]

No. 1.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Final Report of the Commission appointed to examine Proposals for the Settlement of Assyrians in Brazil.—(Communicated by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, April 27, 1934; Received in Foreign Office, April 30.)

THE two members of the commission, Brigadier-General J. Gilbert Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., and Mr. T. F. Johnson, secretary-general of the Nansen International Office, left Southampton by R.M.L. *Almanzora* on Saturday, the 27th January, and arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 12th February, where they were met by the third member, M. Charles Redard, counsellor of the Swiss Legation. This made the commission complete.

M. Pedro Marques, of the Ministry of Labour, M. de Silva, sent by the British Ambassador to help the commission, and also Mr. A. H. M. Thomas, local director of Paraná Plantations (Limited), met the commission at the boat. The commission took up its quarters at the Copacabana Palace Hotel for a few days.

News had already been received that a press campaign against the Assyrian immigration had been started in Brazil. The chief agents were a society called the "Friends of Alberto Torres Society."

There appears to be, as far as the commission can gather, a movement against the arrival in the country of any more people of Asiatic race. A great many of the articles in the press were extremely ill-informed, and some of the illustrations which appeared were not of Assyrians at all.

The commission therefore, in a consultation at Petropolis with the British Ambassador, Sir William Seeds, K.C.M.G., and the Spanish Ambassador, Dr. Sales, on the 13th February, came to three decisions:—

First of all, on no account to enter into a counter-campaign in the press. Secondly, to interview such of the Brazilian Government officials who would be concerned with matters connected with immigration; and, thirdly, to make out for the personal information of such officials a short aide-mémoire on the Assyrians.

As regards the press, the commission decided to meet the press if an interview was asked for, but to be very guarded in what they said.

Owing to the carnival, few official contacts could be made until after Wednesday, the 14th February. Arrangements were made, however, by Dr. Sales for such visits as feasible to Government officials, and for the commission to call on the President of Brazil in the near future.

The commission called on the Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce, Dr. Joaquim Pedro Salgada Filho, being met there by Dr. Sales and Sr. Marques of the Labour Ministry; Dr. Piraja, of the Department of Colonisation, was also present.

The matter of the Assyrians was discussed; the characteristics and history of those people explained, and some photographs of them shown to the Minister and interested officials.

A copy of the aide-mémoire was sent to the Ministers.

In the paper of the morning of the 15th February it was reported that the "Friends of Alberto Torres Society" had approached the Minister of Labour to enlist his sympathy against the Assyrian immigration.

The commission, accompanied by Dr. Sales, visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Cavalcanti de Lacerda, and explained all the points about the

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[81 gg—1]

Assyrian people. He was given a copy of the aide-mémoire, and was shown photographs of the people, and seemed well satisfied with the type shown.

On the 16th February the commission were received by Dr. Bandeira de Mello, at one time Brazilian delegate to the League Assembly, and for many years delegate of the Brazilian Government at the International Labour Conference, and now one of the directors of the Ministry of Labour.

The commission also had an interview with Colonel Fonseca, secretary to the President, to ask him to thank the President for his having decided favourably on the Assyrian immigration.

The commission, accompanied by Mr. A. H. M. Thomas, left in the evening for São Paulo, arrived on the morning of the 17th February, and put up at the Esplanada Hotel. Pressmen arrived at once for interviews.

It was known that there was a small Assyrian community in São Paulo, and the commission invited their representatives to a conversation.

Three Assyrians came to the hotel in response to that invitation. One had never been in the Assyrian country; the other two had left their country some four or five years ago, and were owners of small shops in São Paulo.

Two were against their people coming to Brazil, because, to use their own words, "Our people, if they come, will die out as a nation." They could, however, produce no other solution. They seemed to be frightened of the press campaign, and thought that they might suffer if it continued.

It is quite possible that the members of this community may try and persuade their people now in Iraq not to come to Brazil.

From now on the commission began to receive offers from landowners, or their agents.

Although the commission was sent out with the principal object of reporting on the offers of Paraná Plantations (Limited), it considered it impossible to ignore other proposals which might effect economies.

It did not, however, commit itself in any other way. An offer was acknowledged, and the applicant was told that it would be considered, the commission being one of enquiry only, and not empowered to promise or decide anything.

As a matter of fact the majority could be dismissed after a short examination as unsuitable for various obvious reasons.

One question requiring the closest examination in Brazil is that of title deeds, which the commission had neither the means nor the time to examine thoroughly in every case.

To keep in touch with the press agitation while the commission was away in the proposed settlement area, a press-cutting agency was instructed to collect from the papers all references to the Assyrian settlement scheme.

The commission occupied Sunday, the 18th February, in interviews with pressmen and people with land for sale, and left São Paulo at 7 P.M., arriving at Londrina at 5 P.M. on the 19th February, and established headquarters at the Hotel Luxembergo.

Tuesday, the 20th February, was spent in inspecting areas where colonists are already settled, and noting the degree of prosperity which can be reached by a new settler, especially one coming to the country with little or nothing at all.

Hence the extremely well-run places of two or three years' standing were not of such interest to the commission as those which had been in existence for a shorter period, except to show what this land produces in quantity and quality.

The places visited by the commission confirmed substantially the opinion formed by M. Charles Redard, in his report of June 1932 in which he says that "the success of the scheme depends on the colonists themselves," since the country is most favourable to settlers, and the settlement schemes well run.

As a general rule it was found that a colonist taking on a completely new piece of ground should obtain from his own plantings:—

Vegetables in two months.
Beans in two and a half months.
Rice in five months.
Maize in four months.
Manioc in four and a half months.

Taking the average of the settlers, a settler should become self-supporting in eight months, and should pay up all instalments due to the company in five years.

The commission next visited the hospital in Londrina, and saw there Dr. Müller who has medical charge of the area.

Generally the area is healthy, but there is malaria on the larger rivers, such as the Tibagy and Ivahy, and also in Jatahy village.

If an area has malaria, the argument is that the malarial mosquito (anopheles) must be there. If Assyrians who are malarial subjects go to the area and are bitten by that mosquito they will spread the disease.

Dr. Müller explained that there were four cases of malaria in the area; two which had come up from Santa Catharina were cases of relapse; two others had developed in the Londrina area. This indicated the existence of the anopheles mosquito.

However, during the whole of their time in the area, which included seven nights camped in the forest in the rainy season, no single specimen of the anopheles was recognised, although the commission slept without mosquito nets.

The list of diseases in the area was examined and gave quite a favourable impression. As soon as arrangements are made for the Assyrians to come, a small hospital should be established in the area with a doctor in charge. Dressers and orderlies may be available from the old levy personnel of the levy hospital and pack ambulance.

Statistics of the climate and rainfall are attached.(¹) It appeared to the commission that, while there were not the great extremes of heat and cold as in Iraq, there was sufficient change of temperature to make life healthy.

From the rain charts and information gathered later from the water distribution of the country, there is no danger of droughts.

On Wednesday, the 21st February, the commission left Londrina for the area proposed for Assyrian settlement. The first 33 kilom. were done by car, and then 21 kilom. by mule through forest tracks to a camp formed there, taking five and a half hours.

Next day, the 22nd February, they marched again by mule, again through the forest tracks, and reached a camp 13 kilom. inside the area proposed for Assyrian settlement. They did not ride straight to the camp, but made several deviations to points within the area, to try to get views over it in order to form an idea of the country.

After reaching the camp area two more short expeditions were made to points within the area; eight and a half hours being spent in all on these reconnaissances and the march.

The view was very restricted, generally being limited to the next turning in the forest path and a few yards to right and left.

In some places, however, a view of as much as a mile could be obtained, when, on the top of a ridge, the ground fell rapidly. In other places, particularly where there were good streams, the local people, called "caboclos," had cleared areas and planted their own crops, and these areas were continuous in some cases for about half or three-quarters of a mile.

Next day, the 23rd February, the commission went across the area, south of the line already traversed, and 3 to 5 kilom. from it.

They were able to follow tracks cut by the caboclos and their clearings until the eastern edge of the clearing was reached.

From here they followed the track called the Boiadera, along the ~~Assyrian~~ border of the area proposed for Assyrian settlement, as long as time would permit, going south.

They returned to the first camp in the forest, having been out for nine and a half hours and covered 40 kilom., all of which, except 3 kilom., were within the area selected for Assyrian settlement.

Next day, the 24th February, the commission returned to Londrina. They had covered 46½ kilom. within the area designated for the settlement of the Assyrians, without counting ground gone over twice, and had got a certain number of views of the country, and so were able to say that the country seen differed in no way from the areas already settled on in Londrina area, where the results were so good.

There was no difficulty, of course, in forming an opinion on the ground over which the commission had ridden or walked; but, regarding other parts of the area, they had, in the case where only views could be got, to take the experienced opinion of local people who knew the vegetation and what country that vegetation covered.

(¹) Not printed.

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Further information came from reports of survey parties who had been round the edges of the area, or from a hunter who had been into the forest with which the area was covered.

The only other method of examining the area fully would have been to have paths cut through it, taking time and costing money.

Having in view, therefore, that it was necessary to get their preliminary report off without loss of time, the commission carried out the examination as reported above, and, since sending in that report, a second visit, which took them into and beyond the area, confirms the opinion of the commission.

The commission occupied the 25th February in visiting the Japanese settlements, and the 26th and 27th in visiting Italian, German and Polish settlements.

The most interesting points gathered on these visits were the cases which showed how quickly a colonist who comes out and really works can make good.

The most interesting were the two young brothers Ratke, a married couple called Gaiser, and a single man called Fraeger; all of which bore out the above statement and the report of M. Redard of June 1932.

On the morning of the 27th February the commission had a conference at the Luxembergo Hotel, Londrina, and, after a discussion of the *questionnaire*, decided that enough data had been collected to send in a preliminary telegraphic report; the form of the report was decided on and made out.

It was necessary to see the British and Spanish Ambassadors and to inform them of what the commission had done and what it intended to do next before sending the report off.

It had also to be sent in code, for certain reasons.

The commission also wished to consult the British and Spanish Ambassadors about the press campaign and to ask if any counter-propaganda was desirable.

They decided therefore to return to Rio de Janeiro at once and send off the following telegrams:—

(*a*) A preliminary telegram to the League to say they were going to Rio de Janeiro and that the telegraphic report on the work done would be sent from there.

(*b*) To Sr. Cavalcanti de Lacerda to say that the commission was returning to Rio de Janeiro for a few days only and would like an audience with the President.

(*c*) To the Spanish Ambassador the same as above (*b*).

(*d*) The above (*b*) repeated to the British Ambassador.

(*e*) To Dr. Alfonso Bandeiro de Mello, telling him of the proposed arrival of the commission.

Before leaving Londrina the commission inspected the death register; there having been eighty-two deaths since the formation of Londrina. Of these twenty-eight were children, the cause being mainly mal-nutrition.

Certain points as regards the health of the country and division of the land were discussed by the commission with Mr. Thomas.

The advisability of forming a railhead reception camp, to which the Assyrians could go from Jatahy, near the Tibagy River, was discussed, because of the reputation of that river for malaria.

Mr. Thomas pointed out that the camp on top of the hill will put the Assyrians out of reach of malaria.

Still, the commission feel that if the Assyrians can be transported from the region of the Tibagy River without delay it will be better.

Mr. Thomas also suggested a scheme for putting a certain number of families together in the clearings, so that they can look after one another while learning how to fit themselves to go on the land.

Another point brought up by the commission was whether an Assyrian family could be settled on a smaller piece of ground to save expense. Four alqueires was suggested instead of 5.

Mr. Thomas explained that experience showed that the 5 alqueire block~~s~~ was the most convenient minimum.

The system is to let each settler have one side of his frontage on a stream. The general run of the country is in small undulations divided by streams, and the 5-alqueire block fits into the country. Anything smaller would give the settler a long narrow strip, very inconvenient for all reasons.

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The commission left Londrina on the 28th February and reached São Paulo next day.

The commission left that night and arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 2nd March, Friday.

Dr. Cavalcanti de Lacerda, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, met the commission in the Copacabana Palace Hotel.

In his opinion the commission should give some answer to the campaign against the Assyrian settlement, which was continuing in the press and seemed to be unanswered by anyone.

Dr. Sales, the Spanish Ambassador, met the commission at the hotel, and that afternoon the whole commission, accompanied by Dr. Sales, went up to Petropolis to see the British Ambassador.

The proposed telegram from the commission to Geneva was read and, for reasons explained in my confidential letter to the Secretary-General, dated the 3rd March, was sent in code through the British Ambassador.

On Saturday, the 3rd March, the commission, accompanied by Mr. Thomas, interviewed Sr. Ribas, the Interventor of Paraná. He was given a copy of the aide-mémoire.

Two Assyrians, who live in Rio de Janeiro, came in the morning to the commission, very much disturbed at the press campaign.

Both were well-to-do men, who had been away from their country for many years. They did not, however, like the party at São Paulo, protest against the coming of their people to Brazil.

In the evening the commission interviewed one Dr. de Souza Araujo, a medical specialist on leprosy, who, on the strength of having travelled from Basra to Bagdad and thence to Damascus, had written an article to the papers against the immigration of the Assyrians.

It seemed that he drew most of his information from encyclopedias and other works, and has not, as far as the commission could judge, seen the Assyrians in Iraq and knew practically nothing about them.

In the course of conversation with the doctor it seemed very evident to the commission that there is a party formed in Brazil against all Asiatic immigration. It is an unfortunate occurrence that the Assyrians have come into such undue prominence.

He made a very strong point that there should be a most careful examination of the Assyrians by a committee before they came to Brazil. The commission were, of course, unable to commit themselves on this point.

On Monday, the 5th March, the commission visited the office of the Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce, and saw there Dr. Vital and Dr. Pedro Marqués of that Ministry, and Dr. Pirajá, of the Department of Colonisation.

No one seemed very much opposed to the immigration, but no one committed himself to any opinion.

A press correspondent, Mr. Aspinall (Reuter's agent), called and asked several questions about the Assyrians that evening.

On Tuesday, the 6th March, the commission interviewed two of the Paraná Deputies, General Plinio Tourinho and Dr. Machado Lima, and answered questions put to them concerning the Assyrians.

M. Redard went to see the secretary of the Friends of Alberto Torres Society in the afternoon. He found him in a very excited state, and not inclined to listen to anything. This is the society who are very active in all the anti-Assyrian agitation.

The commission left in the evening for São Paulo. Just before leaving, a telegram was put into the room of one of the commission from the Friends of Alberto Torres. It appeared next day in the newspapers.

The attention of the commission was drawn to an announcement in the papers, which appeared among the cuttings, that Dr. Arlindo Carneiro was offering some land for the settlement of the Assyrians north of São Paulo. As this seemed likely to be a saving in expense, the commission have instituted enquiries into the matter.

A further offer of land was received in São Paulo from Sr. Vaz de Oliveira. His offer was received as in other cases, only he was asked to furnish some information in case of its being of use.

The commission left São Paulo that evening, arriving at Londrina on the 8th March; Sr. Rossi, an operator with a filming apparatus, accompanied them this time.

Next day the commission visited the Japanese settlements, the German ones at Heimtal and the Czech and Novo Vlast for filming. That evening came the cable from the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq from Geneva, asking for the supplementary report. This was made out next day and sent off later by air mail.

On Sunday, the 11th March, the commission left Londrina to inspect another area, 18 kilom. from the first one seen, for the purpose of settling the Assyrians.

Mr. Thomas had already had cutting parties out to enable the commission to penetrate into the area as far as possible.

The commission arrived in the middle of the first area, 69 kilom. from Londrina, on the evening of the 11th March, and spent the next day, the 12th March, in a reconnaissance into the new area.

They divided into two parties for the purpose and were out for eleven and a half hours. Having seen what could be seen by means of new-cut tracks, and by getting views over it from several points, the commission were able to say with practical certainty that the area was similar in all respects to the first one, the area already colonised.

Films of the area for Assyrian settlement were taken, as well as views on the road and in the forest.

On Tuesday, the 13th March, the commission returned to Londrina.

The 14th was occupied in filming certain of the settled areas near Londrina and on the railway, which is rapidly approaching that place.

On the 15th March the commission left Londrina, arriving at São Paulo on the 16th.

The supplementary report was sent off, with copy of a preliminary report by Mr. Johnson to the Nansen Office, on the technical, administrative and financial aspects of the proposed settlement scheme attached to it. A copy of his full report forms Appendix X.[1]

By request of the British Ambassador copies of the supplementary report were sent to him and to the Spanish Ambassador.

The commission left the same evening for Jangada, the settlement of Paraná Plantations (Limited), in North-West São Paulo, and arrived at Biriguy next afternoon, the 17th March.

They went at once to Guatambú and inspected the lands of the Paraná Plantations (Limited) there. Here ~~are~~ there is room for 375 families. The commission returned to Biriguy that night.

The next day, the 18th March, the commission inspected the area proposed for Assyrian settlement in Jangada, going by car as far as the Rio Feio, which forms the southern boundary of the area. This area consists of 7,000 alqueires of land.

On Monday, the 19th March, the commission left Biriguy, arriving at São Paulo on Tuesday, the 20th March.

The 21st and the 22nd March were spent in going over the work done, and making a comparison of the Londrina and Jangada areas.

The commission decided to recommend that the position of the two areas of settlement should be in the lands held by the Paraná Plantations (Limited), near Londrina, and a telegram was drafted on those lines and sent through the British consul-general at São Paulo.

On the 23rd March the commission visited Santos with the object of looking at the place where the Assyrian immigrants ~~will~~ would land and be entrained. They returned that evening to São Paulo.

On the 24th March the commission inspected the title-deeds of the Paraná Plantations (Limited), which Mr. Thomas kindly produced at their request, and all was found in order so far as the Commission could judge.

On the 26th March they left São Paulo, arriving at Rio de Janeiro next day. This completed the work of the commission for which they were sent out.

Conclusions of the Commission.

In coming to their conclusions the commission followed closely the points in the *questionnaire*, and from what they have seen their opinion is as follows:—

I.—*Climate.*

Temperature (*a*) (*b*).—That the temperature, while not running to violent extremes as in Iraq to which the Assyrians are accustomed, yet has a sufficient variation to be healthy.

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[1] Not printed.

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Rainfall.—That the rainfall is more than in Iraq, and ensures that there are no droughts.

II.—*Cultivation* (details in Appendix IV(¹)).

That the crops most easily cultivated in Paraná can be cultivated by the Assyrians.

III.—*Cattle and Sheep Raising and Pig Breeding.*

That a certain number of Assyrians have experience of cattle raising.

That practically the whole of the nation are well acquainted with sheep and goat raising.

That, so far in Londrina area, sheep raising has only been tried to a limited extent; but that goats are plentiful and do well.

That the Assyrians should find no difficulty in pig breeding.

IV.—*Agricultural Settlement Conditions.*

(1) That it is quite possible to start with village centres. This applies especially to the area in which the Patriarch will be located.

(2) That 5 alqueires per family are sufficient in the first instance. Settlers, as they become more efficient and affluent, may extend their area. Any smaller amount than 5 alqueires, in the first instance, is not advisable.

(3) That a settler who already works should become self-supporting on his land in eight months.

That he should be able to pay off his instalments, and become self-supporting in five years; but for the Assyrians this should be extended to eight years, and, if transport included, eventually twelve years (see preliminary report, paragraph 6 (*b*) and II).

(4) This is quite possible. Report in full at the end of this report.

V.—*Other Occupations.*

That the first endeavour will be to put settlers on the land irrespective of abilities in other directions.

That they will first be occupied in gangs under instructors in clearing, road-making, house building and planting.

That when on their own land an instructional labourer will go round and show them the use of machinery, how to situate farm buildings and how to deal with water.

(NOTE.—The latter is probably not necessary for the Assyrians.)

That then outside employment will take place as men show themselves adapted for it, or as they have leisure to do it.

VI.—*Food.*

That until the Assyrians are getting food from their own lands their food requirements will be supplied by the Nansen Office and can be satisfied at reasonable prices.

VII.—*Medical Attention.*

That satisfactory arrangements for medical attention can be made.

That the general health throughout the area is satisfactory.

VIII.—*Religion.*

That there is complete religious freedom throughout the country.

IX.—*Schools.*

That Assyrian schools should be established in the area, under arrangements between the Nansen Office and the Patriarch.

(¹) Not printed.

That Portuguese must be taught in those schools.

The commission went carefully into the matter of paragraph IV (4).

Bearing in mind the differences which at present separate the Assyrians, the commission investigated the means of settlement, which gave three possibilities :—

(1) If it is decided to settle the Assyrians in one block, they can be settled in the first area inspected, 66 kilom. south-west of Londrina.

(2) If it is decided to settle them in two parties (for reasons given in confidential supplement to this report), then one party, preferably that which follows the Patriarch, should be settled in the first area, 66 kilom. south-west of Londrina, and the other either—

(*a*) Also in the area south-west of Londrina, but 18 kilom. further west than the first party, and separated by 18 kilom. of virgin forest; or

(*b*) In the lands held by Paraná Plantations, called Jangada, 250 kilom. in a straight line north of the first party, or four days by rail and road.

Having carefully considered all these points the commission came to these conclusions—

(*a*) That the differences of opinion which at present divide the Assyrians into two parties while in Iraq will tend to disappear once they leave the country. They may not vanish at once, of course, but will in time. Then the people will naturally come together.

(*b*) That, even though one party disagrees with the present policy of the Patriarch, they have never abjured him as head of their people.

(*c*) That the Londrina settlement area is on the whole a better settlement area than the Jangada area.

(*d*) That the expense of settling the Assyrians in the Londrina and Jangada areas will be much more than a settlement in one area only.

Therefore the commission are of the opinion that the settlement should be in two parties in the area south of Londrina, separated by the 18 kilom. of forest.

J. GILBERT BROWNE, *Brigadier-General.*
CHS. REDARD.
T. F. JOHNSON.

(Confidential.)

Addenda to the Report of the Commission.

In making the first telegraphic report on their return to Rio de Janeiro the commission decided that this report should be sent in code for two reasons :—

(*a*) The press campaign was very violent against the settlement, and part of the reason of this campaign was to attack the Government in some way—and this was one.

Therefore, if sent in any way except code, it might accentuate the press campaign and embarrass the President and the Brazilian Government.

(*b*) If the commission reported personally on the possibilities of settlement and the Brazilian Government then decided it would not accept the Assyrians, the commission felt this might be derogatory to the League of Nations.

2. The reason for the visit to Santos of the commission was partly due to the suggestion that there might be a demonstration against the Assyrians on arrival there, and to see how trouble could be avoided.

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3. The reports from Iraq are that there is a very definite cleavage between the Assyrians. There are two parties—

(*a*) Those who follow the Patriarch Mar Shimum implicitly, and
(*b*) Those who, while still venerating him as Patriarch and head of their people, do not agree with his policy.

The differences between the two parties in paragraph (*b*) are whether the Assyrians shall accept the settlement policy of the Iraq Government or not; the Patriarch and those who follow him having set their faces definitely against it, while the other party propose to accept it. In addition there is a certain tribal jealousy which has been present for a very long time.

J. GILBERT BROWNE, *Brigadier-General.*
CHS. REDARD.
T. F. JOHNSON.

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~~Mr~~ t.
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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 2609/11/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3200
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
11 May, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

P.Z. 3197
Mr B 15/5

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva No 30 of Apl 10.	Assyrian settlement
League of Nations C. Min Ass. 31 12 Apl.	

MAILS BRANCH
12 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 20 17 MAY. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
C.O.
Treas.

14—6130 9785 (2)

lo S.C. of L/N Min. d 12/4/34.

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1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

April 13, 1934.

SECTION 1.

[E 2306/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to the Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 30.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a record of the twenty-first meeting of the Council Committee, on the 9th April, 1934, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, April 10, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twenty-first Meeting of the Council Committee held on April 9, 1934, *at* 10·30 A.M.

THE PRESIDENT first drew attention to the telegram of the 29th March from the Spanish Ambassador, which had already been circulated (Annex A[1]), and in view of which he had taken the responsibility of authorising the return of the mission from Brazil on the 7th April. Since then he had discussed with the League Secretariat and with the United Kingdom representative what procedure could now most advantageously be followed. He had come to the conclusion that the committee might, in the first place, usefully employ some time in giving satisfaction to the request which the Iraqi representative had made at the last meeting of the committee, in connexion with the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq pending emigration. The Iraqi representative had suggested a message from the committee to the Assyrians. It was difficult for the committee to issue such a message direct, but there seemed no reason why it should not transmit a message to the Iraqi Government for the latter to communicate to the Assyrians. A draft of a letter to the Iraqi representative on these lines had now been drawn up. The president proposed that the present meeting should be devoted to the examination of this draft and to the examination of various reports received from the Iraqi Government regarding the local situation. The Iraqi representative had been invited to join the committee at midday, with Major Thomson, and it would then be possible to discuss with him the proposed message to the Assyrians and any question arising out of the Iraqi Government's reports. The question of the next step in Brazil also remained for consideration, but the president proposed that this should be left to be dealt with at a meeting in the same afternoon.

A draft letter to the Iraqi representative and a draft message to the Assyrians were then circulated (Annex B[1]).

The Danish Representative criticised the reference in the first paragraph of the draft letter to the "political side" of the question. It was agreed to substitute the words "many important aspects."

The Danish representative further questioned the advisability of the reference in the second paragraph to the engagements assumed by the Iraqi Government *vis-à-vis* of the League. He did not desire to dispute that the Iraqi Government were under a definite obligation to the League, but he thought that the phrasing was not best calculated to ensure the willing co-operation of the Iraqi Government. It was the kind of phrase which might be used if one had reason to believe that the Government concerned were trying to evade their obligations.

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[1] Not printed.

but credit must be given to the Iraqi Government for having done their best to keep the peace.

The President said that he was to some extent in agreement with the Danish representative, as he did not wish to give any offence to the Iraqi Government. At the same time, he thought it was not out of place to call their attention to engagements which they had taken.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it was possible to lay greater emphasis on the responsibility of the Iraqi Government without using the phrase to which the Danish representative had raised objection, by inverting the order of the draft. Most of the second paragraph might be deleted and a further paragraph added instead at the end of the draft, to the effect that the committee wished to point out that the extent to which the Assyrians would be likely to follow the advice contained in the proposed message would depend chiefly on the measures taken by the Iraqi Government themselves to ensure their security; and that the committee, in authorising the communication of the message, relied implicitly upon the Iraqi Government to take all the necessary steps for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians and for the maintenance of stability and order in the areas where they might reside, until emigration should be possible.

This suggestion was adopted, and the committee proceeded to consider the terms of the message to the Assyrians.

The Danish Representative suggested an addition to the last paragraph to the effect that, by carrying on their normal life, the Assyrians would not only not be penalised, but would give evidence of their suitability as settlers in the country which might eventually accept them. With this, and one or two formal amendments, the draft message was accepted.

The United Kingdom Representative raised the question whether, when the Iraqi representative appeared at the meeting, the text of the message was to be given to him as something which had already been decided by the committee or as a draft to be considered with him.

It was agreed that the text should be given to the Iraqi representative as a draft and that he should be invited to offer observations on it.

The Danish Representative asked whether it was also proposed to discuss in the same way with the Iraqi representative the terms of the letter to be addressed to him.

It was agreed that this was unnecessary and might only give the Iraqi representative opportunity to make embarrassing objections, whereas the committee was perfectly free to send the Iraqi representative a letter in such terms as it might think fit. It was agreed, however, that the president, in presenting the text of the message to the Iraqi representative, should accompany it with an oral explanation which would, in fact, express the substance of the proposed letter.

The committee then considered Documents C.Min.Ass./22, 23 and 27. It was agreed that it would be useful to put one or two questions to the Iraqi representative on these documents, if only to show that the committee attached importance to them, and scrutinised them closely, and it was decided, in particular, to ask for more precise information regarding the reconstruction of the villages which had been partially or wholly destroyed during the events of last summer, and regarding the expenses incurred in connexion with the refugee camp at Mosul, since, according to the Iraqi reports, these expenses appeared to fluctuate in a manner which was difficult to understand.

At noon the Iraqi representative, accompanied by Major Thomson, entered the meeting.

The President informed him that the committee had attentively examined the reports regarding the local situation in Iraq which he had addressed to it since the last session of the committee in January. There were one or two points on which the committee would be glad of further information. In report (*c*), circulated in C.Min.Ass./22, the statement was made that all villages which were destroyed, wholly or partly, prior to December 1933 had been repaired. The committee would be glad to know whether this referred, in fact, to all the villages

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which had been occupied by the Assyrians prior to the events of last summer, or whether it only referred to those villages to which the Assyrians had since returned. It was important for the committee to know whether the villages to which no Assyrians had yet returned had also been repaired and whether, therefore, the Assyrians could reasonably be expected to go back there.

The Iraqi Representative said that the reports which he had passed on to the committee represented the substance of information which he had received from time to time from the Iraqi Government. He assumed that this particular statement was to be taken literally, *i.e.*, that it referred to all the villages occupied by Assyrians prior to the events of last summer. He was, however, not absolutely certain on the point.

The President said that the committee would be glad if details could be obtained.

The Iraqi Representative drew attention to the fact that in report (*c*) in C.Min.Ass./27, which was dated February, it was again stated that all the destroyed houses were then being reconstructed. He took this as confirmation of the earlier statement, but he would, of course, try to obtain full information. He stated that he himself had visited a large number of villages before coming to Geneva. Some of them were quite small, consisting perhaps of only half a dozen houses, and many of these small villages had been entirely abandoned by the Assyrians. He was not in a position to say categorically that such villages had been reconstructed.

The President said that the committee had also noticed from the reports before them that the Iraqi Government had spent on the feeding of the Assyrians in the Mosul camp £1,809 in December, £1,458 in January, and only £851 in February. It would interest the committee to know what was the reason for this very marked diminution. Did it involve any alteration of the arrangements or of the numbers of the Assyrians in the camp?

The Iraqi Representative suggested that Major Thomson might be able to throw some light on these figures.

Major Thomson said that one item by which expenses had been reduced during his absence related to the use of a car which he had for visiting Assyrian villages. In December the cost of transport had probably been rather high, as Major Wilson and himself had been touring the country in order to give effect to the committee's resolution of the 31st October by explaining the situation to the Assyrians. Moreover, a number of hired tents had been replaced by much better Government tents, and this involved a further reduction of expenditure of about £100 a month. He assumed that these and other items must have been debited to "feeding the Assyrians," for the actual cost of feeding came to nothing like the figures mentioned in the reports. He thought that the gradual reduction in those figures must be due to the diminution or disappearance of outside expenses connected with the camp, and he did not think that it implied any reduction of the money actually spent on the refugees or in the number of the refugees.

The President, after thanking Major Thomson for this explanation, reminded the Iraqi representative that, at the last meeting which he had attended, the committee had considered the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq during the interval which must elapse before emigration could take place. The committee had taken note of Taufiq Beg's suggestion that the committee might help the Iraqi Government by issuing a message to the Assyrians. An attempt had been made to give effect to this suggestion, and a text was about to be distributed. The committee had thought it well to discuss this text with the Iraqi representative, as, in the light of his knowledge of Assyrian mentality, he would be able to advise on the suitability of the message and perhaps to suggest modifications. The President wished to emphasise, however, on behalf of the committee, that the success of the action contemplated would depend chiefly on the measures taken by the Iraqi Government to ensure the security of the Assyrians. It was proposed to send the message, when approved, in a note to the Iraqi representative, pointing out that the committee could not very well

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address the Assyrians direct, but that it authorised the Iraqi Government to communicate the message to them as embodying the committee's views. In authorising the communication of the message, however, the committee relied implicitly on the Iraqi Government to take all possible measures for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians, and for the maintenance of stability and order in the areas where they resided until settlement took place.

The draft message was then distributed.

The Iraqi Representative, after examining it with Major Thomson, said that the latter, who was well acquainted with the psychology of the Assyrians, thought that the message covered all the points which it was necessary to put to the Assyrians and should have a useful effect. The Iraqi representative, therefore, agreed to the message, which the Iraqi Government would probably communicate to the Assyrians through the local committee presided over by Major Thomson.

The President said that, as regards procedure, the committee would, of course, leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Iraqi Government.

The president then asked the Iraqi representative whether he, on his side, wished to raise any questions.

The Iraqi Representative said that at the present stage, when matters seemed to be held up by events in Brazil, he had little to say. The Iraqi Government had done everything and were doing everything possible to facilitate the committee's difficult task, and he hoped that this was realised by the committee. Major Thomson was returning that day to Iraq, and he might possibly be able to offer some useful observations about the future. As for the Iraqi Government, they would continue the measures already taken for the security of the Assyrians. This had, in fact, always been assured since the events of last summer. As regards the refugee camp in Mosul, this would be directed in the same way as heretofore, so long as the Brazilian scheme was under discussion. He wished, however, to reserve the right, if the Brazilian scheme broke down, perhaps to make proposals to the committee about the future of the camp. He felt that the question was one which would have to be brought before the committee and fully considered in the eventuality which he contemplated.

The President observed that the Iraqi representative had referred to "events" in Brazil. To remove any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that there had been no "events" there; difficulties had simply arisen owing to opposition, in the press and in certain circles, to Assyrian immigration. But the committee could not work on the assumption that the Brazilian scheme was going to break down. There was no reason to assume this. Of course, if it did unfortunately break down, the whole situation would naturally have to be reconsidered.

At the request of the Iraqi representative, *Major Thomson* then made certain observations. He stressed the importance of the issue by the committee when the time came of a statement in the clearest and simplest language, setting out the conditions of Assyrian emigration. He thought the statement should, in particular, deal with the following points:—

(1) Nationality.
(2) The fact that land would have to be paid for by the emigrants, either at once or by instalments.
(3) The fact that those paying at once would obtain their land freehold, and might have other preferential treatment.
(4) Freedom of religion.
(5) The language question.
(6) Schools.
(7) Civil rights.

Major Thomson also drew attention to the existence of two definite parties among the Assyrians: those who wished to follow the Mar Shimun, and those who wished to be settled outside his sphere of influence. This was a matter of great importance, and Major Thomson emphasised the necessity of taking it into account when the moment came for the transfer of the Assyrians from Iraq to their new home.

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The Danish Representative said that the question of the Mar Shimun and his influence was a very difficult one. He thought that no impression should be created among the Assyrians at the present time that two settlements would be provided in Brazil. There were many difficulties involved.

General agreement was expressed with this view.

The President then asked the Iraqi delegation to be particularly careful not to give out information to the press on the Assyrian question. The committee was itself exercising the greatest care on this point, as the situation in Brazil was difficult and press messages had reached Brazil which had tended to increase the difficulty.

On the suggestion of the *Danish Representative*, it was agreed that, before Major Thomson left for Iraq, he should see the acting secretary-general of the Nansen Office to discuss as far as possible the details of transport, &c., which would arise when emigration took place.

The Iraqi Representative then returned to the question of the twofold settlement of the Assyrians. He said that the Iraqi Government considered a double settlement absolutely necessary. They had at first contemplated that one batch of Assyrians would be settled in one country and a second batch in another. It was admittedly a question of the future, but it was a point which would greatly influence the decision of the Assyrians as to whether or not they should leave Iraq. If they knew they were to be settled in a place under the influence of the Mar Shimun, a great many would not go. It was, in his view, a question of capital importance to tell the Assyrians whether two settlements would be possible or not.

The President said that the question would certainly have to be considered, but it did not arise immediately.

The Mexican Representative asked Major Thomson whether he thought that the Assyrians would be prepared to accept Brazilian nationality.

Major Thomson said that this was a most difficult question, on which he hesitated to express an opinion. They had not been willing to accept Iraqi nationality, and a large number had taken no steps to do so. But if the assumption of Brazilian nationality was a part of the entire scheme and, so to speak, a condition of immigration, he saw no reason why it should prove an obstacle.

A copy of the message to the Assyrians as agreed upon at this meeting, together with a copy of the note in which it was subsequently sent to the Iraqi representative, is attached (see Annex C).

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Annexes A and B to Enclosure not printed.

Annex C to Enclosure.

President of Assyrian Committee to Iraqi Permanent Delegate.

Geneva, April 9, 1934.

Sir,

YOU will recall that at a meeting of the committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq on the 27th March last I explained to you, in my capacity as president, that, although the committee has now every reason to believe that the area in Parana where it is suggested that the Assyrians should be settled is suitable for the purpose, many important aspects of the question remain to be adjusted, and the difficulties involved render it inevitable that some delay must elapse before a satisfactory solution can be expected.

The committee is naturally anxious to ensure that no ill results should follow from this delay. At the above-mentioned meeting, at which I enquired of you what measures the Iraqi Government contemplated to this end, you intimated that it would greatly assist your Government if the committee could make it

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known that, in its view, the Assyrians ought, pending emigration, to pursue their normal life and, in particular, to proceed with the cultivation of their lands.

The committee is most ready to do what it can to collaborate in this way. As the Assyrians are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Iraqi Government, the committee is scarcely in a position to address a direct message to them. With a view to assisting the Iraqi Government, however, it has drawn up the attached message, which it gladly authorises the Iraqi Government to communicate to the Assyrians as an expression of its views.

At the same time I desire to point out that the measure in which the Assyrians are likely to respond to the committee's advice will chiefly depend on the steps taken by the Iraqi Government to ensure their security. In authorising the communication of the enclosed message, therefore, the committee relies implicitly upon the Iraqi Government to take all possible measures for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians and for the maintenance of stability and order in the areas where they may reside until emigration shall be possible.

I have, &c.
LÓPEZ OLIVAN,
President of the Committee.

Message to the Assyrians.

The committee appointed by the League of Nations for the resettlement of those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq is making every effort to find a suitable home for them outside that country. But the Assyrians must remember that the problem is an exceedingly intricate one and that there are many difficulties to be overcome. Therefore, the finding of a solution which will be acceptable to those concerned may still take some considerable time.

Meanwhile, the committee wishes to emphasise most strongly the necessity of the Assyrians in Iraq being patient, and at the same time pursuing their normal methods of life, cultivating their farms, shepherding their flocks, &c.

They should not dispose of their household goods, crops or flocks until the question of their future home has been finally decided on, and they are told to do so by the local committee under Major Thomson's presidency, or by the representative of the Nansen Office who is in due course to join that committee.

The Assyrians must understand that the fact of their cultivating, shepherding and earning a livelihood will not only in no way be considered by the League Committee as an objection to their emigrating from Iraq, should they wish to do so when the time comes, but will, furthermore, together with their generally leading a normal and law-abiding life, be good evidence of their suitability as settlers in the country that may eventually accept them as immigrants.

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1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the
Members of the Committee
for the settlement of
the Assyrians of Iraq

C.Min/Ass/31

Geneva, April 12th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the members of the Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter dated April 11th, 1934 addressed to the President of the Committee by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, April 11th, 1934.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated April 9th, enclosing a message to the Assyrians, for which I thank you.

I have communicated to my Government the contents of the above mentioned letter as well as the text of the message, and I hope that its communication to the Assyrians will have a favourable effect by encouraging them to pursue their normal life and to proceed with the cultivation of their lands till the question of their emigration is definitely settled.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(signed) T. SWAIDY

Head of the Permanent Delegation.

INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 2049/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
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1934

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India
~~R.R.C~~
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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
11 May, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

pp. 3142
Mr. Lely's

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations comm^d.	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN [illegible]
No. 20 17 MAY. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECd. POL. DEPT.
12 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Iraq
A.M.
C.O.
D.O.
W.O.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

April 3, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 2049/1/93]

No. 1.

Brigadier-General Browne to President, Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 3.)

Sir,

Londrina, March 10, 1934.

IN conformity with your telegram received through the British consul-general at São Paulo on the 9th March, I have the honour to transmit herewith a supplementary report on the proposed settlement of the Assyrians in Paraná. This report is in two parts, one for publication and the other of a confidential character on points to which it would seem desirable to direct the attention of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.

I have, &c.

J. GILBERT BROWNE,

Brigadier-General.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Report by Brigadier-General Browne on the Settlement of Assyrians on the Lands in Paraná of Paraná Plantations (Limited).

Geneva, March 26, 1934.

Introduction.

THE Council of the League, at its meeting on the 19th January, 1934, adopted the report of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, dated the 10th January, 1934 (document C.69.1934.VII), concerning proposals made by the Nansen International Office for Refugees for the settlement of those Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq.

In that report the committee expressed the opinion that it considered it essential to satisfy itself that the lands selected would meet the special needs of the Assyrian population by means of a local investigation carried out by someone with a thorough knowledge of the requirements and peculiarities of the population in question, and decided to entrust me with the task, assisted by M. Charles Redard, counsellor of the Swiss Legation, Rio de Janeiro, and Mr. T. F. Johnson, Secretary-General of the Nansen International Office for Refugees.

The committee requested this commission to proceed to Paraná as soon as possible, and to submit a preliminary report to the committee by telegram, based on the following *questionnaire* (see Annex I)(¹):—

General Browne and Mr. Johnson sailed for Brazil on the 27th January, and arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 12th February, where they were joined by M. Redard.

The commission got into touch immediately with Sir William Seeds, K.C.M.G., the British Ambassador, and with Dr. Vicente Sales, the Spanish Ambassador, who had already assisted the League in its negotiations with the Brazilian Government.

As soon as the holidays connected with the carnival would permit, the commission established contact with the presidency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Labour, and left Rio de Janeiro on the 16th February for Londrina, the headquarters in Paraná of the Paraná Plantations, which it reached on the 19th February.

(¹) Not printed.

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Accompanied by Mr. Thomas, the director of the company, the commission spent a day on a preliminary inspection of the settlements in the neighbourhood of Londrina. Among others, it had long interviews with German and Japanese settlers, most of whom had begun settlement under financial conditions definitely inferior to those contemplated for the Assyrians. In each case the commission satisfied itself that the settlers had not only succeeded in becoming self-supporting within about eight months of their arrival, but that those who ha shown moderate initiative and energy, had achieved a modest degree of prosperity.

The commission arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the Assyrians, given the necessary goodwill, could be satisfactorily settled in the region of Londrina. The next step was for the commission to satisfy itself that the conditions obtaining in the area proposed for the settlement of the Assyrians were, *grosso modo*, similar to those obtaining in the Londrina region.

The commission therefore proceeded to the proposed area on the 21st February. The first 36 kilom. of the journey were accomplished by motor car, over the company's existing road and over a new road in course of construction by the company. The remaining 33 kilom. were covered on mule-back through forest tracks, and involved seven and a quarter hours' actual riding, one night being spent in a temporary forest camp established by the company. In addition, a deviation was made to inspect certain regions in the northern part of the proposed settlement area.

The two next days were spent in the proposed area, and 64 kilom. on mule-back were covered by the commission in various directions over the northern part of the area. This was as much as the existing forest tracks would permit.

Various views were, however, obtained of other parts of the area, and information supplied by the company's survey parties and a local hunter, who stated that he had traversed the whole area, justified the commission in arriving at the reasonable assumption that the whole of the proposed area was, in all respects, similar to the Londrina region. In all, during its first inspection of the proposed Assyrian area, the commission travelled 170 kilom. on mule-back.

On its return to Londrina the commission spent three days in inspecting German, Italian and Polish settlements in New Danzig and Roland, where, in the light of its inspection of the proposed Assyrian area, it was able to confirm its first impression that the company's lands were suitable in all respects for Assyrian settlement.

Equipped with this knowledge, the commission drafted its telegraphic report, which it transmitted from Rio de Janeiro on the 3rd March, with the approval of the British and Spanish Ambassadors. The relevant part of that report was as follows :—

> "Commission examined area proposed for Assyrian settlement as thoroughly as time at disposal permitted, traversing distance of 64 kilom. along and within northern part of the area. All ground and conditions seen well fitted for Assyrian settlement, and soil of similar quality to that seen in cultivation in about 2,000 hectares of company's territory. Part of area not seen is virgin forest, and only penetrable with help of parties to cut tracks, who must be paid and two weeks extra required. But information from hunter who has been in area, and according to conclusions drawn by company's survey parties who have been on edge of area as well as from such limited views as commission could obtain, indicated ground to be of similar quality to that already seen."

In conformity with the request of the Assyrian committee, Mr. Johnson is submitting a short preliminary report to the Nansen Office on certain technical and financial aspects of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians, with particular reference to *Questionnaire* No. 2(2), considered by the Assyrian Committee on the 19th January. A copy of that report is annexed.

J. GILBERT BROWNE,
Brigadier-General.

CHS. REDARD.
T. F. JOHNSON.

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(2) January 23, 1934, Section 3 (Annex I).

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Note by Brigadier-General Browne.

1. I think the Assyrians should have explained to them that the country they are going to has a climate which does not run to the violent extremes of heat and cold like Iraq. There is a fairly hot summer, and in winter it is often just freezing.

There is plenty of rain in the wet season and no danger of droughts.

The country is well watered, and the water is good and plentiful. There are few inhabitants of the country, and these are quiet and peaceful people, who will keep out of the Assyrians' way at first. Later they may trade with them in a small way.

The land which they go on will have a motor road into it, and very soon the railway will run down to it, so that the land will become more valuable and marketing easy.

There are no plagues in the country, such as the locusts of Iraq.

2. The Assyrians should understand that the country they are going to is, in appearance, quite unlike anything they know, being enormous forests of very thick growth.

This requires clearing, and they should not attempt to do this without help and supervision in the first place, because they will only lose very valuable timber trees, which will bring them in money, but also they will be liable to have accidents.

The land, once cleared, is most wonderfully fertile, and will grow anything which the Assyrians are accustomed to grow.

3. The staple food of the Assyrians is rice in Iraq. This is grown there in water, and is one of the worst causes of the breeding of the Anopheles mosquito, causing malaria.

Here the rice is grown on dry land, and is of excellent quality, and grows thicker and more luxuriantly than that grown in Iraq.

There may be some difficulty at first in getting the Assyrians to take to maize, rye and manioc, instead of barley and wheat, which they use so much in Iraq. I think it may be necessary at first to purchase barley and wheat for them, and let them attempt to grow the crops to which they are accustomed until they get used to using the other more easily grown food crops.

I see a difficulty about tea, if it cannot be provided, not only because it is their habitual beverage, but especially because they are limited to tea and bread only during their fasts of Advent and Lent. Possibly Yerba Mate tea might be accepted as a substitute if the Mar Shimun will give his orders on this matter.

4. Sheep-raising, which is essentially one of the Assyrian activities, is not so developed here, and probably will not be for some years, *i.e.*, until there are large areas of pasture. On the other hand, the climate is quite fit for sheep.

There are, however, goats, pigs and cattle here, which are a most successful industry. The Assyrians have large flocks of goats in Iraq, and some have a knowledge of cattle. Pig-breeding will be new to them, but they should take to this without difficulty.

5. Paraná Plantations have settled on the area of land for settlers at 5 alqueries per family (1 alquerie = 6 acres). This is based on experience. This will be ample for each Assyrian family at the start. I find that in the settlements already established that most settlers have so far only cleared and cultivated, on an average, about half the area of 5 alqueries allotted to them.

6. I find on going round the settlements that—

(*a*) A family of settlers averaging five, who really set to work, can be in a position to live on the produce of their land in eight months.

(*b*) That, on an average, a settler can pay up the money due on his land and become the owner of it in four years. In view of the fact that it is proposed that the Assyrians should be advanced the cost of their initial settlement, which will amount to approximately the same cost as the land, I advise that the period of reimbursement should be extended a further four years. As the Assyrian is keen on owning land for himself, I see no reason why he should fall behind these periods.

These reimbursements might be effected through the intermediary of Mar Shimun and the village leaders. Administration of the settlements could also be effected in the same manner.

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7. The Assyrians are accustomed to medical attention, especially the large number who have served in the levies, and for their dependants. Others would come to the Government district medical officers, or, where levy camps were established, or levy columns were moving, many of the civilian population would come in for advice and treatment from the levy medical officers.

There will be a medical centre established in the colony to which the settlers can go, and it should reassure the Assyrians that they will get medical treatment close at hand in the place they are going to.

8. The Assyrians should have it thoroughly explained to them that there will be no interference with their religion, especially since they are Christians. I found some of the ill-informed criticism was that they were Moslems, and I have endeavoured to remove this idea in interviews and in other ways.

9. It will be most necessary for the Assyrian schools to start classes for learning Portuguese. This will be absolutely indispensable, and I strongly advise that their school-teachers take in hand learning the language now in order to lose no time. This should present no difficulty to people who have in the past mastered up to five languages.

10. Irrigation for crops and the making of mill streams for working crushing machinery is essential, and the streams give every facility for so doing. The Assyrians are expert at this kind of work.

11. There is no malaria in the area where it is proposed to put the Assyrians, nor is the Anopheles mosquito there. Therefore, in about four years all who have the germ should lose it.

12. Finally, this whole area is not only capable of development, but is rapidly developing, and it seems to me that the Assyrians, with the qualities they have, will fit in with and help extensively in the development of this country.

J. GILBERT BROWNE, *Brigadier-General.*

Preliminary report by T. F. Johnson, Secretary-General of the Nansen Office for Refugees, on the Financial and Technical Aspects of the proposals for the Settlement of two Groups of 10,000 *and* 5,000 *Assyrians on the lands of Paraná Plantations (Limited), in North Paraná.*

I.—*Introduction.*

In compliance with the request made by the Assyrian Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, at its meeting on the 19th January, I have the honour to submit a preliminary report on certain financial and technical aspects of the proposals for the settlement of two groups of 10,000 and 5,000 Assyrians on the lands of Paraná Plantations (Limited) in North Paraná.

A similar report on alternative proposals for the settlement of the 5,000 Assyrians on lands owned by the company in the State of São Paulo will be submitted after the inspection of those lands.

This report is based in general on the preliminary offer made by the company and contained in document P.8.1933 (*a*); the revised offers contained in my record of conversations with General Asquith, of the 9th November, 1933, and in his letter of the 13th November (document C. Min. Ass. 13), and in his subsequent letter of the 30th November (document C. Min. Ass. 14). Detailed comments on the various statements contained in those documents concerning the general conditions obtaining in the company's properties will be made in my main report, but for the purposes of this preliminary report it may be assumed that the statements in question have been found to be substantially accurate. It might perhaps be mentioned in this connexion, however, that during several days spent in North Paraná, at a time usually regarded as the hottest period of the year, a higher temperature than 32 degrees centigrade was not experienced. On the other hand, the statement made in document P.8.1933 (*a*) concerning the complete absence of malaria in the company's territory now requires modification in view of the recent appearance of four cases of this illness. Otherwise the population of the area appears to be singularly free from serious infectious diseases and the general health good.

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II.—*Possibilities of Successful Settlement.*

Detailed investigation of the experiences of Austrian, German, Japanese and Polish settlers, whose periods of occupation of their lands in North Paraná varied from eight months to three years, points to the conclusion that, given even a moderate display of goodwill, initiative and energy, the Assyrians should become successful settlers in North Paraná; should reach the self-supporting stage well within the period of nine months contemplated for their support; be able to repay the advances made for their settlement within eight years; and repay the expenses of their transport within a period of a further four years. The fact that settlers without previous agricultural experience, and notably two German brothers of 21 and 20 years of age, one a sailor and the other a bank clerk, have become self-supporting within nine months under financial conditions certainly not superior to those contemplated for the Assyrians, justifies the expectation that even the able-bodied non-agricultural Assyrians should become successful settlers under the proposed settlement scheme. To ensure, however, the successful settlement of the able-bodied non-agricultural categories, and to meet the stipulation concerning their reception made by the Brazilian Government, it would be a wise precaution to arrange that such Assyrians should serve a reasonable apprenticeship with Assyrian agricultural families in Paraná before they are definitely allotted their own lands.

As regards the prospects of the Assyrians once they have become self-supporting, enquiries regarding marketing possibilities at São Paulo, the nearest large population centre, indicate that, after taking into consideration freight charges, their surplus produce should provide them with more than sufficient funds not only to repay the advances made to them, but leave a margin for their economic development.

III.—*Finance and Administration.*

(*a*) *General.*—There are three alternative methods of administering the settlement scheme :—

(1) By means of a contract with the company for the lump sum of £194,000 (or £204,078) mentioned in the company's revised offer (document C. Min. Ass. 13).

(2) By purchase of the necessary land from the company for £65,000, and the company acting as the agents of the Nansen Office for the settlement work (see alternative offer made by General Asquith in the same document).

(3) By the Nansen Office on the lines it has adopted for the settlement of the Armenian refugees in Syria.

The following observations are offered on the advantages and disadvantages of the foregoing alternatives :—

(1) If the Nansen Office makes a contract with the company for the whole settlement work for a lump sum, it limits its financial liability unless actual expenditure exceeds the contracted sum by 10 per cent., in which case the surplus would have to be borne equally by the company and the office. On the other hand, any saving would be similarly divided. Such an arrangement would possess certain manifest disadvantages, not the least being the inability of the company, through *force majeure*, to execute its contract. In addition, difficulties might arise through differences of opinion concerning the interpretation of the contract. At the best, the Nansen Office, whilst shouldering the moral responsibility for the successful settlement of the Assyrians, would only have a representative in Paraná in little more than a consultative capacity.

(2) The main advantages of this arrangement are that the Nansen Office would be able to benefit from the organisation and experience of the company, whilst maintaining the effective administrative and financial direction of the settlement work.(³) Such an arrangement might, however, result in failure to secure economies on the remission of import duties and on the employment of a certain number of Assyrians in minor posts.

(³) This direction could probably be arranged by the appointment of a commissioner of the Nansen Office, assisted by an auditor and a small staff of one or two typists.

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(3) If it is desired that the Nansen Office should assume full responsibility for the successful execution of the settlement plan, it would be necessary to contemplate an arrangement similar to that in force in Syria for the settlement of some 30,000 Armenian refugees, which would enable the major portion of the administrative expenses, other than those of the commissioner, to be utilised for the employment of Assyrians. A somewhat similar system is at present in successful operation, on a small scale, in the German colony, Roland (near Londrina), which enjoys the active assistance and co-operation of the company's administration. Another probable advantage would be the eventual exemption from taxation and import duties usually accorded to League organisations. The possible disadvantage of the application of this system to the settlement of the Assyrians might be that those employed by the Nansen Office might claim to be treated on the same basis as other League officials, but this difficulty could be overcome by the insertion of a specific clause to the contrary in their contracts.

IV.—*Eventual Economies.*

After a detailed examination with the local director of the company of the various items of expenditure contained in the company's revised offer, it would seem possible to effect the following economies :—

			Economy. £
1. *Administration.*			
If the commissioner appointed by the Nansen Office has the necessary qualifications to direct the settlement work, the director mentioned in the company's offer could be dispensed with			1,500
2. *Housing Accommodation, &c.*			
Company's estimates		£2,000	
Revised estimates—			
Passages	£300		
Accommodation	500		
Contingencies	200		
	1,000	1,000	1,000
3. 125 *Instructional Labourers*, reduced by			1,000
4. *Food.*—The local director considers £65,000 amply sufficient, seeing that settlers can produce some of their own food after four months			15,000
5. *Lorries, &c.*, if duty free, £3,000			1,000
6. *Clearing*, £2 per family			1,000
			20,500
Increase.			
7. *Medical Services.*—The local director considers that £3,000 would be required for the first year and £1,000 for the second year			1,000
Net eventual economy			19,500

V.—*Transport, Reception Arrangements, &c.*

The company will, with two months' notice, be able to receive 800 Assyrians per fortnight, and draft them straight on to their holdings, with only two or three days in reception or concentration camps.

I would suggest that each Assyrian be required to sign a declaration to the effect that he leaves Iraq for Paraná of his own free will, that he agrees to repay the Nansen Office the sum advanced for settlement and (?) transport, and that he authorises the Nansen Office to market his produce for the purpose. The scheme

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for the settlement of the Armenian refugees in Syria offers a precedent for the latter proposal, and the repatriation of Russian refugees to Russia is cited as a precedent for the "free-will declaration."

Separate Settlement of 5,000 *Assyrians.*

I will submit estimates for the separate settlement of 5,000 Assyrians in Paraná and/or São Paulo after inspection of the company's territory in the latter State.

T. F. JOHNSON.

São Paulo, March 16, 1934.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Note by Brigadier-General Browne respecting Settlement of Assyrians in Paraná.

(Confidential.)

I CONSIDER that Mar Shimun should go across with the first party. Also that he should be allowed by the Iraqi Government to go to the starting-point, and actually get into the first lorry and go with his people. It will not be good enough for him to start from Cyprus and meet them, as they will be very suspicious.

2. As regards the two parties of Assyrians, I believe this will cease when they leave Iraq. It is to a great extent artificial, and really consists of a cleavage between those who agree to fall in with the Government plans of settlement and those who do not. If the difficulties continue up to the time of settlement, I believe that they will disappear out here, so that, if they are settled within reasonable distance of each other, the people will become united. For this reason the commission have selected another possible area close to the first one selected by Paraná Plantations, and are investigating it.

Status of the Assyrians.

3. This is a matter we are continually asked about in interviewing Brazilian officials. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sr. Cavalcanti de Lacerda, was particularly strong on it.

I stressed this point very strongly in my letter of the 3rd March to the Secretary-General of the League.

4. The press campaign against the Assyrian settlement is continued by the society called "The Friends of Alberto Torres," and certainly has an effect on the political atmosphere, and is going to make difficulties in the settlement of the Assyrians.

I have already drawn attention to this matter in my letter of the 3rd March.

5. I have seen document C/Min. Ass./13 of the 18th November, 1933, that mention is made of sending specially selected single men of robust type on to the area of settlement. If this means separating a man from his family, I advise very strongly against doing so, as things are now in Iraq. The man will object strongly to leaving the family, and it is quite likely will refuse to do so; nor will the family let him go.

J. GILBERT BROWNE,
Brigadier-General.

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No. E 2875

THE Under-Secr

Foreign Office,

May

Name and D

INDEXED

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and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3142
1934

CONFIDENTIAL

~~India Off~~ 328

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith cop ies of the under-mentioned paper.

MCA

Foreign Office,
9 May, 1934.

P.Z. 3004

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad telegram N° 94 of 3 May	Assyrian Question.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY
No. 19 10 MAY. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECd. POL. DEPT.
10 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to D.O. A.M. W.O. C.O.

14—6130 9785 (2)

329

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P.Z.
3142
1934

FROM IRAQ.

Decypher. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
3rd May 1934.

D. 5.25 p.m. 3rd May 1934.
R. 9.30 a.m. 4th May 1934.

No. 94.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

I have just returned from a ten days tour in the North in the course of which I visited about twenty Assyrian villages and discussed the situation with Assyrian representatives of all shades of opinion.

In Mosul town and in villages of Dohuk and SHEI~~Ent~~khan areas I found security good but definite apprehension for the future chiefly from Kurds if re-settlement scheme were long delayed. Assyrians in these areas are living chiefly on their savings or on charity of friends and have hitherto obstinately refused with few exceptions to sow their crops although Iraqi Government repaired their houses and agreed to provide them with necessary means. Great majority of Assyrians in these areas (number perhaps 12,000) will probably wish to leave the country.

In districts of Amadiya Harir and Rowanduz there have been practically no losses of property and rifles are intact. No fear was expressed about security and Assyrians were generally prosperous though some are chafing under the burden of supporting the families of those who have gone to Syria. Although it is impossible to predict their decision with certainty I gained the impression that majority (who roughly represent two-fifths of the total ex-Ottoman Assyrians in Iraq) would prefer to remain in this country if security were maintained as at present. They might change their minds later if reports from Brazil were favourable under the influence of a sense of isolation.

I....

I do not anticipate trouble from Assyrians during the summer or from Kurds if Iraqi Government fulfil the promises they have made to me in regard to security. I fear however that unless emigration of say 2,000 or 3,000 souls is started during the ~~said~~ next five months, destitut~~e~~ion, especially in Mosul town and some of ~~Bat~~Sheikhan villages will assume serious proportions. Frustration of hopes will engender feelings of despair and will lead to thefts and clashes with their neighbours. Once this happens the situation will rapidly become dangerous and I earnestly trust negotiations with Brazilian Government will shortly progress sufficiently to enable emigration to start in July and continue in August and September. This would not only relieve pressure but stimulate patience of those who were left behind.

Despatch follows.

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"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
3004
1934

Infn
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H² ~~Cl.~~

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers.

Foreign Office,
4 May, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Foreign Office letter no. E 539/1/93 of 26th February, 1934.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
United Kingdom Delegation (Geneva) Nos. 26, 27 and 28 of 31st March	Assyrian Question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 19 10 MAY 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
5 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
4 MAY 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Treasury, Air Ministry, W.O., C.O. and D.O.

14—6130 9785 (2)

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

April 3, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[E 2051/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 26.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note of the 18th meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 26th March, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
March 31, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the 18*th Meeting of the Council Committee held on March* 26, *at* 10·30 A.M.

THE President assumed that the members of the committee had read the correspondence which had passed between himself and Brigadier Browne since the last meeting of the committee. When he heard that Brigadier Browne had contemplated leaving Brazil on the 25th March and was only putting off his departure in the expectation of receiving further instructions, he had telegraphed confidentially to the Spanish Ambassador to find out whether the latter considered that the continued presence of the mission in Brazil after the 25th March would be useful or not. He had received a reply to the effect that the mission proposed to leave on the 1st April, unless the Brazilian Minister of Labour asked them to stay longer, and the reply had added that the Spanish and British Ambassadors considered that the mission should leave on that date and that the prolongation of its stay in Brazil was useless, as the political situation rendered the arrival of the Assyrians for the moment impossible. (The text of this telegram is attached as Annex A.) Since then a further telegram had been received from Brigadier Browne (see Annex B) stating that the mission proposed to leave on the 7th April, and asking the President to telegraph if this was agreed. It was, therefore, necessary for the committee in the first place to consider the instructions which should be sent to Brigadier Browne, and, in the second place, to examine the situation in general, which did not appear favourable. The President understood, however, that the United Kingdom representative had a certain amount of information on the situation in Brazil, which he was prepared to give to the committee.

At this point it was announced that Brigadier Browne's report had arrived, but that, owing to the necessity of translation and copying, it was unlikely to be ready before the evening.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that politically Brazil was passing through a somewhat difficult phase. The Government was still a provisional one, and the chief of the Government was Acting President only. The Constituent Assembly was busily considering a new Constitution and an early presidential election had been spoken of. At a time when the Government was thus on the verge of a return to constitutional procedure, it was naturally compelled to pay increasing attention to popular feeling. Unfortunately, a good deal of the feeling expressed appeared to be ultra-nationalist and anti-foreign in tone. It was directed against foreign enterprises in general. It was this feeling which the Assyrian immigration scheme had unfortunately encountered. It appeared, however, to be not so much the case that the Assyrian scheme had of

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itself aroused special opposition, but that the question of the Assyrian immigration had come to the fore at a particularly unfortunate moment when any foreign scheme was suspect. Moreover, in the matter of immigration the Brazilians had had one or two unfortunate experiences; of mutinous Polish colonists, for instance, and of Hungarians who flatly refused to remain on the land and insisted on streaming into the towns and clamouring for reshipment home. When one added to this the ignorance which inevitably existed in Brazil as to what the Assyrians were and the persistent tendency to confuse them with so-called "Syrians," who were mostly small traders and usurers and correspondingly unpopular, the agitation which had sprung up was scarcely surprising.

With this preface, the United Kingdom representative summarised a number of reports received from His Majesty's Ambassador in Rio since the last meeting of the committee. He gave examples of the press campaign which had been carried on against Assyrian immigration, and read to the committee the substance of a tranquillising communiqué which the Brazilian Government had issued in the form of a press interview with the Minister of Labour on the 5th February. Unfortunately, this communiqué appeared to have a temporary effect, the agitation had since been renewed, and was led by a so-called "learned society" named "The Friends of Alberto Torres," which was strongly Nationalist and apparently not very well informed. One of its members, for instance, spoke of the Assyrians as "Bedouins." This society had published a manifesto calling on students to organise a movement against Assyrian immigration, and describing the scheme as "an imperialist imposition on Brazil." Immigration was about the same time a good deal discussed in the Constituent Assembly, where the Assyrians themselves had been the subject of unfavourable comment. It was in this atmosphere that Brigadier Browne's mission had arrived in Brazil.

The United Kingdom representative then read out a statement made by the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 21st February in reply to an interpellation in the Constituent Assembly. (A translation of the statement is attached as Annex C.(1)) He pointed out that the statement was not very accurate, but it showed at least that the Brazilian Government had then no intention of giving up the scheme, and the last paragraph was interesting as showing that they did not contemplate too strict an interpretation of the condition that all the Assyrians should be agriculturalists. This paragraph was, in fact, based on a memorandum which Brigadier Browne had prepared and given to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining that the Assyrians were not all agriculturalists, but that most of them who were not followed callings which would be useful in developing the proposed colony without interfering with the labour market in Brazil.

The position seemed to have changed for the worse at the beginning of March. On the 2nd March His Majesty's Ambassador had reported that Brigadier Browne's mission had returned that day to Rio, but that the chief of the Government had, on a plea of pressure of work, refused to grant the mission an audience which had been previously contemplated. The Ambassador added that there was reason to fear that the anti-Assyrian campaign which was being pursued in the Constituent Assembly was having its effect. The Spanish Ambassador had received no official hint, but both he and His Majesty's Ambassador were inclined to think that an attempt might eventually be made by the Government to withdraw their previous consent or to postpone the immigration. It was possible that the Government would be in a stronger position when the President was definitely elected, but both Ambassadors were of opinion that for a while it would not do to hurry matters. Meanwhile, they felt that the continued presence of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson as experts might be useful. Since then there had been further correspondence between the President of the Council Committee and Brigadier Browne and the Spanish Ambassador regarding the date of the departure of the mission, ending with the telegram from the Spanish Ambassador of the 21st March which the President had just read out. It was possible that circumstances had changed since that telegram was despatched, for the United Kingdom representative had since derived the impression that His Majesty's Ambassador was in favour of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson remaining in Rio in the capacity of experts, in the event of further negotiations with the Brazilian Government. It was possible that, when the telegram of the 21st March was despatched, the Ambassadors did not perhaps realise that detailed negotiations with the Brazilian Government might be necessary in the near future in Rio. Moreover, in a telegram of the 22nd March, His Majesty's Ambassador had reported that the "Society of the Friends of Alberto Torres" had had an audience with the chief of the Government, who had, in consequence, appointed a special Commission of Enquiry into the allegations that the Assyrians were unsuitable colonists.

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(1) Not printed.

Whether this move was designed to cover a retreat by the Brazilian Government from the consent which they had already given, or whether it was merely to give time for the agitation to die down was a matter for conjecture. But, coupled with the fact that the Brazilian Government were understood to have given instructions to a representative in Europe to examine the Assyrian question on behalf of the Ministry of Labour, there was at least ground for supposing that the Brazilian Government meant to adhere to their attitude, provided that they could demonstrate to the opposition in Brazil that the objections to receiving the Assyrians were ill-founded.

The President thanked the United Kingdom representative for this information. He then said that the first question to be decided was whether Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson should leave Brazil. The latest information which the United Kingdom representative had read out was rather contrary to the telegram of the 21st March from the Spanish Ambassador. He himself was pessimistic about prospects in Brazil, and was inclined to doubt whether the continued presence of the mission served any useful purpose. On the other hand, if further negotiations took place with the Brazilian Government, necessary information might be lacking if Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson had been previously withdrawn, and he would like the opinion of members of the committee as to whether the two experts should return on the 7th April or not.

The United Kingdom Representative thought that the answer depended on the procedure which the committee now proposed to adopt. In a telegram addressed to the Brazilian Government on the 16th January the President had foreshadowed that the conditions laid down by the Brazilian Government would be fully examined when Brigadier Browne's report had been received. In addition, it was necessary, in order that full information regarding the scheme might be put before the Assyrians, to obtain authoritative statements in some form or other from the Brazilian Government regarding the treatment which the Assyrians would receive eventually in Brazil in various matters. No progress could, therefore, be made without negotiations with the Brazilian Government on these two points. Brazil seemed the proper place for the negotiations, and the presence of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson might well be necessary in the capacity of experts.

The President said that two kinds of negotiations might be necessary. The first would be simply designed to find out whether the Brazilian Government wished to proceed with the scheme or not. The second kind would concern details regarding the settlement and future status of the Assyrians. He very much doubted the advisability of commencing at present this second kind of negotiation, which was the only one which would necessitate the continued presence of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson. It seemed very doubtful to him whether it was wise to press the Brazilian Government for the moment. It might be better to let matters take their course. On the other hand, the Commission of Enquiry which the Brazilian Government had set up might present arguments against immigration which with the help of experts the two Ambassadors might possibly combat. For that purpose it might be useful for Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson to stay for a while. But the President repeated that he did not think it was of any use to press the Brazilian Government further, and he wondered whether the continued stay of the two experts was possible from the financial point of view.

Mr. Walters said that the credit for 20,000 fr. would certainly be exhausted if the mission stayed in Brazil until the 7th April. It was, of course, possible to obtain a further credit. It would be necessary to obtain the President's consent.

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This could no doubt be obtained, though naturally the League was strongly in favour of economy if possible.

The Danish Representative, while agreeing that economy was very important, said that it was also extremely important to obtain a quick solution of the Assyrian question. He thought that it would be useful to the commission to have further information regarding the situation in Brazil. It might be that the present outcry against Assyrian immigration was not a serious issue at all. He recalled a previous case in Brazil, where the question of the right of inspectors to enter private houses in an anti-malaria campaign had been the subject of great agitation in connexion with an election. Once the election was over, the issue was completely forgotten. It was possible that it might be the same with the Assyrian agitation. He asked whether information was available as to when the presidential election might be expected to take place and how long the newly-appointed Commission of Enquiry was likely to sit.

The United Kingdom Representative regretted that he was not able to give any information on these points. He only knew that the political situation in Brazil was uncertain, and doubted whether anyone could say at present when the presidential election was likely to be held. As to the Commission of Enquiry, his only information was that it had been appointed, apparently on or about the 22nd March.

The President said that, during the time they had spent in Brazil, the members of the mission had time to give ample information to the Spanish and British Ambassadors on points of detail, and he could not believe that their continued presence was really a necessity. The situation in Brazil was more and more difficult, and he did not see how any progress could be made. He suggested that the committee should decide that the mission should return from Brazil on the 7th April. He suggested that it might be advisable for the committee then to consider the situation privately as though not merely the Brazilian project had broken down, but that all alternative schemes had broken down also. The committee might go on hoping that the Brazilian scheme could still be saved or that some alternative destination might be found, but he himself was not hopeful on either point, and it seemed to him that the committee should lose no time in considering the possibility of the Assyrians having to remain, after all, in Iraq. He considered it most urgent that the committee should consider the question as though they had met with a definite check. That would not mean that the Brazilian scheme would necessarily be dropped. The Ambassadors in Rio could be left to do what was possible, but his feeling was that at present the eventual resettlement in Iraq of the Assyrians was more important than a further detailed study of the Brazilian project. He proposed, therefore, that a telegram should be sent to Rio agreeing to the return of the mission on the 7th April, and asking the Ambassadors to continue to do what was possible; and that the committee should then turn to the consideration of the question of the ultimate settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq.

The Danish Representative doubted whether it was wise to let the mission leave. There was insufficient information about the Commission of Enquiry which the Brazilian Government had set up. If that commission had a free hand and could be purely objective in its work, it might be advisable to let Brigadier Browne leave, but if there were a political element in the commission any question might be raised. Brigadier Browne was the only authority in Brazil on the subject of the Assyrians. As soon as he had left, the Ambassadors would have to rely not on his authoritative statements, but on their own influence. It was possible that Major Johnson might be spared from Brazil, but the Danish representative thought it dangerous to allow Brigadier Browne to leave. As to the question of expense, he confessed himself unmoved by this consideration. The object was to get a solution of the question.

The President thought that the influence which the Ambassadors could exercise would be more effective than any authoritative statement by Brigadier Browne. No information was available about the length of time which the Commission of Enquiry might take, and, if Brigadier Browne's movements depended on that commission, he might remain in Brazil indefinitely.

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The French Representative suggested that the Spanish Ambassador should be asked for an appreciation of the situation. He might be asked how long the Commission of Enquiry was likely to last, and whether the presence of Brigadier Browne would help, and, while the financial difficulty could be emphasised, the decision might be left to the discretion of the Ambassador.

The President again read the Spanish Ambassador's telegram of the 21st March. The latest information of the United Kingdom representative was perhaps a little different, but there appeared to be nothing to suggest that the situation was not as serious as when the Spanish Ambassador had telegraphed. The President was most pessimistic about the appointment of the commission. He thought that it could only bear one explanation, namely, that the Brazilian Government were going to use its findings to go back on the consent already given.

The Danish Representative did not agree with this. He thought it was equally possible that the Brazilian Government had appointed the commission to help in carrying through their decision. It would surely be difficult for the Brazilian Government to go back on their attitude, simply on the report of a Brazilian Commission, against the authority of the League and its experts.

The Italian and Mexican Representatives expressed their agreement with the President. The question was a political one. The experts must by now have given all the necessary technical material to the Ambassadors, to whom future action could be left. They saw no useful purpose in retaining Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson.

The United Kingdom Representative regretted that so much pessimism and discouragement should have been expressed. He recalled that, when the task of settling the Assyrians was first entrusted to the Council Committee in October last, there were people in Geneva who had stated that it would be a three-year business, and there was some reason to believe that they might be right. After all, the committee had the whole world to search and had no organisation ready to hand. If, after some five months only, a ready-made scheme which it had had the good fortune to find in the archives of the Nansen Office were to fail, it would be regrettable, but there was no reason to despair. He did not think that the committee was justified in supposing that it must now consider the possibility of the Assyrians remaining permanently in Iraq. Indeed, to do so was rather outside its competence. The one task of the committee was to examine the practicability of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq. It was true that it was empowered eventually to consider the resettlement in Iraq of those Assyrians who wished to remain there, but this was quite a different matter from considering the wholesale resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq on the ground that no home elsewhere could be found for them. The committee was bound to exhaust all possibilities of settlement outside Iraq, and, if it failed to find a suitable home for the Assyrians, its only course was to report the fact to the Council, who would then have to consider what further action was necessary. Even if the Brazilian scheme broke down, it was much too early to say that there was no alternative. In point of fact the committee had not yet made a real effort to find an alternative. It had been unnecessary to do so. They had simply made tentative enquiries of various countries. Replies were still awaited from some of these countries, *e.g.*, Canada, the Argentine and South Africa, and if the Brazilian scheme broke down the committee would have to make a more determined effort to find a destination elsewhere. He was not convinced that one could not be found. Meanwhile, however, the Brazilian scheme could not be left indefinitely in a state of uncertainty. If it broke down, it broke down; but at least the committee was bound to clear up the position. It seemed little use simply to allow matters to take their course. The Brazilian Government must be brought into the open. The question was urgent, and the United Kingdom representative consequently made the definite proposal that the committee should forthwith instruct the Spanish Ambassador in Rio to communicate to the Brazilian Government Brigadier Browne's report, and to offer on the basis of it to begin negotiations at once for the settlement of outstanding points. This would at least show whether the Brazilian Government wished to proceed with the scheme or not. At present he saw no reason to suppose that they wished to draw back. The Spanish Ambassador and His Majesty's Ambassador had apparently feared at one point that they might do so, but nothing had yet happened to prove that this fear was well-founded.

The President said that he would like to share the optimistic view of the United Kingdom representative, but the facts were against it. All countries, other than Brazil, which the committee had tried, had been unfavourable. He did not wish to set aside the Brazilian scheme or any alternative, but he thought it was necessary for the committee to take some thought, in the meanwhile, of the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. As regards the proposed *démarche* in Brazil, he still thought that it was useless to enter into details with the Brazilian Government at present. The committee could, however, ask the Ambassadors for information regarding the Commission of Enquiry which the Brazilian Government had set up, and also invite their opinion on the question whether Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson should remain in Brazil. The President repeated that he regretted to have to take a pessimistic view of the situation, but he thought this view was in accordance with the facts. The Spanish Ambassador had definitely reported that progress was impossible.

The United Kingdom Representative said that the difference between the view of himself and the President was perhaps not as great as it appeared. He himself was anxious that, if it were still possible, negotiations should be started with the Brazilian Government forthwith, but the question whether further progress was really feasible could, of course, only be decided by those in touch with Brazilian opinion. He agreed, therefore, that considerable discretion should be allowed to the Spanish Ambassador, and that he should be asked whether the continued presence of Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson would, in his view, be useful. But the United Kingdom representative thought that the committee ought, in putting this question to the Spanish Ambassador, to explain to him fully what procedure would normally now be adopted. It should be pointed out to him that negotiations were necessary on certain points, and, in deciding whether Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson should remain, he should be asked to take into account the possibility of such negotiations in the near future, and also the assistance which Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson might afford in connexion with the Commission of Enquiry set up by the Brazilian Government. As regards the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq he quite agreed that, if there were to be much delay, the committee must certainly concern itself with this question. But he had understood the President to refer previously not merely to the safety and well-being of the Assyrians pending emigration, but to their permanent establishment in Iraq. The latter question was outside the committee's competence; the former question was certainly within it.

The Danish Representative agreed that, according to its terms of reference, the committee was bound to supervise the safety of the Assyrians pending emigration, but not to consider their permanent settlement in Iraq, except in the case of those who elected of their own free will to stay there.

The President said that he had raised this question of the safety of the Assyrians because Major Thomson was now available in Geneva and was about to leave for Iraq.

There was agreement that on the following day a meeting should be called, to which the Iraqi representative and Major Thomson would be invited. At this meeting it would be explained that, owing to the difficult situation in Brazil, there was likely to be some delay before any immigration scheme could be put into effect, and that the committee would be glad to be assured that in the meantime every effort would be made by the Iraqi Government to prevent further trouble breaking out.

It was also agreed that a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador should be drafted by the President and the United Kingdom representative, for consideration at a meeting later in the day, explaining to the Ambassador that normally the next step would be negotiations with the Brazilian Government, and asking whether he thought such negotiations feasible and whether, in view of their possibility, he wished Brigadier Browne at least, if not Major Johnson also, to stay for the time being in Brazil.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva, March 26, 1934.

Annex A to Enclosure.

Télégramme de l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Rio de Janeiro à M. López Oliván.—
(Reçu au Secrétariat le 21 *mars* 1934.)

LA commission reviendra prochainement de l'intérieur du pays et pense partir pour Genève le 1er avril, à moins que le Ministre du Travail ne lui demande de rester plus longtemps, étant donné que sa situation est devenue difficile pour avoir voulu nous être favorable.

L'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne et moi sommes d'avis qu'elle parte, la prolongation de son séjour ici serait inutile, puisque la politique intérieure de ce pays annule nos efforts et rend impossible, pour le moment, l'arrivée des Assyriens.

Annex B to Enclosure.

Copy of Telegram from Brigadier Browne, São Paolo, March 23, 1934.

(Confidential.)

COMMISSION has completed examination of all areas of Paraná Plantations suitable for Assyrian settlement, and, after careful consideration of all points, recommends that, failing settlement of all Assyrians in one block, the two settlement areas should be in Londrina region separated by 18 kilom. of virgin forest, thus effecting economical fixture compared with separate settlement of São Paulo State, facilitating administration and avoiding additional political complications. Commission now writing full report, and will be prepared to leave Brazil with report on 7th April. Please telegraph if agreed.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

April 3, 1934.

SECTION 3.

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[E 2052/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 3.)

(No. 27.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note of the 19th meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 26th March, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
March 31, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the 19*th Meeting of the Council Committee, held on March* 26, 1934, *at* 5 P.M.

THE committee had before it a draft telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Rio, which had been prepared by the President and the United Kingdom representative on the basis of the discussion at the previous meeting. The telegram was eventually approved in the form attached as Annex.

Brigadier Browne's report of the 10th March was then circulated. *The President* asked whether the committee wished to consider it in detail at this stage, or whether they would prefer to study it at leisure and discuss it later.

The United Kingdom Representative said that a point to be borne in mind was that Brigadier Browne had asked by telegram for instructions as to whether the committee thought that further investigations were required in the Paraná area. If there was a question of the mission returning from Brazil on the 7th April, a decision on this point was somewhat urgent.

The President agreed that this point would have to be considered, but thought it was perhaps premature to consider it at the moment in view of the telegram which was being sent to the Spanish Ambassador. It would be of little use for the committee to instruct Brigadier Browne to make further investigations in Paraná, if shortly afterwards the Spanish Ambassador reported that further progress with the Brazilian scheme was politically impossible.

The United Kingdom Representative agreed, but observed that, on the other hand, if, as seemed probable, the committee was in a position to decide that no further investigations were necessary, there was no reason why Brigadier Browne should not be informed accordingly without delay.

The President said that, apart from this point, it would be necessary to examine the report and see whether the enquiry as a whole had been sufficiently exhaustive, or whether any further general information was required which the mission would be in a position to obtain before leaving Brazil. He noted, however, that a still further and presumably more complete report was already being prepared by the mission. He thought that the most useful course would be to examine the present report in detail in the presence of the President of the Nansen Office.

It was agreed that the report should be communicated to M. Werner, with a request that he would communicate any observations, and, if necessary, attend a meeting of the committee for the purpose.

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The French Representative recalled that in a telegram of the 17th February to the president of the committee, Brigadier Browne had raised the question of the national status of the Assyrians, and his present report showed that this was constantly in the mind of the Brazilian Government. He wondered whether something on this point ought not to be said to Brigadier Browne, and suggested that a reference to the question might even be inserted in the telegram which had been approved to the Spanish Ambassador.

The United Kingdom Representative explained that reference to this and other questions which would have to be taken up eventually with the Brazilian Government if negotiations were opened had originally been made in the draft of the telegram now approved. These details had, however, been cut out in the interests of economy, more particularly in view of the fact that His Majesty's Embassy in Rio was now in possession of details regarding the present status of the Assyrians which were not available when Brigadier Browne first raised the question.

The United Kingdom Representative then explained the present position. Although exact statistics were probably not available, as the question of nationality had not hitherto arisen in an acute form, it appeared from information available that probably only a minority of the Assyrians in Iraq were technically Iraqi nationals. Those Assyrians with whom the committee was concerned were ex-Ottoman subjects, but it was a fair assumption that they had lost their Turkish nationality in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne. At all events, it was certain that the Turkish Government would not at this stage recognise them as Turkish nationals. It might be supposed that the Assyrians had automatically acquired Iraqi nationality in view of the provisions of the Iraqi Nationality Law, since all ex-Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Iraq on the 6th August, 1924, were deemed to be Iraqi nationals in virtue of that law. It so happened, however, that most of the Assyrians were not "habitually resident" in Iraq on that date within the meaning of the law, since a large number had returned to Hakkiari between 1921 and 1924, and it was only in September 1924 that they were once more expelled by the Turks, and that the problem of the Assyrians was created once more in Iraq.

The United Kingdom Representative was not in a position to say what view the Iraqi Government would take of the matter, but he thought he ought to warn the committee that the Iraqi Government might be within their rights in refusing to recognise a very large proportion of the Assyrians as Iraqi nationals. Out of 20,000 Assyrians it was possible that not more than 8,000 were actually Iraqis, and even this number might be an exaggeration. Moreover, the people who were not Iraqis were the very ones who had never wished to settle down in Iraq, and who had been mainly responsible for the request to the League to find a home elsewhere. The committee might therefore assume that the majority of the Assyrians for whom they had to provide would probably be Stateless. The position was that they were already refugees in Iraq, and it was simply a problem not of expatriating them, but of transferring them as refugees from one country to another.

The President said that the information supplied by the United Kingdom representative vitally affected the question of the responsibility for the repatriation or resettlement of the Assyrians if they went to Brazil and did not settle down there. The Iraqi Government would, of course, be bound to receive back, if necessary, those of the Assyrians who were genuinely Iraqi nationals, but obviously might raise difficulties about the rest.

The United Kingdom Representative said that His Majesty's Government had considered this problem with some anxiety, and had come to the conclusion that the best solution would be to arrange, if possible, for the Assyrians who left Iraq to acquire Brazilian nationality at the earliest possible moment, and, preferably, immediately on arrival in Brazil. It was quite clear that in whatever country to which the Assyrians might go they must eventually accept assimilation. They could not hope to go to any modern State and retain indefinitely a separate national existence. His Majesty's Government thought that the best solution to work for was that the Assyrians should lose Iraqi nationality, so far as they now possessed it, and acquire Brazilian nationality immediately on arrival in Brazil.

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No doubt this would need careful handling, and there would be objections and difficulties, but His Majesty's Government felt that it would be in the long run the simplest and most satisfactory course. If the Assyrians went to Brazil under any misapprehension about their national status there was bound to be trouble later. It would be to the advantage of the Brazilian Government, on the other hand, that the position should be cleared up. It would probably be an administrative convenience to them, and the risk would be diminished of the Assyrians trying to maintain a separate national existence.

The President said that, while the proposed solution might have much to recommend it, he was very doubtful himself of the possibility of applying it. It seemed to him to cut entirely across the principle of the free choice of the individual. The committee had hitherto insisted that the emigration of the Assyrians from Iraq must be voluntary, and he thought it was not only the question of leaving Iraq which must be voluntary, but also the question of nationality.

The French Representative suggested that the difficulty could be got over by indicating to the Assyrians that one of the conditions of settlement in Brazil would be the acquisition of Brazilian nationality.

The President doubted whether the committee could suggest such a condition to the Brazilian Government.

The French Representative replied that it was a question of the manner in which the matter was represented to the Brazilian Government. The committee might put it in the form that, if it would help matters, they were ready to tell the Assyrians that one of the conditions must be the acquisition of Brazilian nationality.

The President said that in any case he felt that nothing could be done until a reply had been received from the Spanish Ambassador to the telegram which was about to be addressed to him. He did not think that anything on the subject of national status could usefully be inserted in that telegram.

The Mexican Representative thought that the acquisition by the Assyrians of Brazilian nationality might not be acceptable to the Brazilian Government, as it would thus be impossible for them to send away any of the Assyrians who might not settle in Brazil. The difficulty created by the third Brazilian condition would not be solved.

The Danish Representative said that this led him to return to the suggestion which he had made earlier by letter that the question of the return clause on Nansen passports should be taken up with the Iraqi Government, and that the documents relevant to the Nansen passport procedure should be communicated to that Government.

The President doubted whether this would be useful at the moment, when it was uncertain whether the Iraqi Government would even agree to the repatriation of such Assyrians as might undoubtedly be Iraqi nationals.

Reference was then made to an opinion, dated the 13th March, by the Legal Section of the League of Nations, regarding the eventual status of the Assyrians who might emigrate to Brazil.

Mr. Walters pointed out that that opinion had been written under a misapprehension of the actual facts and was based on the supposition that the number of Assyrians of Iraqi nationality was much greater than now appeared to be the case. However, he did not think that that affected the conclusions of the opinion, which tended to deprecate any attempt to apply the Nansen passport procedure to the Assyrians. Mr. Walters read out the conclusions, which were as follows:—

> "To ask Iraq to accept the Nansen arrangements is to ask her to accept more than is really necessary for the purpose, because these arrangements apply primarily to Armenians and Russians. Iraq may not want to go so far. For practical purposes, if there are Assyrians whom Iraq will not treat as her nationals, it could be quite well arranged for her to issue them special documents of identity containing a clause authorising return to Iraq. The Nansen passport is not the only document which can be used to enable a person without nationality to travel from one country to another.

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"In any case, any sort of immediate *démarche* to call the attention of Iraq to the Nansen arrangements with a view to her accepting them, would, I think, raise the general question in an inconvenient way. It is true that Iraq has not had her attention called to those arrangements, which were not sent to her when she entered the League, but it would seem much better to decide (after consultation with Iraq, if necessary) what course ought to be proposed to Iraq and then make a definite proposal."

The Danish Representative asked whether the three Brazilian conditions had been communicated to the Iraqi Government, and whether it would be useful to ask the Iraqi Government for definite figures regarding the nationality of the Assyrians.

The President explained that particular care had been taken not to communicate the three Brazilian conditions to the Iraqi Government. It had simply been explained to the Iraqi delegation that the Brazilian consent was one of principle only, and that various details remained to be discussed.

The United Kingdom Representative doubted whether any useful purpose would be served by asking the Iraqi Government for detailed figures, as it was probable that exact statistics did not exist. While he naturally could not say what line the Iraqi Government would take if the question of providing the Assyrians with a document, which would eventually allow them to return to Iraq, were raised, he felt bound to point out to the committee that it would be asking a great deal of the Iraqi Government. The position was, he repeated, that the majority of the Assyrians were, in fact, Stateless refugees in Iraq. The question of their removal to Brazil had arisen because they declared themselves unable to remain any longer in Iraq. If the Iraqi Government contributed financially to their settlement in Brazil, it was hardly likely that they would willingly agree that they could come back to Iraq at any time if they did not like Brazil. It had been suggested that the proposal which he had made, that they should be invested as soon as possible with Brazilian nationality, would not solve the difficulty created by the third Brazilian condition. That might be the case, but he claimed that a solution of the nationality problem in the manner which he had proposed might facilitate consideration of that condition. In any case, the difficulties created by the condition would equally not be solved by the proposal which had been made for the provision of Nansen passports with a return clause. It was not merely a question of the consent of the Iraqi Government to receiving these people back. The point was, who was going to be responsible for sending them back and, above all, paying for their return journey.

The President said that this was a difficult question which he thought the committee would only be able to refer back to the Council for further consideration.

The Danish Representative expressed the view that it lay with the Brazilian Government to indicate who must be responsible for resettling the Assyrians outside Brazil, if they did not settle there.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that the Brazilian Government had so far said that Paraná Plantations (Limited) must be responsible, but the responsibility was one which the company clearly could not take.

The Danish Representative said that in that case he presumed that the Brazilian Government must hold the Iraqi Government responsible.

The President observed that this was a responsibility which the Iraqi Government might not be willing to accept.

The United Kingdom Representative said that it was precisely because His Majesty's Government had foreseen these difficulties which were now being raised that they had suggested what might seem the rather arbitrary solution of making the Assyrians Brazilian nationals as quickly as possible and preferable from the outset.

The Danish Representative suggested that the difficulty might prove eventually not to be a serious one in practice. It might be arranged that the Assyrians should assume Brazilian nationality after a short period, and the

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responsibility of the Iraqi Government to take them back might be limited to that period. If, as seemed to be the case, the area selected in Paraná was suitable, the question of responsibility might then never arise in practice.

The President observed that a further point which would have to be considered in connexion with the third Brazilian condition was what body or authority was to decide whether dissatisfied Assyrians should be repatriated or removed from Brazil. He thought, however, that the whole discussion had best be adjourned until the reply from the Spanish Ambassador was received. If negotiations were possible, the point about nationality would have to be gone into very fully in the instructions which would have to be sent out to Rio.

Discussion then took place on future procedure, in view of the fact that the reply from the Spanish Ambassador might be delayed owing to the Easter holiday in Brazil. It was suggested that, if the reply was categorical in the sense that Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson ought to return, the President should have discretion to authorise their return without further consulting the committee, and that he should then convene a meeting to confer with the mission on their return to Europe. It was pointed out, however, that, if the mission returned, it would presumably mean that further negotiations were not at present possible, and it was likely that the committee would have to meet at the earliest possible moment to decide what was to be done in such circumstances. The general feeling was that, while little further progress could be made pending the receipt of the Spanish Ambassador's reply, the committee should not officially adjourn, but that it should simply be left to the President to call the next meeting when he thought fit.

The question then arose of the situation in Iraq if there was likely to be long delay. The President recalled that Major Thomson was at present in Geneva and was about to return to Iraq. It would be useful if he could attend a meeting at which Brigadier Browne's report could be considered, with the Iraqi representative and the President of the Nansen Office.

It was decided to arrange such a meeting for the following day. It was agreed that the President should then explain to the Iraqi representative that, though Brigadier Browne's report was favourable, the situation in Brazil was such that some delay in fixing up the details was inevitable, and the committee would be glad to be assured that during the interval everything would be done by the Iraqi Government to ensure the safety and well-being of the Assyrians.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Annex to Enclosure.

Telegram from President of Assyrian Committee to the Spanish Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, March 26, 1934.

HAVING received Browne's report, which appears satisfactory, committee are in doubt as to next step. They have taken note of opinion expressed in your telegram of the 21st March that political situation makes arrival of Assyrians impossible for the moment. On other hand, delay is most undesirable and difficult to justify now that Browne's report has been received. Next stage would normally be negotiations with Brazilian Government with object of examining conditions laid down by latter, and of obtaining for communication to Assyrians information regarding their eventual treatment in civil matters in Brazil. Committee would value your opinion whether it is really useless to open such negotiations at present. If so, do you consider more favourable opportunity likely to occur in near future? Committee cannot, of course, allow uncertain situation to drag on indefinitely, and may think it advisable to offer to negotiate if only thereby to clear it up.

Question may be affected by proceedings of Commission of Enquiry into Assyrian immigration which committee understand Brazilian Government to have set up. They would be glad of your view on this point together with any information regarding procedure of commission and probable length of its deliberations.

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Immediate question is whether Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson should leave Brazil on the 7th April. Committee must take into account financial considerations, but would be glad to know whether you would like them to remain in connexion with the proposed negotiations if they take place or in connexion with Commission of Enquiry. If so, do you think that Johnson, whose services would be valuable here, need stay as well as Browne?

You will, no doubt, think it well to consult British Ambassador before sending your reply which committee would be grateful to receive as soon as possible.

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P.Z.
2004
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

April 3, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[E 2053/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 28.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note of the 20th meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 27th March, 1934, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
March 31, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the 20th Meeting of the Council Committee held on March 27, 1934, *at* 11·15 A.M.

THE committee first met in private to decide the question whether Brigadier Browne's report should be published. The League Secretariat were understood to be in favour of immediate publication.

The United Kingdom Representative asked whether it was proposed to publish the whole of the non-confidential report, *i.e.*, the covering memorandum signed by the three members of the mission, the note by Brigadier Browne and the report by Major Johnson to the president of the Nansen Office. The last of these three documents did not seem entirely suitable for publication, as it was intended rather for the guidance of the committee and was full of detail, but it was referred to in the covering memorandum. As regards Brigadier Browne's note, the United Kingdom representative thought that there were certain passages which had much better not be published at this stage, more particularly the final section of paragraph 6, which might arouse the apprehensions of the Brazilian Government as suggesting an intention to retain a certain autonomy for the Assyrians. There were perhaps other passages in the note which it might be undesirable to publish, in view of their possible effect on the Assyrians. The only part of the report which seemed suitable for publication at this stage was perhaps the introductory memorandum, but even the publication of this might raise false hopes among the Assyrians by leading them to believe that the question of their emigration was virtually settled. On the whole, therefore, the United Kingdom representative thought publication undesirable at present.

The Mexican, French and Italian Representatives expressed agreement.

The Danish Representative, on the other hand, suggested that publication should be considered as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Brazilian Government. He thought that it would be useful in preventing delay and bringing the Brazilian Government into the open, and he suggested that the whole report should be published, but that those portions which might give rise to trouble either with the Assyrians or with the Brazilian Government should be deleted, and that publication should be accompanied by a note indicating that much yet remained to be done before the Assyrians could go to Brazil.

The President thought that the question which the Danish representative had raised could scarcely be considered pending the reply of the Spanish Ambassador, when the committee would be better able to judge whether publication would be useful or not. His inclination was against publication, without prejudice, how-

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ever, to the further consideration of the question at a later date. He agreed that publication might give a too optimistic impression and cause misunderstanding among the Assyrians. He observed also that a further report from Brigadier Browne was apparently being prepared, and it might perhaps be best to publish the various reports eventually as annexes to a report from the Council Committee to the Council, which would explain the whole position.

The Danish Representative expressed his readiness not to press the proposal for publication in the circumstances, but to await further information from Brazil. He suggested, however, that the attention of the Iraqi delegation, to whom the report had been communicated, should be drawn to the fact that it was to be regarded for the present as confidential.

Mr. Walters then raised the question of the communication of the report to the Brazilian Government. He thought that immediate communication to that Government was most desirable.

A somewhat lengthy discussion took place on this point. It was urged by the Danish representative that the adoption of Mr. Walters's suggestion would have the advantage of bringing pressure to bear on the Brazilian Government without the disadvantage of publication. Moreover, if the Brazilian Government were still prepared to proceed with the scheme, the report might help them in dealing with the opposition, and in that case, the sooner it was communicated to them the better. Some members of the committee, on the other hand, felt that communication was a leap in the dark, and that it would be better before taking any action to await the appreciation of the position for which the Spanish Ambassador was being asked. The communication of the report might then serve as a useful introduction to negotiations or as a means of eliciting from the Brazilian Government a definite reply as to whether they would continue the scheme or not. It was pointed out, however, that, as yet at all events, the committee had no official ground for supposing that the Brazilian Government proposed to withdraw from their previous attitude; that the closest co-operation with the Brazilian Government was desirable, and that the Brazilian Government, who knew that the report had been sent to Geneva, might be offended if its communication to them was delayed, particularly if they heard that it had been communicated to the Iraqi Government. The proposal was accordingly made by Mr. Walters that the report should be handed unofficially and confidentially by Brigadier Browne to the Brazilian authorities, with whom he had been collaborating.

The discussion was interrupted at this point by the arrival of the Iraqi representative and the president of the Nansen Office.

The President observed that the Iraqi representative would have seen from the copy communicated to him that Brigadier Browne's report on the Paraná area was favourable. At the same time, to avoid any misunderstanding, he felt bound to explain that certain difficulties had arisen in Brazil and there might therefore be a certain delay before a solution was reached. In the circumstances the committee wished to ask the Iraqi representative to enquire of his Government what measures they contemplated for the well-being and protection of the Assyrians and the maintenance of stability and order until emigration should be possible.

The Iraqi Representative said that on his side he had intended to draw the committee's attention to the difficult situation which might be created if there were long delay. He had decided, in particular, to ask the committee to consider the question of the Assyrians in the Mosul camp. When that camp was set up the Iraqi Government had thought it would be for only two or three months. There had already been a long delay and the Iraqi Government had incurred considerable expense in consequence, the expenses for the month of January only having been £1,400. A monthly charge of this nature was a heavy burden. If the delay was likely to persist, he would like to know for his personal information whether there was any alternative. The Iraqi Government had made certain promises and were doing their best, but they felt that their friends were not helping sufficiently. For instance, no progress had been made with the French Government regarding the transfer to Syria of the families of those Assyrians who had remained in Syria last summer. No reply had been received from the French Government to a reasonable proposal which had been made about the transfer of these families. On the other hand, the Mar Shimun was making journeys on the

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Continent and printing pamphlets. He was engaging in harmful propaganda and did not appear to realise the expense which the Iraqi Government was incurring on behalf of his people. If there were likely to be long delay, the Iraqi representative would like to discuss in a friendly and informal manner what was to be done about this question of keeping the families of men who had left the country. The Iraqi Government did not wish to hamper the work of the Council Committee, but they must think of the future. He was raising the matter at the moment on his own responsibility and not under instructions. If the committee thought that the present position must continue, he would report accordingly to the Iraqi Government for their consideration, but he thought it was fair to expect the committee to help the Iraqi Government. As one means of assistance the committee might consider the refusal of the Assyrians to cultivate their lands. They were refusing to return to their villages for this purpose and were getting rid of their flocks, &c. The task of the Iraqi Government, in the circumstances, was a very difficult one, and, perhaps, the committee might indicate to the Assyrians that they ought to proceed with cultivation. Further, he appealed to the French Government to help in the matter of the families. If help were not given, in one way or another, the Iraqi Government might be obliged to distribute the refugees in the Mosul camp among the villages, giving two or three to each headman to look after and giving him a little assistance for this purpose. A great deal, however, depended on the help which the Council Committee was willing to afford.

The French Representative said that the Iraqi representative had made reference to the attitude of the French Government over the question of the families. He would like, therefore, to draw the attention of the Iraqi representative to a letter of the 25th March, which the French delegation had addressed to the president of the Council Committee, and which had just been distributed (see C. Min. Ass./25).

The President said that at its next meeting the committee would consider the remarks which the Iraqi representative had made, and would, no doubt, wish to have a further exchange of views with him on the subject.

The president then asked Mr. Werner whether he had any observations on Brigadier Browne's report.

M. Werner said that he had no observations to make on the report. He felt it rather outside his competence to do so as he did not consider himself as a technical expert. So far as he could judge, however, it seemed to him that the mission had adequately fulfilled its task, and he hoped that the return of Major Johnson, at all events, would not be long delayed, as, from the technical point of view, there seemed no further reason for him to remain in Brazil, and the Nansen Office was badly in need of his services.

The President then said that the committee sympathised with M. Werner's difficulties in this respect, but the question of the return of the mission was not an easy one as there were certain difficulties in Brazil.

M. Werner expressed himself as quite willing in the circumstances to leave the question of Major Johnson's return entirely to the committee.

The president of the Nansen Office and the Iraqi representative then withdrew, and the committee proceeded once more to consider the question of the communication of Brigadier Browne's report to the Brazilian Government.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had been principally desirous that the report should not be published. The proposal now was that the report should be communicated confidentially to the Brazilian authorities by Brigadier Browne. This proposal was not open to the same objections as publication. At the same time he felt there were certain objections. One or two passages, in particular the last section of paragraph 6 in Brigadier Browne's note, were liable to antagonise the Brazilian Government. Personally, he would have preferred to have postponed communication to the Brazilian Government until the situation was clearer, but he appreciated the advantages which had been urged in favour of immediate communication, and did not, therefore, wish to obstruct that course. He thought, however, that it would be a mistake to communicate the report without deleting certain passages.

The President agreed that certain passages must be deleted, and he would like to go further than the United Kingdom representative and suggest that all references to the Mar Shimun should be cut out, in view of the controversial nature of the Mar Shimun's position. He referred to the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Brigadier Browne's note. The question whether the Assyrians should drink yerba mate tea was, perhaps, a trivial point, but it seemed to him that, if the Brazilian Government obtained the impression that even a point of this nature required the Mar Shimun's orders, they might have considerable misgivings about his position.

The French Representative suggested that the best procedure would probably be not merely to delete certain passages in communicating the report to the Brazilian Government, but to ask Brigadier Browne to delete those passages altogether from his report, so that they would also not appear when the report was eventually published. This suggestion was adopted, and it was agreed to send Brigadier Browne a telegram of which the text is annexed.(¹)

As the committee was about to rise, a short discussion took place on future procedure.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that Major Thomson was due to leave for Iraq on the 30th March. He knew that Major Thomson, who, although the servant of the Iraqi Government, regarded himself also as acting to some extent on behalf of the committee, had hoped to be able to return to his duties with some kind of message to the Assyrians, which would have the authority of the committee behind it. The United Kingdom representative asked whether the committee thought it worth while that Major Thomson's departure for Iraq should be postponed, if possible, until the committee could consider the position in Iraq, and particularly the remarks made by Taufig Beg Suwaidi on this point, in the light of the Spanish Ambassador's appreciation of the position in Brazil.

It was agreed that it might be a great help eventually if Major Thomson's departure for Iraq could be postponed, and the United Kingdom representative was authorised to arrange this, if possible, on behalf of the committee.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

(¹) Not printed.

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INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 2218/1/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

3

P. Z.
2464
1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
April 11., 1934.

Coll 17/16

P.Z. 1840

14/4

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. Letter: E 1329/1/93 of March 6.

1579

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
ue of Nations Communicated N. Ass./27 and . Ass/28 April 4th	Assyrian question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 16 19 APR. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POL.
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
12 APR 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
A.O.
AM

14—6130 9508 (2)

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P. Z.
2464
1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
members of the Committee
for the settlement of
the Assyrians of Iraq.

C.Min.Ass./27.

Geneva, April 4th,1934

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the members of the Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, a letter together with five reports, addressed to him on March 26th, 1934 by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq.

Geneva, March 26th,1934.

The Secretary-General,

With reference to my letter No.108 of February 13th (document C.Min.Ass.22), I have the honour to send you herewith enclosed two reports for the month of January 1934 and three reports for the month of February 1934 concerning the Assyrian question.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(sgd) T.SWAIDY,

Head of the Permanent Delegation.

REPORT - A

(January)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS.

Posts. The posts established in the Assyrian villages are still maintained, as stated in the previous report.

Patrols. The police patrols are still carrying out patrols between villages for maintenance of security.

Guarantees and undertakings. The guarantees given by the heads of the neighbouring villages to those of the Assyrians are still in force and in effect.

Arms. Nothing new is to be mentioned.

REPORT - B.

(January)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE FAMILIES.

In addition to the aid given to the Assyrians, mentioned in the previous report, further quantities of crops and cash were distributed during January 1934 to some Assyrian villages and some Assyrians, as under:

Qadha	Village	Barley taghars	Wheat taghars	Dinars	Remarks
SHAIKHAN	Dehkan & Artukh	47	28 1/2		
"	Bahandawa	45	15		
"	Badria	25			
"	Ain Hilwa			60	paid to buy 5 mules & 3 horses to replace their lost animals.
"	Qasrun	15			
"	Bioz		1 1/2		
"	Upper Bioz	3			
		135	45		
DOHUK	Dohuk Qasaba	4 1/2			given to Zija ben Mirza and Ishag Iqhtiar.
"	Taqki	1 1/2			given to Toma Aziz.
"	Qulfa Sen	1			given to Mihael Adam.
"	Kori Kafan	11		8.500	given to Dohna Lauko & Bordjum Myako.
"	Telheshi	6			given to Sadek Sleman.
"	Rakawa			3.750	given to Shaul Johna.
AMADIA		60			given to a group of Zia Shemdin & distributed to the Tohobies.
		219	45	72.250	

A sum of I.D. 1.458 was paid to the settlement expert during January 1934 for feeding the Assyrian families living in the camp under his supervision.

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REPORT - A

(February)

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS.

All measures taken in this respect and mentioned in previous reports are still maintained. Nothing has been changed as regards the position of the police posts and patrols. The guarantees and undertakings taken from the chiefs and heads of neighbouring villages to those of the Assyrians are still in force and in effect.

REPORT - B

(February)

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE FAMILIES

In addition to the assistance to the Assyrians, mentioned in the previous reports, the following quantities of crops and cash were distributed to them during the month of February 1934 :

Qadha	Village	Barley taghars	Wheat taghars	Dinars	Remarks
SHAIKHAN	Bioz	8			
"	Ain Hilwa	12			
DOHUK				.500	given to Oraha Kastani.
"		1/4			given to Mirkengi (Assyrian women).
"		1/4			given to Khumi Dankha.
"	Telkhshef	1/2			given to Mirza Nisan.
"	Nordinawah			9	given to Ismail Athina (compensation).
				20	miscellaneous assistance.
		21		29.500	

A sum of I.D. 851 was paid during the month of February for feeding the Assyrians living in the camp.

REPORT - C

(February)

MEASURES TAKEN TO RECONSTRUCT DESTROYED HOUSES.

As all of the destroyed houses are now being reconstructed, there is nothing new to be mentioned in this respect.

P. Z.
2464
1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

mmunicated to the
mbers of the Committee
r the settlement of the
syrians of Iraq.

C.Min. Ass./28.1934.

Geneva, April 4th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, a letter, dated March 26th, 1934, addressed to him by the Permanent Delegate of Iraq, concerning an error which occurred on page one of Report B enclosed in Document C.Min./Ass./22.

Geneva, March 26th, 1934.

The Secretary-General.

With further reference to my letter No.108 of February 13th, 1934, enclosing three reports concerning the Assyrians, I have the honour to draw your attention to an error occurred on page 1 of Report B.

The 28 oxen reported as given to the village of Badria should be crossed out of the list, in view of the fact that they were already mentioned in the previous report attached to the letter No.C.527 of December 21st, 1933, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baghdad.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) T. SWAIDY,

Head of the Permanent Delegation.

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and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
1840
1934

India

MC

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Putly

P.Z. 1763 20/3

Foreign Office,
16 Mar, 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 1581/1/93 of Mar 14

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations 13 Mar	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 12
22 MAR. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

INDIA OFFICE
19 MAR 1934

Similar letter sent to A.M.
D.O.
W.O.

14—6130 9508 (2)

346

P.Z.
1840
1934

OPIE.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS

A la demande du Président du Comité du Conseil pour l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak, le Secrétariat général a l'honneur de faire parvenir aux Membres du Comité du Conseil, à M. le Représentant de l'Irak, à l'office international Nansen pour les réfugiés, copie d'un télégramme, daté de Sao Paulo le 12 mars 1934, que le Président a reçu du Général Browne.

Genève, le 13 mars 1934.

P.Z.
1840
1934

COPIE D'UN TELEGRAMME, DATE DE SAO PAULO LE 18 MARS 1934, DU GENERAL BROWNE, ADRESSE AU PRESIDENT DU COMITE POUR L'ETABLISSEMENT DES ASSYRIENS DE L'IRAK

Reference your cable stop Supplementary Report will reach Geneva about twentysixth March Stop All investigations laid down in Questionnaire number one will be completed by March twentyfirst and Commission could return by boat leaving March twentyfifth but in view your cable will await your instructions.

Browne 109.

INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
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and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
1763
1934

India
~~[illegible]~~
[illegible]

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
14 Mar, 1934.

1587

Keep for file after submission
[illegible]
P.Z. 1587
[illegible] 12/3

Reference to previous correspondence:
F.O. letter E 1407/1/93 of Mar 7.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations Mar 8.	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN [illegible]
No. 12 22 MAR. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
15 MAR 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
D.O.
W.O.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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SOCIE

P. Z.
1763
1934

COPIE

581/1/93)

A la demande du Président du Comité du Conseil pour l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak, le Secrétariat général a l'honneur de faire parvenir aux Membres du Comité du Conseil une copie d'un télégramme que le Président du Comité a adressé en date d'aujourd'hui, 8 mars, au Général de Brigade Brown, actuellement au Brésil.

SOCIETE DES NATIONS
Genève,
8 mars 1934.

350

Copy of a telegram sent to General Brown

Reference your telegram March 4th, please send by air mail as soon as possible in wording capable of publication supplementary Report contemplated in resolution January 16th Stop Please indicate its probable date of arrival in Geneva where Committee will study it and instruct you subsequently Stop Investigation other areas can if you consider useful take place after despatch report.

Lopez Olivan

8/III/1934.

351

Notes.

Register No.
P. Z.
1587/34.

Minute Paper.

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated 193 .
Rec.

To	Date.	Initials.
Under Secretary	21. 3.	
Secretary of State...	21. 3	
Committee............	22. 3.	S. H.
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State....		

SUBJECT.

ASSYRIANS.

Scheme for re-settlement in Brazil.

Copy of to

SOS 21/3

SA 22/3

FOR INFORMATION.

This file was last submitted at P.Z.290/34.

Since the Brazilian Government were persuaded in January last to agree to admit on certain conditions (see at P.Z.290/34) all ~~the~~ Assyrians, who are agriculturists, a League of Nations Mission has visited Brazil and examined on of the proposed Assyrian settlement areas, which seemed well fitted for the purpose. Unfortunately a violent campaign is now being carried on in the Brazilian press against the settlement scheme and owing to the vicissitudes of the internal political situation the Brazilian Government have not as yet dared to challenge the anti-Assyrian clamour. It is possible that the Brazilian Government may even be forced to withdraw its previous consent or to hedge it around with further/

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
27 MAR 1934

Previous papers :—

1743 1000 3.33

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further ~~conditions~~ restrictions.

In any case if the scheme is to go through there are still several difficulties to be overcome. There is little hope of the Assyrians being admitted unless they can be induced to accept assimilation in the Brazilian State and it will be difficult to persuade them to do so. The Brazilian Government have only agreed to accept Assyrians who are agriculturists, but some Assyrians are purely pastoral and some of the demobilized ~~living~~ levies are town-dwellers. Then again there are several Assyrians who belong to the anti-Mar Shimun party and would object to being transferred to any country where they would be within the Patriarch's sphere of influence (see Flag E). Finally the financial arrangements of the scheme have still to be settled though it appears that the Iraqi Government is now prepared to make a generous^x contribution and will not in the last resort allow the scheme to break down for want of money (P.Z.756/34). There is a special financial problem in connexion with the Brazilian Government's third condition regarding repatriation of Assyrians who fail to adapt themselves to life in Brazil. The final outcome of the settlement scheme will largely depend on the trend of politics and public opinion in Brazil.

x No figure ~~to been~~ is mentioned, & Iraqi ideas may will be much less generous than ours.

Meanwhile it seems that measures for the relief and protection of Assyrians in Iraq are being efficiently carried out. (P.Z.757/34, P.Z.1579/34).

J.E. Crombie
19/3/34

23/3
26/3

26/3

SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
27 MAR 1934

INDEXED

India
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MC

352

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P. Z.
1587
1934

CONFIDENTIAL

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

MJ 8.3

~~P.1579~~

Foreign Office,
7 Mar, 1934.

959 mi 6½

Reference to previous correspondence:
F. O. letter E 880/1/93 of Feb 9.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Rio de Janeiro els nos 30 of Mar 2 31 " " 2 33 " " 3	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 10. 8/3/34
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
8 MAR 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
D.O.
W.O.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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D.

R.

No. 30.

Important.

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

P. Z.
1587
1934

From BRAZIL.

Decypher. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
2nd March, 1934.

D. 3.05 p.m., 2nd March, 1934.

R. 7.30 p.m., 2nd March, 1934.

No. 30.

:::::::::::::

Important.

My telegram No. 22.

Chief of Government has on plea of pressure of work refused to grant Mission (who are arriving Rio from Parana today) audience as previously contemplated prior to their departure for Europe. Nor can Mission see Minister of Labour who is in the South and will not return until March 12th.

Political situation (see my telegram No. 29) is such that the Government dare not offend at present what seems to be unanimous public opinion or clamour and anti-Assyrians campaign is being steadily pursued even now with such vigour in the Constituent Assembly that there is reason to fear it is having its effect. Spanish Ambassador has received no official hint but we are inclined to think that after return of the Minister of Labour we may be faced by an attempt to withdraw previous consent or by a request that immigration be postponed.

Mission's presence here would not help in that case. On the other hand Government might only ask for material to rebut opposition's arguments and question therefore arises whether Mission as experts should not

stay ...

stay here until they have seen Minister of Labour again (Mission saw him of course on their arrival in Brazil). But we do not know whether we can properly suggest this delay owing to expense involved and I would be glad of your early advice on this point. Spanish Ambassador thinks that when the President is definitely elected Government will be in a stronger position. I am not so sure of that but we both agree it will be necessary at least to go slow for a while.

355

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P. Z.
1587
1934

From BRAZIL.

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
2nd March, 1934.

D. 9.15 a.m. 2nd March, 1934.

R. 9.30 a.m. 3rd March, 1934.

No. 31. (R).

xxxxxxxxx

Important.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Third paragraph was written under a misapprehension. Mission now explain that they have not returned to Rio with any intention of leaving for Europe but only in order to see President and ascertain the situation in view of press campaign. They have not yet visited second area but will do so in a few days time and will therefore not be leaving Brazil until after return of Minister of Labour.

P. Z.
1587
1934.

NO DISTRIBUTION

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
3rd March 1934.

D. 1.05 p.m. 4th March 1934.

R. 5.50 p.m. 4th March 1934.

No. 33. (R).

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

Your telegram No. 18.

Owing to difficulty of telegraphing through Spanish Embassy the Brigadier begs that the following be sent on his behalf to League of Nations, begins:

"N.L.T. Confidential. Commission examined area proposed for Assyrian settlement as thoroughly as time at disposal permitted traversing distance of 64 kilometres along and within northern part of area. All ground and conditions seem well fitted for Assyrian settlement and soil of similar quality to that seen in cultivation in about 2,000 hectares of company's territory. Part of area not seen is virtually virgin forest and only penetrable with help of parties cutting tracks, who must be paid, and two weeks extra required. But information from Hunter who has been in area, and according to conclusions drawn by company's surveyor, parties who have been on the edge of area as well as from such limited views as Commission could obtain, indicate ground to be of similar quality to that already seen. Commission returned to Rio in view of campaign in press and Assembly against Assyrians which although uninformed has produced a certain influence on Government. Spanish and British Ambassadors agree that Commission should await in Brazil outcome of present complicated political situation and meanwhile Commission will continue the completion of investigation of other areas. If further investigation of first area required please telegraph instructions. Brown - 107". Ends.

EXED
communication on this
No. E 1329
—not to any person by
Secretary of State," Foreign

THE Under-Sec
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for India
mits herewith

Foreign Office,
6 Mar

Re

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357

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(3)

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P. Z.
1579
1934

India
Am

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
6 Mar, 1934.

P.P. 1357

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 335 | 1 | 93 of Jan 31.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C/Min.Ass/22 of Feb 16.	Assyrian question

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 11 15 MAR. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
7 MAR 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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1579
1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

mmunicated to the
mbers of the Committee
r the Settlement of
e Assyrians of Iraq.

C./Min./Ass./22.

Geneva, February 16th, 1934.

SITUATION OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Letter from the Iraqi Government to the Secretary-General, dated February 13th, 1934.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the members of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter, with three annexes, addressed to him on February 13th, by the Permanent Delegation of Iraq.

Delegation of Iraq
to the
League of Nations

F.100
L.No.108.

Geneva, February 13th, 1934.

Sir,

With reference to the letter No. C.527 of December 21st, 1933 (Document Min.Ass.16), addressed to you by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to send you herewith enclosed three reports concerning the Assyrian question for the month of December 1933.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) T. SWAIDY

Tawfik el Swaidy
Minister Plenipotentiary,
Head of the Permanent Delegation.

The Secretary-General,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

Reference: IOR/L/PS/12/2874. Copyright for this page: Unknown

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REPORT - A.

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF ASSYRIANS.

Posts. The posts established in the Assyrian villages are still maintained, as stated in previous report, and there has been no change during December, 1933. A post manned by five policemen has been re-established in Koshki village under Dohuk Qadha. In Shaikhan, Dairestun post was removed to Bayuz village and a post was established in Lower Bius.

Patrols. The police patrols are still carrying out patrols between villages for maintenance of security and guarding the Assyrian villages. Tranquillity is prevalent throughout.

Guarantees and Undertakings. Among the administrative measures strong undertakings were taken from the Kurdish chiefs and Heads of the neighbouring villages to those of the Assyrians for maintenance of order and non-interference with Assyrians. Such guarantees and undertakings are still in force and in effect.

Arms. In addition to the existence of posts in the Assyrian villages it has been decided that the posts and Mukhtars in some of these villages should be supplied with a number of rifles to be carried by Assyrian cultivators not in possession of arms at times of ploughing and sowing in the estates for self-protection against events and beasts, provided that such rifles are returned to the post or Mukhtar subsequent to their return from the field. The total number of rifles issued amounted to 64, each with ten rounds as under:

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Qadha	Village	Number of arms already existing	New Arms	Strength Mounted.	Post Foot	Remarks
SHAIKHAN	Ain Hilwa		5	1	5	
	Peruzawa		8		4	
	Jarrahiya	7	8		5	
	Upper Bios		4	1	4	
	Bios	1	4			
	Bedairestek		5		2	
			34			
DOHUK	Bekawa	1	2			
	Kari-Bahan		1			
	Majelmakht		3		5	
	Lower Bakir		3		3	
	Kaflasen		2		5	
	Aluka Mazuri		2		5	
	Haijerki		2		5	
			15			
AMADIA	Jamsherti		5		7	Loyal Assyrians in Amadia were not disarmed.
	Jamsus	4	3		12	
	Baroshki		4			
	Tahlawa		3		3	Disloyal and disarmed villages are very few.
			15			
	Grand total		64			

IBAR Rifles in possession of Assyrians in Nehla Area are sufficient for self-protection.

QRA About 4-5 rifles exist in each Assyrian village in addition to the posts existing in some of them. There was therefore no necessity to issue other rifles to them.

REPORT - B.

MEASURES TAKEN TO SECURE ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE FAMILIES.

In addition to the aids given to the Assyrians, mentioned in the previous report, further quantities of crops, blankets, cooking utensils, a number of agricultural animals and cash were distributed during December, 1933 to some Assyrian villages, as under:-

Qadha.	Village	Barley.	Wheat	Blankets	Mats	Dinars	Oxen	
		taghars.						
SHAIKHAN	Dehkan & Artukh		28½	32	24	5	20	*
	Jarrahiya			12	6			
	Badria			80	40		28	
	Bioz		1½	28	14			
	Qasruh	8		16	16			
	Ain Hilwa			112	40			
	Bahandawa		15	55	30		4	
	Birozawa			10	10			
	Upper Bios	2						
	Lower Bios						8	
		10	45	345	180	5	60	
AQRA	Khalilkan					20		**
DOHUK	Kori Kafan	4	4½					
	Kandi Kosa		1					
	Taqki	5	26					
	Khrashna	10½	10½					
	Lower Bakir	2	6					
	Majelmakht	3	3½					
	Nafdara	6½	7½					
	Shakhki	1	2½					
	Rakawa	7	11					
	Kandinazi	1	½					
	Kandaknabi	1½	2					
	Dohuk Qasaba	10	31½					
ADIA	Dairi	5	5					
		56½	111½					
		66½	156¼	345	180	25	60	

The oxen were given to Malik Yonan and his party, which they were allowed to sell and exchange for mules. The five Dinars were paid as contribution to Malik Namrud.

Agricultural assistance to Mashko Isa.

The distribution of 169 pans and 179 plates to the llages of Shaikhan Qadha has been completed. The crops were stributed to the Assyrian villages and the transport charges id by the Government.

A sum of I.D. 1809 was paid to Major Thomson during ember, 1933 on account of feeding expenses of the Assyrian nilies existing in the Camp under his supervision.

The following is an abstract of sums spent during December 1933 on account of assistance mentioned in this report:

Paid to Major Thomson and Major Wilson on account of feeding families existing in the camp ...	I.D.	1,809/-
Transport charges of crops	"	53/-
Cost of Mats, cooking pans and utensils ...	"	46/380
Agricultural assistance to Isa Mashko, an Assyrian of Khalilkan village	"	20/-
Transport charges of blankets from Baghdad ...	"	7/612
Miscellaneous cash assistance	"	37/-
Total	I.D.	1,972/992

... ...

REPORT - C.

MEASURES TAKEN TO RECONSTRUCT VILLAGES DESTROYED WHOLLY OR PARTLY.

There is nothing worth mentioning on the subject during December, 1933 as all villages which were destroyed wholly or partly prior to this date have been repaired.

The total amount paid to the Assyrians personally as wages for carrying out repairs to their own houses is I.D. 232/050 in all, other than constructional materials such as wood and doors supplied to them.

Reference: IOR/L/PS/12/2874. Copyright for this page: Unknown

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P.Z.
1357
1934

Confidential

India 364
[illegible]
Mr 6.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

802
P.P. ~~859~~
Mr 6.

Foreign Office,
26 Feb., 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 7726/7/93 of Jan 13. 756

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
ecords of League of Nations ssyrian Committee th meeting of Jan 15 .. .. .. 16 5 .. .. .. 17 6 .. .. .. 18 7 .. .. .. 19. inutes of 4th meeting of th Session of Council Jan 19.	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 9 1 MAR. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Treas
C.O.
D.O.
W.O.
A.M.

14—6130 9508 (2)

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P.Z.
1357
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

January 19, 1934.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E 455/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 11.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirteenth meeting of the Council Committee on the 15th January, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, January 17, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 3·30 P.M. on January 15, 1934.

Reply of the Brazilian Government.

Dr. Kerno circulated to the committee a copy of the telegram (annex 1) received by the Spanish Government from the Spanish Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, communicating the reply of the Brazilian Government to the representations made by the Spanish Ambassador on the lines proposed at the twelfth meeting of the Council Committee.

The President said that the Brazilian Government had informed the Spanish Ambassador that this was their final reply.

Dr. Kerno observed that the committee must present a report to the Council at the present session of that body, and in the report it would be necessary to refer to the Brazilian reply. He asked whether it would be in order to do so on the basis of the message received by the Spanish Government.

The President said that he thought that the message communicated to the Spanish Government, though representing the final attitude of the Brazilian Government, could scarcely be regarded as their official reply. It was not a signed communication from that Government and would no doubt be confirmed in writing in due course.

Dr. Kerno suggested that in that case it would be advisable to obtain official confirmation from the Brazilian Minister at Berne.

After some discussion, *the President* expressed the view that it would be advisable for the Secretariat informally to approach the Brazilian Minister at Berne and to secure from him some official communication in this sense. If, however, the Brazilian Minister at Berne was not in a position to make such an official communication before the report of the committee had to be presented to the Council, the report would, of course, have to say simply that a message in the sense of annex 1 had been received from the Spanish Ambassador.

The United Kingdom Representative asked whether it would not be wiser to decide before pressing for an official reply whether it was desirable to enter into further negotiations with the Brazilian Government regarding the third condition which they had laid down. If it were decided to enter into further negotiations, it might be an advantage that the Brazilian Government should not meanwhile commit themselves to that condition in an official communication. If they did so, they might be the more reluctant to change their attitude. The question seemed to be whether further negotiations should take place forthwith or whether they should be postponed until the proposed mission of investigation had been sent out to Brazil and had reported favourably.

The President said that in the circumstances the committee had perhaps better discuss the substance of the Brazilian reply before considering the procedure for getting it confirmed. The reply as a whole was a great advance on the previous attitude of the Brazilian Government. The idea of a trial limit had been entirely abandoned and the Brazilian Government were now prepared to admit all the Assyrians. There were, however, three conditions attached to this. The first two had been anticipated. The third obviously raised a question of some difficulty and he would welcome the observations of the members of the committee on this point.

The United Kingdom Representative said that while in London he had seen the chairman of Parana Plantations (Limited), who was aware of the Brazilian reply. The chairman of the company, while still prepared to carry out the settlement of the Assyrians, had made it clear that the company could certainly not accept the third condition laid down by the Brazilian Government, and if the Brazilian Government insisted on maintaining this condition, the only solution seemed to be for the League to assume the ultimate responsibility for repatriating or resettling the Assyrians elsewhere. The United Kingdom Representative thought it was most unfortunate, however, that the third condition should have been laid down in its present form. It had been anticipated that the Brazilian Government would themselves disclaim responsibility for repatriating or resettling the Assyrians if they did not adapt themselves to the country, but this was a very different thing from the positive form in which the condition was now worded. The responsibility was not merely disclaimed on the part of the Brazilian Government, but was definitely laid on another entity, namely, Parana Plantations (Limited). The condition would have a most unfortunate psychological effect on the Assyrians themselves, for they would be certain to regard themselves merely as temporary settlers in Brazil, and whenever things did not appear to be going smoothly they would at once petition the League to be removed elsewhere. Furthermore, the wording of the condition was unfortunate in another, possibly minor, respect. Normally, if the Assyrians went in a body to Brazil and afterwards individuals or families who could afford to move elsewhere formed a desire to do so, they would go at their own expense. As the condition was now worded, however, they would be perfectly within their rights in claiming that the company must transfer them at its expense as soon as they expressed a wish to be transferred. It would be most unfortunate for these reasons if the Assyrians knew that their settlement in Brazil was subject to the third condition.

The President said that he entirely agreed, and had for this reason at once arranged with the League Secretariat that the Brazilian reply should not be published. It had not so far been published by the League Secretariat, though M. Olivan could not, of course, say whether it had been published in Brazil.

Continuing, the President wondered whether the responsibility for repatriating or resettling the Assyrians in certain circumstances was one which the League could properly accept. It seemed to him that, at all events, it was outside the competence of the committee to accept such a responsibility on behalf of the League. It might be, indeed, that it was outside the competence of the Council itself and that the matter could only be dealt with by the Assembly. This would mean a very serious delay. He wondered whether the contingency could not be met by some sort of deposit from the Assyrians themselves, which would form a kind of fund to be used in case of necessity for their retransfer if they could not adapt themselves to Brazil.

The Danish Representative said that what was wanted was some form of insurance against this contingency. Perhaps some insurance company might take the risk.

The United Kingdom Representative, returning to the question of procedure, suggested that it might be well to leave the third condition for later discussion with the Brazilian Government, together with other details which would have to be discussed with that Government regarding the status which the Assyrians would enjoy in Brazil. It must be remembered that the Brazilian Government had been approached purely and simply on a point of principle, subject to the later discussion of details. The best procedure at present might be to thank the Brazilian Government for their reply, to recall that the question asked had been simply one of principle, and that before proceeding to a discussion of details the committee thought that it would be wise to make sure, by sending out a mission of investigation, that the Assyrians were likely to thrive in the area proposed and to become a useful element in Brazil. When the suitability of the area had thus been proved, the Brazilian Government might be in a better frame of mind to consider the modification of their third condition.

The Danish Representative agreed. He thought that the mention, in the third condition laid down by the Brazilian Government, of the possibility that the Assyrians might not adapt themselves to the country led, naturally, to the mission of investigation which it had been proposed to send out.

The French Representative also agreed. If the report of the investigation was favourable, the risk involved in accepting the third Brazilian condition would evidently be small. But he thought that the risk of the Assyrians not adapting themselves to Brazil must in any case be allowed for in the final settlement.

The President agreed. Even if Brazil had not made the third condition, the point was one for which he thought the committee would have had to provide. He suggested, therefore, that the committee should now consider the question of sending a mission of investigation to Brazil and the connected question of bringing Brigadier Browne to Geneva. He wondered whether this was really necessary.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that, when the question had been discussed at a previous meeting, it had been decided to leave the point for Brigadier Browne's own decision. The committee had felt that if Brigadier Browne thought a visit to Geneva necessary, then such a visit should be arranged. On the other hand, the committee did not, for reasons of expense, wish to press Brigadier Browne to come to Geneva if he did not think it necessary. The United Kingdom representative said that he had sounded Brigadier Browne while in England, and found that he was strongly of opinion that he ought to be allowed to come to Geneva before proceeding to carry out a task which involved him in considerable responsibility.

The President agreed that this was reasonable, and asked Dr. Kerno whether there would be any objection on financial grounds.

Dr. Kerno said that he would consult the League Treasury, but anticipated no difficulty.

It was agreed that Brigadier Browne should be invited to come to Geneva as soon as possible, and the United Kingdom representative was asked to arrange this.

The President observed that the proposal to send Brigadier Browne to Brazil should be mentioned in the report to the Council. In fact, in that report, the Council might be asked to sanction the mission.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that at a previous meeting the committee had accepted in principle, subject to amendment of detail, a resolution providing for Brigadier Browne's mission to Brazil. Was it not proposed to proceed with that resolution?

After a short discussion it was decided to proceed with the resolution, and to attach it to the report which would be drawn up for the Council.

The draft resolution (Annex 2) was then circulated and considered.

Some discussion took place as to whether it was in order for the Council Committee, in a resolution of this nature, passed while the Council was still sitting, to say that the cost of the investigation would be met from League funds. The resolution, as originally worded, had been drawn up at a time when the Council was not sitting, and in anticipation that the President in office would be asked to sanction the expense subject to eventual confirmation by the Council. It was generally agreed that as the Council was sitting, it might be necessary to obtain its consent for the expense involved.

Dr. Kerno undertook to speak to the League Treasury on this point, but it was agreed that the whole resolution might be made subject to the consent of the Council being obtained for the expense involved. It was proposed that the penultimate paragraph of the draft resolution should be transposed so as to become paragraph 8, and the rest of the resolution slightly redrafted to make it conditional upon the Council granting the necessary funds.

It was agreed that the resolution thus redrafted should be considered by the next meeting of the committee.

The President said that as soon as the resolution had been adopted, it would be necessary (*a*) to issue an official invitation to Brigadier Browne; (*b*) to write to the Swiss Government, asking officially that the services of M. Redard should be placed at the disposal of the committee; (*c*) to arrange with the president of the Nansen Office for the nomination of a representative of that office; (*d*) to warn the Brazilian Government by telegram of the intention of the committee to send out the investigation.

It was agreed that a draft telegram to the Brazilian Government should be drawn up for consideration at the next meeting. It was suggested that it should thank the Brazilian Government for their reply, while leaving the final decision open. It should stress the importance of a mission of investigation, to reassure both the Council Committee and the Brazilian Government themselves that the scheme was likely to prosper, and should express the hope that the Brazilian Government would therefore see no objection to the mission of investigation which the Council Committee would propose to send out subject to a decision on the subject by the Council itself.

The French Representative asked whether, at the same time, the telegram might not press for official confirmation of the reply received through the Spanish Ambassador at Rio.

It was decided, however, that it would be better not to press for any official reply so long as there was any question of endeavouring to induce the Brazilian Government to reconsider the third condition laid down.

Replies from other Governments.

Dr. Kerno distributed to the committee replies received from the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and Mexico to the communications addressed to those Governments following upon the decisions of the committee at its tenth meeting (see Annexes 3, 4, 5 and 6).

Possible Settlement in the Argentine.

The President called attention to a document received from the Nansen Office (Annex 7) regarding a preliminary offer for the settlement of the Assyrians made by a private company in the Argentine. He asked whether the committee would wish to examine this offer at the present stage. Personally, he feared that it would only cause delay if the committee began negotiations with the Argentine Government on the basis of this offer and suspended the scheme for settlement in Brazil meanwhile.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that the Argentine Government had already been approached officially by the League Secretariat as a result of the decisions of the committee at its tenth meeting, and it seemed premature to discuss this new scheme until the reply of the Argentine Government had been received and it was known whether that Government was prepared in principle to accept the Assyrians.

The French Representative said that the distance of the area proposed, the cost of settlement in that area, and the climate seemed very much the same as in the case of the Parana scheme, and he therefore saw no advantage in suspending the consideration of the Brazilian scheme while the new offer was being examined.

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It was agreed to keep the offer for further examination if necessary, but not to go into it further until the attitude of the Argentine Government was known.

Dr. Kerno said that the agent of the company concerned in Switzerland had a film of the colony, which he was prepared to show to the committee if required.

Situation of Assyrians in Iraq.

The President said that two communications from the Iraqi Government had been circulated as C/Min.Ass./16 and 17. As time was short, he proposed that these documents should be considered at a further meeting, and he understood that Major Thomson, who had been closely connected with the subject matter of the two documents, had come to Geneva in the capacity of an expert attached to the Iraqi delegation. He thought it would be most useful if the committee could have the opportunity of discussing the documents in Major Thomson's presence. It would be preferable if this could be arranged in a private session, *i.e.*, without the Iraqi delegate. He suggested that this should be left to the United Kingdom representative to arrange.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he would do his best to arrange this. At the same time, he felt bound to warn the committee that it might be extremely difficult to secure Major Thomson's presence if the Iraqi delegate were not himself also present. The committee would be aware that a new permanent delegate had been appointed in the person of Taufiq Beg Suwaidi, and the United Kingdom representative had formed the impression that Taufiq Beg would be very reluctant to allow Major Thomson to attend a meeting of the committee alone.

The French Representative said that the crucial question was that of money, and he thought that the time had come to address precise enquiries to the Iraqis on this subject.

It was arranged that the committee should hold its next private meeting on the 16th January at 10 A.M., and that at 11·30 the representatives of the Nansen Office and of the Iraqi delegation should be invited to attend. The private meeting should be devoted to an examination of the documents referred to above from the Iraqi Government, the question of finance, and the question of the report to be presented to the Council.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva, January 15, 1934.

Annex 1 to Enclosure.

Télégramme du Ministère des Affaires étrangères d'Espagne, communiqué par M. López Olivan, le 9 *Janvier* 1934, *au sujet de l'Etablissement des Assyriens au Brésil.*

Le Brésil accepte la totalité des Assyriens, par groupes de 500 familles par mois au fur et à mesure que la compagnie anglaise "Parana Plantation" pourra procéder à leur installation et aux conditions suivantes: qu'ils soient agriculteurs, qu'il n'y ait pas de frais pour le pays et que la compagnie accepte la responsabilité, dans le cas d'inadaptation, de prendre à ses frais, soit leur rapatriement, soit leur établissement dans un autre pays.

Annex 2 to Enclosure.

Draft Resolution.

The Committee,

Considering that, in view of the exceptional nature of the problem with which it is confronted, it would be assuming a grave responsibility if, before taking a decision regarding the project for the settlement on land in Brazil at the disposal of Parana Plantations (Limited) of those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq, it did not take steps to satisfy itself as to the suitability for this particular

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purpose of the area concerned, by means of an independent and impartial investigation on the spot, conducted by some person specially qualified to form an opinion by reason of his knowledge of Assyrian needs and characteristics:

Decides to invite Brigadier J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., until recently the Officer Commanding the Assyrian Levies in Iraq, to proceed to Brazil on its behalf as soon as possible, and to report to the committee by telegram, after local investigation, whether, in the light of his special knowledge, he is of opinion that the above-mentioned scheme offers such prospect of success that there is good reason to believe that the Assyrians will thrive under the scheme and become a useful element in Brazil. In the affirmative, it would be of assistance if the investigator were to indicate in a supplementary report any special considerations which, in his view, ought to be taken into account in settling the Assyrians.

The committee considers that it would be of assistance to the investigator to be accompanied by a diplomatic or consular officer with local knowledge, and, bearing in mind the special qualifications of the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro, decides to request the Swiss Government to be good enough to permit the services of M. Redard to be utilised in this manner.

Furthermore, the committee, recognising the advantage which it might be to the investigator to have the benefit also of the advice of an expert in settlement work, gratefully accepts the offer of the president of the Nansen Office to nominate such an expert to accompany the investigator at the expense of the Nansen Office.

The committee authorises its president to acquaint the Brazilian Government with the proposal to conduct an investigation, and requests the Nansen Office to inform Parana Plantations (Limited) also, in order that the necessary local arrangements may be made.

The cost of the investigation, apart from the expenses of the expert nominated by the president of the Nansen Office, will be met from League funds.

The committee requests the League Secretariat to furnish the investigator with all available information which may assist him in the accomplishment of his task.

Annex 3 to Enclosure.

Australian Government Representative to Deputy Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Australia House, London,
December 19, 1933.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 30th November, addressed to the High Commissioner for Australia, regarding the question of the settlement of such Assyrians as may desire to leave Iraq, I am directed to inform you that Mr. Bruce had hoped to have sent you earlier a reply on this matter, but found it necessary first to consult the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The High Commissioner is now awaiting a reply to a cablegram that he has despatched to his Government on the subject, and upon receipt of that reply you will be further communicated with.

I am, &c.
(For Official Secretary),
(Copy unsigned).

Annex 4 to Enclosure.

Australian Government Representative to Deputy Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Australia House, London,
December 21, 1933.

Dear Sir,

I desire to refer to your letter of the 30th November, addressed to the High Commissioner, and my reply thereto of the 19th December, 1933, on the subject of the possible settlement in Australia of such Assyrians as may desire to leave Iraq.

I am directed to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have given this matter careful consideration, but, in view of unemployment consequent upon the prevailing economic depression, it has been

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found necessary to restrict greatly the admission of aliens into Australia. In these circumstances, I am to express regret that it is not practicable to absorb the Assyrians to whom your letter of the 30th November refers.

Yours faithfully,
(Copy unsigned),
Official Secretary.

Annex 5 to Enclosure.

New Zealand Government Representative to Deputy Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir,
London, December 11, 1933.

With further reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, regarding the settlement of such Assyrians as may desire to leave Iraq, I am directed by the High Commissioner to inform you that he has to-day received a reply to the cablegram which he addressed to the New Zealand Government. It is as follows:—

> "With reference to your telegram of the 6th December, New Zealand Government much regret they can see no prospect of settlement of Assyrians in this Dominion."

I have, &c.
(Copy unsigned),
Official Secretary.

Annex 6 to Enclosure.

Mexican Minister at Paris to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

M. le Secrétaire général,
Paris, le 11 *décembre* 1933.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre communication du 30 novembre, ainsi que des documents que vous avez bien voulu y joindre, relative à l'établissement d'Assyriens en dehors de l'Irak.

Étant donné qu'il n'y a pas assez de temps pour compter sur une réponse des autorités de mon pays avant le 15 janvier, je me permets de vous anticiper que, en principe, le Gouvernement du Mexique, pour des raisons économiques spéciales, n'envisagerait pas favorablement l'établissement sur son territoire des Assyriens qui exprimeraient le désir d'abandonner leur pays.

Sous réserve de revenir sur ce sujet dès que j'aurai reçu une réponse de mon Gouvernement, je vous prie, &c.

Le Ministre,
F. CASTILLO NAJERA.

Annex 7 to Enclosure.

Preliminary Settlement Offer made by an Argentine Company in Missiones, Argentina, to the Nansen International Office for Refugees.

(Confidential.)

Situation of Property.

Latitude 26–27°: 10 miles from Parana River, navigable from Buenos Aires, in colony in existence ten years and already occupied by 2,000 German settlers.

The exact situation of the property is marked in green on the back page of the attached pamphlet.(¹)

References.

Swiss Emigration Office, which has authorised Dr. Fuchs of Zurich to open a propaganda bureau; British Ambassador and Swiss Minister, Buenos Aires; Pastor Jean Schorrer and M. René Turrettini, of Geneva, who have visited colony.

(¹) Not printed.

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Description of Land and Colony.

The company owns 250,000 hectares of land. This land is stated to consist of virgin forest, first-class soil, covered with valuable timber, with an abundance of small streams and no danger of floods or drought. There are schools, churches, doctors, choirs and other rural entertainments, as well as shops, sawmills, carpenters, blacksmiths, wheelwrights, &c.

In this and adjoining colonies owned by the company, there are 10,000 inhabitants of thirty-four different nationalities, including Austrians, Czechoslovaks, Dutch, English and Germans.

Climate.

The temperature ranges from – 2° to 38°.

Rainfall, 1,500–2,000 mm. per annum.

Produce.

The land is stated to be very suitable for the cultivation of yerba maté, a large variety of fruits, including bananas, pineapples, oranges, lemons, melons and grapes; maize, manioc, sugar-cane, lentils, potatoes and many other vegetables; rice, tung for wood-oil, and a number of vegetable oils. Sub-tropical timber of all descriptions.

Cattle-raising, Pig-breeding, Poultry-farming and Bee-keeping.

These are stated to be very profitable industries in Missiones, with ready markets.

Means of Communication.

There is a service of boats, up to 200 tons, on the Parana River, twice weekly throughout the year, from Buenos Aires.

Posadas, the capital of Missiones, a town of 20,000 inhabitants and connected by railway and river with Buenos Aires and the principal commercial centres of the country, is about 200 kilom. from the colony.

Alternative Offers.

1. Sale of land for the settlement of 2,000 families, the settlement work to be carried out by the Nansen Office: 40,000 hectares at 25 paper pesos per hectare = £65,760,000.

2. Settlement cost for 2,000 families, including 20 hectares of land per family, simple shacks, necessary live-stock, and generally to make them self-supporting: 2,000 paper pesos per family, or £263,000.

Transport.

As for Parana Plantations.

NOTE.—The comparative offers made by Parana Plantations (Limited) were—

1. 24,200 hectares	£65,000
2. Total settlement cost	£204,000

Finance.

The company is stated to be financed by the Tornquist Bank.

Reimbursement of Advances.

The company estimates that colonists should be in a position to reimburse advances made to them within ten years, commencing at the end of the second year.

Time Factors.

The company state that their organisation would enable them to receive from 200 to 2,500 families this year, given reasonable notice.

N.B.—A film of the colony is at the disposal of the committee.

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P. Z.
1357
1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

January 22, 1934.

SECTION 4.

[E 491/1/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 19.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the fourteenth meeting of the Council Committee, on the 16th January, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, January 19, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Council Committee, held at 10 A.M. *on January* 16, 1934.

Reply to Brazilian Government.

THE committee had before it the draft of a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro (Annex 1).(¹)

The President proposed that paragraph 2 of this draft should mention the persons who would collaborate with Brigadier Browne in the capacity of advisers.

The French Representative proposed that there should be inserted in the telegram a sentence thanking the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro on behalf of the committee for the part which he had played in securing the change of the Brazilian Government's attitude.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that the first paragraph, which spoke of the committee being convinced that it would be possible to arrive at a complete understanding with the Brazilian Government regarding conditions of settlement, was somewhat too definite. He proposed that the telegram should be modified so as to merely express the hope that it would be possible to arrive at a complete understanding. He also suggested that, to make it still more clear that the committee intended to discuss further the conditions laid down by the Brazilian Government, a phrase should be added to the second paragraph of the telegram to the effect that, before proceeding to discuss the matter in further detail, the committee thought it best to make sure, by sending out the mission of investigation, that the scheme was likely to prove suitable.

The United Kingdom Representative also suggested that it was undesirable in the last paragraph to ask the Brazilian Government definitely for their consent to the despatch of the proposed mission.

There was general agreement, and, after various suggestions had been made, the Danish representative proposed that the committee should simply express the hope that the Brazilian Government would facilitate the task of Brigadier Browne and his associates.

The draft telegram, as amended in the above sense and eventually adopted, is attached as Annex 2.(¹)

Resolution regarding Mission to Brazil.

Dr. Kerno said that he had discussed with the League Treasury the passage in the draft resolution considered by the committee on the 15th January regarding the expense of the proposed mission to Brazil. The opinion of the Treasury was

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(¹) Not printed.

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that it was not necessary to approach the President of the Council on this matter, and that it was not necessary to make a special request to the Council to sanction the expenditure in question. It would be sufficient to embody the resolution in the committee's report to the Council, and the Council's resolution approving the report would have to contain a sentence authorising the proposed expenditure.

Dr. Kerno suggested a corresponding amendment to the draft resolution, and it was decided that the draft, amended as suggested, should be circulated in due course, but should be regarded forthwith as passed. (The resolution in its final form is attached as Annex 3.)(1)

The United Kingdom Representative informed the committee that, as authorised at the previous sitting, he had telephoned to Brigadier Browne, and had arranged for him to arrive in Geneva on the morning of Thursday, the 18th January.

Situation of Assyrians in Iraq.

The President invited the committee to consider what questions, if any, arising out of documents C./Min.Ass./16 and 17 it would be advisable to put to Taufiq Beg Suwaidi, the new Iraqi permanent delegate, and to Major Thomson.

The United Kingdom Representative reported that he had seen Taufiq Beg Suwaidi the previous evening and had invited him to meet the committee at 11·30. He had also told him that the committee was glad to learn that Major Thomson was available, and hoped that Taufiq Beg Suwaidi would place him at its disposal to assist the committee with his knowledge and recent experience of the Assyrians, and particularly of those in the refugee camp in Mosul. Taufiq Beg Suwaidi had at once expressed his willingness to place Major Thomson at the disposal of the committee, but the United Kingdom representative was doubtful whether he would be willing for Major Thomson to attend a meeting of the committee without being also present himself. He suggested, however, that the president should endeavour to get Taufiq Beg Suwaidi to confirm before the committee that Major Thomson's services were entirely at its disposal.

The President said that he proposed to ask Taufiq Beg Suwaidi for further details regarding the situation of the Assyrians in Northern Iraq, and particularly regarding that of the refugees in the Mosul camp, as the report on the latter subject furnished by the Iraqi Government only covered the period ending the 30th November. The president also asked whether the committee thought it opportune that he should ask the Iraqi delegate what financial contribution the Iraqi Government proposed to make. An alternative was to leave the matter for the report to the Council, so that the Council might put some pressure on the Iraqi Government, which would be more effective than anything which the committee could do. He was rather in favour of leaving the matter for the report of the Council, which would in any case have to touch on the question of finance and appeal for funds from various Governments and private charitable institutions.

The United Kingdom Representative said that in the course of his conversation the previous evening with Taufiq Beg Suwaidi he had broached the question of finance, and had urged the importance of the Iraqi Government, as having the greatest interest in the settlement of the Assyrian problem, making a really generous contribution. Otherwise the settlement scheme might break down and the Assyrian problem would remain unsolved, to the great inconvenience of the Iraqi Government. Taufiq Beg Suwaidi had on his side stressed the difficulty in which the Iraqi Government found themselves in deciding on a definite amount for their contribution so long as certain details were not yet precisely fixed. It would be much better for the Iraqi Government that the number of Assyrians who wished to move should be established and the exact cost of the operation ascertained before they suggested to the Iraqi Parliament a definite sum. The Iraqi contribution in such circumstances was likely to be bigger than if the Iraqi Government were pressed at once to state how much they would contribute.

The French Delegate expressed his preference also for leaving the matter to be dealt with in the report to the Council. The committee had been charged, in the first place, with the task of finding a destination for the Assyrians. This first stage had now, to all intents and purposes, been reached and it must be emphasised to the Council that the next step was to decide how the scheme would be financed. The Council, with its authority, ought to recall to the Government of Iraq that, in demanding a substantial contribution, the Council was not asking for a benevolence, but was asking the Iraqi Government to fulfil a responsibility, since it was the Iraqi Government which was most closely concerned with the question.

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(1) Not printed.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he agreed that it might be left to the Council to bring pressure upon the Iraqis. He thought, however, that the committee ought at least to ask the Iraqi delegate, without pressing him, whether he was yet in a position to state what his Government were prepared to contribute. It seemed necessary to make this enquiry in order to have something on which to base the report of the Council on this point.

The President agreed. He recalled that a letter had already been addressed to the Iraqi delegate on this point and it had so far remained without answer. The best course was to confirm that the Iraqi delegate was still not in a position to give the answer of his Government, and afterwards to point out to the Council the necessity of bringing pressure to bear on that Government.

Dr. Kerno, with reference to document C./Min.Ass./16, observed that it embodied a report by Major Thomson which covered only the period up to the 30th November last. Later information, however, had been received from the Mar Shimun in the form of the petition of the 11th January, which had been circulated as C./Min.Ass./19.

The President said that the Mar Shimun had recently been to see him. The Patriarch had complained of the composition of the local committee in Iraq and had alleged that it could not possibly be impartial. He had also emphasised the sufferings which his people in Iraq were still undergoing. In fact, he had said that they were being massacred, though he had corrected himself to the extent of saying that it was not by the sword but by starvation and destitution. The president had informed the Mar Shimun, with regard to the first point, that the committee had done its best, but the Mar Shimun must remember that it was dealing with the Government of an independent country, a member of the League of Nations, and could not therefore impose conditions upon that Government. It was a question of mutual arrangement. The president said he had purposely not entered into the second point raised by the Mar Shimun. It was desirable not to give the Patriarch the status of a party to the dispute, and to treat him as a Government. He had made it clear that he could not discuss the allegations made by the Mar Shimun (which had been couched in exaggerated language), but could only listen to them. He had pointed out, however, that it was always open to him to address a letter to the Council Committee. The letter of the 14th January (see Annex 4 (1)), of which the Mar Shimun had sent copies to the various members of the committee, supplementing his petition of the 11th January, was no doubt the result.

Dr. Kerno said that the Mar Shimun had also been to see him and had spoken in the same sense as to the president. He had particularly insisted that the procedure contemplated in Iraq was not satisfactory. Major Thomson could not be regarded as impartial. Dr. Kerno had replied that the committee had taken precautions. They had arranged for the Assyrian headman in each village to become a member of the local committee. The Mar Shimun had said that the headmen would be useless. They would be terrorised and even massacred. Dr. Kerno had then referred to the presence on the committee of a Nansen representative. The Mar Shimun had replied that the Nansen representative would be submerged by the rest of the committee. Dr. Kerno then said that it was quite impossible for the Council Committee to assume in advance that the machinery set up in collaboration with the Iraqi Government was not going to work, and, if any injustice occurred, the Nansen representative would be on the spot and would be able to report to the Council Committee, who could then consider other measures.

The President said that it was obviously impossible for the committee to ignore the Mar Shimun's fears and allegations. At the same time, he thought that it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to them and to obscure the issue by going into them in detail.

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The Danish Representative agreed. At the same time he suggested that, in talking to the Iraqi representative and Major Thomson, the committee must assure itself that conditions were not and would not be as stated by the Mar Shimun. In the reports presented by the Iraqi Government the situation was described as satisfactory. The committee must ask for further details and press the Iraqi Government to do everything possible to relieve the situation of the Assyrians pending transfer.

The President asked whether the committee thought it useful to consider the possibility of sending the Nansen representative to Iraq at an earlier stage than had so far been contemplated.

Dr. Kerno pointed out that under the resolution of the 31st October it was provided that the Nansen representative should only go to Iraq as soon as possible after the place of settlement had been definitely fixed.

The French Representative said that he thought that under the terms of the resolution of the 31st October the Nansen representative could not be sent to Iraq at least until Brigadier Browne's report of his mission to Brazil had been received.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that the resolution of the 31st October had been prepared by negotiation with the Iraqi Government, and, if it was proposed to depart from its terms, such departure could only be by agreement with the Iraqi Government. Whether it was necessary for the committee to seek that agreement was for decision. There were certainly disquieting reports about the state of the Assyrians in the north. There was, in the first place, the refugee camp in Mosul, and it would be necessary for the committee to satisfy themselves by questioning Major Thomson that conditions in this camp were satisfactory. In addition, there were a good many Assyrians who had left their villages and flocked into Mosul outside the refugee camp. So far as his information went, the United Kingdom representative said that he did not understand these refugees to be at present in a state of actual destitution, though obviously their conditions might be better. He understood that they were being lodged and kept by the Assyrians permanently resident in Mosul, but there was always a chance of this system breaking down if the refugees insisted on remaining in Mosul indefinitely and refused to go back to their villages. It was alleged that their reluctance to return to the villages was due to unsatisfactory arrangements by the Iraqi Government for their security and to insufficient payment of compensation. That was one side of the question. On the other side it was alleged that the Assyrians in Mosul were themselves chiefly to blame for their present condition, and that their refusal to go back to their villages was simply due to the fact that they had got it into their heads that they were to be transferred almost immediately and were waiting for something to be done for them. It was desirable to question the Iraqi delegate on this point, and it might be necessary, at some stage, to urge the Iraqi Government to do everything possible to arrange for the Assyrians to return to their villages in security and to compensate them for losses.

The President recalled that in his letter of the 14th January the Mar Shimun had suggested the despatch to Iraq of a mission from the International Red Cross Society to relieve distress. The president had reason to believe that the Mar Shimun might approach the International Red Cross direct, and he wondered whether the Council Committee ought to pass some resolution recommending the despatch of such a mission. On the whole he was opposed to this step, which he thought might create serious difficulties with the Iraqi Government.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed the view that the committee should act very cautiously in this matter. If there were real reason to believe that a Red Cross mission was essential, naturally it would be the duty of the Council Committee to facilitate it as far as possible. There were, however, two reasons against sending out a mission unless it was proved to be essential. In the first place, the upkeep of the destitute Assyrians in Mosul was a responsibility which devolved upon the Iraqi Government, and this responsibility ought to remain squarely upon that Government. If any mission were sent out the Iraqi Government might wash their hands of the whole affair. In the second place, the

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effect on the Assyrians themselves had to be considered. There was little doubt that a large number of the Assyrians at all events were simply hoping that, if they made enough of their difficulties, a camp would be provided for them like the one in which they had lived for some four years after the war at Baquba. The United Kingdom representative suggested that for these reasons the committee ought to hear what Major Thomson had to say before proceeding any further.

It was decided to proceed accordingly.

The committee then considered document C./Min.Ass./17.

The President pointed out that in paragraph 6 of that document the attention of the Council Committee was drawn to four categories of Assyrians whose treatment would require special consideration.

The president recalled that the questions raised had been already considered to some extent by the committee, and the most difficult seemed to be the category of non-agriculturalists. He thought, however, that the treatment of this category would eventually solve itself. When a nucleus of agriculturalists had been settled in Brazil, they would create new wants and new employment, which might dispose of those Assyrians now in Iraq who followed some employment other than agriculture.

It was agreed to leave consideration of these four categories for the time being, but to ask the Iraqi delegation for further particulars regarding the numbers of each category if possible.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that there was the question raised by paragraph 5 of the document under consideration. That paragraph recommended that two places of settlement should be found. The United Kingdom representative suggested that the committee could hardly do anything but proceed on the line which they had been following. Their task had been to find a single area large enough to accommodate all the Assyrians in Iraq if they wished to leave. Once the area had been found, the scheme could be submitted to the Assyrians, and those who wished to take advantage of it (presumably the Mar Shimun and his followers) would do so. The most urgent part of the question would then be solved. It was just possible, in any case, that if a single scheme were put before the Assyrians, and it were clear that no alternative was in sight, those who did not follow the Mar Shimun might decide after all to make the best of it and accept it. If, however, as feared by the Iraqi Government, they took the line that they still wished to leave Iraq, but could not follow the Mar Shimun, then it would be for the Council Committee to try to find a second area.

The Danish Representative noted that the document referred to the impossibility of certain Assyrians going to a place under the influence of the Mar Shimun. He did not think that the committee could concern itself with questions of this sort. It was natural, of course, that the committee should ask the Brazilian Government to give the Assyrians the right to follow their religion, but to get for the Mar Shimun the full powers which he claimed over his people was not the task of the committee; nor was it its task to divide the followers of the Mar Shimun from the rest.

The President suggested that a written reply ought to be sent to the points raised by the Iraqi Government.

The Danish Representative suggested that, if a reply were sent, the point might be made that if there were two settlements it would cost the Iraqi Government more.

The President suggested that a reply should be drafted on the lines of what the United Kingdom representative had said, to the effect that the first object of the committee was to find a single area in which all the Assyrians could be settled, and that the question of what was to be done with those who felt they could not accompany the Mar Shimun would have to be dealt with as and when it arose.

It was agreed that a draft reply to the Iraqi Government should be prepared in this sense.

Draft Report to the Council.

At the previous meeting, Dr. Kerno had distributed a rough preliminary draft of a report from the committee to the Council and the committee now proceeded to consider this draft. A number of amendments were suggested and it was eventually decided to set up a drafting committee to prepare the report; the drafting committee to consist of the president, the United Kingdom, French and Danish representatives.

The sitting was then suspended for a few minutes and was resumed on the arrival of the Iraqi permanent delegate, accompanied by Major Thomson and M. Shabandar, and of the President and Secretary-General of the Nansen Office.

The President, after welcoming the Iraqi delegate, explained generally the present position of the question. He emphasised the difficulty which the committee had encountered in finding a suitable destination for the Assyrians. In the present economic condition of most countries this was inevitable. The committee had, however, recently learned that, subject to the discussion of details, the Brazilian Government were disposed to accept all the Assyrians at the rate of 500 families a month, as and when they could be accommodated by Parana Plantations (Limited). The committee now proposed to send out a mission to Brazil to make sure that the area proposed was likely to suit the Assyrians. The president explained the composition of the mission. He then referred to the reports which the Iraqi Government had furnished on the refugee camp at Mosul and the measures taken for the security of the Assyrians, the relief of destitution and the repair of villages. He asked if the Iraqi delegate could supplement these reports with any later details regarding the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq.

Taufiq Beg Suwaidi expressed appreciation of the great efforts which the committee had made since October. He was glad to hear officially that a destination had been practically found. As to the nomination of Brigadier Browne, he also appreciated this. Brigadier Browne had commanded the levies in Iraq and the knowledge which he had acquired of the Assyrians would certainly facilitate his task in Brazil. As to the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, the committee had no doubt been sufficiently informed by the reports furnished by the Iraqi Government, and he had nothing to add to those reports. The position remained unchanged. To return to the question of settlement, it only remained to await the report of Brigadier Browne before ascertaining the number of Assyrians who would wish to leave Iraq. Once the question of the adaptation of the Assyrians to Brazil and the numbers of Assyrians who wished to go had been ascertained, the Iraqi Government would be in a position to consider the situation as a whole.

The President said that this led him to mention the question of finance. He recalled that a letter had been addressed to the Iraqi delegation some time ago about the Iraqi financial contribution. Was the Iraqi delegate now in a position to reply?

The Iraqi Representative said that when the Iraqi Government had considered the question of finance the two points which he had already mentioned were still outstanding. Until it was known that Brazil was suitable and until the numbers of the Assyrians were ascertained, it was not easy for the Iraqi Government, or even for the Council Committee, to know how much the whole scheme would cost. The Iraqi Government were, therefore, somewhat embarrassed. They must wait before taking a decision until they knew the number to be settled and this in turn depended on the destination. It was necessary to wait a little, and it was impossible to decide finally at this stage how much the Iraqi Government could contribute.

The President asked whether the Iraqi Government would give an assurance that once the necessary details were fixed they would take all steps to ensure that there should be no delay in deciding the question of a financial contribution. He referred to the administrative and legislative machinery which would probably have to be set in motion and he would like to know that the delay involved would be reduced to a minimum.

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The Iraqi Representative referred to Yasin Pasha's declaration before the Council on the 14th October last regarding the Iraqi contribution. The Iraqi Government would fulfil this declaration with the best will. They would, however, be taking considerable responsibility in promising in advance any particular contribution, since Governments were likely to fall and to be replaced. The Iraqi Government were unanimous in their readiness to liquidate the affair and to facilitate the operation of settlement. There was no change since Yasin Pasha's declaration.

The President took note of this declaration, of which he expressed appreciation. He then proceeded to discuss Document C./Min.Ass./17, paragraphs 5 and 6. He reserved the right of the committee to reply direct to the Iraqi Government on the points raised in this paragraph, but as regards paragraph 6 he would like to know whether the figures of the various categories were to be found in the reports which Major Thomson had made.

Major Thomson said that he had no precise figures of the various categories. The points mentioned in paragraph 6 of the document were points which he and the local committee had felt ought to be discussed before the Nansen representative went out to Iraq if there was not to be delay.

The President said that the committee would appreciate precise figures if that were possible.

Major Thomson promised as soon as he returned to Iraq to get the necessary figures.

The President then asked the president of the Nansen Committee whether he was now in a position to nominate the representative of the Nansen Office who would accompany Brigadier Browne on his mission to Brazil. Brigadier Browne was due to arrive in Geneva almost immediately, and it was desirable that he should be able to consult with the Nansen representative who would collaborate with him and arrange to travel out with him.

M. Werner said that he had not been present at the meeting of the Council Committee at which Brigadier Browne had been chosen. He had intended to appoint Major Johnson as the Nansen Office representative, and he would still be inclined to do so, but he wished first to ask whether the question of nationality was not an obstacle. Was it desirable that the mission should consist of two British subjects?

The President said that the Council had already considered this question and felt that nationality was no obstacle. These two British subjects would go out as servants of the League.

M. Werner said that in that case he would nominate Major Johnson and the Nansen Office would pay Major Johnson's expenses. He would eventually get this decision confirmed by the managing board of the Nansen Office, but meanwhile would take full responsibility for it.

The President then asked the Iraqi representative whether he desired to make any comments.

The Iraqi Representative said that, *à propos* of the question of finance, he noted that a resolution passed by the Council Committee on the 31st October last had provided that the local committee in Iraq, in collaboration with a representative of the Nansen Office, should examine the question of the participation by the Assyrians themselves in the cost of settlement. He felt that there should be an obligatory contribution to the initial expenses from those Assyrians who could afford to pay. He said that the Assyrians had a considerable amount of property in the shape of herds, land, &c., and he suggested that they should be divided into four categories, according to their ability to pay. The first category should be obliged to pay in advance one-half of the estimated cost, the second category should pay one-third, the third one-fourth, while the fourth category would consist of those Assyrians who had no means, who could not afford to pay anything, and to whom it might even be necessary to grant an exemption of a certain percentage of the ultimate cost, say, 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. If some scheme of this sort were not adopted and the Assyrians gained the impression that they could, if they wished, go free to Brazil, every one of them would say that he was insolvent.

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The second point which the Iraqi representative wished to make was that it seemed unnecessary to await the report of Brigadier Browne regarding Brazil before sending a representative of the Nansen Office to Iraq to make preliminary arrangements of the type which he had suggested.

The President said that the committee would consider the suggestion which the Iraqi representative had made regarding an obligatory contribution from the Assyrians according to their means. He suggested it would be preferable, however, if the Iraqi representative would put his suggestion into writing. The second point regarding the despatch of the Nansen representative to Iraq was governed by the committee's resolution of the 31st October. The committee had, in fact, discussed the advisability of sending out a Nansen representative at an earlier stage than had been contemplated in that resolution, but thought it best to wait. Now, however, that the earlier despatch of the Nansen representative had been proposed by the Iraqi representative, the committee would, of course, reconsider the matter.

The president added that the committee was very glad that Major Thomson was present, and he was sure that the committee would like to have information from Major Thomson, who, with his special knowledge of the Assyrians, could be of great assistance. He therefore asked the Iraqi representative to place Major Thomson at the disposal of the committee.

The Iraqi Representative said that he gladly agreed.

M. Werner said that, if it was proposed to send a Nansen representative to Iraq, he would like the matter to be arranged quickly before Major Johnson went to Brazil, as he would require Major Johnson's advice and help in making the necessary arrangements.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

January 16, 1934.

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January 23, 1934.

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SECTION 4.

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No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 23.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a record of the fifteenth meeting of Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 17th January, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, January 21, 1934.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council Committee at 4 P.M. on January 17, 1934.

THE committee met first in private, and with particular reference to the communications from the Iraqi Government contained in Documents C/Min.Ass./16 and C/Min.Ass./17, and to the Mar Shimun's letter in Document C/Min.Ass./19, decided on the questions to be put to the Iraqi representative, who with Major Thomson joined the meeting at 5 P.M.

The President then recalled to the Iraqi delegate that the committee had a double task. Its first duty was to arrange for the resettlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq, but in addition to this the Council had entrusted it with the duty of receiving reports from the Iraqi Government regarding the measures taken to ensure the security of the Assyrians, to relieve those rendered destitute by the events of last August and to repair the villages partially or wholly destroyed during the same events. It had taken note of the report furnished by the Iraqi Government of the 21st December (Document C/Min.Ass./16). In anticipation of the report which it would have to furnish to the Council and also to acquit its own conscience, the committee desired to ask certain questions and to obtain supplementary details. In the first place, the committee had noted that Major Thomson's report, which the Iraqi Government had enclosed, was only for the period up to the 30th November last. It would be of interest to know whether there were any modifications since that date.

The Iraqi Delegate said that he would ask Major Thomson to reply to this question.

Major Thomson said that he had later information, which had been sent to him since his departure from Iraq, though it only went up to the 1st January. Up to that date there were in the camp 1,505 men, women and children. A certain number had left to join their friends outside. From the 21st December to the end of the year, one man and twelve children had died.

In response to a question by the Danish representative, who asked whether this rate of mortality was not alarmingly high, Major Thomson said that the deaths of the children were due to bronchial pneumonia following whooping cough, and were attributable entirely to the negligence of the mothers themselves who refused to let their children remain in hospital in Mosul.

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The President referred to a phrase in paragraph 3 of the Iraqi report which referred to the general improvement in the situation. He asked whether this improvement referred to security or to health.

Major Thomson said that questions of security and police measures were not within his competence, and he must ask the Iraqi delegate to reply to this point.

The Iraqi Delegate regretted that he also was not in a position to reply to this particular question, or to explain details regarding police measures. The report had been prepared just after he had left Iraq on his way to Europe. He could of course refer the president's question to the Iraqi Government, but himself read the phrase in question as meaning that, after the events of last summer, a certain tension had naturally existed, but that lately the feeling of security had improved.

The President noted that Major Thomson's report stated that it had been found necessary to admit into the refugee camp, at Mosul, some seventy men, who were destitute through blindness, paralysis, loss of limbs or old age. The committee would be glad to know why it had been necessary to admit this class of person to the camp, and whether it was suitable that they should be there.

Major Thomson explained that the men in question were living with their families in villages and had been supported by those families. He had found them destitute in Dohuk or Al Qosh and unable to support themselves. For the sake of humanity, therefore, he had taken them into the camp, which had been primarily intended for women and children. They had, in fact, nowhere else to go.

The President observed that if the Assyrians were settled outside Iraq, the case of these people, who were not physically fit to emigrate, would naturally arise. What did the Iraqi Government propose to do about this?

The Iraqi Delegate said that unfortunately Iraq suffered from a lack of charitable institutions. An institution for the reception of people who were physically incapacitated was, in fact, being built in the neighbourhood of Mosul, and, if it were ready in time, the men in question could, he imagined, be admitted there. He submitted, however, that the question was a secondary one, as when emigration took place these men would either accompany their families or would have to be treated in the same way as other indigent persons.

The President said that the number of houses and tents in the refugee camp in Mosul seemed somewhat small for the large number of people to be accommodated. Was there not over-crowding?

Major Thomson explained that the camp was composed partly of houses and partly of double-fly tents holding 23 to 25 people each. Inside each tent he had made the refugees build mud walls 2 feet high, which prevented the wind from coming in. There was in addition a large church tent, and he had started a school there for the children. There was also an ablution tent with as much hot water as was required for baths.

The United Kingdom Representative pressed the question of over-crowding. Was not the number of persons per tent excessive?

Major Thomson replied that the truth was that the families refused to split up. If he tried to diminish the number in a tent they refused to separate and, if removed, went back again. He was convinced, however, that the conditions were not unhealthy, and as an interesting example he said that there had been an outbreak of diphtheria. There had been twelve cases among the children, but the disease had been stamped out in fifteen days.

The Danish Representative noted that the number of deaths up to the 30th November was stated in Major Thomson's report as seventy. Was not this a very high percentage?

Major Thomson admitted that the number seemed alarming, but it was not in fact excessive. Some 2,000 persons had passed through the camp, and the deaths mostly occurred among children who were in a very weak condition on

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being admitted. Most of them had been young children, nursed by their mothers, who themselves had been in want of food for several days. It was a particularly hot time of the year, and a great many of the children who came in were in such a condition that he personally had never thought they would live. Many of them had, however, survived and they had all received every attention. He thought that the death-rate, if compared with that in the poor quarters in European towns, would not compare badly.

The President said that the committee would be glad to have some assurance regarding the future that the Iraqi Government would pay particular attention to the needs of the destitute Assyrians.

The Iraqi Representative said that before his departure from Bagdad, he had gone into the matter thoroughly and he would of course transmit to his Government the president's request. He could, however, say that the Iraqi Government were ready to maintain the refugee camp until the settlement operation had been finished and would be particularly careful in the matter of the security of the Assyrians and the health of those in the camp. Generally speaking, they would receive as good treatment as the rest of the population. Major Thomson had shown that conditions in the camp were favourable and in regard to the question of the Danish representative regarding mortality, he had to admit that infant mortality as a whole in Iraq was very high. In fact it amounted to about 40 per cent. over the whole country, generally because the mothers were suspicious of new forms of treatment. He pointed out, however, that the Assyrians enjoyed equal facilities with the other inhabitants of Iraq in the matter of dispensaries, &c.

The President then referred to the petition from the Mar Shimun which had been circulated as Document C/Min. Ass./19. The committee would be glad to hear any observations which the Iraqi representative might wish to make on this petition.

The Iraqi Representative recalled that the Mar Shimun had now addressed many petitions to the League, and all of them contained many allegations which were completely false. The Iraqi Government had had to point this out. The present petition was no exception. It contained many falsehoods. He would only take two examples, namely, the figures quoted regarding the refugees in the Mosul camp and those who had taken refuge in Mosul outside the camp. The Mar Shimun said that there were 3,000 persons in the refugee camp. In fact, there were only 1,500. The total of 4,000 for the other category was also about twice too high. The Mar Shimun was, in fact, always quoting unchecked figures. His petition would, of course, be sent to the Iraqi Government for detailed observations.

In answer to questions regarding those Assyrians alleged to be destitute outside the refugee camp, *Major Thomson* said that these were people who had left their villages and flocked into Mosul, where they had joined their friends. These people numbered about 2,000, whereas the permanent Assyrians resident in Mosul numbered about 1,000. Major Thomson had himself seen the people who had come in from the villages and who were living on the permanent residents. They refused to go back to their villages. The Iraqi Government had made a definite offer to the inhabitants of the Shaikhan area, where, although there had been no massacres, the villages had been looted by the Arabs after the massacre at Simel. The people in this area had retired to Al Qosh with a good proportion of their flocks and personal property. They had, of course, been obliged to leave their crops. A British officer had since assessed the quantities of grain and crops left in the villages, and the Iraqi Government had promised that to those who would return to the villages, they would give as much grain as was necessary for cultivation, in addition to sufficient grain to maintain the persons concerned until fresh crops were grown. The Iraqi Government had also provided ploughs and other implements, household necessaries and blankets. All this had been done in the case of those who had agreed to go back, but, in spite of this, there were many who still refused to go back to the villages. Major Thomson had himself asked that the Government should give back more rifles to the Assyrians, to increase security. The Iraqi Government had agreed to do so, and more were being

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issued. Police posts had also been established, and the Iraqi Government had, in fact, done everything to induce the Assyrians to go back. Those who had done so were well looked after and would prosper. He had urged upon them the necessity of cultivating, as their transfer might be somewhat delayed. The Iraqi Government had, in order to increase confidence, promised to buy any standing crops which it might prove impossible to harvest before the Assyrians left. Those who had not gone back to the villages were very largely actuated by the hope that, if they were destitute, they would be the first to be sent away from Iraq. He had, however, impressed upon them that the first settlers sent to a new land would have to be strong and healthy cultivators, and that those who had returned to the villages and were working and keeping themselves fit were far more likely to be sent in the first batch than any who were idling in Mosul. His arguments had not, however, had much effect, for the people in Mosul hoped to play upon the feelings of the Nansen representative and thus to be transferred first.

As to the condition of the refugees in Mosul outside the refugee camp, he had considered in October whether he could not get more clothing for them. He had already spent about £300 on clothing for the camp, and he had received from private charitable sources in Great Britain £150 in cash, £200 worth of clothing and £90 worth of blankets. This cash and material had either been sent, or was on the way, to Major Wilson, the British Administrative Inspector in Mosul, and Major Thomson had arranged with him that it should be used not only for the refugees in the camp, but for necessitous cases outside, in Mosul and the villages.

Major Thomson continued, however, that the Assyrians who had flocked into Mosul, although not actually in great need at the moment, would probably present a serious problem if resettlement were long delayed. The people who were supporting them had limited means. On an average, he thought perhaps one wage-earner was keeping twenty people. At present they had sufficient money and the chief burden was falling upon the men in the Iraq Levies, who were well paid. He had himself distributed gifts of £80 and £50 sent up by the Levies. As to the refugee camp, he was satisfied that conditions were satisfactory, and the problem of the other refugees was not likely to be acute for another month or six weeks. He had approached various quarters for private assistance and he was opposed to any general appeal. If such an appeal were made, all the Assyrians who had gone back to the villages would leave them, and all would pretend to be poor and flock into Mosul. A large number of them, unfortunately, preferred to live at ease rather than to work. Major Thomson hoped that he would be able to tide over the difficulty. At any rate, the action of the Iraqi Government was not in question. The Iraqi Government had paid all the money for which he had asked, and if conditions were unsatisfactory, he himself was to blame. He was sure that the Iraqi Government, if necessary, would give more than they had already done. He was, however, against any form of treating the Assyrians as destitute. The Assyrians were fond of being refugees. They had had four years at Baquba, and there had been, after that, another refugee camp at Mindan. They had, therefore, to some extent, a refugee complex.

The Iraqi Delegate said that he was sure that the Iraqi Government would keep conditions satisfactory pending settlement. There was one point which had not so far been touched on to which he would like to refer; that was the transfer to Syria of the families of certain Assyrians who were now in Syria. There had been negotiations with the French Government, and the Iraqi Government had received a reply, the substance of which he understood had been communicated to the Council Committee. In principle, the French Government were ready to accept the families, but one thing remained to be settled, and that concerned finance. The Iraqi Government had estimated that the question of settlement might take six months to arrange. They had therefore proposed that the French Government should take the familiies for six months against a payment by the Iraqi Government of a lump sum of £1,400. The French Government, on their side, did not agree. They wished to spend an indefinite sum on the refugees and present the account to the Iraqi Government afterwards. This created a budgetary difficulty for Iraq. He hoped that the French Government might accede to the Iraqi Government's request on grounds of humanity, and the Iraqi Government were prepared to pay the upkeep for so many months. He would be glad if the committee could find a way of getting out of the *impasse* and of reconciling the two points of view.

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The French Representative said that if the Iraqi Government could not accept an indefinite liability, neither could the High Commissioner in Syria. The cost could not be borne by France and could not be charged to the Syrian budget. He would not refuse to report to his Government what the Iraqi representative had said, but the question was what was to happen after six months?

The Iraqi Representative said that after six months the Iraqi Government were prepared to reconsider the position. If the French Government would agree to take the families at once they could be transferred at once, and after six months the question would be again discussed if the families had not by that time been transferred elsewhere under a different scheme of settlement.

The French Representative said that the Syrian budget was not supported by the French Government, but by local taxpayers. The French authorities in Syria were, therefore, very anxious about the prospective burden on the budget.

The Iraqi Representative said that he fully realised this, but the Iraqi Government were offering to pay expenses and to consider the matter further, if necessary, after six months.

The French Representative said that he had no mandate to deal with this question, but he would transmit to his Government, for consideration, the suggestion that an arrangement should be made for six months, subject to reconsideration of the position, if necessary, at the end of that time.

The Iraqi Representative said that the Iraqi Government had supposed that there was no need for any arrangement longer than six months. They had taken what they thought would be the maximum period. He was, for his part, ready, however, to put to the Iraqi Government the same suggestion as the French representative had offered to put to his Government.

The President concluded the meeting by taking formal note of the assurances which he understood the Iraqi representative to have given during the course of the meeting:—

(1) That the Iraqi Government would maintain the refugee camp until the completion of the operation of settlement;
(2) That they would, in general, treat the Assyrians in the same manner and with the same care as the rest of the population; and
(3) That they would pay particular attention to security and health.

J. C. STERNDALE-BENNETT.

Geneva, January 17, 1934.

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SECTION 2.

[E 515/1/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Council Committee at 5 P.M. *on January* 18, 1934.—(*Received in Foreign Office, January* 23.)

THIS meeting was called to adopt the draft report to the Council prepared by the Drafting Committee.

The President explained that the Drafting Committee had not been able to complete the report on the previous day, as there was one point which the United Kingdom representative had felt bound to refer to higher authority. The point referred to the question of finance. In the draft considered by the Drafting Committee it had been proposed, after drawing the Council's attention to the urgency of the question of finance and to the prospect of obtaining contributions from the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians themselves, merely to suggest to the Council the advisability of an appeal on humanitarian grounds to Governments and charitable institutions to make up whatever balance might be required. The United Kingdom representative had, however, drawn attention to the declaration which he had made to the committee on the attitude of the United Kingdom Government, namely, that the United Kingdom Government were prepared to pay their share of the League contribution, but could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. The United Kingdom representative had felt it necessary that this question of a League contribution should be dealt with and he had proposed that after the recommendation to the Council to issue an appeal to Governments and private institutions, a paragraph should be inserted in the report drawing attention to the attitude of the United Kingdom Government. Other members of the Drafting Committee had felt that to insert a paragraph to the effect that one Government, and that a Government very closely interested in the question, would only contribute on condition that all the other members of the League also contributed, would not fit in very well with the recommendation for an appeal by the Council. It would, in fact, give a perhaps unnecessarily discouraging impression of the chances of such an appeal since it was quite clear that a League contribution was impracticable. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative was perfectly entitled, if he wished, to have a reference to his declaration inserted in the report, but in that case certain members of the Drafting Committee had felt that the paragraph regarding an appeal by the Council had better be omitted.

The President understood that the United Kingdom representative had now referred the matter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this was so, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs approved his attitude in pressing that the question of a League contribution should be faced. The United Kingdom representative had discussed the question privately with the president of the committee in his capacity as representative of the *rapporteur*, and M. Oliván had eventually suggested that the best way out of the difficulty might be to keep in the committee's report the paragraph recommending an appeal and the paragraph regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government, on the understanding that the *rapporteur*, in his report, would show that a League contribution, at all events prior to the Assembly in September next, was impracticable, and would suggest that in view of the urgency of the question there was nothing for it but for the Council to fall back upon the committee's suggestion of an appeal. The United Kingdom representative was now authorised to agree to this procedure. He suggested that after the paragraph regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the committee's report should contain a

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short paragraph to the effect that the Council Committee considered the question of a League contribution to be outside its competence and could only refer it, for consideration, to the Council.

This proposal was agreed to and a text was drawn up accordingly. Various other minor amendments were discussed in the rest of the report, which was eventually adopted in the form circulated to the League as document C/69.1934/VII.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

January 18, 1934.

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SECTION 3.

[E 516/1/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Council Committee, held on January 19, *at* 11 A.M.—(*Received January* 23.)

THIS meeting was attended by Major Johnson, and its object was to decide the points to be discussed with Brigadier-General Browne.

The President first informed the committee that he had just received a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Rio in reply to the telegram despatched as a result of the committee's fourteenth meeting on the 16th January. The reply was to the effect that the Brazilian Government would facilitate the work of the proposed mission. As this information had come too late for inclusion in the *rapporteur's* report, which had already been circulated, the president proposed that the *rapporteur* should inform the Council orally after the presentation of his report.

The president then explained that Major Johnson had been asked to attend this preliminary meeting in order to advise the committee on the scope of the proposed enquiry in Brazil before the committee met Brigadier Browne. The president observed that the resolution passed by the committee left considerable liberty to the investigators.

Major Johnson thanked the committee for giving him this opportunity for consultation, and he would like, in the first place, to have more precise information as to his own functions in the investigation. When the Nansen Office had first submitted the plan for settlement in Brazil, it had done so with the stipulation that it could not accept responsibility for carrying out this plan without a previous opportunity of examining on the spot its financial and technical aspects. In the Council's resolution this procedure appeared to have been somewhat reversed. Nothing was, in fact, said about the Nansen representative examining the technical and financial aspects of the proposals, but the whole enquiry seemed to be limited to ascertaining whether the area proposed was suitable for the Assyrians. Major Johnson said that, naturally, if Brigadier Browne considered the scheme unsuitable for the Assyrians, his point fell to the ground.

The President said that the object of the mission was clearly laid down in the committee's resolution. For the rest, he thought that Major Johnson had himself given the answer to his own question. The primary object of the committee at this stage was not to obtain details about the proposed settlement, but to have the opinion of someone who had personal knowledge of the Assyrians regarding the chances of their settling down in the area proposed. That was the first question, and if the examination of the scheme on the spot showed that it was not likely to be a success the whole project fell to the ground. The committee's first idea had been to settle this most urgent question first, leaving it to the Nansen Office subsequently to examine details on the spot if the report of the Assyrian expert was favourable. In view of the urgency of the matter, however, the committee had subsequently decided to combine these two aspects. If Brigadier Browne's report was favourable, Major Johnson would, without delay, be able to examine the scheme in all its technical details on behalf of the Nansen Office.

Major Johnson said he desired to clear up one other point. In addition to the committee's resolution regarding the mission to Brazil, the Nansen Office was mentioned in another resolution of the 31st October, which contained, he thought, a passage to the effect that the eventual operation of settlement should be entrusted to the Nansen Office.

The President pointed out that this had been a decision of principle, and it was expressly stipulated in the resolution that it should be subject to conditions to be laid down eventually.

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Major Johnson said that, if Brigadier Browne's report was favourable, he proposed to look into the details of the Brazilian scheme on the spot, and that all he wished to know was whether he had the committee's authority to do so.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that the passage in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, to which reference had been made, after deciding in principle to entrust the work of settlement to the Nansen Office under conditions to be laid down, asked the Nansen Office in the meantime, without commitment, to continue its study of the Brazilian scheme. He thought that Major Johnson's mission to Brazil followed naturally from this request. It was the president of the Nansen Office who had suggested that a representative of the office should accompany the investigator chosen by the Council Committee to Brazil at the expense of the Nansen Office. It was, therefore, natural that Major Johnson should take the opportunity to make all enquiries on the spot which his office thought necessary.

The committee then considered the points to be discussed with Brigadier Browne. For this purpose Major Johnson had drawn up two memoranda (Annexes 1 and 2). The first consisted of a list of points which he thought it might be advisable for Brigadier Browne to consider before making his report to the committee. The second contained a list of questions which would have to be considered later, assuming Brigadier Browne's report to be favourable.

Major Johnson, after explaining the various points raised in his first memorandum, asked whether, if Brigadier Browne's report was definitely unfavourable, the mission of investigation would have discretion to extend its enquiries elsewhere, for instance, to the Argentine?

The President said that this was not a point which he could answer at the moment. It was first necessary to await the reply of the Argentine Government as to their willingness in principle to accept the Assyrians. Until the consent of the Argentine Government had been obtained, it would perhaps be a waste of time to consider settlement in that country.

Some discussion then took place as to the precise rôle of the mission of investigation. Was it competent, for instance, to take up questions concerning religion and schools (see points 8 and 9 of Annex 1)? It was eventually decided that the rôle of the mission, pending further instructions, should be one of enquiry only. It would not have power to engage in negotiations. Subsequently, negotiations with the Brazilian Government would be necessary, and the most appropriate channel would no doubt be the Spanish Ambassador in Rio, assisted perhaps by the British Ambassador. It might be advisable that Brigadier Browne and Major Johnson should be available to help the Ambassadors in the course of their negotiations. This was a point to be decided later. It was agreed, however, that it would be desirable for the mission to establish contact with the two Embassies at the outset, and be placed in touch by the Spanish Embassy with such Brazilian authorities as might seem necessary.

(Brigadier Browne then joined the meeting.)

The President thanked him for having accepted the mission, and explained that the committee would have liked to lay down the rôle of the investigators in more detail, but found it difficult to do so, and were prepared to place their complete confidence in Brigadier Browne. What they wanted in the first place, and as soon as possible, was a general report as to whether the Assyrians were likely to thrive under the scheme. The mission was one of enquiry, and the committee would have to decide at a later stage whether it wanted the members of it to do more than make enquiries.

The president then handed to Brigadier Browne Major Johnson's two memoranda, and Brigadier Browne left the meeting for a short time with Major Johnson to consider the two documents.

While they were absent, the committee considered and approved the main lines of the communications which the League Secretariat proposed to address to the Iraqi Government regarding document C/Min.Ass/17 and to the Governments of Brazil and Switzerland in the event of the Council passing the resolution which would be proposed to it that afternoon.

Dr. Kerno was also instructed as to the nature of a formal letter to be addressed to Brigadier Browne.

Dr. Kerno pointed out that, although the question of the transfer to Syria of the families of the Assyrians now in that country had been discussed by the Iraqi and French representatives in the presence of the committee, the latter had not hitherto formally considered the French communication on this subject embodied in Document C/Min. Ass/18.

The President asked the French representative to be good enough to notify the committee of the decisions ultimately arrived at on this point.

At the request of the French representative, Dr. Kerno was instructed to record in a note, to be circulated to the committee, the above request, and the understanding of the committee that any settlement scheme for the Assyrians in Iraq should apply also to those who were now refugees in Syria.

The question of sending the Nansen Office representative to Iraq at an earlier stage than had been contemplated by the committee's resolution of the 31st October was also considered. Some apprehension was expressed lest this should complicate rather than help matters, although the advantage of having a Nansen Office representative at the earliest possible moment in Iraq was realised. It was proposed that discretion should be left with the president to arrange for the immediate despatch of a Nansen Office representative to Iraq as soon as Brigadier Browne's report was received, if that report were favourable. It was eventually decided, however, that, as the question was a difficult one, and as the committee would almost certainly have to meet in any case, immediately after the receipt of Brigadier Browne's report, to consider the many details which remained to be discussed with the Brazilian Government, the question of sending a Nansen Office representative to Iraq might be left over for the moment, in case the president felt it better that it should be considered by the committee as a whole.

Brigadier Browne then returned and made various observations on Major Johnson's memoranda.

As regards cultivation, he said that the Assyrians were great rice growers, and it was to that fact that was due the great prevalence of malaria among them. He proposed to enquire into the possibility of dry rice cultivation in Brazil. Many of the Assyrians were dependent on sheep farming. He understood that this had not yet been tried on the Parana lands, and he proposed to investigate the possibilities. As regards method of settlement, the Assyrians were used to living in villages of fifteen to twenty houses, and he thought it would be better to maintain this system. One of the great difficulties which he foresaw was in connexion with arms. The Assyrians possessed when he was last in Iraq some 6,000 rifles, and he thought it would be a matter of the utmost difficulty to induce them to give them up.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that, according to the latest figures supplied by the Iraqi Government, the number of rifles in the possession of the Assyrians had dwindled greatly since the events of last August, and perhaps it might be possible to arrange for the disarmament of the Assyrians as soon as they got over the Iraqi frontier.

Brigadier Browne noted that the Brazilian Government were only prepared to receive agriculturalists, and this, he thought, would raise a very difficult problem, though it might be possible to deal with it on the lines of Major Johnson's proposal for an agricultural adaptation centre. The Assyrian tribes were to some extent divided according to occupation. For instance, the men of the Jelu tribe were many of them railway workers and traders; the men of the Baz tribe were builders for some part of their time. In the winter their habit was to leave their homes in the hills and go down into the towns and build houses. The men of the Diz tribe were hunters and trappers. Another question which was going to raise difficulty was the question of nationality, as many of the Assyrians had never taken out Iraqi nationality papers. A point had, he understood, been raised as to what was to happen to the old and feeble. The Assyrians regarded family ties as something almost sacred, and he thought that some arrangement would have to be made for the old and feeble to go with the rest to Brazil, where, he was sure, they would be adequately maintained by their relatives.

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The President thanked Brigadier Browne for these observations. The questions raised in Major Johnson's second memorandum would, of course, have to wait until it was established that the area concerned was suitable.

The Danish Representative referred to remarks which Brigadier Browne had made regarding the difficulty of settling the Assyrians except in villages, and also regarding the difficulty of making them give up their rifles. The Danish representative wished to enter a general caveat, namely, that it might be undesirable to try to keep too closely in Brazil to conditions under which the Assyrians were living in Iraq. The main question was whether reasonably suitable conditions could be obtained for the emigrants which would enable them to settle down.

The United Kingdom Representative supported this attitude. While every effort must be made to get the best conditions possible for the Assyrians, it did not follow that nothing short of the ideal would be satisfactory. All emigrants had to take some chance and to adapt themselves to new conditions of life. It would, indeed, be a mistake to try to reproduce in Brazil the conditions which the Assyrians had enjoyed in Iraq, and the object was to see whether conditions in the area in question were such that the Assyrians might reasonably be expected to adapt themselves to them in time and to gain a livelihood.

The question of the date of departure of the mission was then raised.

Major Johnson said that there were two possible ships, one leaving Southampton on the 27th January and the other on the 9th February.

The President said that, naturally, the committee understood that the members of the mission required some time for their preparations. At the same time, the question was an extremely urgent one, and he could only emphasise the importance of the earliest possible departure. Even ten days might make a very great difference.

Brigadier Browne and *Major Johnson* said that, in the circumstances, they would make every effort to leave on the 27th January.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva, January 19, 1934.

Annex 1.

Questions concerning the Suitability of Conditions in Parana for the Assyrians.

I.—*Climate.*

Temperature :—

(*a*) Summer : (1) maximum; (2) mean; (3) minimum.
(*b*) Winter : (1) minimum; (2) mean.

Rainfall : average annual and rainy periods. Comparison of findings under paragraph I above with conditions in regions inhabited by Assyrians.

II.—*Cultivation.*

Report on crops most easily cultivated in Parana, with indications showing to what extent the Assyrians are accustomed to the cultivation of those crops, or should be able, without great difficulty, to adapt themselves to their cultivation.

III.—*Cattle and Sheep Raising and Pig-Breeding.*

Similar enquiries to those outlined in paragraph II.

IV.—*Agricultural Settlement Conditions.*

(1) Possibility of village settlement on conditions similar to those to which the Assyrians are accustomed.

(2) Are 5 alqueires per family sufficient for the reasonable requirements of an Assyrian family?

(3) Prospects of becoming self-supporting.

(4) Feasibility of establishing two separate settlements.

V.—*Other Occupations.*

Prospects of employment for other than agricultural categories, eventually by means of the creation of an agricultural adaptation centre.

VI.—*Food.*

Could the reasonable food requirements of the Assyrians be satisfied at accessible prices?

VII.—*Medical Attention.*

VIII.—*Religion.*

Would the Assyrians be allowed facilities for the practice of their religion under the direction of their own religious leader?

IX.—*Schools.*

Similar enquiry to that under paragraph VIII (Religion).

Annex 2.

Questions to be Considered as soon as General Browne reports on the Suitability of the Conditions in Parana for the Settlement of the Assyrians.

(A) *In the event of an affimative report.*

(1) The Brazilian Government stipulates that only agriculturists will be received. The maintenance of that stipulation would preclude Brazil from offering a complete solution for the Assyrian problem.

Acceptance of other manual workers should be considered—possibly on condition that they complete a course in an adaptation centre which might be created in the colony.

(2) The Brazilian Government states that the colonisation company must place elsewhere Assyrians who cannot adapt themselves to the conditions in Parana. It is unusual to ask colonisation companies to accept such conditions, and it is unlikely that Parana Plantations will agree to this condition.

(3) What will be the status of the Assyrians? If they travel on Iraqi passports, the Brazilian Government, under its immigration laws, would have the right to require the Iraqi Government to repatriate "undesirables." If, however, the Assyrians are regarded as refugees and travel on Nansen passports, the Iraqi Government could only be required to agree to repatriation of any of them, if their Nansen passports are endorsed to that effect.

(4) Are any steps to be taken concerning the ultimate status of the Assyrians in Brazil? It is understood that Brazilian nationality can be obtained after six years' residence in the country.

(5) Two alternative offers are submitted by Parana Plantations:—

(*a*) Settlement by the company of 10,000 Assyrians at a contract price of £194,000.

(*b*) Sale of sufficient land to the Nansen Office at £65,000, the Nansen Office to effect the settlement work, as in Syria, with the co-operation of the company.

In either eventuality, it would seem to be desirable for the Nansen Office to market the Assyrians' crops (as it does in Syria for the Armenians), both in the interest of the Assyrians and of the reimbursement of advances made to them.

The estimates for the settlement cost of £129,000 must be examined in detail to ascertain whether they can be reduced in view, *inter alia*, of the more modest requirements of the Assyrians compared with those of the European colonists settled on the lands of the company.

(6) The Brazilian Government states that the reception of the Assyrians must involve it in no financial liability.

The Brazilian Government, however, normally accommodates immigrants free of charge on their arrival at a Brazilian port and provides free transport to the nearest railway station to the settlement area. Should not an effort be made to secure these facilities for the Assyrians?

(7) Parana Plantations offered to receive 10,000 Assyrians between the 15th March and the 15th September, at the rate of 1,250 every three weeks.

As it will now be impossible to contemplate the arrival of the first contingent until considerably after the 15th March, it would, perhaps, be well to examine the question of the reception of larger groups during the shorter reception period available.

(8) Any statistics which could be obtained in Iraq and cabled to Brazil concerning the numbers, occupations and constitution of families desirous of transfer to Brazil, would be most useful.

(B) *In the event of a negative report.*

Would the mission be given discretion to extend its enquiry to the settlements in Missiones and Santa Fé concerning which the Nansen Office has received offers?

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SECTION 1.

[E 539/1/93]

No. 1.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Seventy-Eighth Session of the Council, League of Nations.

Extract from the Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, held on January 19 *at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, January* 23, 1934.)

TEWFIQ BEG AL SUWAIDI, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. de Madariaga presented the following report and draft resolution :—

"My colleagues on the Council will certainly have studied with great interest the report which has been submitted to us by the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq (see Annex). The mass settlement of a large population living in rather special conditions is proving to be a difficult matter in the present economic state of the world. The committee's tireless efforts enable us, however, to anticipate a satisfactory solution of the problem in the near future.

"The Council will, in the first place, wish to signify its profound gratitude to the Brazilian Government for its generous offer to throw open its territory to the population in question. It will rely on the committee to pursue its negotiations with the Brazilian Government in order to fix all the details connected with the carrying-out of the proposed plan.

"The Council will also note with satisfaction that the committee proposes to create a local body in Iraq to ensure the proper carrying-out of all the operations which will be necessary on the spot. In the same way, the despatch of Brigadier-General Browne to Brazil, assisted by M. Redard and Mr. Johnson, is a mark of the committee's desire not to take a final decision concerning the place of settlement until after an independent and impartial enquiry has been made.

"The committee specially draws the Council's attention to the difficult problem of financing the plan. The Council will be glad to note the Iraqi Government's reiterated statements that it is prepared to make as generous a contribution as its resources will permit. There can, indeed, be no doubt that the Iraqi Government's contribution will be the most important factor in the success of any emigration plan. Moreover, the Council will certainly agree to authorise the committee to study carefully the question of the payment of part of the expenditure by the Assyrian population itself.

"As regards the financing of the plan by a contribution from the League of Nations, in accordance with the suggestion of the United Kingdom representative, the *rapporteur* has given this question the most careful attention. He finds, after consultation with the competent authorities of the Secretariat, that this problem cannot be considered at the moment. Moreover, in the budget voted at the last Assembly there is no item which could be utilised for this purpose, the Financial Regulations fixed by the successive Assemblies not allowing the League to incur expenditure of this kind without a vote of the Assembly. It would therefore be necessary to wait at least until the next Assembly before any discussion on this question could usefully take place.

"In view of the urgency of the problem to which the committee draws attention, the *rapporteur* thinks that the Council should accept the committee's proposal that an appeal should be made by the Council to the Governments and to certain private organisations; such a procedure would have prospects of success, and it is to be hoped that certain Governments

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might consider the problem from a new aspect, particularly in view of its humanitarian nature.

"In the second part of its report, the committee submits to the Council a communication from the Iraqi Government on the measures taken for the benefit of the Assyrian population in accordance with the Council resolution of the 14th October, 1933. The committee also reports the conversations it has had in this connexion with the Iraqi delegate and with Major Thomson.

"The *rapporteur* draws the Council's attention to the assurances given to the committee by the Iraqi representative regarding the situation of the Assyrians.

"I beg to move the following resolution :—

"'The Council,

"'Approves the report of the committee and the present report;

"'Instructs the committee to continue its work in conformity with the Council resolution of the 14th October, 1933, and with the committee's report;

"'Cordially thanks the Government of Brazil for its decision to admit the Assyrian population to its territory;

"'Firmly trusts that the Government of Iraq will contribute in the largest measure that its resources will permit to the financing of the scheme, in accordance with the reiterated declarations of its representatives;

"'Is equally convinced that that Government will not fail to protect and aid the Assyrian population, in conformity with the declarations of its representatives in the committee;

"'Appeals to the generosity of Governments and private organisations to consider participating in the financing of the scheme, having regard more especially to its humanitarian aspect;

"'Authorises the Secretary-General to take, in conformity with article 33 (2) of the Financial Regulations, a sum not exceeding 20,000 Swiss francs from the item "Working Capital Fund" to cover the cost of the investigation in Brazil, apart from the expenses of the expert nominated by the president of the Nansen Office. These expenses will be reimbursed to the League out of the funds that will be available for financing the projected action as a whole.'"

The *rapporteur* added that, according to his information, the Brazilian Government had notified the Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro that it would assent to the despatch of the mission, mentioned in the report, to investigate the prospect of settling emigrants.

Tewfiq Beg Al Suwaidi, representative of Iraq, stated, on behalf of his Government, that he greatly appreciated the work done by the *rapporteur*, the chairman and the members of the Council Committee, between last October and the present date. Referring to the declaration made to the Council by his predecessor, Yassin Pasha Al Hashimi, on the 14th October, 1933, he was glad to say that his Government still remained firmly attached to the spirit of that declaration as to the successful issue of the Assyrian problem.

Sir John Simon felt that the report which the representative of Spain had been able to make, including the information on certain quite recent communications and decisions, was more hopeful and constructive than might, a short time previously, have seemed possible. There were those who deplored the fact that it had not been possible to make more rapid progress in this urgent question. But the fact that it had not been possible to do more in the space of three months would, he thought, surprise only those who did not appreciate the difficulties with which the Council Committee had had to contend. It had been faced with a problem which was quite unprecedented in modern times—nothing less than the organised transfer of a large part of a people from one part of the world to another. It had therefore had to explore a wide field of possibilities, for the world was wide, and at the outset none of those possibilities offered any outstanding likelihood of proving practicable. But, in spite of the difficulties, considerable progress appeared to have been made, and he felt that the Council owed a debt of sincere gratitude to the Council Committee and to the representative of Spain for the efforts which they had made.

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Although a destination for the Assyrians of Iraq had not yet been definitely fixed, there was at least reason to hope that one was now in sight. That that should be so was due to what he would call the helpful sympathy with which the Brazilian Government had received the representations made to it, on humanitarian grounds, on behalf of the Council Committee. Of course, details remained to be adjusted, but he and his colleagues must all be most grateful to the Brazilian Government for the favourable reply it had now given in principle to the request that had been addressed to it, and he associated himself entirely with the message of thanks which the *rapporteur* proposed that the Council should send to that Government.

In conclusion, he would repeat his expression of gratification that, as a result of the strenuous efforts which had been made by the Council Committee and its chairman, there was so much hope of a solution of this problem.

The draft resolution was adopted.

Tewfiq Beg Al Suwaidi withdrew.

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Annex.

Report by the Committee of the Council.

(Translation.)

THE committee set up by the Council at its meeting on the 14th October, 1933, was requested, in the first place, to consider to what extent a solution of the problem of the Assyrians of Iraq by means of their settlement outside the country was practicable, and, if so, to take, in close collaboration with the Iraqi Government, any steps which it might deem to be appropriate with a view to the preparation and execution of a detailed plan of settlement.

The Council was led to consider such a solution, which doubtless exceeds the scope of the protection of minorities, because it was faced with a wholly exceptional situation, and the necessity for such a solution appears to have been recognised both by the Iraqi Government and the minority concerned. The Iraqi Government stated that it was prepared to make as generous a contribution as its resources permitted to facilitate the settlement of the Assyrians outside its territory, but, as its representative informed the Council, "there was one thing it could not do, and that was to find land." It therefore appealed to the League for assistance in this matter.

It was in these circumstances that the committee of the Council was set up. The latter set to work as soon as the Council's last session had ended. It has been obliged to remain in more or less permanent session, since the task entrusted to it by the Council has turned out to be a particularly arduous and difficult one, mainly on account of the extremely unfavourable economic and social conditions obtaining at the present time in every country in the world.

The committee desired to satisfy itself in the first place that any plan of settlement which it might draw up would apply solely to those persons who expressed a desire to leave Iraq. In order that this emigration might be entirely voluntary, the committee, which was anxious to obtain the desirable guarantees in this matter, accordingly entered into negotiations with the Iraqi Government with a view to the constitution of a local organisation.

The committee's resolution dealing with this question is attached to the present report (Annex 1).(¹) The local commission appointed by the Iraqi Government has as its chairman Major Thomson, an expert in settlement questions, and its members consist of officials of that Government and the head men of the Assyrian villages. A representative of the Nansen Office will later proceed to Iraq for the purpose of collaborating with the commission in the tasks laid down in the committee's resolution.

In accordance with the Council's decision, the committee's chief task was to assist the Iraqi Government to "find lands on which the Assyrians could be settled." The committee accordingly got into touch with the Governments of States which appeared to offer certain immigration possibilities under the present difficult conditions of world economy. The committee also considered it

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essential to enlist at the outset of its work the assistance of the Nansen Office for Refugees, which has for many years closely investigated the possibilities which might exist for the settlement of Russian and Armenian refugees. In agreement with the committee, the Nansen Office approached several large colonisation companies, and in particular the Paraná Plantations (Limited), which owns vast tracts of land in the State of Paraná in Northern Brazil. This company submitted a plan of settlement, which was sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole population which might desire to emigrate.

As this was a scheme for the colonisation of Brazilian territory, the committee asked the Government of that country whether it would be prepared to authorise the entry into, and settlement on, its territory of the Assyrian population. The Brazilian Government informed the chairman of the committee on the 9th January, 1934, that it was prepared to accept the whole of the Assyrians in groups of 500 families a month, as and when the Paraná Plantations (Limited) was able to provide for their settlement. Before going more fully into the conditions of this settlement with the Brazilian Government, the committee considered it essential to satisfy itself that the lands selected would meet the special needs of the Assyrian population by means of a local investigation carried out by someone with a thorough knowledge of the requirements and peculiarities of the population in question. It proposes to entrust this task to Brigadier-General Browne, who is of British nationality and has resided for a very long time in Iraq, where he was in close contact with the Assyrians. Brigadier-General Browne would be assisted by M. Redard, counsellor of the Swiss Legation at Rio de Janeiro, who has been resident in Brazil for some twenty years, and by Mr. Johnson, secretary-general of the Nansen Office. The text of the resolution adopted by the committee in regard to the enquiry in Brazil is attached to the present report (Annex 2).(¹)

As soon as Brigadier-General Browne has formed his own opinion, and if this is favourable, a representative of the Nansen Office may proceed to Iraq to carry out, in conjunction with the local commission, the mission entrusted to it, and first of all to draw up a list of persons desirous of leaving the country. The committee has not lost sight of the importance of this question, but it did not consider it possible to arrange for this enquiry until it was in a position to propose to the Assyrian population a definite destination and to give it a general idea of the conditions of settlement.

The committee would repeat that it has so far not been possible for it finally to accept the Brazilian colonisation scheme or to discuss all the details of execution which will necessarily arise, but it has received certain favourable information which leads it to hope that it will be possible to carry out this scheme satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, whatever scheme is finally adopted, its execution will necessarily depend on the financial resources available. The committee therefore ventures to draw the Council's attention to the importance and urgency of this question. If it is postponed until the Council's next session it will be impossible to carry out the proposed scheme during the present year.

It will not be possible to calculate the exact expenditure involved until the final destination and the number of persons to be transported are known. As an indication, the committee would mention that, according to the rough provisional calculations made by the Paraná Plantations (Limited) and the Nansen Office, the total cost of settlement in Brazil (cost of transport, purchase of land, initial settlement, food for the first three months, &c.) would amount, for 5,000 persons, to £162,000 (£32 per head), for 10,000 to £314,000 (£31 8*s*. per head) and for 15,000 to £465,000 (£31 per head).

Ever since it began its work the committee has been considering what possibilities there were of obtaining the necessary funds. It was with that object that it reminded the representative of Iraq of his statement to the Council at its last session that "the Iraqi Government was prepared to make its contribution, as generous a contribution as its resources permitted." The committee is happy to be able to inform the Council that at its meeting on the 16th January the representative of Iraq again confirmed his statements, and assured the committee that the question of Iraq's contribution would be settled with all due speed as soon as the destination was definitely fixed and the number of persons to be dealt with had been ascertained by enquiry in Iraq.

(¹) Not printed.

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The committee also agrees with a suggestion made by the representative of Iraq that the Assyrian population itself might provide part of the necessary funds. In any scheme of settlement it is customary to arrange for the expenses to be repaid by the settlers in the more or less near future. Since, however, according to the committee's information, the Assyrians are not all destitute, those of them who own some property could undertake to defray part of the expenses from the outset. The committee proposes to go carefully into this question at its later meetings. It would point out here and now, however, that such participation by the Assyrians themselves cannot be contemplated unless guarantees can be obtained that the Assyrians will be able to dispose of their property in Iraq at reasonable prices. Such an operation will necessarily involve active and generous intervention on the part of the Iraqi Government.

Should the funds supplied by the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians prove inadequate, it would become necessary to seek other sources. As the problem presents certain humanitarian aspects which would probably arouse a more general interest, the Council might appeal to the generosity of Governments and certain private organisations to supply the missing funds.

In this connexion the committee draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the representative of the United Kingdom Government has informed the committee that his Government is willing to pay its share of a League contribution, though it can only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme.

Being of opinion that the question of a possible League contribution exceeds its province, the committee submits that question to the consideration of the Council.

In its resolution of the 14th October, 1933, the Council expressed the hope that the Iraqi Government would be good enough to keep the committee regularly informed of the measures taken to ensure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist the families left destitute and to rebuild those villages which had been wholly or partly destroyed.

The committee has the honour to submit to the Council as an annex a report which it has received from the Iraqi Government on this subject (Annex 3).(1)

Regarding that report, the committee has had the opportunity of a long conversation with the representative of Iraq, who was assisted by Major Thomson. It has obtained certain additional information and details regarding the position of the Assyrians who are in the Mosul camp, in the villages and outside the Mosul camp. The representative of Iraq assured the committee (*a*) that his Government would maintain the Mosul camp until the scheme had been completely carried out; (*b*) that it would give the entire Assyrian population the same treatment and the same care as the rest of the population of the country; (*c*) that it would pay special attention to safety and hygiene.

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(1) Not printed.

INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 488/11/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
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1934

India ~~82~~

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
2nd Feb, 1934.

pp. 757

Reference to previous correspondence: 756

F.O. letter E 414/11/93 of Jan 31.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. ~~Represen~~ Consul Geneva Tel No 8 Saving Jan 19.	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 6 8 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH 3 FEB 1934 INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Treas
A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
C.O.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P.Z.
502
1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Telegram (en clair) from His Majesty's Consul (Geneva).

D. 19th January, 1934.

R. 22nd January, 1934.

No. 8 (Saving).

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo

Following from Mr. Strang.

Council considered today report of Assyrian Committee which, after describing its work up to decision to send mission of investigation to Brazil, asked Council to consider forthwith question of financing any scheme of settlement. After recalling Iraqi Government's offer of generous contribution and possibility of contribution from Assyrians themselves, report suggested that if additional funds were necessary appeal on humanitarian grounds might be made to certain governments and private organisations. In this connexion reference was made in the report to declaration of United Kingdom representative that His Majesty's Government are willing to pay their share of a League contribution though they can only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. Committee considered that question of League contribution was outside its competence and referred it to Council.

Second part of report referred briefly to situation of Assyrians in Mosul, both in and outside refugee camp and in villages. It recorded interview with Iraqi delegate in course of which he was asked for details and gave assurances (a) that Iraqi Government would maintain Mosul camp until a settlement scheme had been completely carried out; (b) that they would give to the Assyrian people the same treatment and care as to the rest of the population of Iraq; and (c) that they would pay

particular ...

particular attention to security and health.

In his report to Council Rapporteur emphasised importance of question of finance and observed that there could be no doubt that the Iraqi contribution would be the most important factor in the success of any settlement scheme. As regards League contribution to make up the balance, there was no item in present budget which could be utilised and question could only be considered at the earliest by the next Assembly in September. In view of urgency of matter, Rapporteur recommended Council to fall back on Committee's suggestion of an appeal to governments and private organisations, and expressed hope that if such a procedure were adopted certain governments might be able to consider the problem from a new aspect, particularly in view of its humanitarian character.

Secretary of State said that the fact that there was now reason to hope that a solution of this question was in sight was due to the helpful sympathy with which the Brazilian Government had received recent representations.

Committee's report and Rapporteur's report were adopted in resolution which *inter alia* (1) thanks Brazilian Government for their decision to admit Assyrians; (2) expresses hope that the Iraqi Government will contribute in the largest measure that its resources will permit to the financing of a settlement scheme and will protect and aid Assyrian population; and (3) appeals to governments and private organisations to consider financial contribution on humanitarian grounds.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 8 (Saving); repeated to Bagdad in code No. 4.

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No. E 8

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P. Z.
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1934

India

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
9 Feb., 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:
✓

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Rio Tels no 17 & 18 of Jan 25. — do. Tel no 7 of Jan 27 — omdo. Tel no 21 of Feb 6 .. - 22 .. - 6	Assyrian resettlement

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 7 15 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
10 FEB 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P. Z.
959
1934

From BRAZIL.

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro),
25th January, 1934.

D. 9. 4 a.m. 26th January, 1934.

R. 1.00 p.m. 26th January, 1934.

No. 17. (R).

Geneva telegram No. 5 of January 16th.

Press of all shades is carrying on violent campaign against Assyrian immigration. Great Britain is accused of evading her responsibility by not settling them within her dominions. Latest suggestion is that whole scheme is a job put up by Parana Plantations Company. On the other hand a Brazilian traveller is quoted to the effect that Assyrians are essentially pastoral and nomadic with something of the brigand about them and even the most reasonable newspapers view with apprehension 20,000 of these Asiatics refusing to stay in a strange country and climate and descending in hordes on the towns. On the other hand unfortunate extract from article by Journal de Genève has been telegraphed here stating that they will be settled in compact mass enabling them to keep "their own customs, language and religion" in what would be a new Assyria - a most objectionable prospect from Brazilian point of view.

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P.Z.
959
1934

From BRAZIL.

Decypher. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro),
25th January, 1934.

D. 9. 6 p.m. 26th January, 1934.

R. 1.00 p.m. 26th January, 1934.

No. 18.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Feeling runs high and I fear that anything we say here in answer to campaign will be misinterpreted and used in evidence against us.

Brazilian Government have kept silence as yet but may perhaps find it necessary at least to announce, and perhaps to add to, conditions on which they have already insisted.

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P. Z.
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1934

(E.635/1/93).

To BRAZIL.

Cypher telegram to Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
Foreign Office, January 27th 1934. 1.00 p.m.
No.7.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Your telegrams Nos. 17 and 18 (of January 25th. Assyrian settlement).

I agree that any public statement might only make matters worse, but this agitation is most unfortunate and I rely on you by unofficial action to try to induce Brazilian government to do what they can to put an end to it. Meanwhile, if Brazilian government feel bound to make any announcement, it is important that everything possible should be done to dissuade them from publishing third condition, which will have to form subject of delicate negotiation between Council Committee, Company and Brazilian government. If published in its present form it might lead Assyrians to regard whole settlement scheme as purely experimental and thereby increase difficulty of inducing them to accept complete assimilation in Brazilian State, thus creating danger referred to in last sentence of your telegram No.17. Council Committee realise importance of Assyrians accepting all obligations of Brazilian citizenship and one of main objects of Brigadier Browne's mission is to ascertain whether Assyrians are "likely to become a useful element in Brazil".

Condition at P.Z. 290/34

He and Major Johnson leave on January 27th by S.S. "Almanzora".

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P. Z.
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From BRAZIL.

Decypher. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
February 5th 1934.

D. 2.50 p.m. February 5th 1934.

R. 7.00 p.m. February 5th 1934.

No.21.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

59 Your telegram No.7.

I spoke on January 29th to Minister for Foreign Affairs who promised that as it was impossible to apply censorship (against which a press campaign is also being waged at present) Minister of Labour would issue a tranquillizing communiqué in the form of interview which would appear almost at once. It was however not issued till yesterday morning.

No allusion is made therein to third condition beyond harmless statement that after the Brigadier's investigations "we shall formulate guarantees which we require in order to ensure that these families shall not deviate from their precise destination."

As newspapers do not appear on Monday the press re-action to this communiqué will not be known until tomorrow.

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P. Z.
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1934

From BRAZIL.

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
6th February, 1934.

D. 9.04 a.m. 7th February, 1934.

R. 1.15 p.m. 7th February, 1934.

No. 22. (R).

....

My telegram No. 21.

Today's Journal de Brazil twists communiqué into meaning that Assyrians will constitute an enclave on land belonging to a British company out of Brazilian control but is hopeful that conditions formulated after Brigadier's visit will be such as to "avoid the calamity of this invasion."

A certain learned society which has taken prominent part in agitation publishes manifesto repeating old arguments and calling on students to organise general movement for preventing arrival of those undesirables and for demonstrating that Brazil is a nation and not a colony.

Most papers make no comment but publish several speeches by deputies in constituent assembly where immigration and the crimes of the censorship have been discussed. These lay stress on assertion that British who know Assyrians best will not have them in their territories, not even in British Guiana. The same local experts are quoted to the detriment of Assyrians as agriculturalists.

INDEXED
No. E 335
THE Under-Sec
Foreign Office,
31 Jan
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P. Z.
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1934

~~India~~ 391
Misc 392

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
31 Jan, 1934.

P.Z. 756

Reference to previous correspondence: 452

F.O. letter E 336/1/93 of Jan 18.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of nations C/Min Ass /16 Jan 8.	Assyrian situation in Iraq.

MAILS BRANCH
1 FEB 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 6 8 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 8931 (2)

P. Z.
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1934

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Members
of the Committee for the
Establishment of Assyrians
of Iraq.

C./Min.Ass./16.

Geneva, January 8th, 1934.

SITUATION OF THE ASSYRIANS IN IRAQ.

Letter dated December 21st 1933 from the Government of Iraq to the Secretary-General.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Iraqi Government, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Committee for the Establishment of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter, with four enclosures, addressed to him on December 21st 1933 by the Government of Iraq under the terms of paragraph 5 of the Report concerning the situation of Assyrians in Iraq adopted by the Council on October 14th 1933.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BAGHDAD,
IRAQ.

21st Dec. 1933.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

1. By its Resolution of 14th October 1933, paragraph 5 regarding the Assyrians, the Council requested the Iraqi Government to keep the Committee of Six informed of the

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(a) to assist destitute families

(b) to ensure the safety of Assyrians in Iraq

(c) to rebuild villages partly or wholly destroyed.

2. As regards relief, two reports by Major Thomson to 15th September 1933, were appended to the observations forwarded with Yasin Pasha's letter of 5th October (Document C.567.1933.I). I now forward a further report by Major Thomson covering the whole period to 30th November 1933. (Enclosure I).

3. The special police measures taken to protect the Assyrians were briefly referred to in paragraph 14 of the same Observations, to which a map showing the location of 24 new police posts was attached. A list of villages where posts have since been established or abolished, as circumstances have required, is appended (Enclosure II). In view of the general improvement in the situation the number of additional police specially recruited at the time of the disturbances, and subsequently retained for the protection of villages, has been reduced to 250. The whole area is constantly and vigorously patrolled. A special escort, under an Assyrian head-constable, was attached to the pastoral tribe of Ashuti, which itself has 500 rifles, for its winter migration to the South.

4. The number of registered rifles in possession of each Assyrian village at the end of November is also

given in Enclosure II; in addition the Assyrians possess many unregistered rifles. Although they are not strictly necessary, further rifles are now being issued, under proper safeguards, to the villagers of Shaikhan, principally with a view to giving confidence to shepherds who are obliged to take their sheep to distant pastures.

5. As a result of the various measures taken the state of general security in the Assyrians' area is now good. Apart from the incident of the three shepherds killed by Turkish tribesmen from across the border mentioned in the observations forwarded with the Iraqi Delegation letter of 9th October 1933 (League Document C.573.1933.I), which occurred on September 29th (and not on September 1st as stated, owing to a telegraphic error), three violent deaths have been reported in the last three months, viz., between September 15th and December 15th, 1933: (1) One Hurmuz Bello was killed by persons unknown on September 30th at Haishi, (2) On October 10th a man of Lower Tiyari, while guarding his sheep, was killed by persons unknwon. (3) On December 7th two Assyrians of Diana, who had lost their way while out shooting, were attacked at night by Kurds; Yokhannis Enwiya was killed and Jams Mirza seriously wounded; one of the accused has been arrested.

6. The experienced British official referred to in paragraph 13 of the Observations noted above remained one month in the area. He visited every Assyrian village, enquired into the damage done and the condition

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of the population, and reported on the measures to be taken in each to enable the villagers to resume their normal life. Following his report houses have been repaired, woodwork has been replaced, grain both for food and seed, mules and oxen for ploughing, ploughs, blankets and cash have been issued to the villagers. Detailed statements of villages repaired and assistance given in kind and cash are appended (Enclosures III and IV). The execution of this work was hindered in some cases by the attitude of the Assyrians themselves who refused to work on the repair of their own houses even for a daily wage; in other cases villagers, hearing of the Council's decision, abandoned their villages and left for Mosul after relief had been distributed or repairs begun. In addition to the issue of grain referred to above, abandoned crops were saved for the owners by the administrative authorities who had these reaped, threshed etc., by hired labour.

7. You are requested to circulate this letter to Members of the Committee.

I have the honour, etc.,

(Signed) Naji al Asil.
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosures:

1. Major Thomson's report.
2. Mutasarrif's statements 1 a, b and c.

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Enclosure I.

Report by Major Thomson on Mosul Refugee Camp.

I forward you herewith a report on the Assyrian Refugee Camp in Mosul up to the end of November, 1933:

1. Local Committee.

On 20th August His Excellency the Minister of Interior approved the formation of the following local committee to deal with Assyrian refugees from Dohuk, and other areas affected by the disturbances.

The committee was as follows:

Major D.B. Thomson	President
Faiq Beg the Mudir Tapu	Member
Abdul Aziz Effendi	Member
Kasha Kina	Member
Malik Khamo	Member
Abdul Aziz Effendi	Secretary

2. Admissions to Camp.

a) The camp was opened on 21st August, 1933 and by the 30th August there were 1294 women and children in the camp.

On the 14th September the total in the camp was 1563.

This number has remained more or less constant up to the end of November when there were 1536 men, women and children in the camp.

During the period 14 September - 30 November a further 213 persons were admitted and 189 persons either removed by the R.A.F. to Hinaidi or by their relatives.

Though the camp is primarily for destitute women and children, it was found necessary to admit some 70 men, who were destitute through blindness, paralysis, loss of limbs, or old age.

b) Of the 1536 persons in camp on 30.11.1933 578 women and children have either husbands or grown up sons now in Syria.

c) There are 27 orphan boys and girls in the camp. Of these 25 have been accepted by individuals in the camp who have undertaken responsibility for them. Two boys have been sent to the orphanage of the Papal Delegate in Mosul.

3. Composition of Camp.

Accommodation

a) The Refugee Camp is composed of 3 houses en suite in all 24 rooms of varying size and 31 E.P. Tents and 68 180 lbs tents, an ablution tent, latrines, a medical Dispensary, Kitchens and stores. Water is laid on stand pipes to both the houses and tents. Electric light is provided in the houses, and lanterns in the tents.

Distribution.

b) 548 persons are accommodated in the houses and 984 persons in tents.

Amenities.

c) Hot water is provided daily from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. for ablution and clothes washing purposes.

Wood issued daily for heating rooms and tents at the rate of 1 lb. per individual big or small, spoons, bowls, grass mats, buckets, tishts, and earthen water jars to each family sufficient for their requirements.

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Adults have on an average 3 blankets. Clothing in the form jerseys, pullovers, and jackets have been purchased locally and ssued to each person.

100 maunds of sheep's wool (fleeces) were purchased locally nd have been issued to the women, and this wool they have spun nd knitted into stockings and socks etc., for themselves and their hildren.

. Food.

The rations are amply sufficient and consist of Tea, Sugar nd Bread at 8 a.m.

Bread and fruit at 12 noon.

Meat, Vegetables, Ghee and Rice on 4 days per week at 3.30 p.m.

Vegetables, Ghee and Rice on 3 days per week at 3.30 p.m.

The food is distributed in the rooms or tents by attendants.

Fresh milk is distributed twice daily to all children recommended by the Medical Officer. At present 220 pints are distributed morning and evening.

6. Health.

By the kindness of the Air Officer Commanding Vice Air Marshal Brunett, C.B., D.S.O., the services of Ft.Lt. Dix~~s~~on R.A.F. (med.) were wholly placed at the disposal of the local committee, until the 20th October.

The services of this Officer were very much appreciated not only by the Committee but also by the Assyrian Refugees.

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The health of the camp has been satisfactory. A small outbreak of diphtheria was quickly and successfully dealt with.

As is to be expected in a large community mostly living in tents in this cold weather there have been a number of people sick with malaria, coughs, etc.

During the period 21st August - 30th November there have been 70 deaths and 18 births.

The deaths have been confined to children mostly under 2 years of age, and the number is not excessive in view of the condition of the children when they arrived in the camp after very trying experiences to their mothers and themselves.

7. Finance.

The Iraq Government has freely met all demands for funds to finance the administration of the camp.

The amount expended from the opening of the camp on the 21st August up to the 30th November is 4405 I.D. Of this sum a considerable amount was spent in the initial stages of the formation of the camp.

The sum actually spent on the running of the camp does not exceed 200 I.D. per week. This amount covers food, milk, rent of the houses, tents, pay of staff, electric light and minor incidental expenses.

Mosul, 6 December, 1933.

II.

LIST O

NAME OF VILLAGE : PO

Cham Sus
Tahlawa
Daudiya
Tani
Dahi
Araden

Hamzik

Bibad
Sar Sinak
Dohik
Birozan
Diraluk
Sakreen
Birbank
Cham Sherit
Cham Rabtek
Musa Laka
Chelki
Kani Balaf
Safra Zor
Qadish

Kandi Nazi

Kend Kusa)
Alkoshki)

Mijilmakht
Kori Kafar
Bakir Ulya

Bakir Sufl
Salahi

Kafla Sin
Dostka

Tel Khas

Qala' Ba

Khershan

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losure II.

LIST OF POLICE POSTS IN THE ASSYRIAN VILLAGES.

F A.	NAME OF VILLAGE	POPULATION	No. OF ARMS IN THE VILLAGE.	POLICE STRENGTH (FOOT).	
IYA	Cham Sus	200	4	12	
	Tahlawa	75	2	3	
	Daudiya	275	26	12	
	Tani	200	22	3	
	Dahi	140	17	3	
	Araden	515	93	4	Post abolished as not needed at present.
	Hamzik	50	12	10	Post abolished at present.
	Bibad	250	42	10	- do -
	Sar Sinak	150	4	10	- do -
	Dohik	130	23	3	- do -
	Birozan	200	-	3	- do -
	Diraluk	130	5	7	- do -
	Sakreen	65	2	10	- do -
	Birbank	75	-	3	- do -
	Cham Sheriti	70	-	12	- do -
	Cham Rabtek	90	10	12	- do -
	Musa Laka	55	2	6	- do -
	Chelki	210	53	22	- do -
	Kani Balaf	110	19	12	- do -
	Safra Zor	35	3	3	- do -
	Qadish	150	1	10	
K	Kandi Nazi			10	Post abolished as villagers have gone to Kend Kusa.
	Kend Kusa)	150	30	6	Post still exists.
	Alkoshki)			6	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
	Mijilmakht	190	-	5	
	Kori Kafan	250	50	36	Strength reduced to 6
	Bakir Ulya	-	- -	12	Post abolished as villagers have gone to Bakir Sufla.
	Bakir Sufla	150		5	
	Salahi			10	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
	Kafla Sin	80		5	
	Dostka			3	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
	Tel Khasaf			6	Post abolished as village is void of Assyrians.
	Qala' Badri			8	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
	Khershana	15	5	5	

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Nordinawa				6	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
Kabirtu				5	Post abolished as village is void of Assyrians.
Sarshur				6	(Post abolished as the (male population have (gone to Syria and the (families gone to Mosul.
Garfil				5	
Busiryan				6	
Kani Gulan				12	Post abolished as villagers have scattered.
Bablu	65	10		8	Post abolished as the situation is quiet which leave no necessity for its retention.
Badi				8	Post abolished as the Assyrians have gone to Syria and the families transferred to Mosul.
Hijarki	85			5	Post abolished not needed.
Aluka	30			5	Post opened on the arrival of Ashutis who all have arms.
Dinarta	113)	-		10	In addition to the arms registered the inhabitants of these villages have 50 unregistered rifles.
Kashkawa	134)	122		5	
Ain Hilwa	100	-	1	5	
Qasrun	38	-	-	4	
Dairstune	22	-	-	4	Post is to be transferred to Baibuz as this village is empty of Assyrians.
Baibus Ulya	57	-	1	4	
Taftyan	120	-	1	4	
Jarrahiya	114	7	-	5	
Birozawa	65	-	-	4	
Qasraj			1	4	Post opened though the village has no Assyrians owing to the importance of its locality.
Alnisairiya	41	-	-	-	is controlled by the Jarrahiya post, yet a new post will be opened in this village.
Biboz	33	1	-	-	A post is to be opened in this village.
Karanjak	35	-	-	3	Post abolished after the departure of the Assyrians.
Biban		-	-	5	This is a Yazidi village. The post which has been abolished was first opened as it lies on the road.
Dahkan	33	5	2	-	Abolished after departure of the villagers.
Karrana	110	-	2	5	- do -
Bibos Sufla	33	-	-	-	It is decided to open a new post.
Dirstek	45	-	-	2	Abolished after departure of villagers.
Qasruk	13	-	-	2	
Mulla Barwan	35	-	2	-	Post withdrawn as it is no longer required as the Chaldean villagers have enough rifles.
Badriya	100	7	-	-	No post as the villagers have enough rifles.

Quadha	Name of village.	Monetory assistance		Seeds Wheat	Taghar Barley	Mules	Oxen	Agricultural implements	Blankets	Remarks
		I.D.	FILS							
AMADIA	Chem Sos Tuhlawa Mosalga Sufra Zir	100	-	50						No other needs
DOHOK	Karshna	17	250	22	18	2	-	1	-	
	Bakawa	11	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	
	Majalmakht	26	250	14	12	-	-	5	-	do.
	Gori Kafan	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	
	Kifla Sin	15	-	5	5½	-	-	4	-	
	Baqir Sufla	7	500	3½	2½	-	-	2	-	
	Injirki	29	-	10	-	-	2	8		
	Kenda Kosa	-	-	30	13	2	-	-	-	No losses suffered. Took shelter at Korj Kapan & did not return to the village & now inhabited by Ashutis.
	Alocka inhabitants	14	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Ql'at Badri	50								Inhabitants scattered
	Nafdara	17								Inhabitants moved to Dohok.
	For subsistence of villages	43	533							
	For subsistence of Families at Dohok	66	825						159	
	Al Koshki	5								
	Keri Bahen	19								

N.B. Each Taghar equals to 266 kilos.

SHEIKHAN	Ain Halwa	20						65	People did not apply for stores, but they will be given when they do so.
		4	-	17	8	-	8	4	12	Part of its inhabitants are reluctant in accepting anything.

Name of Qadha	Name of village	Financial assistance I.D.	Fils	Stores Wheat Taghar	Stores Barley Taghar	Mules	Oxen	Agricultural implements	No. of blankets	Remarks.
SHEIKHAN	Ain Halwa	20							65	People did not apply for stores, but they will be given when they do so.
	Qasrun	4	-	17	8	-	8	4	12	Part of its inhabitants are reluctant in accepting anything.
	Pios Ulia	18	-	4	1	-	-	1		This village was not looted & does not require blankets.
	Tuftiyan	2								Rais Malik Tallo refused to take anything as he decided to leave village.
	Jarahiyah	13	-	6	4	-	2	1	12	All these were handed over to Malik Nimrood & the inhabitants refused sowing except himself.
	Pirozawa	13	-	30	38	-	2	5	-	Part of its inhabitants refused assistance.
	Nisieiah	11	-	16	6	-	-	3	-	They will be given their requirements when they apply for them.
	Biyose	10	-	18	17	-	14	6	14	Declined to come & receive the oxen & agricultural implements & do not require stores or blankets.
	Biyose Sufla	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Badriyah	18	-	35	30	-	28	14	60	After they received the money they left the village.
	Karanah	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Bahindawa	10	-	4	4	-	6	8	35	
	Karanchiq	1	250							Inhabitants left the village.
	Dahkan) Artokh)	4								Requirements will be given to them when they decide to cultivate as they intend to move to Makanan village.
	Birstiq	8								Inhabitants are still reluctant to receive assistance.
	Al Qosh	54	950							This money was distributed among the families who took refuge in Al Qosh for their maintenance & for return expenses to their villages.

			original houses	destroyed	doors	Remarks
SHAIKHAN	Karana	110	25	25	–	Inhabitants left the village before completion of repairs.
	Dairstone	22	5	26	–	do.
		65	14	16	62	Completely repaired.
						After repairing part of the village work had to be

REPAIRS IN VILLAGES PARTLY OR WHOLLY DESTROYED.

Name of Qadha	Name of village	Population	Number of original houses	Number of rooms destroyed	Number of wooden doors	Remarks
SHAIKHAN	Karana	110	25	25	-	Inhabitants left the village before completion of repairs.
	Dairstone	22	5	26	-	do.
	Bairuzawa	65	14	16	62	Completely repaired.
	Karanjaq	35	6	41	-	After repairing part of the village work had to be stopped as the villagers have left the village.
	Jarrahiya	114	33	9	60	Completely repaired.
	Nasairiya	41	18	30	28	do.
	Qasrun	38	10	30	30	do.
	Ain Hilwa	100	27	110	90	do.
	Baiboos	33	8	35-40	27	do.
	Badriyah	100	15	50-55	71	do.
	Dahkan	32	5	2	-	Repairs of the two rooms started but were stopped owing to the desertion of same by their owner Malik Yonan.
	Artokh	-	4	1	-	Owner refused its repair as he left the village.
	Ain Bakra	-	-	93	-	(Repairs started but their owners refused
	Maknan	-	-	59	-	(their repairs and left the villages
	Baqqaq	-	-	46	-	(for Mosul.
	Baiboos Ulia	57	14	-	8	Nothing was destroyed in it.
	Tuftiyan	120	20	-	26	do.
	Bahandawa	124	36	-	37	do.

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1934

any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E414 1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
31 Jan, 1934.

P.Z. 737
290

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E146/1/93 57 Jan 11

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva Tel. No. 7 of 16 Jan.	Assyrian resettlement scheme: finance

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LET
No. 5 1 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITI
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFIC

MAILS BRANCH
1 FEB 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.
Treas.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P.Z.
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1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. H.M's Consul (Geneva),
16th January, 1934.

D. 10.50 a.m. 17th January, 1934.

R. 10.50 a.m. 17th January, 1934.

No. 7 LN. (R).

Following from Mr. Eden.

At meeting of Council Committee on January 16th Iraqi permanent delegate said that he was not yet in a position to announce amount of Iraqi contribution towards Assyrian re-settlement. It was difficult for Iraqi Government to take decision so long as number of Assyrians to be transferred was uncertain and cost of settlement was therefore not precisely known.

Taufiq Beg Suwaidi has privately intimated to Mr. Sterndale Bennett that Iraqi contribution is likely to be bigger if decision is left until above facts are established and at the same time he expressed the view that the Iraqi Government would not in the last resort allow scheme to break down for want of finance. Question of finance will now almost certainly be dealt with in Committee's report to the Council and Committee feel in the interim that no useful purpose will be served by putting pressure on the Iraqi Government through permanent delegate here.

Before the Committee on January 16th Iraqi delegate stressed the desire of obtaining as large a contribution as possible towards initial expenses from those Assyrians who can afford to pay a proportion forthwith. He suggested that contribution should be made obligatory in case of Assyrians who possessed property and that population might for this purpose be classed in four categories namely those who could pay respectively one half,

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [408r] (828/1206)

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ie third, one quarter and nothing. He suggested that Nansen
epresentative should be sent out to Iraq to begin investigations
or this purpose without waiting for Brigadier Browne's report
garding Brazil.

Committee undertook to consider this proposal but although
esence of Nansen representative in Iraq at earlier stage than
d been contemplated may have some advantage, suggestion seems
likely at present to be adopted by the Committee as it is
fficult to assess possible Assyrian contribution without
rst enquiring which of Assyrians wish to leave Iraq. Committee
ill feel it would be inequitable to make this enquiry before
ncrete scheme of settlement can be placed before Assyrians in
aq.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 7, repeated to Bagdad.

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INDEXED

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 7925/7/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

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757
1934

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Coll 17/16
581
P.Z. 581

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
0th January, 1934

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter No E 7355/7/93 of 24th January

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad No 773 14th December 1933	Assyrian refugee camp at Mosul

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 5 1 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECD. POL. DEPT.
31 JAN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Adm.
W.O.
Do

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P.Z. 767 1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

December 27, 1933.

SECTION 4.

[E 7925/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 773.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from Sir K. Cornwallis, dated the 9th December, respecting the Assyrian refugee camp at Mosul.

Bagdad, December 14, 1933.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.

Bagdad, December 9, 1933.

Dear Sir Francis,

I FORWARD herewith, for information, a copy of a letter of the 6th December, 1933, from Major Thomson, regarding Assyrians.

Yours sincerely,
K. CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Copy of a Letter of December 6, 1933, *from Major Thomson, President of the Relief Committee, to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Bagdad.*

I FORWARD you herewith a report on the Assyrian Refugee Camp in Mosul up to the end of November, 1933:—

1. *Local Committee.*

On the 20th August his Excellency the Minister of Interior approved the formation of the following local committee to deal with Assyrian refugees from Dohuk and other areas affected by the disturbances:—

The committee was as follows:—

Major D. B. Thomson, president.
Faiq Beg the Mudir Tapu, member.
Abdul Aziz Effendi, member.
Kasha Kina, member.
Malik Khamo, member.
Abdul Aziz Effendi, secretary.

2. *Admissions to Camp.*

(*a*) The camp was opened on the 21st August, 1933, and by the 30th August there were 1,294 women and children in the camp.

On the 14th September the total in the camp was 1,563.

This number has remained more or less constant up to the end of November, when there were 1,536 men, women and children in the camp.

During the period the 14th September to the 30th November a further 213 persons were admitted, and 169 persons either removed by the R.A.F. to Hinaidi or by their relatives.

Though the camp is primarily for destitute women and children, it was found necessary to admit some seventy men, who were destitute through blindness, paralysis, loss of limbs or old age.

(*b*) Of the 1,536 persons in camp on the 30th November, 1933, 578 women and children have either husbands or grown-up sons now in Syria.

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(c) There are twenty-seven orphan boys and girls in the camp. Of these twenty-five have been accepted by individuals in the camp who have undertaken responsibility for them. Two boys have been sent to the orphanage of the Papal Delegate in Mosul.

3. *Composition of Camp.*

(a) *Accommodation.*—The refugee camp is composed of three houses *en suite*, in all twenty-four rooms of varying size, and thirty-one E.P. tents and sixty-eight 180-lb. tents, an ablution tent, latrines, a medical dispensary, kitchens and stores. Water is laid on stand-pipes to both the houses and tents. Electric light is provided in the houses, and lanterns in the tents.

(b) *Distribution.*—Five hundred and forty-eight persons are accommodated in the houses and 984 persons in tents.

(c) *Amenities.*—Hot water is provided daily from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. for ablution and clothes-washing purposes.

Wood issued daily for heating rooms and tents at the rate of 1 lb. per individual, big or small, spoons, bowls, grass mats, buckets, tishts, and earthen water jars to each family sufficient for their requirements.

Adults have on an average three blankets. Clothing, in the form of jerseys, pull-overs and jackets, has been purchased locally and issued to each person.

One hundred maunds of sheep's wool (fleeces) were purchased locally, and have been issued to the women, and this wool they have spun and knitted into stockings and socks, &c., for themselves and their children.

4. *Food.*

The rations are amply sufficient, and consist of—

Tea, sugar and bread at 8 A.M.
Bread and fruit at 12 noon.
Meat, vegetables, ghee and rice on four days per week at 3·30 P.M.
Vegetables, ghee and rice on three days per week at 3·30 P.M.
The food is distributed in the rooms or tents by attendants.
Fresh milk is distributed twice daily to all children recommended by the medical officer. At present 220 pints are distributed morning and evening.

5. *Health.*

By the kindness of the Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, C.B., D.S.O., the services of Flight-Lieutenant Dixon, R.A.F. (med.), were wholly placed at the disposal of the local committee, until the 20th October.

The services of this officer were very much appreciated, not only by the committee but also by the Assyrian refugees.

The health of the camp has been satisfactory. A small outbreak of diphtheria was quickly and successfully dealt with.

As is to be expected in a large community mostly living in tents in this cold weather, there have been a number of people sick with malaria, coughs, &c.

During the period the 21st August to the 30th November, there have been seventy deaths and eighteen births.

The deaths have been confined to children mostly under two years of age, and the number is not excessive in view of the condition of the children when they arrived in the camp after very trying experiences to their mothers and themselves.

6. *Finance.*

The Iraq Government has freely met all demands for funds to finance the administration of the camp.

The amount expended from the opening of the camp on the 21st August up to the 30th November is 4,405 I.D. Of this sum a considerable amount was spent in the initial stages of the formation of the camp.

The sum actually spent on the running of the camp does not exceed 200 I.D. per week. This amount covers food, milk, rent of the houses, tents, pay of staff, electric light and minor incidental expenses.

Copy has been sent to the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, the Mutessarif, Mosul Liwa, and the Administrative Inspector, Mosul.

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No. E 7935/7/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
581
1934

India 410
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Ktd 26/1

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India, and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned papers.

Foreign Office,
January 24, 1934.

P.Z. 537
Coll 17/16
B3

Reference to previous correspondence:

From F.O.:- E 7437/7/93 of Jan 4th.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
7. Representative Bagdad. 84 d F5 } of December 14th 1933	Assyrian situation in Iraq.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 5 1 FEB. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH 25 JAN 1934 INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Air Min.
W.O.
D.O.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

December 27, 1933.

SECTION 2.

[E 7934/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(*Received December* 27.)

(No. 784.)

Sir, *Bagdad, December* 14, 1933.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 735 of the 22nd November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter and enclosure which I have received from Sir Kinahan Cornwallis on the subject of the work of the local Assyrian Committee at Mosul.

2. I also enclose an extract from the *Iraq Times* which, in its edition of the 11th December, gave prominence to a Geneva news telegram announcing that the Brazilian Government had refused permission for Assyrian immigration on a large scale.

3. I am informed that this news has caused much depression among the Assyrians.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.

Dear Sir Francis, *Bagdad, December* 9, 1933.

I FORWARD a copy of a memorandum of the 5th December, 1933, from the president of the local Assyrian Committee to the Minister of the Interior.

2. As I have already informed you verbally, Naji Beg has instructed the mutessarif, Mosul, to issue sufficient rifles to the Assyrians for their self-protection, provided that it is done in a manner which will not excite public criticism. Wilson informs me that the arrangements which are being made are satisfactory.

3. I am sure that Naji Beg will have no hesitation in impressing on the chief Kurdish aghas that petty thieving will not be permitted.

4. Major Thomson, in his report, confirms that a large number of Assyrians —chiefly from the Lower Tiari, Jelu, Ashuti and Baz—now say that they are not prepared to go to the same country as Mar Shimun and his followers. We have had reports of this before, but nothing of a sufficiently definite character to justify representation to the Committee of the League.

I presume that the Iraq Government will forward Major Thomson's report to the Committee of the League and recommend that another place be found for these people. It is a pity that no mention of numbers is made in the report; Major Wilson thinks that the total will not exceed 5,000 souls, but he admits that this is merely conjecture.

The question is extremely difficult. On the one hand, it is necessary from every point of view that the Assyrians who have caused so much trouble should be sent to some other country; on the other hand, the local Assyrians, who have suffered so severely, make a special appeal to one's sympathy, and it would be unfair to subordinate their claim for assistance to that of the Mar Shimun party simply because they are less likely to give trouble. Since, at the most, their number will not apparently exceed 1,000 families, I suggest that every effort be made to place them in one of the colonies, for instance, Kenya. Their natural inclination is, I think, to stay in Iraq, and they are only deterred from doing so by a sense of insecurity. It is possible that this feeling will disappear as time goes on, and that when faced with the question they will decide to remain, but, since they have made representations to Major Thomson, it is clearly the duty of Government to do its best to help them.

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5. I am obtaining details as to the number of widows, children and women who are "without any form of supporter." These people must have male relations, and the obvious course is to make arrangements with them through their chiefs.

6. The question of providing for the pastoral people and the town dwellers amongst whom can be reckoned most of the demobilised levies, appears to res with the League Committee rather than with the Iraq Government. The committee has information regarding these elements and presumably has their case under consideration. At the same time I shall recommend that, in forwarding the report, the Iraq Government calls the attention of the committee to this problem.

Yours sincerely,
K. CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Copy of a Letter of December 5, 1933, *from President of the Local Committee to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Adviser, Ministry of Interior, Mutessarif, Mosul, and Administrative Inspector, Mosul.*

IN accordance with your letter of the 21st November, 1933, appointing me president of the local committee for dealing with the evacuation of Assyrians from Iraq, the committee proceeded on the 28th November to Dohuk.

We interviewed Mar Serkis, the mukhtars and chief men of all Assyrian villages in Dohuk Qadha, explained to them the terms of the decision of the League of Nations and distributed to them copies of the decision and also the statement of the committee.

On the 29th November we saw Mar Yawalahah and the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages in Amadiah Qadha.

On the 1st December the committee proceeded to El Qosh, and there saw the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages of Shaikhan Qadha.

On the 4th December we visited Aqra, and there saw the mukhtars and chief men of the Assyrian villages in Aqra Qadha and Zaibar (Nahla area).

The absolute necessity of all Assyrians cultivating this winter was impressed on all mukhtars, and those in Amadia, Aqra and Zaibar were willing to do so. In Shaikhan and Dohuk they were not willing to do so, pleading lack of public security and want of rifles. The committee are strongly of opinion that sufficient rifles should be returned to all the Assyrian villages in Shaikhan, Aqra and Zaibar. It is understood that the Amadia villages retain their rifles.

It is considered that it is only by the return of rifles to villages that a feeling of confidence and trust in Government can be properly restored.

Arrangements could be made for mukhtars of villages to be responsible for rifles returned to villages.

The committee feel that the Government should take steps to impress on the chief Kurdish aghas that they view with the greatest disapproval the petty thieving and pilfering of Assyrian animals and property which is undoubtedly still being carried out by irresponsible Kurds. The enforcement of a firm policy of public security would go far towards re-establishing the confidence of the Assyrians in the Government.

The committee, during their various interviews, were impressed by the fact, which they had already formed independently and which had been reported in writing and verbally, that a large number of the Assyrians were definitely not prepared to be transferred from Iraq to any country in which they would be within the sphere of influence of the Mar Shimun.

This feeling is chiefly in the Lower Tiari, Ashuti, Jelu and Baz tribes. There are also many others who individually have expressed their objection to following the Mar Shimun.

The committee consider that this aspect of the case should be fully considered and laid before the League of Nations for their consideration. It must be remembered that these tribes were absolutely loyal to the Iraq Government, and did their best to implement the policy of the British Government in this respect, and it is they who have suffered by far the most heavily, in loss of men and property.

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It is our considered opinion that those who have been loyal and borne the heat and burden of the day should be given some form of preferential treatment in their final disposal.

There are other questions which the committee consider should be dealt with before the arrival of the Nansen representative.

Namely: How it is proposed to deal with the large number of widows and children and women without any form of supporter.

The very large number of men, many with families, who are *not* cultivators, and have lived all their lives in towns, as clerks, servants, &c.

The large number of people who are entirely pastoral and whose only livelihood is acquired from shepherding; this refers especially to the Ashutis.

The question also of how the demobilised levies should be dealt with needs careful consideration. These men have lived a particular type of life, and in many cases have never cultivated, but rather enjoyed good pay and the comforts of a town life, and so are not primarily fitted to be agriculturalists.

There is no doubt in the minds of the committee that when the time comes for opting as to leaving Iraq or remaining in Iraq a considerable number of individual Assyrians will opt for Iraq. This, however, is not an important matter at the moment.

The committee will visit Batas and Diana during the present week, and also interview the leading local Assyrians in Mosul.

I am sending 200 copies of the League statement and that of the committee in Assyrian, as it is considered advisable that these papers be distributed to the Assyrians in Bagdad and also to the Assyrian levies at Hinaidi.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

December 27, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[E 7935/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 785.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from Sir K. Cornwallis, dated the 14th December, respecting the Assyrians in Iraq.

Bagdad, December 14, 1933.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Sir F. Humphrys.

Bagdad, December 14, 1933.

Dear Sir Francis,

I FORWARD herewith for information a copy of a memorandum of the 11th December, 1933, from Major Thomson regarding Assyrians.

Yours sincerely,
K. CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Copy of a letter of December 11, 1933, from Major Thomson, President of the Assyrian Local Committee, Mosul, to His Excellency Naji Beg Shawkat, Minister of Interior, Bagdad.

IN continuation of my report No. 302, dated the 5th December, 1933.

1. The Local Assyrian Committee on the 7th December visited Batas, and was joined by the Mudir Batas. It met Mar Yussuf and the mukhtars of the Assyrian villages in that area.

The same procedure was carried out here as at previous meetings.

When the question of winter sowing was discussed, it was found that a considerable number of the villagers had disposed of their oxen, sheep and wheat at ridiculously low prices and only retained sufficient wheat to last till next summer.

The excuse made was that the newspapers had announced that the League of Nations had stated that the Assyrians were to be moved as soon as possible. This, of course, was a ridiculous excuse, and there is every reason to believe that their action was the result of correspondence from the Mar Shimun to Mar Yussuf.

It is of interest to note that I personally saw Mar Yussuf and some of his followers on the 15th October at Harir and impressed on him the necessity of all Assyrians ploughing and sowing winter crops, and on no account should anyone dispose of his animals, or possessions.

This advice I repeated to Mar Yussuf in a letter written to him on the 14th November, which he received on the 19th November.

The committee impressed on the mukhtars the absolute necessity of sowing winter crops, that otherwise they would be in great want by next summer, and that their precipitate action in no way could commit the Iraq Government to give them help should they be in want.

They were advised to borrow ploughs and oxen if necessary and carry on their normal life.

On our return the following day, we noticed a number of Assyrians busy ploughing in the Batas–Harir areas.

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2. On the 8th December the committee was joined by the Kaïmakam Rowanduz at Diana, and the local mukhtars were interviewed.

In this area the people have on the whole cultivated better than in the Batas area, and have not disposed of their animals in the same way. In fact, the Mukhtar of Alana informed us that he had made the people of his village cultivate as in past years, and he had forbidden them to sell their animals.

Undoubtedly all the ex-Ottoman Assyrians in this area who are Shemzdin tribe will leave Iraq when the time comes.

3. On the 9th December the committee met the representatives and mukhtars of the Assyrians at present in Mosul.

Two meetings were held, one being attended by the followers of Mar Shimun, and the other by those who refuse to follow him.

The position was explained to both meetings.

The leaders of those who refuse to follow Mar Shimun, the Lower Tiari, Ashuti, Baz, Jelu were asked to supply figures as soon as possible of the number of families they estimated were in their following.

The necessity of accuracy and certainly of *no exaggeration* in the figures was emphasised.

4. A point has arisen during the tour of the committee which is considered worthy of consideration, namely, the recovery of loans, &c., by the Assyrians to Kurds, Yezidis and Arabs. These undoubtedly amount to a very considerable sum.

The committee suggest that a British judge or failing him an Iraqi judge be appointed to deal with this question. Should the Iraq Government agree to this proposal, it is considered that the sooner the judge takes up his duties the better.

5. The committee impressed on each meeting the inadvisability of accepting every statement they read in the local press as being authentic. They were advised to communicate either with me or with Major Wilson should any statement concerning their move arise in the press or from any other source of which they had not been informed by the committee.

Copy to the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, the Mutessarif, Mosul Liwa, and the Administrative Inspector, Mosul.

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CONFIDENTIAL

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 416/1/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
22nd Jan, 1934.

P.P. 473

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 146/1/93 of Jan 11th 29°

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Consul Geneva Tels No 5 L.N. of Jan 15 6 16	ENCLOSURE IN ... No. 4 25 JAN. 1934 FROM SECRETARY, POLITIC... SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE Assyrian resettlement RECD. POL. DEPT. 23 JAN 1934 INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
A.M.
D.O.
Treas.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P. Z.
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1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decypher. H.M's. Consul, (Geneva),
15th January, 1934.

D. 8.50 a.m. 17th January, 1934.

R. 9.30 a.m. 17th January, 1934.

No.5.L.N.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

Following from Mr. Eden.

Assyrian question. Brazilian reply.

Committee feel it may be wiser not to deal with third condition except in conjunction with other details which will have to be discussed once suitability of area proposed has been proved by local investigation.

Resolution entrusting investigation to Brigadier Browne accompanied as experts by representatives of Nansen Office and Counsellor of Swiss Legation at Rio has been passed. Material parts are embodied in telegram which is being sent to Brazilian Government by the President of Committee and of which translation follows in my immediately following telegram.

Brigadier Browne is due in Geneva on January 18th for consultation with Committee regarding procedure.

Committee consider it important that, if possible, conditions mentioned in Brazilian reply shall be treated as confidential pending ultimate discussion with Brazilian Government. Conditions have not and will not be published here and Iraqi representative has simply been informed, though various details remain to be examined, that Brazilian Government are now prepared in principle to accept all Assyrians in groups of 500 families a month as and when they can be accommodated by Parana Company.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.5 of January 16th, repeated to Rio and Bagdad.

417 ~~416~~

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P.Z.
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1934

From SWITZERLAND.

Decode. H.M.'s Consul (Geneva).
16th January, 1934.

D. 8.50 a.m., 17th January, 1934.

R. 10.15 a.m., 17th January, 1934.

No. 6 L.N. (R).

::::::::::::::::

Following from Mr. Eden.

My immediately preceding telegram.

The Council Committee warmly thank Brazilian Government for generous offer communicated to Spanish Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro (Rio) which Brazilian Government are ready to admit to their territory all Assyrians whose transfer outside Iraq is contemplated. The Committee hope that it will be possible to arrive at a complete understanding with Brazilian Government concerning all conditions and details of this operation.

Keenly anxious to surr~~ender~~ound. settlement proposed with fullest possible guarantees in the interest of Brazilian Government no less than in that of Assyrian people, the Committee before proceeding to a fuller examination with Brazilian Government of conditions and methods of settlement, propose to send immediately to Parana Brigadier Browne, a British subject who has lived long in Iraq and has considerable knowledge of conditions of Assyrian people. The task of Brigadier Browne assisted by Monsieur Redard, Swiss Counsellor of Legation in Rio, and Major Johnson representing Nansen Office, will be to report to the Committee whether in the light of his

special ...

special knowledge there is a reasonable prospect that under the scheme proposed Assyrian people can thrive and become a useful element in Brazil.

The Committee hope that Brazilian Government will be good enough to facilitate the task of Brigadier Browne and his associates.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 6, repeated to Rio de Janeiro; copy by post to Bagdad.

INDEXED

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
19th Jan, 1934.

pp. 451

Reference to previous correspondence:

E

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Embassy Bagdad (Communicated) Nov 23.	Assyrians

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 4 25 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH 20 JAN 1934 INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.
Treas.

14—6130 8931 (2)

ENCLOSURE IN FOREIGN OFFICE
COVERING LETTER DATED 19 JAN 1934

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

December 5, 1933.

SECTION 3.

[E 7467/7/93]

No. 1.

Note of Conversation between the Chaldean Patriarch and Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes.—(Communicated by His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad, November 23; *Received December* 5.)

THE Chaldean Patriarch came to see me on the 21st November, accompanied by his English-speaking procurator. The visit had no special object other than courtesy.

The conversation naturally turned on—

(1) The position of the Christians in general.
(2) The Assyrians in particular.

The Chaldean Patriarch, as an Iraqi and as head of the largest denomination of native Christians and being the only prelate in the Senate, can, not unreasonably in the circumstances such as the present, be regarded in some way as representative of the whole Christian body. His services towards pacification and the avoidance of further massacres in the north last August will not lightly be forgotten.

With regard to (1), he said that the action of the extremist Assyrians had inflicted a wound on all Christians here which would take years to heal. The Assyrians had raised the bogey of religious war and intolerance, which in Mesopotamia had been laid a century ago. It was touch and go with the big Christian villages of Tel Kaif and Alqosh. The latter would certainly have shown fight against the army, and the result would have been a general pogrom of Christians all over the country. He added that his relations with the then Minister of the Interior, Hikmet Sulaimani, were very good, and he had no difficulty whatever in persuading the Ghazi to visit Alqosh to note the large number of his Christian subjects there and their loyalty to the throne. Nevertheless, the present situation of all Christians was very difficult, certain passions having been aroused in the hearts of the meaner spirits, especially in certain circles in Mosul. Those in authority wished, in certain cases, to attack the Christians for their own private ends, and were prepared to incite the mob on grounds of religion.

His companion also mentioned that now that the British had surrendered their mandate the Christians were worse off than in the Turkish days, when the Turks at least favoured them as a counterweight to the Arabs, when their schools had better treatment and when Government appointments were more open to them than at present. French protection made itself felt in those days, but now the Christians had only the guarantee made by Iraq to the League, and one year had not elapsed before they had experience of how these guarantees were respected. This was the opinion of the Christians of all denominations.

2. With regard to the Assyrians, the Patriarch said that from two to three thousand were given shelter and protection by the other Christians, with whom a certain number of Assyrians still remained. Certain Assyrian leaders had thanked him. Provided they were allowed to retain their arms a great number would have been content to have settled down in Iraq, as they enjoyed special fiscal privileges, and the Arabs would not dare to attack them. But it was the provocative attitude of the Patriarchal family and of their supporters and the desire to maintain the temporal power of the Mar Shimun that proved their undoing. He thought that they would not go to Brazil even at the bidding of the Mar Shimun, and hinted that the saner elements in Iraqi politics would be very sorry to lose a great many of the Assyrians, who would form a defence against the Turks.

The old man was clear and coherent in spite of his 83 years.

G. O.-F.

November 23, 1933.

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1934

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
18th Jan, 1934.

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P.Z. 332

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 6857/7/93 of Nov 22, 1933.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations C.16. of 5th Jan.	Assyrians: Mar Shimun's petitions

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 4 25 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to
the Council.

C.16.1934. I.

Geneva, January 5th, 1934.

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN IRAQ.

Observations of the Iraqi Government on the Supplementary Petition, dated October 8th, 1933, from Mar Shimun, "Catholicos" Patriarch of the Assyrians.

(Documents C.504, C.535, C.545, C.556, C.567, C.573 and C.625. 1933. I.)

Note by the Secretary-General.

In document C.625, 1933. I, the Secretary-General had the honour to circulate to the Council a petition from Mar Shimun, dated October 8th, 1933, regarded as supplementary to those from the same source and concerning the same question which had previously been communicated to the Council. This petition was at the same time transmitted to the Iraqi Government for its observations.

In a letter dated December 14th, 1933, the Iraqi Government forwarded to the Secretary-General its observations on the petition.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the text of the letter and the observations in question.

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Baghdad,
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December 14th, 1933.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 4/7390/3314 of 26 October 1933, forwarding a petition from Mar Shimun, dated 8 October 1933 and circulated to the Council as document C.625.1933.I. Since it consists for the most part of a repetition of his previous petitions already submitted to the ordinary procedure and refers to matters already dealt with by the Council, I should not have felt called upon to offer any further observations, had it not contained certain misstatements concerning a high and trusted official of the Government of a kind already familiar to the Council in this series of petitions, and to which exception has been taken not only in the earlier observations of my Government but even by the Delegation of the United Kingdom which is not directly concerned (Document C.603,1933.I).

I accordingly attach a short note on this and one other new point raised in the petition.

I take this opportunity of suggesting that no useful purpose, least of all the interest of the Assyrian people generally, is served by the continued circulation of the compositions of this petitioner, which appear to violate in essential particulars the conditions governing the acceptance of minority petitions.

You are requested to bring this letter and the attached observations to the notice of the Council.

I have the honour, etc...

(Signed) NAJI AL ASIL.

for Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Observations on the Petition of Mar Shimun dated 8th October 1933 and circulated under League Document C.625.1933.I. of 31st October 1933.

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1. This document consists for the most part of repetitions of statements already made in previous petitions and already commented upon by the Iraqi Government. Only two points seem to deserve further comment: (a) the statement under "note 1" appended to the petition: "The practice of first "settling" and displacing Assyrians was very wide spread; (b) the letter alleged in "note 5" to have been written by Major Wilson, Administrative Inspector, Mosul, in May 1933.

2. Statement (a) is a deliberate lie. The only Assyrians ever displaced by the Govemnment were a small sect called the Bani Gippa. They were, in the very early days, moved (against compensation) from Mai and Baiduh owing to the unexpected return of the original owners; and then from Mulla Arab where they were unable to live in harmony with their new neighbours. They were then settled happily in Gund-i-Nazi and Gund--i--Kosa, took no part in the exodus to Syria and actually prevented others from crossing the Khabur river near their villages.

In 1927-28, at the express request of Mar Shimun himself, who wished to reserve the area for the Tkhuma, a few families of Baz who had built themselves houses in the villages of Boserian, Giril and Sarshur, were moved elsewhere by Captain Foweraker, the Settlement Officer.

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3. The letter alleged to have been written by Major Wilson in May 1933 is an impudent forgery; part of it is pure invention, part of it appears to consist of notes made by some disloyal clerk having access to the files over the greater part of a year.

Paragraph 1. Appears to be a note referring to Document 27 of the Blue Book; Major Wilson did not recommend the detention of Mar Shimun but discussed the possible eventual necessity (see also Document 11 of the Blue Book).

Paragraph 2. Major Wilson certainly pressed for the promotion of Assyrian officers of the Army who had distinguished themselves in the Barzan operations; this was after those operations and had no connexion with the Patriarch or his position.

Paragraph 3. The recommendation for additional Assyrian police inspectors was designed to increase the feeling of security among the Assyrians generally, and again had no connexion with the Patriarch.

Paragraphs 4 & 5. The alleged reports and recommendations regarding Surma Khanum and Yaku are baseless inventions.

Paragraph 6. Major Wilson did not recommend that pressure should be brought on Mar Shimun to sign a Document renouncing temporal power. Nor was then any suggestion that the Partriarchal family should be "obliged to accept the Dashtazi region"; on the contrary it was proposed to give the first opportunity to the Lower Tiyari who were hostile to Mar Shimun (see Blue Book Document 3.). Cham Pashai, "the lands near the Syrian frontier", referred to was privately owned land and therefore did not fulfil the first of the desiderata invariably urged by the Assyrians themselves.

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1934

India 425
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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copyes of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
18th Jan, 1934.

P. 332

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
League of Nations No C/Min. Ass./17 8th Jan	Assyrian settlement

MAILS BRANCH
19 JAN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 4 25 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
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Iraq.

C./Min.Ass/17.

Geneva, January 8th, 1934.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Letter of December 24th 1933 from the Government of Iraq to the Secretary-General.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the Committee for the establishment of the Assyrians of Iraq a letter dated December 24th, 1933, addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

---

istry for Foreign Affairs,
Baghdad,
Iraq.

Date.. 24th Dec. 1933.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

With reference to the resolution of the Committee of the Council adopted on 31st October 1933 and circulated under Document C./Min.Ass/11 of 15 November 1933,

I have the honour to inform you that the Local Committee has now completed the first phase of its work and Major Thomson has submitted his reports.

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2. The Local Committee interviewed: on 28th November at Dohuk, Bishop Serkis, leading Assyrians and headmen of all Assyrian villages of Dohuk Qadha; on 29th at Amadiya, Bishop Yawalaha, leading Assyrians and headmen of all villages in Amadiya Qadha; on 1st December at Al Qosh, the leaders and headmen of the Assyrian villages in Shaikhan Qadha; on 4th December at Aqra, the leaders and headmen of the Assyrian villages of the Aqra and Zibar Qadhas; on 7th December at Batas, Bishop Yusuf and the headmen of the villages of Batas nahiya; on 8th December at Diana, the headmen of the villages in Ruwanduz Qadha; on 9th December at Mosul, the representatives and headmen of the Assyrians now in that city.

3. Syriac translations of the Resolution of the Committee and of an explanatory statement, copy of which has been transmitted to you through the Permanent Delegation at Geneva, were distributed, and additional explanations given. It was impressed on the Bishops and headmen that all Assyrians must cultivate this winter. There was no difficulty in respect of Amadiya, Aqra, Zibar and Ruwanduz. The villagers of Shaikhan and Dohuk, however, have not yet recovered sufficient confidence and were for the most part unwilling: as stated in my letter C/527 of 21st December 1933[1], arrangements are being made to issue rifles to them and it is hoped that this will restore their courage.

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[1] See C./Min. Ass/16. (Note by the Secretary-General).

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4. At Batas the Committee found that, although this area was entirely unaffected by the events of August last, a considerable number of villagers had disposed of their oxen, sheep and grain at ridiculously low prices, retaining only sufficient wheat for food till next summer. Major Thomson had himself, as long ago as 15th October, seen and warned Bishop Yusuf and a number of headmen of this area against selling their possessions or otherwise interrupting their normal agricultural activities at this stage; he had repeated the warning by letter in November. There is reason to believe that this improvident action was due to correspondence from Mar Shimun to Bishop Yusuf, who, as mentioned in paragraph 6 of the Notes forwarded to you with Yasin Pasha's letter of 16 October 1933 (Document C/Min.Ass./I.1933) is attached, by matrimonial ties, to the Patriarchal House. The villagers concerned were advised to borrow ploughs and oxen and to resume their normal life; many have now begun to plough in consequence.

5. The particular attention of the Committee of the Council is drawn to the following extract from one of the reports:

> "The Local Committee, during their various interviews, were impressed by the fact that very many of the Assyrians were definitely not prepared to be transferred from Iraq to any country in which they would be within the sphere of influence of the Mar Shimun. This feeling is chiefly in the Lower Tiyari, Ashuti, Jelu and Baz tribes. There are also many others who individually have expressed their objection

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to following Mar Shimun. The Committee are of opinion that this aspect of the case should be fully considered, and laid before the League of Nations for their consideration."

It appears to follow that two separate areas must be found. The President of the Committee has been asked to estimate the proportion which the two factions bear to each other.

6. The Local Committee has also asked that the attention of the Committee should be drawn to the problems presented by:

(a) women and children without any supporters,

(b) the men, many with families, who are not cultivators but have lived all their lives in towns as clerks, servants, etc.,

(c) persons, notably the Ashuti tribe, who are entirely pastoral,

(d) demobilized levies who have never cultivated but have always engaged good pay and the comforts of a town life.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) NOURI Said.

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

ER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ENCLOSURE IN W
No. 3 18. JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLIT AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
15 JAN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

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The Under Secretary of State
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NO DISTRIBUTION.

Code telegram to Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).

Foreign Office. 12th January, 1934. 4.45 p.m.

No. 4. (R).

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Your telegram No. 5 (of January 5th. Assyrians).

The Brazilian Ambassador told me on January 9th that his Government, in response to personal appeal which I had made to him just before Christmas, had decided to modify their attitude in regard to Assyrian immigration. He then communicated to me the substance of their official reply to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio. This corresponds with what you have reported, except that third condition, instead of merely disclaiming responsibility on behalf of Brazilian Government (see my telegram No.1 (of January 3rd)) stipulates that if Assyrians do not adapt themselves to the country, responsibility for their repatriation or settlement elsewhere shall lie with the Paraná Company.

I thanked the Ambassador warmly for the message and would like you to convey my personal thanks to Brazilian Foreign Office for their response to my appeal. I added that the third condition may raise considerable difficulty as it is unlikely that Company will be able to accept this responsibility, but I told the Ambassador that I quite understood that the Brazilian Government could not themselves undertake the contingent liability of providing for the Assyrians' return if the experiment did not succeed.

You need not at present do more than convey above message of thanks. Presumably the Council Committee will take up question of modifying third condition.

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Mr Cr.

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No. E 7726/7/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
he Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
13th Jan, 1934.

P.P. 290
Mr L. 16/1

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 7481/7/93 of Jan 2. 90

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva No 268 of Dec 3 269 of Dec 12.	Assyrians Records of 11th and 12th meetings of Council Committee

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

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P. Z.
330
1934

December 5, 1933.

SECTION 5.

[E 7482/7/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 268.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the eleventh meeting of Assyrian Committee of Council on the 2nd December respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, December 3, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Council Committee, held at 10·30 A.M. *on December* 2, 1933.

THE President said that he had not yet received news of the result of the representations which the Spanish Ambassador had been instructed to make at Rio de Janeiro. He had, however, on the preceding day visited the Brazilian Minister at Berne. The latter had no news regarding the attitude of his Government. M. Olivan had emphasised the urgency of the matter, and had referred to the report which had reached the committee that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour was only disposed to accept a limited number of Assyrian families on trial. He had pointed out that a limited acceptance of this nature would not solve the problem with which the Council Committee were faced, and in fact would only embarrass the committee, and make it difficult for them to proceed further with the Brazilian scheme, since they were seeking a plan which would allow of the removal from Iraq, with as little delay as possible, of all the Assyrians who might wish to leave, and their settlement in a single group.

The Brazilian Minister had said that he believed that his Government had been rather apprehensive about the suggested immigration of Assyrians. There had been an unfortunate occasion on which a colonisation company had introduced a number of the most undesirable immigrants, and the Brazilian Government were therefore somewhat cautious. Moreover, it appeared that they had believed the Assyrians to be "Syrians," who were usually small traders, hawkers and mendicants. M. Olivan had endeavoured to remove this misapprehension and had explained, so far as he was able, the good qualities which the Assyrians were reputed to possess. He had expressed the hope that, if the Brazilian Government thought it necessary to limit the number of immigrants at the outset, they would fix a much higher limit than was apparently contemplated. It would be helpful if the limit could be not less than 9,000 to 10,000 persons and if, in any case, it could be elastic. By that he meant that the Brazilian Government should indicate their willingness to accept more if the first batch of settlers proved satisfactory. The Brazilian Minister had said that the Brazilian administrative machine worked extremely slowly and he was doubtful, therefore, of the possibility of any immediate reply. He promised, however, to telegraph the same day to the Government to emphasise the urgency of the matter and to impress upon them the importance of the question of numbers. M. Olivan had urged upon him the humanitarian aspect of the question, and had explained the *démarche* which was being made at Rio.

The president expressed the view that there was nothing to be done, but to await the reply from the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, and he proposed on the

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4th December, if no reply had been received, to ask the Spanish Government to send a reminder.

The committee then considered the question of the proposed investigation in Brazil.

In reply to a question from the president, the *United Kingdom Representative* said that Brigadier Browne had been approached without commitment, in the manner authorised by the committee, and that, although he was naturally unable to take a definite decision until he knew precisely what was expected of him, he was prepared, in principle, to accept an invitation to go out to Brazil.

The United Kingdom representative then circulated the attached draft resolution (Annex A) which, in accordance with the committee's request, he had prepared in consultation with the French representative.

Dr. Kerno said that he had telephoned to Berne to find out whether M. Redard was still in Brazil and whether, in that case, the Swiss Government would be prepared to place his services at the disposal of the committee, if invited to do so. He had ascertained that M. Redard was still in Brazil, and the question of utilising his services was being submitted to M. Motta.

The draft resolution was then examined.

The President suggested that the reference to Brigadier Browne in the last paragraph of the draft should be omitted, and the paragraph worded impersonally, so as to be appropriate in the event of Brigadier Browne being unable to serve and some other investigator being eventually chosen in his place.

The French Representative suggested that the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the draft should be amplified, so as to invite the investigator in a supplementary report to make any recommendation which he might think desirable as regards the method of settling the Assyrians in the area in question.

The Danish Representative thought there was some danger of an amendment so worded being resented by the Nansen Office as impinging upon their province.

The French Representative explained that what he had in mind was that the Assyrian expert might be invited to offer suggestions as to whether the method of settlement by individual families, suggested by Paraná Plantations (Limited), was suitable for the particular case of the Assyrians, or whether it would be preferable to settle them in villages according to tribes.

It was felt that the objection of the Danish representative had some force, and as no suggestions were immediately forthcoming which would overcome the difficulty, the *United Kingdom Representative* suggested that since there was no question of adopting the draft resolution until the attitude of the Brazilian Government had been cleared up, the best course was for him to try after the meeting, in consultation with the French and Danish representatives, to find a form of words which would embody the French representative's idea, but would not give offence to the Nansen Office. This was agreed to.

The Danish Representative said that he presumed the resolution would be eventually published. It was necessary, therefore, to look at it from the point of view of its possible effect on the Iraqi Government and on the Brazilian Government. He saw nothing in the resolution which could give any offence to the Iraqi Government. As regards Brazil, the first paragraph gave the impression that the object of investigation was to see whether Brazil was suited to the Assyrians. He would like to include some phrase which made it seem that the object of the investigation was equally to establish that the Assyrians were suited to Brazil.

It was agreed that the United Kingdom representative should consult with the Danish representative to see whether amendments on these lines could be introduced into paragraph 1.

The Danish Representative then suggested that it was most desirable that Brigadier Browne, before proceeding to Brazil, should visit Geneva for a conversation with the committee. He thought that if such a conversation did not take place, there might be room for some misunderstanding. Brigadier

Browne might not appreciate exactly what kind of a report the committee desired.

Dr. Kerno said that it was extremely difficult for the League Secretariat to find money for any purpose, and if the expense of a journey to Geneva could be avoided, it would be an advantage.

The President said that it seemed to him that the expense of a journey to Geneva must be very small and that this consideration should not be allowed to stand in the way of a visit by Brigadier Browne if it were thought necessary.

The Italian Representative thought that the draft resolution would make clear to Brigadier Browne what was expected of him.

Dr. Kerno pointed out that, according to the draft resolution, Brigadier Browne would receive all relevant documents from the League Secretariat.

The French Representative suggested that it might be sufficient, if Brigadier Browne required supplementary information, that he should discuss the matter with the United Kingdom representative, who, if he returned to London in time, could act as the mandatory of the committee. Otherwise it might be that the Foreign Office would be prepared to acquaint Brigadier Browne with the nature of his task.

The Danish Representative said that he was quite sure that Brigadier Browne would obtain all the necessary information in this way. At the same time it seemed to him an advantage that there should be a personal discussion between the brigadier and the committee. Otherwise, if things went wrong, the committee might complain that the brigadier had not carried out their wishes, and the brigadier might reply that he had had insufficient opportunity of informing himself of those wishes. It was probable, in fact, that the brigadier would himself feel the need of such a discussion before setting out for Brazil.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he was quite ready to act on behalf of the committee, if required to do so, and he felt sure that the Foreign Office would do what was possible to facilitate matters. At the same time, he felt strongly that, if time permitted, it would be greatly preferable, for the reasons advanced by the Danish representative, that there should be personal contact between Brigadier Browne and the committee as a whole.

The President suggested that, as a preliminary measure, perhaps it might be arranged for Brigadier Browne to visit the Foreign Office and for the situation to be explained to him without any commitment. He could then be asked whether he himself thought a visit to Geneva, for consultation with the committee, necessary. In that event the financial difficulty must be overcome. It was impossible to inform him that he could not visit Geneva; if that were done, he would be able to say at a later stage that he had not been sufficiently informed before proceeding to Brazil.

The French Representative said that the question of time alone might make it difficult for a visit to Geneva to be arranged.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he would try to arrange for the situation to be explained to Brigadier Browne, as a preliminary measure, without commitment, as suggested by the president.

The President then raised the question as to what was to be done if the scheme for settlement in Brazil broke down. That possibility must be envisaged, and, for his part, he expected very little from the enquiries which the League Secretariat was addressing to various other Governments. If none of these Governments sent a favourable reply, what would be the committee's position? Should they simply report to the Council that they had not been able to find any place of settlement? Alternatively, what fresh efforts could be made? He excused himself for raising these hypothetical questions, but it seemed necessary to take stock of the position and to decide what should be done in certain eventualities.

The Danish Representative said that the president's attitude needed no excuse. It was one of realistic foresight. He wondered whether, if the Brazilian Government offered to accept a limited number of families, however small that number might be, it would not be worth while to accept the offer in the hope of the number being eventually increased. He thought it might be at least worth while to ask the Assyrians whether they were prepared to accept a limited offer of this nature.

The President referred to recent press reports from Iraq on the Assyrian question and, in particular, to reports which had appeared in the *Times*, to the effect that the Assyrians were already stopping work in the expectation of early removal from Iraq and to the effect that a campaign was being conducted in the Iraqi press against any contribution by the Iraqi Government towards their resettlement. The president recalled that the committee's task was not merely to endeavour to resettle the Assyrians outside Iraq, but to concern itself with the position of the Assyrians in Iraq, and with the possibility of their remaining in that country. He wondered, in fact, whether it was not time for the committee to consider some steps to carry out the second part of its task, namely, to investigate the measures to be taken in order to give effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, in the case of those Assyrians who might remain in Iraq.

The French Representative pointed out that the *rapporteur's* report in which this task had been specified spoke of measures for settlement in Iraq only as regards those Assyrians who *wished* to remain in Iraq. The committee was not empowered to arrange for the settlement in Iraq of those who wished to leave, but were not yet in a position to do so.

The United Kingdom Representative said that the present position was discouraging, but, after all, the task of the removal of a race was bound to be a difficult one. It seemed only possible to proceed step by step, and the first step was evidently to clear up the attitude of the Brazilian Government. The question of consulting the Assyrians regarding their willingness to go to Brazil, if only a limited number could be accepted, must depend on the numbers which the Brazilian Government were willing in the first place to receive. It was urgently necessary, if further trouble in Iraq was to be avoided, that at least those Assyrians most closely associated with the Mar Shimun, namely, the Tiari and Tkhuma tribes, should be removed at an early date. They numbered, he believed, between 4,000 and 5,000. If the Brazilian limit was less than this, the Brazilian plan could probably not be accepted. But if a limit of 5,000 could be obtained, with an understanding that more might be admitted eventually, the matter might be worth considering.

According to the *rapporteur's* report, which had been adopted by the Council on the 14th October, the first task of the Council Committee was to consider whether the settlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq was possible in practice. This passage had been purposely inserted in the report, because it had been anticipated that insuperable difficulties might be encountered. If no suitable place could be found in which to settle the Assyrians, the committee would have to report accordingly to the Council, and there would be no reflection upon the committee for so doing. At the same time, it would be most regrettable if the committee found itself obliged to take this course. If, therefore, the Brazilian scheme broke down, every effort must be made to find some alternative. If the Brazilian Government were only prepared to accept a small number of Assyrians, the United Kingdom representative did not think that the only course open to the committee was to put such a limited offer before the Assyrians. Enquiries were being made of other Governments, and the result of these enquiries would have to be awaited and every effort made to supplement them in other quarters. It was only after every effort to settle the Assyrians outside Iraq had been exhausted that the question which the president had raised of the settlement in Iraq of those Assyrians who could not be settled outside would have to be faced.

The French Representative said that, if the Brazilian Government were unwilling to accept more than a small number of Assyrians on trial, it might be worth while to inform the Brazilian Government that the committee had intended to send out Brigadier Browne to investigate the settlement scheme in Parana, and that, if it would assist them in taking a decision, the committee would be willing to send out Brigadier Browne, in any case, to give explanations about the Assyrians. *The United Kingdom Representative* agreed, and recalled that he had already made a similar suggestion at the previous meeting.

The Danish Representative said that it seemed important to find out how many Assyrians the Brazilian Government would take, if they were only prepared to receive a limited number, and that it was equally important to induce the Brazilian Government to accept the principle of elasticity, *i.e.*, to say that they would be prepared to accept more Assyrians within a comparatively short time if the first batch were of a satisfactory character.

It was agreed that no further progress could be made on the questions raised by the president until the result of the representations at Rio was known.

Dr. Kerno then circulated a note prepared by the Secretariat, as a result of its enquiries as to whether any precedent existed for a contribution by the League to refugee settlement (see Annex B).

It was agreed that there was no purpose in calling a further meeting until the Brazilian attitude was known. The next meeting was accordingly fixed provisionally for the 5th December, with discretion to the president to advance or delay it, according to the news which he might receive from Rio.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Annex A.

Draft Resolution.

The Committee,

Considering that, in view of the exceptional nature of the problem with which it is confronted, it would be assuming a grave responsibility if, before taking a decision regarding the scheme submitted by Parana Plantations (Limited) for the settlement of those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq, it did not take steps to satisfy itself as to the suitability for this particular purpose of the area concerned, by means of an independent and impartial investigation on the spot conducted by some person specially qualified to form an opinion by reason of his knowledge of Assyrian needs and characteristics,

Decides to invite Brigadier J. G. Browne, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., until recently the Officer Commanding the Assyrian Levies in Iraq, to proceed to Brazil on its behalf as soon as possible, and to report to the committee by telegram, after local investigation, whether, in the light of his special knowledge, he is of opinion that the scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians submitted by Parana Plantations (Limited) offers a reasonable prospect of success. The report should draw attention to any considerations which the investigator may think it desirable for the committee to take into account.

The committee considers that it would be of assistance to the investigator to be accompanied by a diplomatic or consular officer with local knowledge, and, bearing in mind the special qualifications of the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro, decides to request the Swiss Government to be good enough to permit the services of M. Redard to be utilised in this manner.

Furthermore, the committee recognises the advantage which it might be to the investigator to have the benefit also of the advice of an expert in settlement work, and gratefully accepts, therefore, the offer of the president of the Nansen Office to nominate such an expert to accompany the investigator, at the expense of the Nansen Office.

The committee authorises its president to acquaint the Brazilian Government with the proposal to conduct an investigation, and requests the Nansen Office to inform Parana Plantations (Limited) also, in order that the necessary local arrangements may be made.

The cost of the investigation, apart from the expenses of the expert nominated by the president of the Nansen Office, will be met from League funds.

In the event of Brigadier Browne's acceptance of the invitation which is to be addressed to him, the committee requests the League Secretariat to furnish him with all available information which may assist him in the accomplishment of his task.

Annex B.

Note du Secrétariat.

Le budget de la Société des Nations n'a jamais contribué directement au financement des différentes actions d'établissement de réfugiés.

1. Pour les réfugiés russes et arméniens, la Société des Nations s'est bornée à subvenir aux frais d'administration. En effet, le Haut-Commissaire pour les réfugiés russes et arméniens (le Dr. Nansen) avait à sa disposition un bureau qui faisait partie du Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations et, pendant un certain temps, du Bureau international du Travail. Depuis la création de l'Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés, l'Assemblée lui accorde annuellement une somme forfaitaire pour ses frais administratifs (à peu près 300,000 francs suisses).

Les frais d'établissement et d'assistance sont couverts par le produit du timbre Nansen (5 francs-or, payables par chaque réfugié non indigent) et par des contributions d'organisations et de personnes privées.

2. Dans le cas des réfugiés grecs et bulgares, la Société des Nations n'a même pas subvenu aux frais administratifs. Toutes les dépenses furent couvertes par des emprunts contractés par les Gouvernements hellénique et bulgare, sous les auspices de la Société des Nations. Les frais administratifs (par exemple les dépenses de la Commission mixte gréco-bulgare) furent couverts par des contributions des deux Gouvernements intéressés.

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

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

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P. Z.
330
1934

December 14, 1933.

SECTION 2.

[E 7726/7/93]

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 269.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the twelfth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council on the 11th December, 1933, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, December 12, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Council Committee, held at 10·30 A.M. *on December* 11, 1933.

ALL the members of the committee were present, with the exception of the Mexican representative. In addition, M. Azcarate, of the League Secretariat, attended.

Settlement in Brazil.

The President said that a reply had been received from the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, shortly after the last meeting of the committee, to the effect that the Brazilian Government contemplated the acceptance of one hundred families only. The Spanish Ambassador had said, however, that he had succeeded in obtaining a promise from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to take the matter up with the Ministry of Labour in the hope of enlarging this limit. Some days later, the Spanish Ambassador, who, of course, was without full details, had been recommended by the Spanish Government to enter into direct contact with the British Ambassador and to consult with the latter as to what further action could best be taken to move the Brazilian Government from the attitude which they had taken up. Now, however, a note had been received from the Brazilian Minister at Berne purporting to give the definitive reply of his Government, which was as the Spanish Ambassador had anticipated, and which attached certain conditions even to accepting so limited a number as 100 families. (A copy of this letter is attached as Annex A([1]).) The categorical nature of this reply would be discouraging, but for the fact that the United Kingdom representative apparently had news that conversations in Rio de Janeiro were still continuing.

The United Kingdom Representative said that when the instructions decided upon at the meeting on the 29th November had been despatched to the Spanish Ambassador, His Majesty's Ambassador had been informed in case he could render any unofficial assistance to the Spanish Ambassador. Two reports on the position had since been received from His Majesty's Ambassador. According to the first, there appeared to be some reason to suppose that the Ministry of Labour might agree to a larger immigration of Assyrians, if persuaded of the practicability of the scheme and of the desirability as immigrants of the Assyrians. The second report had only just arrived. From it, it appeared that the reluctance of the Brazilian Government to accept the Assyrians in greater numbers was due to three reasons:—

(*a*) Ignorance about the Assyrians;
(*b*) A fear that the Brazilian Government were themselves expected to provide land for settlement; and
(*c*) A prejudice on general principles to immigration *en masse*.

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[1] Not printed.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [437v] (887/1206)

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According to the report, a memorandum on the practicability of the scheme had just been submitted to the Brazilian Government by the local representative of Paraná Plantations (Limited), and in one way or another the favourable characteristics of the Assyrians were being brought to the notice of the Brazilian Government. The Spanish Ambassador had evidently been very active, and had done everything possible, and was still doing everything possible, to induce the Brazilian Government to take up a more favourable attitude. The United Kingdom representative understood that his Excellency was on the point of seeing the Minister of Labour personally, and no doubt the president of the committee would shortly be receiving a direct report from him.

The President said that in the circumstances it appeared to have been unnecessary to call the committee together that morning, and, had the information just received and communicated by the United Kingdom representative been available earlier, he would not, of course, have done so. The position really was now the same as when the committee last sat on the 2nd December. The attitude of the Brazilian Government was still not definitely cleared up. He had come to the meeting prepared to discuss the matter on the basis of the Brazilian Minister's note, and he did not know whether the committee would now wish, before proceeding further, to await the result of the conversations which were still taking place in Rio, or whether it considered that anything could be gained by discussing hypothetically what action should be taken if the attitude of the Brazilian Government remained as described in the Brazilian Minister's note. M. Olivan thought that it would be dangerous to reject the offer entirely. It seemed also undesirable to accept it as it stood. He thought it might be best to give it full consideration, and in the first place to obtain certain supplementary explanations regarding it. For instance, it was necessary to know whether the number of 100 families was final, or whether the Brazilian Government, if the experiment turned out satisfactorily, would be prepared to accept larger numbers. Again, the time factor was of importance, and it was necessary to ascertain the length of the experimental period which the Brazilian Government had in mind. If the immigrants were agriculturalists, it would obviously take more than a few months to make sure that the experiment was going to be a success. M. Olivan asked whether the members of the committee wished to discuss the matter hypothetically, as he had suggested, or simply to wait for further news from Rio.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed the view that the only thing to be done for the moment was to endeavour to develop the conversations which were proceeding in Rio in the direction of inducing the Brazilian Government to depart from the attitude taken up in the Brazilian Minister's note. There was at least a hope that the Brazilian Government might consent to abolish or enlarge the proposed limit.

It might, however, be of some use to exchange ideas as to what should be done if the conversations in Rio failed to shake the Brazilian Government. He agreed with the President that it would be undesirable to reject the Brazilian offer out of hand, although it promised so little. On the other hand, it seemed impossible to accept it in its present form. Such a decision would be criticised by opponents of the League, who would represent the League, when asked to settle some ten or twenty thousand Assyrians, as being satisfied with having found a home for 500. Further, the decision would be opposed by the Assyrians, who objected to being split up, and it would be opposed by the Iraqis, who would say that it afforded no solution to the problem in Iraq. Before accepting definitely a limited solution of this sort, it would be necessary to wait until replies from other Governments approached showed that there was no prospect of settling the Assyrians in a compact group elsewhere. Even then it would be difficult to adopt the Brazilian offer unless it could be definitely stated that there was a prospect of the eventual settlement in Brazil of all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq; and it would be assuming a considerable responsibility to send 100 families to Brazil as an experiment, unless the League were in a position to ensure their repatriation to Iraq, or their settlement in some other place if the experiment in Brazil proved a failure. The question of repatriation to Iraq had only to be stated for the difficulty to be realised. For these reasons the United Kingdom representative thought there were two possible courses before the committee if the Brazilian offer remained unchanged. One was to inform the Brazilian Government that the committee had received their offer with interest, but that it did not unfortunately afford a solution to the problem which confronted the committee. The latter was bound, therefore, before considering it further, to await the result of enquiries which had been addressed to other Governments, regarding the possibility of their accepting all the Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq, but would like to reserve the right to discuss the matter further with the Brazilian Government at a later stage. The other course was to thank the Brazilian Government and to remind them that all they had been asked for was a decision of principle, subject to discussion of details; that the committee proposed, before proceeding further, to send experts to satisfy it that the scheme proposed by Paraná Plantations (Limited) was really suitable for Assyrian settlement; and that, if the result of the investigation were satisfactory, the committee would like to arrange for further discussion of the matter with the Brazilian Government. It might be possible in these further discussions, in which the experts could participate in Rio, to induce the Brazilian Government to admit larger numbers than they were at present prepared to do.

The United Kingdom representative reminded the committee that, besides satisfying itself as to the physical suitability of the Paraná scheme, before accepting any Brazilian offer, it would also have to satisfy itself as to the status which the Assyrians would enjoy in Brazil. It was naturally impossible to expect the Brazilian Government to accept anything in the nature of "minority guarantees." At the same time, the committee would be bound to get some official statement from the Brazilian Government to the effect that the Assyrians would enjoy religious toleration. Furthermore, there was the difficult question of nationality. The national status of the Assyrians in Iraq was sufficiently complicated. Most of them were technically Iraqi nationals, but some were not, and some who possessed Iraqi nationality technically refused to admit it. But when those Assyrians who were technically Iraqis went to Brazil, it would clearly be unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case to expect the Iraqi Government to continue to regard them as Iraqi nationals and to protect them. It was necessary, therefore, to look rather closely into the question of what status these Assyrians would enjoy, unless and until they acquired Brazilian nationality.

The President enquired whether the United Kingdom representative thought it necessary to have an investigation on the spot and to clear up this question of status if only a small number of Assyrians were going to Brazil on trial.

The United Kingdom Representative replied that, if only a small number were sent to Brazil, it could only be on the assumption that, if the experiment turned out satisfactorily, all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq might in due course hope to follow. The committee must therefore, he suggested, proceed, even if only a trial number were sent, in precisely the same way as though it was deciding to settle all the Assyrians in Brazil.

The President asked whether he was right in supposing that the United Kingdom representative proposed that there should be further immediate discussion with the Brazilian Government.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought that the first stage was to await the result of the conversations now going on in Rio. When a reply had been received from the Brazilian Government which might fairly be regarded as final, and if the committee then felt that it was worth while to proceed with the matter, he thought that the investigator should be sent to Brazil, and that the question of the status of the Assyrians should be cleared up before any offer was finally accepted.

M. Azcarate said that he thought the first thing to do was to fix clearly the character of the present Brazilian offer. He thought that it should be pointed out to the Brazilian Government that, if it meant that only a maximum of 100 families would be accepted, it put the committee in a most difficult position. If, on the other hand, the Brazilian Government were ready to have 100 families as an experiment, then negotiations could be pursued. It would be a difficult matter to choose the 100 families in Iraq, and it would be necessary to know how long the experimental period was intended to be. It seemed impossible to do anything further without a definite assurance from the Brazilian Government that it would take more than 100 families, and he thought that the point should be clearly put to them.

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The President said that he thought that the local investigations in Rio must be going in the direction indicated by M. Azcarate, and he thought it would be a good thing to send a further telegram to the Spanish Ambassador asking him to continue his efforts to induce the Brazilian Government to enlarge the limit, and to ascertain the length of time which they contemplated for the experimental period.

The French Representative pointed out that the Brazilian reply was capable of a double meaning. It might mean that the Brazilian Government were willing to accept 100 families on trial and that, if not satisfactory, these families would be sent back. On the other hand, it might mean that, if the 100 families sent on trial proved satisfactory, the Brazilian Government would be prepared to accept more. It seemed necessary to make sure that the latter meaning was the one which the Brazilian Government intended.

The Danish Representative raised the question of the guarantee which the Brazilian Government desired from the League of Nations that the immigrants would be agriculturalists. It was clearly impossible for the League to give any such guarantee.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that the Iraqi delegation had in October calculated a report by Major Thomson, which had included a list of Assyrians who were not agriculturalists. The number of persons not in agricultural employment was quite considerable, though most of the persons concerned were soldiers or policemen, and it had been hoped that they would have no difficulty in reverting to agriculture. At the same time it was impossible to say that all those who desired or ought to be removed from Iraq were agriculturalists.

The President pointed out that the guarantee which the League was asked for referred only to the first 100 families, and it seemed necessary at the appropriate moment to arrange for the first 100 families to be carefully selected, so that they should only contain agriculturalists.

It was eventually decided that the president of the committee should ask his Government to send a further telegram to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio, quoting the letter from the Brazilian Minister at Berne, and asking the Spanish Ambassador to continue to do everything possible to secure the abandonment or enlargement of the limit. The telegram would also state that the committee assumed the Brazilian reply to mean that, if the first 100 families were satisfactory, more Assyrians would be accepted, and it would ask the Spanish Ambassador to confirm this. It would also ask the Spanish Ambassador, in the event of the Brazilian Government being unwilling to enlarge the limit, to find out what length of time the Brazilian Government considered suitable for the experimental period. The Ambassador would also be asked to explain that the Council Committee hoped, by measures of selection in Iraq, to be able to give satisfaction to the Brazilian Government regarding the agricultural character of the 100 families whom the latter were prepared to admit as an experiment.

The president said he hoped to be able to get a telegram on these lines sent to the Spanish Ambassador on the following day.

Proceedings of Local Committee in Iraq.

The committee then considered document C./Min.Ass./15 containing a copy of the instructions issued by the Iraqi Government to the local committee in Iraq under Major Thomson's presidency, and a copy of an announcement to be made by Major Thomson to the Assyrians.

The President said that he had examined the document with the League Secretariat, and two points seemed to require the Council Committee's attention. In the first place, the announcement to the Assyrians seemed to imply that the ascertainment of the wishes of the Assyrians and the arrangement for the transport outside Iraq of those who wished to leave would be carried out by the local committee, in collaboration with the Nansen representative, rather than by the Nansen representative in collaboration with the local committee. He thought that the latter had been the intention of the Council Committee.

It was pointed out, however, that the resolution adopted by the Council Committee on the 31st October spoke of the Nansen Office representative

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proceeding to Iraq to collaborate with the local committee, and it was agreed that there did not seem to be any point to take up with the Iraqi Government.

The president said that the second point was that it appeared from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the instructions issued to Major Thomson that the constitution of the local committee, as envisaged by the Iraqi Government, was not quite in accordance with the Council Committee's resolution of the 31st October. These paragraphs made it appear that the committee would consist of Major Thomson, Major Wilson, and an Iraqi administrative official only, and that Assyrian headmen would not be members of the committee, but would only be called in to receive information.

The United Kingdom Representative drew attention to the fact that the actual text of the Council Committee's resolution had been communicated to Major Thomson as an enclosure to the instructions which were being criticised, and that it should be quite clear, therefore, what the intention of the Council Committee was. It might be that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the instructions were not intended in any way to alter the constitution of the local committee as laid down in that resolution, but simply to refer to the machinery for assembling various members. He thought, however, that the point was one which ought to be cleared up with the Iraqi representative.

Dr. Kerno asked whether the Iraqi representative who was at present not in Geneva, but in the country, should be asked to attend a meeting for this purpose.

It was agreed that the point was of no real importance until it came to the stage of ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians about leaving Iraq. Furthermore, it was difficult to ask the Iraqi representative to attend a meeting of the committee simply to clear up this matter of detail. If he attended, it would be difficult not to inform him of the present position in Brazil, which might be undesirable. It was agreed, therefore, to leave the point for the moment and to clear it up with the Iraqi representative at a later stage.

The Danish Representative drew attention to the passage in Major Thomson's announcement to the Assyrians that it was very unlikely that anyone would be moved before next July. He did not know that the Iraqi Government had any special reason to suppose that this was the case.

The French Representative suggested that it had probably been thought desirable to make the statement because most of the Assyrians were cultivators, and it was necessary that they should be induced to carry on with their work and sow crops which might be harvested before they left Iraq.

The President agreed that the phrase had no doubt some connexion with the reports which had recently appeared in the press that the Assyrians were refusing to sow crops in the hope of early removal from Iraq.

Correspondence with the Mar Shimun.

The President circulated for information copies of a letter which he had received from the Mar Shimun, dated the 30th November (Annex B)(¹), and of the reply which he had sent on the 7th December (Annex C).(¹) He explained that, although there might be something to be said for the considerations which the Mar Shimun put forward in his letter, he had felt it impossible for the committee to take official cognisance of it, and hoped that the committee would approve of the somewhat evasive personal reply which he had sent.

General approval was indicated.

Conversation with the Ecuadorean Minister.

Dr. Kerno reported that the Ecuadorean Minister had visited the Secretariat on the 6th December, and had stated that he had submitted to his Government the information regarding the Assyrians supplied by the Secretariat. In view of the great distance, and the fact that an electoral campaign was proceeding in Ecuador, he did not expect any reply from his Government before the end of January next. He thought that his Government would insist that immigration should be by echelons of 50 to 100 families, and that the Assyrians should not be settled in exclusive enclaves. He hoped also that the Assyrians would prove peaceful settlers and would forget their somewhat bellicose past.

(¹) Not printed.

Investigation in Brazil.

Dr. Kerno reported that the Swiss Government had consented to the services of M. Redard being utilised, if necessary, by the committee in connexion with the proposed investigation in Brazil.

League Contribution to Assyrian Settlement.

Dr. Kerno distributed a note by the treasurer of the League on this subject (Annex D).(¹) He recalled that the United Kingdom representative had, at an earlier meeting, stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were prepared to pay their share of a League contribution towards Assyrian settlement, but could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. This had raised the question whether a League contribution was, in fact, practicable. The enclosed note had been prepared in response to a request from the United Kingdom representative.

In rely to a question from the Danish representative, Dr. Kerno explained that the memorandum was not designed to cover the question of the expenses of a possible investigation in Brazil. The question of the expenses of such an investigation had already been settled in principle. It was proposed to charge the expenses to the working capital fund, in the expectation that ultimately they would be recovered from the general fund provided for Assyrian settlement.

Letter from Argentine Minister at Berne.

Dr. Kerno distributed the text of the reply of the Argentine Minister to the enquiry which had been addressed to him by the League Secretariat regarding the willingness of the Argentine Government to accept the Assyrians. The reply is attached as Annex E.(¹)

Future Procedure.

It was decided to leave it to the president to call a further meeting as soon as he thought that the attitude of the Brazilian Government had been sufficiently defined by the conversations proceeding in Rio to enable the committee to take decisions. The president was authorised in the meantime to take such supplementary steps as he thought necessary to elucidate the Brazilian attitude.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

December 12, 1933.

(¹) Not printed.

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Notes.

Minute Paper.

Register No.
P. Z.
290/34

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 193 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary			Assyrians.
Secretary of State...			
Committee...........	16.1.		Proposed resettlement in Brazil.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Copy of to

SEEN
TICAL COMMITTEE
23 JAN 1934

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous submissions at P.Z. 7880/33 and P.Z. 8050/33.

The Brazilian Govt. have now agreed to admit all the Assyrians at the rate of 500 families per month on three conditions:—

(1) That they are agriculturists
(2) That no expence is involved for Brazilian Govt.
(3) That the Parana Plantations Coy accepts responsibility in case of failure of the Assyrians to adapt themselves to life in Brazil for repatriating them or settling them in another country.

This is satisfactory and it is to be hoped that the scheme will not be allowed to break down because of finance. The 'Iraqi Govt. have not yet undertaken to pay a reasonable part of the expenses. (P.Z. 8269/33).

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The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P. Z.
290
1934

CONFIDENTIAL

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
11th Jan, 1934.

Pp. 134

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To H.M. Representative Rio de Janeiro Tel. No 1 of Jan 3. From do. Tel No 5 of Jan 5. Senor Olivan (commd) Jan 5.	Settlement of Assyrians in Brazil

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 3 18 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

RECd. POL. DEPT.
12 JAN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
C.O.
D.O.
Treas.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P.Z.
290
1934

/93.)

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Cypher telegram to Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).

Foreign Office. 2nd January, 1934.

Despatched: 11.35 a.m., 3rd January, 1934.

No. 1.

::::::::::::::

Your telegram No. 113 (of December 30th - Assyrians).

President of Geneva Committee, who is passing through London, called here this morning and produced copy of telegram dated December 25th from Spanish Ambassador at Rio reporting confidentially that Brazilian Government were now likely to accept all Assyrians on three conditions:

A. That they were agriculturists.

B. That no expense should devolve on Brazilian Government.

C. That in event of settlement scheme proving unsuitable Brazilian Government should incur no responsibility.

I fully realise difficulty caused by Brazilian Cabinet crisis, but if Brazilian reply on question of principle is not received in time to enable Geneva Committee to report to Council at its session opening on January 15th consideration of important questions other than that of destination of Assyrians, which require Council decision, would have to be postponed to next meeting of Council, and delay may have serious consequences in Iraq.

Anything therefore which you may be able to do to secure reply before January 12th would be most helpful.

Decode. Si

D. 4.

R. 8.

No. 5. (R)

Your

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P. Z.
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1934

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro),
5th January, 1934.

D. 4.30 p.m. 5th January, 1934.

R. 8.10 p.m. 5th January, 1934.

No. 5. (R).

Your telegram No. 1.

Brazilian Government have officially replied to the Spanish Ambassador in the sense of his telegram of December 25th.

Assyrians will be allowed in at rate of 500 families per month.

P.Z.
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1934

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146/1/93)

ASSYRIAN RESETTLEMENT.

MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM BRAZIL THROUGH MADRID

COMMUNICATED BY SENOR OLIVAN: 5th January, 1934.

Le Brésil accepte tous les Assyriens en les recevant par groupes de 500 familles par mois, au fur et à mesure que la compagnie anglaise Parana Plantations leur trouve accommodement, et sous les conditions suivantes:

Qu'ils soient agriculteurs.

Qu'ils ne produisent par de dépense pour le pays, et

Que la compagnie assume la responsabilité au cas où ils ne pourront pas s'adapter au pays, en les repatriant ou en les installant dans un autre pays à sa charge.

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"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

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1934

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
10th Jan, 1934.

7665

Reference to previous correspondence :

F.O. letter E 7203/7/93 of ~~Nov~~ 25th, 1933

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad No 795 of 19th Dec.	Murders of Assyrians in Northern Iraq.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 3 18 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

MAILS BRANCH
11 JAN 1934
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to W.O.
D.O.
A.M.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P. Z.
252
1934

Copy.

(E 9/1/93)

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(425/162/33)

British Embassy,
Bagdad,
19th December, 1933.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No.471, regarding recent murders of Assyrians in Northern Iraq, I have the honour to inform you that the following further incidents, involving the deaths of three Assyrians, have been reported by the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to the Ministry of the Interior:-

(1) An Assyrian named Hemez ibn Bello was killed by persons unknown in the village of Haishi on September 30th.

(2) An Assyrian of the Tkhuma tribe, who is described by the police as an "outlaw" and is said to have been a notorious bad character, was shot by policemen at night early in October while attempting to commit a robbery in the village of Tine.

(3) Two Assyrians from Diana village, who despite warnings by the authorities had most unwisely proceeded on a distant shooting expedition, were treacherously attacked by two Kurdish shepherds of the Balikian tribe on December 12th. The Kurds fired on the Assyrians, killing one (Yokhanis Enwia by name) and seriously wounding the other (Jamo Mirza by name), who however succeeded in reaching Diana where he is said to be

lying

Right Honourable
Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O.,
etc., etc., etc.

lying dangerously wounded. The Iraqi police at Rowanduz have arrested one of the murderers but the second has absconded.

I have, etc.

(Sgd) F.H. Humphrys.

INDEXED

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and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

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1934

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P.P.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
4th Jan., 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 6581/7/93 of Dec 14th

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad No 755 of 30th Nov.	Welfare of Assyrians in Mosul districts

ENCLOSURE IN W[illegible]
No. 2
11 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLI[illegible]
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE
5 JAN

Similar letter sent to A.M.
O.O.
W.O.

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P. Z.
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1934

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

December 11, 1933.

SECTION 1.

[E 7610/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 755.)

Bagdad, November 30, 1933.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 724 of the 15th November, regarding the possibility of distress occurring amongst the Assyrians in Mosul during the coming winter, I have the honour to inform you that Major Thomson's camp is intended only for destitute women and children who have lost their bread-winners, and aged men incapable of maintaining themselves by work. It cannot, therefore, alleviate the situation which may possibly arise from the concentration in Mosul town of a large number of families from the outside villages. Those who have crowded into the town appear to be making no serious effort to find work, and when the meagre resources which they may possess at present are exhausted they may become a difficult problem.

2. During my recent visit to Mosul, I gathered that the Assyrians there anticipated that sooner or later someone would provide for them by organising a camp similar to that which was established at Baqubah when the Assyrians first took refuge in Iraq. Apart from the pernicious moral and material consequences of such an arrangement, there appears to be no practical possibility of a camp of this kind being set up again, and the only solution of the problem is to endeavour, as the Iraqi Government are doing, to persuade these people to return to their villages. I am pressing the Iraqi Government to agree to reissue a reasonable number of rifles with about twenty rounds of ammunition to all who will return to their villages and resume their normal life, pending a decision concerning their future. I also hope that, as a result of the explanations which the local committee are making to all Assyrians concerning the decision adopted by the Council of the League, some of those now idle in Mosul will realise the wisdom of going back to work on the land.

3. I am instructing His Majesty's consul at Mosul to keep me fully informed of the general condition of the Assyrians living in Mosul, and, as far as may be possible, of the safety and welfare of those remaining in the villages, and I shall not fail to report to you if it appears desirable that an appeal should be made to private charity in England to assist them.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

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1934

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P.Z. 90

Foreign Office,
4th Jan, 1934.

7367

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. letter E 6900/7/93 of Nov 13, 1933.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad No 735 of Nov 22.	Assyrians

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 2 11 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

5 JAN 1934

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.

14–6130 8931 (2)

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

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P. Z.
133
1934

December 4, 1933.

SECTION 2.

[E 7437/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 735.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 22, 1933.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government have now taken the necessary steps to give effect to the first part of the resolution of the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations referred to in my telegram No. 456 of the 13th November.

2. A local committee has been constituted in Mosul, under the presidency of Major D. B. Thomson, in accordance with the declared intention of the Iraqi Government, and I enclose herewith a copy of the letter and enclosures in which Major Thomson has been given instructions as to the manner in which this local committee are to proceed with the first phase of their work.

3. The Iraqi Government are forwarding copies of their instructions to Major Thomson, and of their circular to the Assyrians, to the Committee of the Council for their information, and are also preparing a report containing the information called for in paragraph 5 of the report of the Spanish representative adopted by the committee on the 14th October. I will endeavour to obtain and forward to you a copy of this report when it has been completed.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Ministry of Interior to Major Thomson, Assyrian Settlement Expert, Mosul.

November 21, 1933.

BY a resolution passed on the 13th October, 1933, the Council of the League of Nations stated that the greatest difficulty of the Assyrian question was that a part of the Assyrian population who live in Iraq did not look upon itself as permanently and finally incorporated in the Iraqi State, and would, in fact, prefer to leave Iraq and be resettled in another country if given the necessary facilities; it then set up a committee of its members to consider (*a*) whether a solution by settlement outside Iraq of Assyrians unwilling to stay would be feasible, and, (*b*) if so, to take, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government, the necessary steps for the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme for settlement outside Iraq of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country, it being clearly understood that the Assyrians who remained in Iraq would be regarded as the minority to which, on the one hand, the provisions of the Iraqi Declaration on the protection of minorities would apply, and which, on the other, would be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State which the Assembly of the League of Nations has specifically emphasised.

2. I forward herewith copy of a resolution passed, with the agreement of the Iraqi Government, by the above-mentioned Committee of the Council, defining the procedure to be followed in Iraq.

3. I hereby appoint you president of the committee charged with the task of explaining the resolution of the League Council to the Assyrians. Major W. C. F. A. Wilson, Administrative Inspector, Mosul, will be vice-president. The kaïmakams or mudirs affected will join the committee as members in their respective administrative units.

4. You should arrange to summon representative Assyrians and village headmen to convenient centres and distribute to them copies, in Syriac, of the accompanying announcement and give them any further explanations they may require.

Minister of Interior.

[991 d—2]

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Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Copy of Resolution.

COMMITTEE takes note of intention of Iraqi Government to nominate local committee, consisting of land settlement expert, an administrative inspector, the interested kaïmakam or nahiya mudir, according to local circumstances, and the Assyrian village headman concerned, to proceed forthwith to explain to Assyrians exact meaning of decision of Council of League of Nations, and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution.

As soon as possible after place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees appointed by that office in agreement with president of Committee of Council will proceed to Iraq to collaborate with above-mentioned local committee and local authorities in task of—

(*a*) Ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country.
(*b*) Taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c.

Full reports on work will be forwarded through Iraqi Government to Committee of Council.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Copy of Announcement.

To the Assyrians,

THE League of Nations has understood that a number of Iraqi (including ex-Ottoman) Assyrians do not wish to stay in Iraq. It has therefore set up a committee to examine the possibility of finding a place outside Iraq for the resettlement of those Assyrians who express their wish to leave Iraq.

2. It must be known to all that the committee formed by the League Council has not yet found a suitable place. As soon as such a place has been found you will be informed, and a committee which has been formed under my presidency in collaboration with a representative of the Nansen Organisation for Refugees will then tour the villages inhabited by Assyrians and enquire from each family in each village whether it wishes to stay in Iraq or to go to the new place of settlement. Every head of a family will have perfect liberty to say whether he wishes to go or to stay. Arrangements for the transport of the families who wish to go to the place fixed will then be made in collaboration with the Nansen representative.

3. We should like to repeat here that the new place for settlement has not yet been found, and it is probable, therefore, that a considerable period will elapse before the arrangements for transport are completed. It is very unlikely that anyone will be moved before next July. It is also probable that, at first at any rate, only cultivators will be accepted in the new settlement. It is therefore most important that the Assyrians shall stay in their villages and carry on with their cultivation and other agricultural pursuits. In this way they can maintain themselves, and when the time comes those who wish to go will start their new life with greater chances of success and prosperity.

4. Those Assyrians who wish to stay in Iraq are perfectly free to do so. They may confidently expect the same protection of life and property as is enjoyed by all other Iraqis; the guarantee regarding the minorities given by the Iraqi Government to the League of Nations will apply to them. But they must understand that they are nothing but Iraqi subjects and are bound to obey the laws and be loyal to the Iraqi Government.

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THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P.Z. 8050/33

Foreign Office,
2 Jan., 1934.

Reference to previous correspondence:
F.O. letter E 6804/7/93 of Dec 5. 7925

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
U.K. Delegation Geneva os 265 of 12th Dec 266 and 267 of 13 Dec.	Assyrian resettlement. Minutes of 8th, 9th, 10th meetings of Council Committee

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 1 4 JAN. 1934
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to A.M.
C.O.
D.O.
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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

P. Z.
90
1934

December 4, 1933.

SECTION 1.

[E 7426/7/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 265.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the eighth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council on the 29th November respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

Geneva, December 1, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 10·30 A.M. *on November* 29, 1933.

The President said that the meeting had been called in order to exchange views on the various outstanding questions prior to further discussions with Major Johnson, Secretary-General of the Office, and M. Shabandar, Iraqi permanent delegate in Geneva, both of whom, he suggested, should be invited to attend the next meeting of the committee.

Constitution of Local Committee in Iraq.

Dr. Kerno reported that the resolution provisionally adopted by the Council Committee at its sixth meeting on the 31st October regarding the local organisation to be set up in Iraq to prepare for the removal of the Assyrians had since been accepted by the Iraqi Government, and the president, in accordance with the authority given to him by the Council Committee, had ordered its publication. The text had been circulated to the committee in Document C/Min.Ass./11.

Financial Contribution of the Iraqi Government.

Dr. Kerno circulated copies of a letter sent to the Iraqi permanent delegate on the 17th November (see Annex) enquiring whether the Iraqi Government had taken a decision regarding its financial contribution towards the Brazilian scheme.

No reply having been received, it was agreed that M. Shabandar should be asked, when he attended the next meeting of the committee, whether he was in a position to state his Government's decision.

Correspondence with the Brazilian Government.

Dr. Kerno explained that several reminders had been addressed to the Brazilian Minister at Berne. The latter had sent to Rio de Janeiro by mail various documents communicated to him by the League Secretariat and did not feel able to press his Government for a reply until they had received these documents. He had promised to telegraph on the 20th November, and M. Azcarate had since pressed him to do so again.

The President offered to go to Berne to see the Brazilian Minister personally and explain to him the present position and the urgency of the matter in the hope of inducing him to put pressure on his Government to extract from them an early reply.

The members of the committee welcomed this proposal, and it was arranged that the president should, if possible, go to Berne on the 30th November.

Correspondence with the Government of Ecuador.

The President drew attention to the letter of the 11th November from the Ecuadorean Minister at Berne, which had been circulated to the committee. He pointed out that, whereas in the first place the Ecuadorean Minister had given the impression that he was putting forward an offer on behalf of his Government, the letter of the 11th November showed that he had taken a purely personal initiative. The letter was of a very vague nature, and it was evident that there was little hope of any practicable scheme of settlement in Ecuador.

Dr. Kerno observed that, in the letter sent to the Ecuadorean Minister in accordance with the decision of the committee at its second meeting, a request had been made for a concrete scheme. The letter of the 11th November was not in any way concrete. The Secretariat had replied by giving such information as was available regarding the Assyrians.

It was agreed not to pursue the matter further for the time being, but to leave it open.

Correspondence with Ecclesiastical Organisations.

Dr. Kerno explained that letters had been circulated from the Inter-Church Aid Bureau and the Christian Social Council of Great Britain in order that the committee might, if it thought fit, approach those organisations with regard to a financial contribution. His private enquiries *vis-à-vis* of the Inter-Church Aid Bureau had not led him to expect any substantial financial assistance from that body.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that, at the seventh meeting of the committee, he had undertaken, while in London, to make informal enquiries, if possible, as to the amount of financial assistance which might be expected from ecclesiastical and charitable sources in Great Britain. An enquiry of this sort was clearly one of some difficulty, and it was hard to form any reliable opinion as to what amount of money might be expected to be raised. He had been advised, however, from a quarter which had experience of this kind of work, that it might be possible, if an appeal were properly launched and organised, to raise perhaps as much as £25,000. It was doubtful if more than this could be obtained. This was, of course, a purely personal opinion and given merely by way of indication. The United Kingdom representative said that it had been suggested to him that the best method of procedure would be to set aside some particular item of the total cost of any settlement scheme and issue an appeal to ecclesiastical and charitable organisations to cover that particular item. He recalled that, in the latest report of the Nansen Office (Document C/Min.Ass./13), the suggestion was made that the representative of the Nansen Office, who might be ultimately appointed to superintend the settlement operations in Parana, should have at his disposal a fund for social services. It seemed appropriate that this fund should be provided from private charitable sources, but they might also perhaps be asked to contribute towards the cost of the maintenance of the Assyrians during the first nine months in Brazil.

The President thanked the United Kingdom representative for this information and said that the possibility of setting aside some particular item to be covered by private contributions would be borne in mind.

Possibility of Contributions from American Sources.

Dr. Kerno said that he had taken soundings on this point, but had met with discouraging replies. In view of the present internal situation in the United States and the amount of unemployment which existed there, it appeared to be quite useless to expect contributions towards Assyrian resettlement from the United States.

Investigation in Brazil.

The President recalled that the committee had resolved in principle to institute an independent investigation into the Brazilian scheme of settlement, and he desired to know whether the members of the committee were definitely of opinion that such an investigation should take place. He understood that the president of the Nansen Office was very anxious that there should be an independent investigation before the Nansen Office assumed responsibility for the scheme. The president said that he thought that the investigation would have to be dependent upon the reply of the Brazilian Government regarding their willingness in principle to accept the Assyrians. He understood that the Nansen Office were willing to pay the expenses of a Nansen representative, and that there would be no difficulty about the payment from League funds of the expenses of an Assyrian expert, if it were decided to send one. As a matter of form, however, this would require the consent of the President of the Council, acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General.

The French Representative expressed the view that it was desirable for an investigation to take place. As regards the association with it of an Assyrian expert, he suggested that it might be possible to find such an expert from among the British officers who had commanded the Assyrians in Iraq.

Dr. Kerno explained that the Nansen Office had wished their representative to be M. Burnier, who was actually their representative in Syria and engaged in the work of Armenian settlement there. M. Werner had pointed out that, if M. Burnier went to Brazil, it would be necessary for him to pay a short prior visit to Iraq to acquaint himself with Assyrian requirements. A telegram had been sent to M. Burnier to ascertain whether he was able to go to Brazil, and it appeared from his reply that this was unfortunately quite impossible, owing to the work on which he was at present engaged.

The President said that an enquiry certainly seemed desirable to him, as in the absence of such an enquiry, the committee would be taking a heavy responsibility.

The Italian Representative agreed.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he also agreed with the president. In addition to safeguarding the responsibility of the Council Committee, it was also necessary to convince the Assyrians that the proposed scheme was suitable. The possibility must also be borne in mind that the Assyrians might eventually refuse to go to Brazil. In that case it would be desirable that the Council Committee should be in a position to demonstrate beyond doubt to public opinion that the scheme offered to the Assyrians was one which it was unreasonable of them to refuse. The United Kingdom delegate said that he felt that the Nansen Office ought to be associated with the proposed investigation, and that it was desirable that someone with personal knowledge of Assyrian requirements should also be associated with it. He hoped in a short time to be able to suggest a suitable candidate as an Assyrian expert, but was not yet in a position to do so.

The question was raised whether the committee had power to send investigators to Brazil without a decision by the League Council. It was pointed out that wide powers had been delegated to the committee by the Council, which covered all steps necessary to ascertain the practicability of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq, and of preparing and executing plans. It was agreed therefore that the committee had the necessary power and that it was unnecessary to have a legal opinion on this point, as had been suggested by the Danish representative.

Dr. Kerno said that the Treasury of the League were very reluctant to find the funds necessary for the investigation.

It was the general feeling of the committee, however, that the expenses of the investigation, other than those which the Nansen Office were willing to bear, ought to be borne by the League.

The Danish Representative referred to the delay which might be caused by the enquiry. The members of the commission of enquiry might not be immediately available, might have to go first to Iraq to ascertain Assyrian requirements, and a considerable time would be taken up by their journey out to Brazil, their stay there, and their return.

The French Representative pointed out that, if an Assyrian expert were associated with the enquiry, no prior visit to Iraq should be necessary.

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The United Kingdom Representative said that he understood that it would be possible to leave Bordeaux on the 16th December by a ship which arrived at Santos on the 29th December. The journey of the Swiss counsellor, who had previously visited the area concerned, showed that the headquarters of Parana Plantations (Limited) could be reached in two days. The enquiry on the spot should not take very long, although it might be desirable also for the investigators to discuss matters with the Provincial Government concerned and even with the Central Government in Rio. It seemed unnecessary, however, to await the return of the investigators to Europe. It should be possible for them to send a telegraphic report to the Council Committee of a nature which would permit the committee to take decisions.

It was agreed to arrange matters if possible so that the investigators would be in a position to leave by the 16th December, thus giving an opportunity for a decision on the place of settlement to be taken before the meeting of the League Council in January next.

The suggestion was made that it might be desirable to associate with the investigation M. Redard, the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio, or some other person with local knowledge.

Enquiry regarding Possibilities of Settlement elsewhere than in Brazil.

The President recalled that, in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, the League Secretariat had been requested to continue its enquiries as to the possibility of settling the Assyrians in countries other than Brazil. He asked whether the enquiries of the Secretariat had produced any result.

Dr. Kerno replied in the negative. He saw no alternative to Brazil, unless one of the British Dominions were prepared to take the Assyrians. He observed that the United Kingdom representative, at the seventh meeting of the committee, had undertaken to make enquiries on this point.

The United Kingdom Representative replied that Dr. Kerno was under a misapprehension. At the seventh meeting of the committee he (the United Kingdom representative) had said that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were still making enquiries as to whether there was any place in the Colonial Empire, *i.e.*, the colonies and dependencies of the United Kingdom. He had also said that he was unaware of any place in those colonies and dependencies where the Assyrians could be settled. The enquiries of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were still proceeding, and he was not yet therefore in a position to make a definite statement. He could say, however, that no suitable place had yet been discovered. Most of the territories which might at first sight seem suitable were either already overpopulated or had an unemployment problem or did not contain available land. In others, the Assyrians could not be introduced without creating serious racial problems.

As regards the Dominions, the United Kingdom representative pointed out that he had already endeavoured to make it clear that he could not speak on their behalf. So far as his information went, however, he doubted whether any suitable place could be found in the Dominions. If the committee wished, however, to make quite sure on this point, he suggested that the most suitable course was for the League Secretariat to approach the Dominion Governments direct. With regard to Dr. Kerno's statement that no alternatives to Brazil had yet come to light, he asked whether enquiries had actually been made into possibilities in the Argentine and in Abyssinia.

Dr. Kerno replied that, so far as the League's information went, the Argentine Government appeared to be unlikely to accept the Assyrians.

The Italian Representative, on the strength of personal experience of Abyssinia, expressed the view that that country would be quite unsuitable.

The Danish Representative said that he had understood that the northern territory in Australia might be possible.

Dr. Kerno undertook to make further enquiries regarding the Argentine and Australia.

The United Kingdom Representative asked whether the League Secretariat had been able to make any progress regarding the other enquiry which they had

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been requested to make in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, namely, as to the manner in which funds should be raised to supplement the eventual Iraqi contribution.

Dr. Kerno said that the Nansen Office had only funds for its own establishment. These were derived partly from the League budget and partly from the proceeds of the sale of Nansen stamps. In carrying out refugee work the normal method of the Nansen Office had been to issue appeals for funds, signed by eminent persons, such as, for instance, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. There had been cases in which individual Governments had made contributions. He understood that such a contribution had been made on one occasion by the Norwegian Government. Dr. Kerno thought the only means of raising such funds as might be necessary to supplement the Iraqi contribution and whatever the Assyrians themselves could pay would be by an appeal issued by the Nansen Office.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that at the seventh meeting of the committee he had been asked whether any contribution might be expected from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. He had indicated then that His Majesty's Government considered the matter to be one which concerned the League as a whole, and it was for that reason that he had suggested that the League Secretariat should prepare a note on the manner in which analogous operations had been financed in the past. Since the date of the committee's last meeting, the question had been considered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and he was now authorised to state that, in their view, the cost of resettling the Assyrians, in so far as it was not met by the Iraqi Government or by the Assyrians themselves, should be borne by the League as a whole. His Majesty's Government were for their part willing to pay their share of the League contribution, but could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that Dr. Kerno had so far spoken only of schemes financed by the Nansen Office. It would be interesting to know whether a scheme in any way analogous had been financed by the League, and, if so, in precisely what manner it had been done.

Dr. Kerno said that he could recall no suitable precedent, but he would make further enquiries into the matter.

The French Representative expressed doubt whether a League contribution was practicable. He could think of no State which would be prepared to contribute.

The Danish Representative raised the question whether a League scheme was constitutionally possible, and the *President* and the *Italian Representative* made it clear that they shared his doubt on this point.

The opinion was expressed that the committee could certainly not accept financial responsibility of this nature on behalf of the League, and that it was doubtful whether even the Council could do so. The point seemed to be one which could only be decided by the Assembly of the League.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that a legal opinion on this point should be obtained. While he disclaimed any desire to enter into past history in detail, he felt it necessary to point out that His Majesty's Government considered that the root of the present trouble lay in the decision of the League Council in 1925, when it determined the boundary between Iraq and Turkey. In spite of the most earnest representations of His Majesty's Government and the statement made by the British representative that the decision would remove any hope of settling the Assyrians in a compact group in that part of the world, the League had assigned the old homelands of the Assyrians, in the Hakkiari territory, to Turkey. It was for this reason that His Majesty's Government felt that the resettlement of the Assyrians should be a League responsibility.

The French Representative and the *President* of the committee deprecated any discussion of responsibility and expressed the view that, if the committee attempted to concern itself with such questions, it would be straying far outside its competence. The president was inclined to think, and his view was evidently shared by the other members of the committee other than the United Kingdom

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representative, that the utmost which it would be possible for the committee to do would be, in its report to the Council in January next, to state the cost of the Brazilian scheme, if adopted, the amount of the Iraqi contribution, and the amount, if it could be ascertained, of what might be expected from the Assyrians themselves. The committee would then simply point out that there remained a balance, and that it was for the Council to decide how this balance was to be met.

The general view of the members of the committee, other than the United Kingdom representative, appeared to be that probably the only course open to the Council would be to issue an appeal for funds from public and private sources.

While on the subject of finance, the *French Representative* referred to the problem of liquidating the property of the Assyrians in Iraq before their removal to Brazil. If such property were placed on the market at the same time, the effect would be to reduce prices, and it was necessary to guard against the Assyrians being the losers in this way. He suggested that the matter was one in which the Iraqi Government might well take the responsibility. He thought that the prices should be fixed by the Nansen representative who eventually went out to Iraq, and that the Iraqi Government should agree to pay these prices. It was possible that the proceeds might be formed into a "caisse," which should be used to defray the expenses of settlement, the amount being credited to the individual Assyrians concerned as a refund of the money spent on their settlement.

The President expressed the view that this was an interesting suggestion which might be borne in mind, but which could more properly be discussed at a later stage.

It was agreed that Major Johnson should be invited to attend the next meeting of the committee to give any necessary explanations regarding the report of the conversations in London.

The question was raised whether the Iraqi permanent delegate in Geneva should be asked to attend this meeting.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed the view that, as the whole scheme largely depended on the financial contribution which the Iraqi Government would provide, it was desirable to keep the Iraqi delegate as far as possible *au courant* with the discussions on the Brazilian scheme. He suggested that it might be desirable, therefore, to invite the Iraqi delegate to attend the next meeting.

This was agreed to, and the *President* said that he would take the opportunity of asking the Iraqi Government whether the local committee provided for in the Council Committee's resolution on the local organisation to be set up in Iraq had in fact yet been established; and whether the reply of the Iraqi Government had yet been received regarding the amount of the contribution which they were prepared to make to the Brazilian scheme if adopted.

J. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Annex to Enclosure.

Note to the Iraqi Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations.

M. le Délégué permanent,

Genève, le 17 *novembre* 1933.

DANS son rapport présenté au Conseil de la Société des Nations en date du 14 octobre 1933, M. de Madariaga, représentant de l'Espagne, a constaté que le Gouvernement de l'Irak s'était déclaré disposé à contribuer, aussi généreusement que le lui permettraient ses propres moyens, à faciliter l'établissement en dehors de l'Irak des Assyriens qui voudraient quitter le pays. Dans des conversations officieuses avec les membres du Comité du Conseil, son Excellence Nouri Pacha a bien voulu promettre de saisir sans délai son Gouvernement de cette question.

Le Comité du Conseil devant reprendre ses travaux dans quelques jours, son président m'a chargé de vous faire connaître qu'il serait très heureux de savoir si votre Gouvernement a déjà pu prendre une décision au sujet du montant de sa contribution financière. Il serait évidemment désirable que cette contribution

soit de telle nature qu'elle permette au comité d'envisager un plan concret d'établissement avec de grandes possibilités de succès.

A titre de simple indication, je me permets d'ajouter que, d'après les négociations préliminaires du Secrétaire général de l'Office Nansen avec la Parana Plantation Limited, le coût total du transport et de l'établissement de 2,000 familles de cinq personnes (au total 10,000 personnes) s'élèverait à environ [illegible]00,000 livres sterling.

Veuillez, &c.
AZCARATE,
Secrétaire général adjoint.

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December 5, 1933.

SECTION **2.**

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No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 266.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the ninth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 29th November, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

Geneva, December 3, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. *on November* 29, 1933.

AT the beginning of the meeting, in addition to the members of the committee, the permanent Iraqi delegate—M. Shabandar—was present and on behalf of the Nansen Office, M. Werner, the President, and Major Johnson, the Secretary-General.

The President explained that the meeting had been called to give an opportunity to the members of the committee to raise any questions suggested by the record of the recent conversations in London between Paraná Plantations (Limited) and Major Johnson (Document C/Min. Ass/13) and to give an opportunity to Major Johnson to make any supplementary observations which he thought necessary.

Major Johnson said that there were two or three points which he would like to bring out. The first was that payment to Paraná Plantations (Limited) was to be at the rate of exchange of the day, on the understanding that the company would not accept payment at less than 4*d*. to the milreis, and would not expect the League to pay at a higher rate than 4½*d*. to the milreis. He observed that payment was not to be made all at once, but in three instalments spread over twelve months. Another point which he wished to emphasise was that the company required two and a half months' notice of the arrival of the first batch of settlers. This was necessary in view of the preparatory work which had to be done, *e.g.*, clearing, building of roads, preparation of camps and transport, &c. If notice were given by the 1st January, 1934, it was hoped to settle all the Assyrians during 1934, but if the notice was delayed beyond the 1st January, the accomplishment of the task would be correspondingly retarded.

M. Werner said that before the committee proceeded to discuss Major Johnson's report in detail there were one or two general observations which he would like to make. The resolution which the Council Committee had passed regarding the organisation to be set up in Iraq provided that a representative of the Nansen Office should go to Iraq to collaborate with the local committee and with the local authorities in certain tasks. In order that the Nansen representative might have a clear idea of the position, there was one point which it was necessary to establish, namely, the freedom of the Assyrians to choose whether they would remain in Iraq or go elsewhere. M. Werner recalled that the *rapporteur's* report to the Council of the 13th October contemplated a scheme

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for the settlement elsewhere than in Iraq "of such Assyrians as might express the desire to leave the country." He understood that Assyrians who did not want to go were quite free to stay in Iraq and that no pressure was to be brought upon them to leave. He knew that the League Secretariat shared this understanding, but he would like to have the assurance that the committee confirmed it. If the Assyrians did not wish to go to Brazil, the alternative must be, in his view, that they should remain in Iraq, where, according to the *rapporteur's* report, they would have the benefit of the minority guarantees.

The Italian Representative pointed out that the Council Committee's resolution on the organisation to be set up in Iraq provided that steps should be taken to ascertain which of the Assyrians wished to leave the country.

The French Representative quoted the following passage from the *rapporteur's* report: "It being clearly understood that such part of the Assyrian population as remained in Iraq would be regarded as a minority to which would be applicable the provisions of the Iraqi declaration on the protection of minorities and which would, further, be bound by the obligations of loyalty to the State recalled by the Assembly in its resolution of the 21st September, 1922."

The President said there seemed no doubt that the Assyrians would be quite free to choose whether they should leave Iraq or not and that if they chose to stay the conditions under which they would remain were those stated in the *rapporteur's* report.

M. Werner then said that, in his view, it would be necessary to inspect the territory to which it was proposed to send the Assyrians and that this inspection should be carried out by competent persons. He thought that it was a very great responsibility for a single investigator to judge whether or not the territory was suitable. He thought that it would be better therefore that more than one person should go. A further point was that it seemed desirable that whoever was chosen to investigate should first of all go to Iraq to acquaint himself with the local conditions of the Assyrians.

The President said that the committee had already considered this question and that the principle of an independent enquiry had been accepted. The modalities only remained to be settled, and this would be done as soon as the reply of the Brazilian Government regarding their willingness to receive the Assyrians had been received. It was probable that the enquiry would be conducted by more than one person and to avoid the necessity of sending anyone to Iraq and thus losing valuable time, the committee was trying to find someone with the necessary knowledge of the Assyrians. One of the members of the committee had undertaken to try to find a candidate with the necessary experience and hoped to be able to propose a name shortly.

M. Werner raised the point whether the investigators might not be sent without waiting for the Brazilian reply.

The Danish Representative expressed the view that it was necessary to know the attitude of the Brazilian Government in principle.

The French Representative pointed out that the reply of the Brazilian Government was expected from day to day, and that if investigators were sent out without awaiting it their mission might suddenly be rendered useless, after they had started, by the receipt of a negative reply from the Brazilian Government.

The President at this point read a letter sent to him by the Brazilian Minister at Berne saying that the question of receiving Assyrians in Brazil was being considered by the Brazilian Ministry of Labour. The President explained that the committee were anxious to do what was possible to expedite the reply of the Brazilian Government and with this object he himself proposed to discuss matters personally with the Brazilian Minister at Berne. It had not been possible to fix an interview for the 30th November, but he had arranged it for the 1st December. The president pointed out that it was difficult for the committee to decide upon an investigation which would involve certain expenses without knowing the attitude in principle of the Brazilian Government. He hoped, however, that there would not be a long delay in the despatch of the Brazilian reply, and the committee were hoping that it might be possible for the investigators to go out by a ship

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which left Bordeaux on the 16th December and which would permit them to arrive on the spot about the end of December.

M. Werner returned to the idea of sending investigators first of all to Iraq. He said that if this involved too much delay it might be possible for M. Burnier, the Nansen Office representative in Syria, to pay a short visit to Iraq, and to send a report on the Assyrians, which might be useful as a basis for the investigation in Brazil.

The President repeated that it was hoped to avoid the necessity of sending anyone to Iraq, by associating with the investigation someone with Assyrian experience.

M. Werner said that he had made enquiries of M. Burnier as to whether there was not someone in Syria, possibly in the French High Commission, who was acquainted with Assyrian requirements. He hoped to have a reply in a day or two and would communicate it at once to the committee. He repeated that, in his view, more than one person should go to Brazil, and again emphasised the responsibility which would lie with the investigators. As regards expense, the Nansen Office would be glad to bear the expense of one of the members of the investigating commission.

The President expressed appreciation of this offer, which he said the committee would gladly bear in mind.

The Italian Representative said that as the Nansen Office was prepared to bear the expense of one of the investigators and to share the responsibility, it would only be fitting that the Nansen Office should nominate one of the investigators.

M. Werner said he was afraid that M. Burnier would not be able to go to Brazil as he could not be spared from Syria. As he had said, however, he hoped to be in a position shortly to suggest the name of some person with Assyrian experience.

The Italian Representative suggested that if M. Burnier could not go perhaps some other representative of the Nansen Office might go. M. Werner seemed somewhat reluctant to make any definite recommendation, and turned the discussion to another point, namely, the difficulty of preparing plans without knowledge of Assyrian requirements, and, in particular, of the numbers of Assyrians who might be likely to wish to leave Iraq. Would it not be possible, he asked, to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians forthwith? Perhaps M. Burnier could go for a short time to Iraq to assist in this matter.

The President pointed out that according to the resolution regarding the organisation to be set up in Iraq, which had been accepted by the Iraqi Government, the ascertainment of the wishes of the Assyrians was to take place after a place of settlement had been fixed.

M. Werner wondered whether some kind of rough preliminary estimate could not be made unofficially before that stage was reached.

The President said that it seemed to him a matter of considerable difficulty, as it was most doubtful whether the Assyrians would be prepared to commit themselves until they knew what was to be offered to them. He doubted, therefore, whether any preliminary enquiry would serve a useful purpose.

It was then decided to go through Major Johnson's report, paragraph by paragraph, in case members of the committee had any questions to raise. The following points were considered.

Title to the Lands.

The Danish Representative asked whether it was proposed that the land should be purchased outright by the Nansen Office, and, if so, whether it was possible for this to be done before the wishes of the Assyrians had been ascertained or not. It seemed to him that the Assyrians might be unwilling to take any decision unless a firm offer was made to them, and from this point of view it seemed necessary, if possible, to sign the contract for the purchase of the land before approaching the Assyrians.

It was pointed out, however, that the present offer of the company was for the settlement of not more than 10,000 nor less than 9,000 Assyrians, and the question was raised as to what the position would be if a contract for land to accommodate this number were signed, and the Assyrians refused to go to Brazil or went in much smaller numbers.

The President asked M. Shabandar if he could give any indication of the numbers of Assyrians who might be expected to wish to leave Iraq.

M. Shabandar said that he could not do so. The question was a very difficult one. Pressed to give an opinion, he said that he thought that very many more Assyrians might elect to remain in Iraq than had been at first anticipated. He thought that perhaps only 5,000 would want to go. The limits, in his opinion, might be placed at 4,000 and 15,000.

The question was raised whether some sort of preliminary agreement at least ought not to be signed with the company before the Assyrians were approached, and in view of the obvious difficulty of this, the *President* suggested that perhaps a contract might be based on a sliding scale. To facilitate further consideration of the suggestion, Major Johnson undertook to obtain from Paraná Plantations (Limited) a sliding scale estimate showing what the costs would be for every thousand Assyrians, with 4,000 and 15,000 as the minimum and maximum limits.

Cost of Land.

The Danish Representative, while expressing appreciation of the reduction which Major Johnson had been able to secure in the original price asked for the land, still thought that the price demanded was excessive. He suggested that whoever went to Brazil as investigator might examine the price of the land in the neighbourhood. Major Johnson said that the Nansen Office had considerable experience of buying land in various parts of the world, and he could assure the committee that the prices asked by the Paraná Plantations (Limited) compared most favourably with those ruling elsewhere.

The Danish Representative still urged that they should be compared with those ruling in Brazil, and that this should be part of the task of the investigator. This led to a discussion of the character of the proposed investigating commission, and the Italian representative once more raised the question whether one of the members should not be the representative of the Nansen Office. M. Werner was evidently reluctant to commit himself to any definite recommendation, but ultimately indicated that he would probably nominate Major Johnson.

Initial Settlement.

The Danish Representative observed that the company proposed to give paid employment in making roads, &c., to those settlers who went out first. Were the wages of this employment fixed?

Major Johnson replied that it was the practice of the company to give employment to the colonists on its estimates, and the Assyrians would receive the same wages as other colonists, *i.e.*, Germans, Danzigers and Japanese.

Temporary Maintenance in Brazil.

Major Johnson drew attention to the large item in the company's estimate for the provision of maintenance for the first nine months in Brazil. He said that this estimate was excessive compared with what was paid by the Nansen Office in Syria, and that it ought to be possible to effect some reduction. The company, being a commercial concern, had naturally allowed a considerable margin in their estimate on this head, but were not anxious to make a profit out of the maintenance of the settlers. Indeed, they felt that the maintenance of the Assyrians would be a considerable responsibility, which they would prefer to be borne by the Nansen Office. They were prepared, therefore, instead of providing maintenance themselves, to act directly as the agents of the Nansen Office. This meant that all purchases would be made by a Nansen representative in Paraná, the company allowing him to make full use of their organisation and charging only the cost of administration.

(M. Werner, Major Johnson and M. Shabandar withdrew at this point and the committee continued in private session.)

The President said he had ascertained that the Iraqi representative had no news regarding the contribution of the Iraqi Government, and that it would apparently be necessary for parliamentary sanction to be obtained before an offer could be made.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he understood that it was quite true that parliamentary sanction would be necessary before any contribution could actually be made. It need not necessarily be assumed, however, that the reply of the Iraqi Government must, therefore, be correspondingly delayed. He thought it might be possible for the Iraqi Government to state the kind of contribution which they would eventually be prepared to ask Parliament to sanction. He wondered, however, whether the delay might not be due to the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to commit themselves before knowing the attitude of the Brazilian Government.

The President then informed the committee that his proposed interview with the Brazilian Minister at Berne had been fixed for the 1st December in the afternoon. Meanwhile, however, information had been received by the United Kingdom representative which it seemed necessary for the committee to consider at once.

The United Kingdom Representative said that Paraná Plantations (Limited) had received a telegram from their local representative in Brazil to the effect that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour approved only a trial immigation of 100 families. The United Kingdom representative felt that it was important to find out whether this information was correct, and, if so, whether the view of the Ministry of Labour was adopted by the Brazilian Government. In the latter case, it might be possible to make representations in Rio de Janeiro in an endeavour to forestall an embarrassing reply on these lines, and to see whether it was not possible to induce the Brazilian Government to adopt a more favourable attitude, especially as only a decision of principle was required at the present stage, subject to discussions of details and to various other considerations.

The President said that, if the news received was correct and the attitude of the Ministry of Labour was endorsed by the Brazilian Government, the position would certainly be serious and would make it practically impossible to continue with the Brazilian scheme. He was therefore favourable to the idea of representations in Rio de Janeiro to try to induce the Brazilian Government to consider the matter further before sending the contemplated reply.

The French Representative thought that there might be a danger of the Brazilian Government resenting collective representations, and he thought the task of approaching them should be entrusted to a single diplomatic representative. He suggested that the most appropriate course would be, in view of the nationality of the president of the Council Committee, that the Spanish Ambassador at Rio should act on behalf of the committee.

The United Kingdom Representative endorsed this suggestion, but thought that it might be useful that the representatives in Rio of the Governments represented on the Council Committee should be instructed to support the representations of the Spanish Ambassador if, in the latter's view, this would help rather than complicate matters.

The French Representative and the *President* thought that the effect of successive representations from several representatives might have a bad effect on the Brazilian Government. The French representative suggested, however, that, in view of the special interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in this question, the United Kingdom representative in Rio might appropriately support the Spanish Ambassador, even if the representatives of the other Governments concerned did not.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he felt quite sure that His Majesty's Ambassador would be prepared to support the Spanish Ambassador in any way which might be appropriate. As this was a League matter, however, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom might prefer that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rio did not act in any way differently from the other representatives concerned, and he could not, therefore, commit His Majesty's

Ambassador to any sort of separate action without referring the matter to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The President said that he also naturally could not say without reference to his Government whether they were prepared to allow the Spanish Ambassador to act in the manner suggested. He did not suppose, however, that they would have any objection, and he would telephone to Madrid as soon as possible to try obtain the necessary authority for instructions to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador.

It was agreed that the other representatives in Rio of the Governments represented on the Council Committee should be informed of whatever instructions might eventually be sent to the Spanish Ambassador, in case the latter wished to consult them or desired their support.

Some discussion followed on the nature of the instructions to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador if the Spanish Government were willing. It was suggested that it should be pointed out that a decision on the lines apparently contemplated by the Brazilian Ministry of Labour would mean that it would be practically impossible to proceed with the scheme of settlement in Brazil owing to the fact that it was urgently necessary to remove from Iraq a large proportion, if not all, of the Assyrian population, and that the Assyrians desired to be settled in a homogeneous group. It was also suggested that the good qualities of the Assyrians should be pointed out to the Brazilian Government, who should be asked to consider the humanitarian aspect of the question.

The President was authorised to cause instructions on the above lines to be sent to the Spanish Ambassador at Rio without further consulting the committee if the Spanish Government agreed.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

P. Z. 90 1934

December 5, 1933.

SECTION 4.

[E 7481/7/93]

No. 1.

United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 267.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a note of the tenth meeting of the Assyrian Committee of Council, on the 30th November, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

Geneva, December 3, 1933.

Enclosure in No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. *on November* 30, 1933.

THIS was a private meeting of the committee, sitting without the Iraqi permanent delegate and without representatives of the Nansen Office.

Communications to various Governments.

Dr. Kerno first read the draft of a letter which had been prepared for despatch by the League Secretariat to various Governments, asking them to inform the Secretariat whether they would be prepared to consider the reception of those Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq. The Secretariat proposed to send a communication of this nature to the Argentine, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and South Africa.

Dr. Kerno asked whether similar communications should be sent to the Governments of Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.

The Mexican Representative said that he saw no chance of the Mexican Government accepting the Assyrians, mainly on account of the strict immigration laws in force. There was, however, no objection to the Secretariat addressing the Mexican Government if it was thought advisable to do so.

With regard to Bolivia and Peru, it was agreed that a communication would serve no practical purpose.

The Mexican representative asked whether a communication on the lines suggested might not be sent to the Government of Ecuador, but it was agreed that, in view of the correspondence which had already taken place with the Ecuadorean Minister, this was unnecessary.

The United Kingdom Representative raised two questions. In the first place, it was necessary to have replies to the proposed communications at a very early date. He recalled that at an earlier meeting he had referred to the possibility that the Brazilian scheme might be found feasible, but might have to be held up pending the receipt of replies from other Governments to whom enquiries had been addressed, more as a matter of form than in the expectation of a favourable result. He wondered, therefore, whether it was not possible to ask for replies by a certain date. The other point was that, if possible, more detailed information about the Assyrians should accompany the proposed communications. He could not help feeling that the difficulty in Brazil was perhaps that it was not sufficiently clearly realised who the Assyrians were. It was possible that they were being confounded with what were generically known in Central and South America as "Syrians," a term which, he believed, included Palestinians and

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Arabs. He suggested that the League Secretariat might find useful information about the origin of the Assyrians in the report of the Mosul Boundary Commission, while their more recent history was contained in the special report prepared by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist the League Council when considering the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq.

The general feeling of the committee was that it would be inadvisable to specify any time-limit for a reply to the proposed communication. On the other hand, the urgency of the matter should be stressed, and *the President* suggested that a time-limit should, in effect, be included without being actually specified, by indicating that the committee desired to be able to present a report on the subject to the Council at its next meeting in January and wished to be in a position to consider possible destinations for the Assyrians before them. This suggestion was agreed to.

The president also suggested that the League Secretariat should consult the documents mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, in case they contained information which it would be advisable to communicate to the Governments concerned.

Representations in Rio de Janeiro.

The president then informed the committee that the Spanish Government had consented to instruct the Spanish Ambassador at Rio to act as had been suggested at the last meeting of the committee. He had accordingly asked that instructions should be sent in the following sense:—

The Ambassador should first explain the capacity in which he was acting, *i.e.*, as the representative of the Council Committee, owing to the fact that the president of the committee was Spanish. He should then enquire whether the news which had reached the committee that the Brazilian Ministry of Labour were only prepared to accept a limited number of families on trial was correct, and, if so, whether this attitude had been endorsed by the Brazilian Government? In the latter case, he should point to the difficulty which such a question would create owing to the urgency of the removal of the Assyrians from Iraq and their desire for settlement in a homogeneous group, and should invite the Brazilian Government to consider the matter further on humanitarian grounds, taking into account the good qualities of the Assyrians, namely, their long tradition of Christianity and civilisation on European lines, the discipline which the majority had acquired from military service, their reputation for thrift and industry, and the unlikelihood of their becoming a social or economic burden. Finally, he should represent the urgency of the matter and ask for an early reply, emphasising that it was at that stage only a question of a decision in principle, subject to discussion of details, the practicability of the scheme put forward by Paraná Plantations (Limited), and the eventual attitude towards it of the Assyrian population in Iraq.

The president said that the Spanish Ambassador was being instructed to keep in contact with his colleagues, who might be in a position to assist him, and particularly with the British Ambassador, on account of the information probably in the latter's possession on the Assyrian question in general.

Investigation in Brazil.

The Committee then considered the question of an eventual enquiry in Brazil into the suitability for Assyrian settlement of the territory belonging to Paraná Plantations (Limited).

The President said that it was for decision whether such an enquiry should take place before the Brazilian reply was received, or whether it must wait until after that reply. Furthermore, if the reply was favourable, but only to a limited extent, it was for consideration whether the enquiry should still take place.

The French Representative said that so long as there was a risk of a negative reply, it seemed useless to start an enquiry. If, on the other hand, a reply was received expressing willingness to accept a limited number of Assyrians, then the question would depend on the limit. If only 100 families were to be received, it would be useless to proceed with the scheme. On the other hand, if the limit were as high as, say, 1,000 families, it might be worth while to examine the matter further. It seemed to him that all the committee could do for the moment was to study the mechanism of an investigation. He thought that it might be left to the president to decide whether the Brazilian reply, when received, made it worth while to go on with the investigation, and if he thought that it did, to give instructions for the enquiry to begin.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he agreed with the French representative that it was useless to send out investigators so long as there was a risk of a negative reply. If, however, the result of the representations which were being made in Rio showed that the Brazilian Government did, in fact, intend to accept only a limited number of families, then it would be for consideration whether an attempt should not be made to induce the Brazilian Government to hold up such an answer until someone with Assyrian experience could go out to Brazil and explain to the Brazilian Government who the Assyrians were and what their requirements were. In such a case the investigator or investigators would have a double task, *i.e.*, to examine the suitability for Assyrian needs of the area proposed in Brazil and to give explanations to the Brazilian authorities.

The President said that this would be more than an enquiry. It would virtually entail diplomatic negotiations. His opinion was that such negotiations should be left to the diplomatic representatives in Rio rather than to an expert sent out as investigator. He thought that the reply to the Spanish Ambassador should be awaited, and that, if it gave room for hope, the question of the despatch of an investigator should be considered further.

The United Kingdom Representative explained that he had not intended to suggest that the investigator should be entrusted with negotiations: his idea had been that it might in certain circumstances be useful for the local diplomatic representatives to have his assistance in the capacity of an expert who could explain Assyrian requirements and characteristics.

The President feared that the expense of sending out an expert for this purpose might be criticised, if the Brazilian scheme ultimately came to nothing.

The Danish Representative suggested that, while the attitude of the Ministry of Labour possibly resulted from the existence of an unemployment problem, it might also be due to suspicion of the Assyrians themselves.

The United Kingdom Representative said that this was why he had suggested for consideration the idea of sending an expert to give explanations. He thought, however, that the point might be left for further consideration until the reply to the Spanish Ambassador had been received.

The President said that if the difficulty arose from an unemployment problem, it would clearly be of no use to pursue the matter; but if, on the other hand, it arose from ignorance of the Assyrians, then the suggestion made by the United Kingdom representative might be useful.

The Danish Representative said that it seemed important to find out what was the reason underlying the attitude of the Brazilian Ministry of Labour.

The President said that if the reply from the Spanish Ambassador was not clear on this point, he might be authorised to have the point elucidated without further reference to the committee. He thought that the committee should now consider the mechanism of the proposed investigation, in case it was found necessary to proceed with it and advisable to do so at short notice. It was for consideration whether it was necessary to send an investigator to Iraq in the first place before an enquiry took place in Brazil, and, if so, whether it was essential that the same persons should carry out the enquiry in Iraq and in Brazil. Another point was what instructions should be given to the investigator.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it would save time if the committee discussed first the composition of the commission of investigation which would be sent to Brazil. He had promised to try to find a candidate with Assyrian experience, and now suggested to the committee the name of Brigadier Browne. He explained that Brigadier Browne, who was 55 years of age, had first been appointed to the Iraqi Levies in 1925, and had commanded the

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levies from April 1926 to April 1933. During that time the levies had been in the main composed of Assyrians, their numbers decreasing from 4,000 to 2,000. These Assyrians had been accompanied by their families and Brigadier Browne had thus had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with Assyrian customs, requirements, &c. Furthermore, he had travelled extensively in Assyrian districts in Iraq, and was therefore well acquainted with conditions in Assyrian villages.

The United Kingdom representative added that it seemed important that the expert who would be sent out to Brazil to examine the scheme from the point of view of its suitability for Assyrian settlement should be not merely a person with experience of the Assyrians, but also, if possible, someone who was favourably regarded by both the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians themselves. Although not in a position to make any categorical statement about the views of the Iraqi Government and the Assyrians, he thought that the choice of Brigadier Browne was likely to be well received by both sides.

The President and the other members of the committee agreed that Brigadier Browne appeared to be a most suitable choice, and authorised the United Kingdom representative to ascertain without commitment, and with every reservation, whether, if Brigadier Browne received an invitation to proceed to Brazil on behalf of the committee, he would be disposed to accept.

The president said that Brigadier Browne's qualifications appeared to be such that it seemed unnecessary to have any other Assyrian expert. He thought it desirable, however, that some diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Brazil, and with local knowledge, should be attached to the investigator.

The French Representative suggested that if M. Redard, the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro, were available, it would be most appropriate that he should accompany the investigator in view of the fact that he already knew the area concerned.

The President asked Dr. Kerno to enquire whether M. Redard was still in Rio, and if so, whether the Swiss Government, if asked to lend his services, would be prepared to do so.

It appeared from remarks by the president and the French representative that they contemplated an investigation conducted simply by Brigadier Browne and M. Redard.

The United Kingdom Representative therefore asked whether it was not intended that a representative of the Nansen Office should be associated with the investigation as originally contemplated. It seemed to him that neither Brigadier Browne nor M. Redard could be regarded as settlement experts, and that it was desirable that a settlement expert should be associated with them.

The Italian Representative recalled that the president of the Nansen Office had been most anxious for a local investigation to be made before the Nansen Office assumed responsibility for the settlement scheme, and that M. Werner had offered to pay the expenses of such a representative.

The French Representative suggested that if the Nansen Office felt it necessary on their own account to examine the Brazilian scheme, they might send out a representative on their own responsibility at a later stage when it had been established that the area concerned was suitable for Assyrian settlement.

The Danish Representative expressed the opinion that it was desirable that the committee should not appear in any way to be cold-shouldering the Nansen Office.

The United Kingdom Representative said that, apart from the intrinsic desirability of associating a Nansen representative with the proposed investigation, he thought it would be most difficult after what had passed at the last meeting, in the presence of M. Werner, not to do so.

The President said that he had been most careful at the previous meeting not to enter into any commitment regarding the association of a Nansen representative with the investigation. He had simply thanked M. Werner for his offer to nominate a representative and to pay his expenses, and had said that the offer would be borne in mind.

The Danish and United Kingdom Representatives said that even if there were no definite commitment, it seemed very difficult, in view of what had passed, not to accept M. Werner's offer. They pointed out that the committee had already decided, in principle, to entrust the work of settlement to the Nansen Office.

The President said that, so far as he remembered, the resolution passed by the committee on the 31st October, at its seventh meeting, had provided for the work of settlement to be entrusted to the Nansen Office only afer a destination had been agreed upon.

Dr. Kerno read the relevant passage of the resolution, pointing out that the president's impression was correct, and also that the work of settlement was eventually to be entrusted to the Nansen Office "under conditions which will be defined later by the committee." Nevertheless, Dr. Kerno thought that as the committee were asking the Nansen Office eventually to take responsibility, it would be difficult not to give them an opportunity of studying the scheme on the spot, at the same time as it was being investigated by the Assyrian expert.

The Danish Representative observed that if there were to be two investigations, the first by an Assyrian expert, and the second afterwards by the Nansen Office, there would be delay, and he could see no purpose in this delay.

The President said that there was a point which he felt some diffidence in mentioning. Though M. Werner had shown some reluctance to say whom he proposed to nominate, he had eventually indicated that it would probably be Major Johnson. He wondered whether, as the Assyrian expert now provisionally chosen was a British subject, it would be considered entirely appropriate to associate with him another British subject, namely, Major Johnson. Personally, he had no objection to the investigation being carried out by two British subjects, but it seemed to him possible that the arrangement might cause some little surprise, and perhaps be criticised.

The French Representative indicated that he shared the president's view.

The Danish Representative said that he could not accept this point of view. The persons who would go to investigate in Brazil might be British subjects, but they would not be going out as British subjects. They would be international officials, the servants of the League, and he could not admit that the question of nationality should be taken into account.

The Italian Representative entirely agreed with the Danish representative. The question, he said, was a technical one, and it seemed necessary to send out persons who were best fitted to do the work without regard to nationality.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he was grateful to the president for having raised this point, as the prospect of sending out an investigating mission which might have the appearance of a British mission had caused him a little uneasiness. He felt that it was probably difficult to find anyone with sufficient Assyrian experience who was not a British subject. In the nature of the case, therefore, it seemed inevitable that the Assyrian expert should be British. For this reason he had welcomed the original intention of the president of the Nansen Office to nominate M. Burnier as the Nansen representative. Had M. Burnier been available, he thought there could have been no ground for criticism of the composition of the mission. Unfortunately, M. Burnier no longer appeared to be available, and the United Kingdom representative thought it could only be left to M. Werner to select the alternative representative whom he might think most suitable. It might be preferable that the representative should not be British, but the question of nationality seemed to be a secondary one. For his part, he thought that the main thing was that the Nansen representative should be well qualified for the task.

After some further discussion, it was agreed in principle to entrust the investigation to Brigadier Browne, if he would accept, and to arrange for him to be accompanied, as advisers and experts, by a representative of the Nansen Office and a local diplomatic or consular officer, preferably M. Redard.

The question was then raised as to the moment at which the investigator should be sent out. It was agreed that there could be no question of this until the Brazilian attitude in principle was known.

The French Representative suggested that it should be left to the president to decide whether the Brazilian answer was such as to warrant the sending out of the investigator.

The President indicated that he was willing to accept responsibility as far as he could, but it might be a matter of considerable difficulty to decide the particular point at issue.

The Italian Representative suggested that it should be left to the president to set the machinery in motion, or alternatively, if the situation was not sufficiently clear, when the reply of the Spanish Ambassador at Rio had been received, to call a further meeting of the committee.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he did not entirely understand these suggestions. Was the proposal that the committee should now adjourn, leaving to the president the responsibility to decide on the next step when news was received about the Brazilian attitude? If so, it seemed to him to be placing an unfair responsibility upon the president. He did not see how the committee could possibly justify an adjournment at the present stage. Certain enquiries were being made in Rio, upon which the whole fate of the Brazilian scheme depended, and it seemed to him that the committee must continue in session until it learnt the result of these representations and was in a position to appreciate the situation and to decide what must be done next.

The President said that, although he had been willing to accept a certain amount of responsibility, he would certainly prefer that the reply from Rio should be considered by the whole committee.

It was agreed that the committee should continue in session, and the question of delegating responsibility to the president for deciding on the moment for beginning the investigation in Brazil thus fell to the ground.

A short discussion followed on the terms of reference for any investigation which might take place, and the Danish representative suggested that when they were settled, it might be useful for the committee to have a discussion with the Nansen Office representative and with Brigadier Browne, if this could be arranged.

The question of such a discussion was left in suspense, to be reconsidered once the decision had been definitely taken to send out investigators.

The President suggested that a draft resolution should be prepared for eventual adoption when the situation was clearer regarding the investigation, and in particular stating what the duties of the investigator would be.

It was decided to entrust the drafting of such a resolution to the United Kingdom representative, in consultation with the French representative.

The question was raised whether the consent of the Brazilian Government ought to be obtained before an investigation took place.

The French Representative took the view that as the investigation was not into the suitability of Brazil for colonisation, but simply into the suitability of a particular scheme submitted by a private company, it was not necessary to get the prior consent of the Brazilian Government.

It was agreed, however, that it would be desirable at the appropriate moment to warn the Brazilian Government that the committee intended to institute such an investigation and to explain to the Brazilian Government the object and scope of the enquiry.

As the President proposed to visit Berne on the following day, it was decided not to hold a further meeting until the 2nd December.

J. C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

DER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 52
28 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

oreign Office,

December, 1933.

The Under-Secretary of State
India Office.

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Decypher.

No.498.

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1933

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
December 18th 1933.

D. 5.00 p.m. December 18th 1933.

R. 9.30 a.m. December 19th 1933.

No.498.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 52 28 DEC. 1933
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
FROM

My immediately preceding telegram.

I learnt privately yesterday that acting on Cabinet resolution Minister for Foreign Affairs had telegraphed to Shahbendar instructing him to make statement regarding Iraqi contribution to Assyrian re-settlement which would certainly be regarded by Council Committee as unsatisfactory.

At my suggestion Tufiq Suwaidi persuaded Minister for Foreign Affairs to send second telegram to the effect that no communication should be made to the Committee until Tufiq Suwaidi arrived. I advised Tufiq Suwaidi to explain to the Committee that his government would be in a better position to make offer when definite scheme had been adopted at any rate in principle and that if they were pressed prematurely to specify the amount of their contribution response might be disappointing. In the meanwhile I shall endeavour to have the whole matter considered here. It is still my opinion that £100,000 irrecoverable is the maximum sum that it will be possible to attain from Iraqi government and even this will not be at all easy.

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8269
1933

(E.7830/7/93).

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Cypher telegram to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).

Foreign Office, December 22nd 1933. 9.30 p.m.

No.362.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 52 28 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

8269

Your telegram No.498 (of December 18th. Iraqi contribution to Assyrian resettlement.)

I approve your action.

Does last sentence mean that maximum amount obtainable from Iraqi government would be £100,000 whether it is recoverable or not, or that in addition to an irrecoverable payment of £100,000 Iraqi government might be persuaded to consider further payment in the form of a loan? I earnestly hope that Iraqi government may be induced, if and when Brazilian scheme is shown to be practicable, to offer not only a substantial sum as an irrecoverable payment, but also a further amount on a recoverable basis.

Possibly contribution might appear less formidable and arouse less criticism in Iraq if it were expressed in terms of a maximum sum (say £10,000) for every 500 persons, rather than in terms of a maximum total payment as contemplated in your telegram No.12 to Geneva (of November 27th).

I.O. ~~464~~

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INDEXED

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1933

Communications on this subject
ld be addressed to—
Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
London, S.W.1,
the following number quoted :—
12572/33

Subject · The possibility of resettling the Assyrians now in Iraq in certain Colonial dependencies etc.

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P.Z.
~~[illegible]~~
P.Z. 19
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Reference to previous correspondence:

Letter ~~*to*~~ *from the* ~~*Colonial*~~ Foreign *Office of the* 16th November
(No. E 6101/7/93)

Transmitted by direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

A copy has also been sent to the Air Ministry, War Office, Dominions Office, and Treasury

LOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
. 52 28 DEC. 1933
M SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Colonial Office, Downing Street,
December 1933.

MAILS BRANCH
20 DEC 1933
INDIA OFFICE

9720) Wt 18117/2750 10,000(2) 12/31 H & Sp Gp 112

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P.Z.
8211
1933

Downing Street,
6th December, 1933.

IMPORTANT.

18256/33.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.E.6101/7/93 of the 16th of November and to request you to inform Secretary Sir John Simon that he has again carefully considered the possibility of re-settling some or all of the Assyrians, now in Iraq, in one or other of the dependencies mentioned therein. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister regrets that he is unable to modify his view that it would be quite impracticable to carry out any such proposal and he is satisfied that no useful purpose would be served by referring the matter to the Officers Administering the Governments of any of the territories concerned.

P.Z.7544

The nature of the difficulties which would be encountered in the various territories are indicated in the enclosed memoranda.

I am, etc.,
(Sgd.) O.G.R.WILLIAMS.

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

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Cyprus.

The settlement of 10,000 Assyrians in Cyprus must be regarded as definitely impracticable. Cyprus is a very poor country which is already faced with an unemployment problem. The drought of 1932 and the combination of circumstances consequent on the universal depression in trade have gradually brought about conditions which have necessitated Government assistance being given to labouring classes throughout the island.

Moreover the system of land tenure in Cyprus renders impossible the provision of suitable land for settlement. All available land is already owned and settled, under the time-honoured system in force in the Island. For political and ethnological reasons the introduction of another race is highly undesirable. Such an influx would be calculated to alter the ethnological status of the Island and give rise to considerable difficulties.

The settlement of British Subjects has been found impracticable in the past and it is certain that a proposal to settle Assyrians there, even if land were available, would evoke strong protests.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [469r] (950/1206)

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Mauritius or Seychelles.

There is no land available in Mauritius or Seychelles upon which any considerable number of Assyrians could be settled. The colony of Seychelles includes a number of small outlying islands which are the property of the Government and are let on lease, but their total area and productivity are so small as to render them quite unsuitable, apart from the lack of communications, which would render marketing an insurmountable difficulty. Mauritius is already densely populated and has an unemployment question of its own. A number of labourers from Rodrigues, a dependency of Mauritius, have recently been recruited for work in the neighbouring French Colony of Réunion where there appears to be a shortage of labour.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [470r] (952/1206)

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Ceylon and Malaya.

In Ceylon, under the 1931 Constitution, the State Council is vested with wide powers of executive, legislative and financial control, and in the State Council the Ceylonese nationalism which is in control would strongly resent any suggestion which might be construed as an attempt to foist an alien people on the Island. The State Council have expressed themselves definitely against any further alienation of land to non-Ceylonese. There would be no anxiety to help His Majesty's Government in the matter, and jealous eyes would be cast on any scheme which might involve competition with Ceylonese in obtaining land for cultivation, or competing with them in any form of employment.

Apart from political considerations, it would be difficult to find land on which the Assyrians could be settled. Extensive schemes of land settlement for Ceylonese have the first claim on the limited land available. Finally climatic and other conditions would scarcely suit the Assyrians. The high land is already fully occupied by tea estates, or by forest reserves. It would not be possible to settle the Assyrians in any form of peasant village community. The planters employ immigrant Indian Tamil labour, against whose standard of living the Assyrians could not be expected to compete even if they were prepared to accept the type of work which labour on European estates involved.

In

In Malaya, the Colony of the Straits Settlements consists principally of the commercial harbours of Singapore, Penang and Malacca. The colonial hinterland, where there is any, is far too small to absorb a body of 10,000 to 15,000 men, even were the land not already well populated with Chinese and other immigrants in addition to the indigenous Malays. In the Malay States the various Sultans naturally put the interests of their Malay subjects foremost, and would almost certainly raise the strongest objections to the suggestion of the settlement of an alien minority in their territories, even were the country under-populated.

Moreover, the various component States of the whole Peninsula have only recently passed legislation to control immigration, and with the present slump there is a balance of emigration over immigration. All parts of the Peninsula have suffered from unemployment and repatriation of destitute Chinese has been proceeding regularly during the last two years. In these circumstances Malaya could hardly be expected to absorb some 10-15,000 people within a few months. Finally, the type of cultivation to which the Assyrians have been used would be very different from the rubber tapping, pineapple growing or padi planting of Malaya.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [472r] (956/1206)
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Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The same general arguments apply to Northern Rhodesia as to the rest of British East Africa, and more particularly the geography of the country appears to preclude any settlement by Assyrians in the territory. The Assyrians would prefer a mountainous land. Northern Rhodesia is not mountainous; it consists of three great river valleys and a tableland from 3,000 to 4,000 feet up. This tableland rises to greater heights in the extreme north-east in the neighbourhood of Abercorn, but that area is not available for settlement, as it consists largely of native reserves and also contains freehold estates of considerable size belonging to the British South Africa Company.

Apart from these climatic considerations, it must be remembered that Northern Rhodesia has been passing through a critical period, in which large numbers of Europeans who had entered the territory during the boom years have been compelled to leave, or have been repatriated to the countries from which they came. It would therefore be an inopportune moment to replace these destitutes by a large Asiatic community whose power of obtaining a livelihood from the land would be in the highest degree doubtful. Further, except in the Railway area, which is out of the question, Northern Rhodesia has hardly reached a sufficient state of development to receive a large influx of non-African settlers, and it would therefore be unfair to the Assyrians to send them to live in such a country.

As regards Nyasaland there is already a shortage of land for occupation by the natives, and the Government is attempting to check the immigration of natives from adjoining Portuguese territory. No land could be found for the Assyrians.

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Tanganyika Territory.

In view of the obligations undertaken in Articles III and VI of the Mandate for Tanganyika, no question of the settlement in bulk of an immigrant race can be entertained which would in any way prejudice the interests of the native population by occupying land necessary for their present, or reasonable future, requirements. It was for that reason that in 1930, with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Government laid it down that alienation of land in certain Provinces to non-natives for agricultural and pastoral purposes would be refused unless it was shown to the satisfaction of the Government that, land being available, the promoters were in command of sufficient capital to undertake operations on an adequate scale. In the Lake, Western, Lindi and Central Provinces, therefore, non-native settlement is ruled out except in the form of enterprise, adequately supported by capital, which would utilise the local population as its labour supply. It may be added that in these Provinces considerations of climate would also rule out the settlement of a working agricultural population of European or similar stock.

Of the remaining areas, the extent of land already alienated in the Northern and Tanga Provinces, in most cases before the British regime in Tanganyika, is such as to cause acute concern to the administration owing to the inadequacy of land for native purposes. The only area, therefore, where non-native settlement on

on any scale is feasible is that in the South Western corner of the Territory, within the Provinces of Iringa and Mahenge.

In these Provinces there are no large blocks of land available for alienation. No figures are available for the Mahenge Province, but the position is certainly not so favourable as in the Iringa Province. In the First and Second Land Development Survey Reports on the Iringa Province, dated 1928 - 29 and 1930 respectively, the areas so available were computed at about 700 square miles, and of these some 137 were already advertised for lease. But any prospect of developing this limited area was said to be dependent on the construction of a railway from the Central Tanganyika Line. The cost of a railway from the Ubena area to Dodoma (242 miles) has been estimated at £2,020,000; and of the alternative route from Ubena to Kilosa (354 miles) at £3,200,000; and the provision of either of these lines is ruled out altogether by the present economic situation, and will not be a matter of practical politics within any measurable period. Further, the same climatic considerations apply here as in the rest of the Territory: the land is emphatically not suitable for settlement by European agriculturists without the necessary capital to provide themselves with machinery and native labour; and the settlement en masse of a population with European characteristics would be exposed to all the ravages of tropical disease, to deal with which the local

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administration, already preoccupied with the enormous difficulties of improving native health and sanitation, would have no resources.

Although, as shown above, land is available in no great quantity for European occupation of the plantation type, the prospects of success attending such occupation are extremely doubtful. The immense distances from the sea rule out the commercial possibilities of any crops except those commanding high prices, such as coffee, tea, and tobacco. Experience is showing that the south-western highlands of Tanganyika are not generally suitable for coffee-growing; while as regards tea, as is well known, the state of the industry is such that a voluntary restriction scheme has been adopted by the principal tea-exporting countries to which the as yet experimental Tanganyika tea industry will in all probability have to conform. Tobacco is also a crop of doubtful future, so far as Tanganyika is concerned. As regards pastoral industries, the prospects are no less uncertain: the latest report of the Government Stock Farm established to test the possibilities of wool production in the Southern Highlands indicates that economic success is doubtful, as the sheep on the farm have become heavily infested with a worm disease which is unlikely to be combated successfully unless certain deficiencies in the pasturage can be remedied.

In the absence of any reasonable possibility of developing a cash crop, or a livestock industry, a

settlement

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settlement of Assyrians or similar race in the small areas available for occupation in Tanganyika would not be able to maintain for itself the standard of living essential to the survival of non-Africans in unhealthy tropical regions. It would almost certainly not be able to maintain itself by entering the labour market in competition with the indigenous labour-supply which is, indeed, already, owing to the depressed economic condition of the country, in excess of the demand. It would, therefore, in all probability, become a permanent liability on the hands of the Mandatory Government, which would be hampered in the discharge of its primary duty under the Mandate to the native inhabitants. It is indeed doubtful whether such a settlement could survive exposure to tropical conditions, even with the assistance of heavy and continued subsidy which there is no reason to suppose would be forthcoming.

It should be mentioned that enquiries have been made as to the feasibility of the acquisition of land in South Tanganyika by refugees from the present regime in Germany. No definite proposals have been made, but any such settlement would necessarily take the form of plantation enterprise, backed by adequate capital and utilisng scientific experts and native labour. It would raise questions entirely different from those which would be raised by the introduction of the Assyrian community from Iraq.

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Kenya and Uganda.

There is no land available for the Assyrians in Kenya or Uganda. They could not be settled in the "white highlands" without a breach of the pledges repeatedly given by His Majesty's Government in respect of European settlement. Nor could they be settled in the Native Reserves. Even as it is, important sections of public opinion in this country are representing to the Governments concerned, on the one hand that white settlers in East Africa should be encouraged, on the other, that the land available there for natives is inadequate; and the extent to which the influx of Assyrians would complicate the matter need hardly be stressed. In districts other than the "white highlands" and the Native Reserves, the lack of suitable cultivable terrain and climatic reasons make Assyrian settlement impracticable. Even if the Assyrians were willing to settle down as labourers, without land of their own, they could hardly compete with native African or acclimatized Indian labour, while a very substantial amount of capital would be required to enable them to start on their own account, even if vacant land were available.

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Palestine or Trans-Jordan.

It may be said at once that such a proposal is quite impracticable, and indeed neither of these territories is among those which are suggested in the Foreign Office letter of the 16th November as possible places for settlement.

Considerable difficulty is being experienced in finding land in Palestine on which to settle the relatively small number of Arab tenants who have been displaced from the land which they had been cultivating owing to its passing into Jewish hands. The increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine owing to present favourable economic conditions there coupled with the comparatively large amount of Arab unemployment has led to considerable agitation amongst the Arabs, culminating in disturbances which have had to be suppressed by the police. Arab public opinion would inevitably regard the introduction of any foreign element into Palestine as a threat to their own position there. It would also probably lead to an outcry from the Jews.

As regards Trans-Jordan - attempts have recently been made by the Jews to open the question of Jewish settlement in Trans-Jordan. These attempts have been firmly discouraged by the High Commissioner for reasons of public security, and it would certainly lead to a considerable outcry amongst the Jews, if, while discouraging their settlement in Trans-Jordan, we were to facilitate the settlement there of Assyrians. Apart from this consideration it is very unlikely that Arab public opinion in Trans-Jordan would tolerate any attempt to settle a body of Christians, like the Assyrians, in Trans-Jordan, and it should not be forgotten that the Arabs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan have shown considerable sympathy with the Iraq Government in the controversy over the Assyrian problem.

Notes.

Minute Paper.

Register No.
P.Z.
8050/33

SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Dated
Rec. 19 .

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
To			Iraq
Under Secretary	21.12.		
~~Secretary of State~~			
Committee	23.12		The Assyrians : latest papers.
~~Under Secretary~~			
~~Secretary of State~~			

Copy of to

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous submission at P.Z. 7880. The Brazilian Govt. have not yet been persuaded to accept more than 100 families.

A.F.M.
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SEEN
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
2 JAN 1934

Previous Papers :—

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

DER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 50 14 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLI
SECRET DEPT. INDIA

Foreign Office,
13th Dec., 1933.

The Under-Secretary of State
for India

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(E7534/7/93)

Code telegram to Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro)
Foreign Office, 7th December 1933. 6.35 p.m.
No. 82. (R).

- - -

My telegram No. 81 (of December 2nd. Assyrian settlement).

Spanish Ambassador at Rio reports that Brazilian government contemplate acceptance "for settlement on coffee plantations" of 100 families only on trial, but that as result of his representations Ministry for Foreign Affairs is approaching Ministry of Labour to see if limit can be enlarged. President of Committee is recommending Spanish Ambassador to do everything possible, after consultation with you, to expedite definite decision and to secure enlargement of limit. I hope you have by now received my despatch No. 267 of November 3rd giving full information about scheme.

From wording of report from Spanish Ambassador who is without details and may have given false impression, it seems possible that Brazilian government think they are being asked themselves to find land for settlement. President of League Committee has asked that you should be instructed if possible to assist unofficially in removing any misunderstanding by explaining scheme generally in proper quarter, in particular making it clear (a) that Brazilian

government

482 480

government are only being asked to indicate in principle whether they have any objection to mass immigration by Assyrians for settlement on land which Parana Plantations Limited are prepared to offer, (b) that while precise number to be settled cannot be ascertained until definite scheme can be put before Assyrians in Iraq, League Committee is working on assumption that out of estimated total of 20,000, at least 10,000 will wish to leave Iraq so that offer to take 100 families (500 persons) would afford no solution of the problem.

Unless you see objection please act accordingly.

If Brazilian government accept in principle, Committee would like Parana Plantations scheme investigated on the spot by British officer with knowledge of Assyrian needs and characteristics, accompanied as advisers by a representative of the Nansen office and local diplomatic or consular officer, preferably counsellor of Swiss Legation.

If Brazilian government maintain their present attitude it is important to know reason. If it is mere lack of knowledge regarding Assyrians and there is hope of its being modified by explanation, Committee might arrange for proposed investigation to be carried out before Brazilian government come to definite decision, in order that Assyrian expert, having satisfied himself that scheme has reasonable prospect of success, might then be available to furnish

information

information about Assyrians to Brazilian authorities, thus assisting local diplomatic representatives to induce Brazilian government to take more favourable view of Assyrians as colonists and to accept them in larger numbers. This is tentative suggestion made without authority of Committee, who will naturally be most reluctant to incur expense unnecessarily. But it is possible that Committee might consider suggestion if you and Spanish Ambassador think there is real prospect of thus persuading Brazilian government to abandon idea of trial limit.

Please telegraph report on position as soon as possible with observations on above suggestion. Council Committee cannot make further progress until attitude of Brazilian government is cleared up.

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Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
6th December, 1933.

D.	5.45 p.m.	6th December, 1933.
R.	9.30 a.m.	7th December, 1933.

No. 102. (R).

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050

Your telegram No. 81.

Spanish Ambassador and representative of Parana Plantation Limited have both been active but have failed to shake decision of Minister of Labour only to accept trial ~~of~~ immigration of 100 families.

Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated today that that decision has now been telegraphed to Geneva but added personal belief that Minister of Labour might possibly agree to a larger immigration if he could be persuaded that practical difficulties of settling large numbers could be overcome and that Assyrians were desirable immigrants. Representative of Parana Plantations is sending him memorial on former point.

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(E 7541/7/93)

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Code telegram to Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro)
Foreign Office, 7th December 1933. 10.00 p.m.
No. 83. (R).

- - -

Your telegram No. 102 (of December 6th - Assyrian settlement) arrived after my telegram No. 82 (of December 7th) had been approved.

Parana Plantations here are confident that their representative will be able to convince Brazilian government that practical difficulties of scheme are not insuperable. They suggest desirability of giving Brazilian government further information to show that Assyrians are entirely different in race and character from so-called "Syrians" in South America and would not be undesirable immigrants. You may therefore if you see no objection, explain that Assyrians are a white race of European type with a high level of civilisation on European lines and that they have maintained their Christian religion from the earliest times under the greatest difficulties. The majority of the men have served in the Assyrian Levies under British officers who have without exception spoken of them in the highest terms, and they have an excellent tradition of military discipline on British lines. Many have also done excellent service in the Iraqi police. Further information has already been sent to you by post.

P.Z.
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88/7/93)

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Cypher telegram to Sir W. Seeds. (Rio de Janeiro).

Foreign Office. 9th December, 1933. 3.00 p.m.

No. 84.

.....ooo.....

IMMEDIATE.

16 Your telegram No. 102 (of December 6th: Assyrian settlement).

Assyrian Committee of League Council meets morning December 11th to consider Brazilian reply now communicated to President of Committee by Brazilian Minister at Berne. It would be very useful if United Kingdom representative at Geneva could have before then your opinion, after consultation with Spanish Ambassador, regarding utility, from point of view of inducing Brazilian Government to enlarge limit, of proceeding with investigation before accepting or rejecting Brazilian offer (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 82 (of December 7th)).

Addressed to Rio de Janeiro No. 84.

Repeated to Geneva No. 356.

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Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
9th December, 1933.

D. 1.05 p.m. 9th December, 1933.

R. 5.45 p.m. 9th December, 1933.

No. 106. (R).

…………………

Your telegram No. 83.

Reluctance of Brazilian Ministry of Labour seems due to ignorance about the Assyrians themselves, to fears that Brazilian Government may be expected to provide land for settlement, and to prejudice against immigration en masse on general principles. The last motive is I fear the strongest.

A lengthy and excellent memorandum prepared by Parana Plantations representative was sent in to Brazilian Government yesterday after I had seen and approved it. It contained full information of all that the company is prepared to do and also all the points favourable to the Assyrians which were contained in your recent telegrams. I gave a copy to the Spanish Ambassador who will try to see the Minister of Labour and who is now thoroughly primed with every possible argument. He will suggest that the Brazilian Government should give assent in principle while reserving definite decision until the representative of the Nansen Bureau has verified the practicability of the scheme and a British expert has simultaneously reassured them regarding the Assyrians.

As he thinks the main Brazilian objection lies in the difficulty of assimilating large blocks of alien colonists I told him to stress the difference between a mere tribe of peasants such as the Assyrians, on the one hand, and big detachments of subjects of World Powers such as Germans and Japanese, on the other hand.

83.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs are thoroughly aware of our interest but I could not myself approach Minister of Labour without unduly identifying His Majesty's Embassy with the problem and assuming undesirable responsibility in pressing a proposal to which Labour officials objected from point of view of their general policy. But I will continue to keep the matter before the attention of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).
11th December, 1933.

D. 4.55 p.m. 11th December, 1933.

R. 8.30 p.m. 11th December, 1933.

No. 107. (R).

IMPORTANT.

8050

Your telegram No. 84.

I discussed situation fully with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs today. He thinks if League of Nations committee instructed Spanish Ambassador to renew representations in the case that permission for 100 families is quite useless Brazilian Government could be moved to give consent in principle on lines mentioned in my telegram No. 106. He will himself speak tomorrow to Chief of Government and lay Parana Company's memorandum before His Excellency.

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NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decode. His Majesty's Consul. (Geneva).
December 11th.1933.

D. 1.40.a.m. December 11th. 1933.

R. 9.30.a.m. December 12th. 1933.

No. 430.L.N. (R).

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Following from Mr. Bennett:

Assyrian Committee considered on December 11th note from Brazilian Minister at Berne transmitting "definite reply" of his government to the effect that Brazilian Ministry of Labour will authorize as an experiment entry into Brazil of 100 families provided that their agricultural character is guaranteed by League of Nations and that company which is promoting their immigration assumes full responsibility for their localization in state of Parana.

Having just received Rio telegram No. 106 I explained that according to my information steps were still being taken in Rio to induce Brazilian Government to adopt more helpful attitude.

As a result of subsequent discussion President of Committee is asking Spanish Government to instruct Spanish Ambassador (1) to continue efforts which he is understood to be making to secure abandonment or enlargement of trial limit, (2) if Brazilian Government adhere to trial limit, (a) to obtain confirmation of Committee's assumption that they mean by "experiment" that if first settlers are satisfactory more will be accepted, (b) if above assumption is correct, to ascertain length of experimental period contemplated/

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contemplated and to explain, without promising League guarantee required by Brazilian Government, that in the event of acceptance of offer Committee would hope by measures of selection in Iraq to satisfy Brazilian Government as to purely agricultural character of first batch of settlers.

President is authorized without consulting Committee to take any additional steps which he thinks necessary to elucidate Brazilian attitude and to call further meeting as soon as he considers position sufficiently well defined to permit of decisions being taken.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 430.

Repeated to Rio.

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Decypher. His Majesty's Consul. (Geneva),
December 12th. 1933.
D. 6.30.p.m. December 12th. 1933.
R. 7.00.p.m. December 12th. 1933.

No. 431. LN.

-------000-------

Following from Mr. Sterndale Bennett.

050 Rio telegram No. 107.

I at once communicated this information to President of Committee and as instructions summarized in my telegram No. 430 had not actually been issued he is arranging for their amendment in sense of next paragraph in hope of facilitating solution on lines indicated in Rio telegram under reference. 50

2. Object is to concentrate on point 1 since Committee is faced with problem which demands urgent and radical solution and permission for 100 families as an experiment offers no such solution. Only if Brazilian Government cannot be induced to abandon trial limit of some kind, is the Ambassador to ask for information regarding their conception of "experiment" and proposed length of experimental period. Instruction in 2B to explain Committee's hope of satisfying Brazilian Government regarding agricultural character of first settlers is being cut out. (President agreed with me that it was premature and likely to convey wrong impression of Committee's attitude towards present Brazilian offer).

Confidential.

3. With reference to last sentence of paragraph 2 of Rio telegram No. 106 relative status of Assyrian expert 8050

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and Nansen representative is a delicate matter. If proposed investigation materializes Committee's intention is to entrust it to Assyrian expert Nansen representative being attached to him merely in capacity of adviser. Owing to reluctance on the part of certain members of Committee (including the President) to give independent responsibility to Nansen office they would only agree to participation of Nansen representative on the above basis and any suggestion which tended to place him in fore front or even on equality with Assyrian expert might consequently lead to difficulties.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 431 December 12th; repeated to Rio.

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1933

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6580/7/93.
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India. and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P.7975

Foreign Office,
December 12th, 1933.

P.7880
Nos 3/12

6871

Reference to previous correspondence:

From F.O.- E 6175/7/93 of Oct. 25th.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Representative Bagdad. 67 of Oct. 19th.	Incidents between Kurds and Assyrians in Amadi district.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY
No. 50 14 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Air Min.
W.O.
D.O.

14—6130 8931 (2)

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P.Z.
8030
1933

EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

October 31, 1933.

SECTION 4.

[E 6580/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 667.)

Bagdad, October 19, 1933.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 625 of the 4th October and to previous correspondence regarding incidents between Kurds and Assyrians in the Amadia district, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a report from the Administrative Inspector at Mosul on the murder of three Assyrians by Kurds from Turkish territory.

2. I understand that the "Karamusiyin" are a small tribal division affiliated to the Tkhuma, whose reputation for wildness they fully share. The particular incident in question is the logical consequence of a blood feud, which appears to have been begun by the Assyrians themselves, but I am bringing it to your notice as it is possible that attempts will be made to involve the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Memorandum from the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, to the Ministry of Interior, Bagdad.

(Secret.)

Mosul, October 14, 1933.

REFERENCE my telegram of the 10th October, 1933.

I forward herewith copy of a letter from Kaïmakam Amadiyah of the 8th October, 1933.

I am informed that the kaïmakam has returned to the Qaramus the forty rifles which he had taken from them last month.

R. S. STAFFORD,
Administrative Inspector,
Mosul and Arbil Liwas.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Translation of Kaïmakam Amadiyah's Letter of October 8, 1933, to the Mutessarif, Mosul.

ON the 29th October, 1933, three men of the Karamusiyin tribe were killed in the fields of Chailki Village. From enquiries made by the police it appeared that the murderers are Na'mo, Tayar (the brother of Meho-al-Majuli, the well-known band leader, who has recently been killed by the Karamusiyin and Ashutis, while directing an attack against them), and five others, all residents of Jaman Village, in Turkey. The reason for the murder is due to the existence of enmity and feud between the two tribes on account of the abduction of a woman previously, and the death of Meho. A large number of Zakho inhabitants, while returning to their houses, have seen the band under reference. Further, Tayar has sent information to the relatives of the deceased regarding the matter, telling them that he has avenged himself. I shall communicate with the frontier authorities, and ask for the extradition of the murderers on completion of investigation. Please communicate with Hakkari and Van Vilayets, and ask them to arrest the murderers and to prevent the repetition of such acts.

Reference: IOR/L/PS/12/2874. Copyright for this page: Unknown

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1933

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6804/7/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

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P.Z. 7882
7727

Foreign Office,
December 5th, 1933.

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. Letter: E 6803/7/93. of November 25th

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
endale Bennett October 31st	Assyrian resettlement.
d of 7th Meeting of League tions Council Committee October 31st	

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 50 14 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

7 DEC 1933

Similar letter sent to Adm
W.O.
D.O.
C.O.
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P.Z.
7325
1933

November 8, 1933.

SECTION 2.

[E 6804/7/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Council Committee held at 4 P.M. *on October* 31, 1933.—(*Received in Foreign Office, November* 8.)

THIS was a private meeting of the committee, sitting without an Iraqi representative.

The President said that it did not appear possible for the committee to make much substantial progress pending replies from the Brazilian and Iraqi Governments and the outcome of Major Johnson's visit to London. A short adjournment therefore seemed advisable, and he understood that this would meet the plans of those delegates who were not permanently stationed in Geneva. In the first place, however, he understood that the United Kingdom representative had some observations to make on the present stage of the committee's work.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he thought it might be useful before the committee decided to adjourn to review the progress which had already been made in its work and to consider the next steps to be taken.

He recalled that the committee had been established—

(*a*) To consider whether the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who might wish to leave the country would be possible in practice, and, if so, to take all necessary steps, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, to prepare and execute a detailed scheme.

(*b*) Eventually, to examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government, the measures taken by that Government to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1932, so far as concerns those Assyrians who might remain in Iraq.

(*c*) To receive reports from the Iraqi Government regarding the measures taken to assure the safety of the Assyrians in Iraq, to assist families left destitute by the events of last August and to rebuild villages wholly or partially destroyed in the course of those events.

In the accomplishment of the first of these tasks, the point of departure was the Secretariat's memorandum of the 24th October, which concerned itself with—

(1) The number of the Assyrians in Iraq.
(2) The safeguards required in ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians as to their departure from Iraq.
(3) The place of eventual settlement.

As regards the first of these questions, the Secretariat had felt bound to point out that the figures quoted by Major Thomson were less than previous estimates obtained from non-Iraqi sources. The United Kingdom representative observed that these estimates were merely in the nature of round figures, and did not possess the same value as the carefully worked-out and detailed statement by Major Thomson, whose figures were, moreover, generally confirmed from an independent source, *i.e.*, the League Commission on the Mosul Boundary. On p. 83 of the report of that commission it was stated that "the total number of Assyrians to be settled would be only about 20,000 if the Assyrians from Persia returned to their own country." The same report estimated the number of Persian Assyrians in Iraq at 5,000. Nevertheless, even if 20,000 were taken as the total figure, this did not mean that 20,000 would have to be resettled elsewhere. It was quite possible that a number might wish to remain in Iraq, particularly those who had their pre-war homes in what is now Iraq.

On this question of numbers the committee had, by implication, in the draft resolution provisionally accepted on the 28th October, decided that the wishes of the Assyrians should be ascertained as soon as a place of settlement had been

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definitely decided upon; and in the meantime it had agreed to work on the assumption that a minimum of 10,000 would require to be resettled.

The second question concerned the safeguards to be adopted in ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians as to their departure from Iraq. The draft resolution provisionally accepted on the 28th October provided that these wishes should be ascertained by a committee in which there would be Assyrian participation, and in which, as Nuri Pasha had himself pointed out, there would be a non-Iraqi majority, counting the Assyrians as non-Iraqi for this purpose. The draft resolution further provided that a Nansen Office representative, who would, in fact, be the representative of the Council committee, would collaborate with this local committee, whose reports would be made available to the Council committee. If this resolution were ultimately adopted and carried out, the United Kingdom representative thought it could be claimed that the interests of the Assyrians during this important stage of the work would have been fully safeguarded. Unfortunately, the Iraqi Government had proposed amendments which would greatly diminish the value of the draft resolution. But their decision was not yet final and there was time for negotiation.

As regards question (3), *i.e.*, the place of eventual settlement, various places have been suggested. They were Brazil, Syria, the Argentine, France, Spain, Cyprus, Palestine, Canada, the United States, Persia, Ethiopia and Ecuador. If the United Kingdom representative had understood the French representative rightly, the French Government were not prepared to consider the settlement in Syria of all the Assyrians who might wish to leave Iraq. The Secretariat might perhaps enquire regarding the possibilities in the Argentine, but the United Kingdom representative assumed that neither France nor Spain could be seriously considered. Enquiries made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had shown that settlement in Cyprus was unfortunately impracticable. The committee would readily understand why Palestine was out of the question. As regards Canada, the Secretariat's report showed that Major Johnson considered it impracticable on account of the strict immigration laws. Although the United Kingdom representative could not speak on behalf of the Canadian Government, his information was to the same effect. The United States could not, in the view of the Nansen Office, be seriously considered. The United Kingdom representative recalled that at an earlier meeting he had mentioned that the possibility of settlement in Persia had been explored by the Assyrians themselves without success. He could offer no opinion on the prospects of Ethiopia, but he was inclined to doubt whether general conditions there were such as to warrant the committee in considering it as a suitable place of settlement. As regards Ecuador, a detailed plan was awaited if the Ecuadorean Government saw fit to produce one.

The United Kingdom representative continued that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had been actively exploring for some time the possibility of settlement in the Colonial Empire. Although these enquiries were still proceeding and he was not yet in a position therefore to make a definite statement, he could tell the committee, and felt he ought to tell them, that no suitable area had yet been found in which land could be made available for the Assyrians. Nor were His Majesty's Government aware that any place could be found in the self-governing Dominions, though the League Secretariat might wish to include the Governments of those Dominions among those to whom an enquiry should be addressed.

On this point, while the committee was ready to consider any other solution which the League Secretariat might be able to discover, the only practicable solution at present available appeared to be settlement in Brazil.

The work of the committee in considering settlement in Brazil was at present held up—

(*a*) For the answer of the Brazilian Government to an enquiry whether they were prepared in principle to receive the Assyrians.

(*b*) For the final decision of the new Iraqi Government, when formed, regarding the draft resolution provisionally approved by the committee on the 28th October concerning the local organisation to be set up in Iraq to ascertain the wishes of the Assyrians regarding departure, and to prepare for that departure, and regarding the amount which the Iraqi Government would be prepared to contribute towards settlement in Brazil if that were decided upon.

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If these answers were favourable, the points which would remain for consideration were—

(1) Where the remainder of the money over and above the Iraqi contribution was to come from.
(2) Under what general conditions the Assyrians were to be settled in Brazil.
(3) How detailed plans for the move were to be drawn up.

Of these, the first two would presumably require decisions by the committee before settlement in Brazil could be put before the Assyrians as a concrete proposal. But as soon as these decisions had been taken it seemed to the United Kingdom representative that the remainder of the work of settlement could be definitely entrusted to the Nansen Office, working in close collaboration with the League Secretariat, the Council committee being kept informed of developments and being called together when necessary to take decisions should difficulties arise.

For the moment then, the questions which the committee could usefully consider were two. The first was the question of finance, and to enable the committee to consider what steps must be taken it would be useful if the Nansen Office could state how previous movements of refugees had been financed. The United Kingdom representative was sure that the League Secretariat also could offer useful suggestions based on their previous experience.

The second question concerned the general conditions under which the Assyrians were to be settled in Brazil. These might be considered under two headings :—

(*a*) Physical and economic.
(*b*) Political.

On the first of these headings, a considerable amount of information was already before the committee, which was also aware that a favourable impartial report has been obtained from the counsellor of the Swiss Legation in Rio de Janeiro. At the same time the committee might justifiably feel that it could not take the responsibility of sending the Assyrians to the area concerned without satisfying itself by some further enquiry that conditions were such that the Assyrians might be expected to adapt themselves to them. The most appropriate arrangement, if the Iraqi Government would agree, might be that Major Thomson's services should be placed at the disposal of the committee for this purpose and that, accompanied by a representative of the Nansen Office, he should visit the area concerned as soon as it was practicable for him to do so.

The United Kingdom representative said that he would like at this point to clear up a misapprehension concerning Major Thomson's present position which he thought existed in the minds of some of his colleagues. Major Thomson was not a servant of the Iraqi Government in the ordinary sense, *i.e.*, he was not a permanent official. He had been engaged purely temporarily by the Iraqi Government for the sole purpose of carrying out the League decision—the decision of the Council of the 15th December, 1932, regarding Assyrian settlement. He was a doctor, had had considerable administrative experience and knew Assyrian requirements. The objection to sending him to Brazil was the great delay which would be involved, and this objection was a serious one. Moreover, the Iraqi Government might not be able to spare Major Thomson from Iraq, and in that event the committee might wish to consider the despatch of some other suitably qualified person to accompany a Nansen representative to Brazil. Alternatively, it might be possible to arrange for a small commission of consuls from São Paulo to visit the area. This would no doubt be the quickest arrangement, but such a commission would not, of course, have first-hand knowledge of Assyrian requirements, and it was doubtful, therefore, whether its report would possess any greater value than the report of the Swiss counsellor of Legation which was already available. It seemed advisable in any case that a Nansen representative should be associated with any investigation.

As regards political conditions, no doubt the Brazilian Government, before accepting the Assyrians, would require certain information and assurances regarding them. The committee, on its side, would no doubt require information from the Brazilian Government as to the status which the Assyrians would have in Brazil. The machinery for this mutual supply of information had to be set up.

A point which also required consideration was the provision of funds to cover any extra expense over and above its normal budget to which the Nansen Office might be put in carrying out work entrusted to it by the committee, as well as the expense which would be incurred if it were decided to send out someone to make a preliminary investigation in Brazil.

The United Kingdom representative, in conclusion, suggested that, when the outstanding points had been discussed, it might be useful to record the present position of the committee's work in the form of a minute or resolution.

The President, on behalf of the committee, expressed appreciation of the United Kingdom representative's statement of the position. He suggested that one of the most important, if not the most important, of the points which had been dealt with therein was that which concerned the financial aspect of the transfer and resettlement of the Assyrians. He felt that, before any further progress could be made, it was essential that the committee should know more clearly how much money was likely to be contributed by the Iraqi Government, and how much it would be possible to obtain from other sources. Clearly, if the contribution of the Iraqi Government was to be limited, as had been suggested by Nuri Pasha privately in conversation, to £40,000, the high cost of the Brazilian proposal would render it impracticable, and other alternatives would have to be sought urgently. The expenditure which would have to be undertaken fell into two categories: (*a*) Preliminary expenditure which might be incurred in the investigation of likely schemes; (*b*) the expenditure which would be incurred in the actual execution of the plan of resettlement finally adopted. It might be suggested that expenditure of the first class could be undertaken before the problem of financing the settlement scheme had been resolved. For his part, however, he considered that it would be unwise to incur any financial liabilities whatever until the sources from which money could be obtained to meet them had been more clearly defined. He did not wish to be indiscreet, but he thought that it would be of interest to all members of the committee to know whether it was probable that financial assistance would be forthcoming from the United Kingdom Government.

The United Kingdom Representative replied that he much regretted that he was not in a position to reply to this question or to commit his Government in any way on the point. As the result of the mandate which they had held for Iraq and of their past relations with the Assyrians, the United Kingdom Government had, of course, a peculiarly close interest in the Assyrian question, but they no longer had any greater responsibilities than other members of the Council. The resettlement of the Assyrians, and the financing of it, were questions which concerned the League as a whole, and he would like to suggest that the League Secretariat, in collaboration with the Nansen Office, should prepare a note, for the information of the committee, on the manner in which analogous operations had been financed in the past.

The Danish Representative and *Dr. Kerno*, who was representing the League Secretariat, suggested that some financial assistance might be obtainable from ecclesiastical and other benevolent organisations, which from a feeling of Christian solidarity had shown constant interest in the welfare of the Assyrians and their Church.

The President asked the United Kingdom representative whether he thought that British organisations of this sort would be prepared to contribute.

The United Kingdom Representative said that if the committee, as now seemed likely, suspended its work for a few days, he proposed in the interim to go to London, and while there he would be glad to make such informal enquiries as he could as to what financial assistance might be expected from charitable organisations in the United Kingdom. Although he could not promise to be in a position on his return to offer the committee any precise information on this point, he could do his best to explore the ground. Again, however, he saw no reason why assistance from such sources should be expected from the United Kingdom alone. Mention had been made of "Christian solidarity," and he hoped that means might be found, on this basis, of raising funds in other countries, in view of the wide interest taken in the Assyrian question.

The Danish Representative pointed out that the committee had already received a communication from the Geneva office of the International Bureau for

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Church Co-operation, and this and other similar organisations throughout the world would, it might be hoped, respond generously to any appeal for help which the committee might later on think fit to make.

Dr. Kerno expressed his willingness to approach the above-named office informally.

The French Representative referred to the possibility, which the committee should not overlook, of the Assyrians themselves being able to contribute towards the cost of their transport and resettlement.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had no personal knowledge of the individual capacity of the Assyrians to pay a contribution of this kind, but he would ask Captain Holt to give the committee any information which he had on this point.

Captain Holt said that the capacity of families to pay a contribution towards the cost of their transport and settlement outside Iraq would, of course, vary very much in individual cases. Many of the families who were likely to wish to leave Iraq had suffered heavy loss in the recent disturbances, but others had been quite untouched and should be in a position to contribute substantially towards the cost of their resettlement. Many of the latter might be able to pay as much as £40 or £50, or, in some instances, even more. He thought that most families would be eager to obtain full title to the land on which they would be settled, and that the arrangements outlined by Major Johnson at the meeting which had been held in the morning would be an effective inducement to those who had capital to contribute to the best of their ability towards the expenditure which would be incurred on their behalf.

The French Representative mentioned the possibility of raising funds in the United States of America.

After some further general discussion, the *President* said that it appeared that the committee as a whole were in agreement with the observations which the United Kingdom representative had made at the beginning of the meeting, and suggested that some form of resolution should now be adopted accordingly.

The United Kingdom Representative intimated that he had, in anticipation of some such suggestion, already prepared, on the basis of the statement which he had made, a tentative draft resolution, which, if the committee desired, he would submit for discussion.

The President thanked the United Kingdom representative and asked him to put this draft before the committee for consideration.

A short discussion followed, in the course of which a few minor textual amendments were made to the draft put forward by the United Kingdom representative. The text as adopted is annexed.

Geneva, October 31, 1933.

Annex.

Text of Resolution adopted by the Council Committee on October 31, 1933.

THE committee—

Considering that further substantial progress with its work cannot be made pending the receipt of replies—

1. From the Brazilian Government concerning their attitude in principle towards settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in the Brazilian Province of Paraná;
2. From the Iraqi Government regarding—
   (*a*) The draft resolution provisionally accepted by the committee on the 28th October, 1933;
   (*b*) The financial contribution which they are prepared to offer towards the cost of the resettlement in Brazil of those Assyrians who no longer wish to remain in Iraq;

Decides to ask its president to convene a further meeting as soon as he considers it desirable.

In the meantime the committee requests the League Secretariat—

(*a*) To continue its enquiries regarding the possibility of settling the Assyrians outside Iraq in countries other than Brazil.

(*b*) To make enquiries as to the most appropriate method of raising [illegible] funds for settlement as may be necessary to supplement the eventual contribution of the Iraqi Government.

(*c*) Should the reply now awaited from the Brazilian Government be favourable, to prepare for the committee's consideration the draft of an enquiry which might be addressed to the Brazilian Government as to the general conditions under which the Assyrians would be settled in Brazil.

The committee further resolves in principle that, before deciding on the place of settlement, it will cause an independent investigation to be made regarding the suitability of that place for Assyrian settlement.

Finally, it decides that, once a destination has been agreed upon for the Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, the task of preparing and executing plans for transfer and settlement of these Assyrians shall be entrusted, under conditions which will be defined later by the committee, to the Nansen Office, working in close collaboration, through the League Secretariat, with the Council Committee. In the meanwhile, the committee requests the Nansen Office to continue, without commitment, to study detailed arrangements for the transport of Assyrians to Brazil and their settlement on the land at the disposal of Paraná Plantations (Limited).

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In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6581/4/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
December 4th, 1933.

P.Z. 7880

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M.L. 6/12

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. Letter: E 6101/4/93 of November 18th

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
H.M. Representative Bagdad. October 19th	Assyrians at Mosul.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 49 7 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

5 DEC 193

Similar letter sent to A.M.
W.O.
D.O.

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EASTERN (IRAQ).

October 31, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[E 6581/7/93]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 669.)

Sir, *Bagdad, October 19, 1933.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 422 of the 12th October, His Majesty's consul at Mosul reports that the number of Assyrians (other than those in the Rest Camp) at present in Mosul is believed to be considerably in excess of previous estimates. There are, he says, about 600 families (2,000 persons), of whom some 400 families were more or less permanently resident. The rest are refugees from the country districts. A large percentage of the men are unemployed and although many are living on savings or being supported by private charity, it is possible that there will be much distress during the coming winter. The administrative inspector has informed the Iraqi authorities, and something will have to be done to induce those who have come in from the country to return to their lands.

2. Mr. Monypenny further reports that about 200 Assyrian women and children recently visited the consulate to seek assistance. They pleaded poverty and declared that it was not safe for them to return to their quarters. They were, however, persuaded to return and the local authorities informed. Mr. Monypenny gathers that the main purpose of their visit was to press for their removal from Iraq preferably to Cyprus.

2. His Majesty's consul adds that when Major Thomson requested the Assyrian leaders to furnish a list of those men who desired to leave Iraq, the latter declined to do so on the ground that this information might be used the Iraqi authorities to bring pressure on to them to return to their villages. by the Iraqi authorities to bring pressure on to them to return to their villages.

4. I observe that the *Daily Herald* of the 9th October publishes an interview with the Mar Shimun in Geneva, in which the Patriarch is reported to have stated that the atrocities still continue. Apart from the murder of three Assyrians by Kurds from across the Turkish border, reported in my despatch No. 667 of the 19th October, I know of no such case and I will not fail to report any incident if properly authenticated.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[935 hh—3]

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Notes.

Register No.
P.Z.
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SECRET.
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

Minute Paper.

Dated
Rec. 193 .

To	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6.12.		Iraq
~~Secretary of State....~~			—
Committee............	16		The Assyrians : latest papers.
~~Under Secretary.....~~			
~~Secretary of State....~~			

Copy of to

FOR INFORMATION.

The belief in Geneva that the Brazilian Govt. are likely to approve only the trial immigration of 100 families has caused consternation, and the Spanish Ambassador at Rio is to make representations on behalf of the League Ctee. against such a temporizing attitude.

Meanwhile there is no Iraqi undertaking to pay a reasonable share of the expenses nor agreement as to who shall pay the rest. (A large part of the expenses ~~are~~ is theoretically recoverable). No-body wants to be committed until the exact estimate is made; but this cannot be done until it is known how many Assyrians wish to emigrate; but the scheme cannot be put to them by the League until it is known that it is financially practicable — a very vicious circle.

A. J. Harley
5.12.33

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SEEN
TICAL COMMITTEE
20 DEC 1933

Previous papers :—

Presumably it should be possible to take such soundings among the Assyrians as will enable a provisional estimate to be formed.

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E 7296/7/93.
E 7383/7/93.
E 7384/7/93.
E 7284/7/93
E 7081/7/93.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 49 7 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

Foreign Office,
December 4th, 1933.

The Under-Secretary of State
India Office.

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Decode. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
20th November, 1933.
D. 5.20 p.m. 20th November, 1933.
R. 4.30 p.m. 20th November, 1933.
No. 469. (R).

Iraqi Government are anxious to know when reply may be expected from Brazilian Government regarding their willingness to admit large number of Assyrians for settlement in territory of Parana Estate Company.

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Code telegram to Sir W. Seeds, (Rio de Janeiro).

Foreign Office, 22nd November, 1933, 2.30 p.m.

No. 74. (R).

Bagdad telegram No. 469 (of November 20th: Assyrian re-settlement).

I leave it to your discretion whether to make enquiry on behalf of Iraqi Government. You can best judge whether, following so soon after enquiries reported in your telegram No. 88 (of November 21st), it would help matters or be resented.

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Decode. Sir W. Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).

28th November, 1933.

D. 12.17 p.m. 28th November, 1933.

R. 4.00 p.m. 28th November, 1933.

No. 95. (R).

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Your telegram No. 74.

Further enquiry yesterday at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs elicited the reply that the matter was still being studied by Ministry of Labour.

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Decode. H.M's Consul (Geneva),
30th November, 1933.

D. 1.15 a.m. 30th November, 1933.

R. 9.30 a.m. 30th November, 1933.

No. 424 LN. (R).

Your telegram No. 74 to Rio.

Confidential.

Following from Mr. Sterndale Bennett.

Assyrian Committee in private meeting on November 29th considered news received by Parana Plantations Limited from their representative in Brazil to the effect that Brazilian Ministry of Labour approves only of trial immigration of 100 families.

2. Committee decided by representations in Rio to try to forestall embarrassing and temporizing reply of this nature and to expedite definite decision. As collective demarche by governments represented on the Committee might be resented by Brazilian Government, the Committee felt that in view of nationality of its president the most appropriate course would be that Spanish Ambassador at Rio should act on its behalf, representatives of other governments represented on the Committee being informed in case Spanish Ambassador desired to consult them or to have their support.

3. Spanish Government have now consented to Spanish Ambassador acting as suggested and are sending instructions to him in the following sense.

4. He should ascertain whether the position is as reported in paragraph 1 and if so whether view of Ministry of Labour has been adopted by Brazilian Government. In latter case he is to refer

refer to difficulty which decision of that nature would create (owing to urgency of removal of Assyrians from Iraq and their desire for settlement in homogeneous group) and to invite Brazilian Government to reconsider the matter on humanitarian grounds taking into consideration the good qualities of Assyrians i.e. their long tradition of Christianity and civilization on European lines, discipline which majority have acquired from military or police service and unlikelihood of their becoming social or economic burden as they have the reputation for thrift and industry and have rapidly become self-supporting in Iraq mainly as agriculturists. Finally he is to represent urgency of the matter and request early reply emphasising that at this stage it is only a question of a decision of principle subject to discussion of details of practicability of the scheme put forward by Parana Plantations Limited and eventual attitude towards it of Assyrian population in Iraq.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 424, repeated to Bagdad and Rio.

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Decode. His Majesty's Consul (Geneva).
30th November, 1933.

D. 12.15 a.m. 1st December, 1933.

R. 9.30 a.m. 1st December, 1933.

No. 425. (R).

XXXXXXXXX

Addressed to Rio de Janeiro No. 2.

My telegram No. 424 to Foreign Office paragraph 2.

Following from Mr. Sterndale Bennett.

Spanish Ambassador is being recommended privately by his Government to keep in touch with His Majesty's Embassy in particular in view of information in the latter's possession regarding Assyrian question. Provided you see no objection I hope that on grounds stated in Foreign Office telegram No. 72 you will find it possible to exert unofficial influence in support of Spanish Ambassador to ensure that Brazilian Government do not send negative or unhelpful reply without full consideration of issues involved.

Repeated to Foreign Office.

/7/93)

NO DISTRIBUTION

Code telegram to Sir W.Seeds (Rio de Janeiro).

Foreign Office. 2nd December, 1933. 5.10 p.m.

No. 81. (R).

Geneva telegram No. 2 to you (of November 30 proposed Assyrian settlement in Brasil).

Unless you see serious objection please act as suggested by Mr. Sterndale Bennett.

Addressed to Rio de Janeiro No. 81, repeated to Geneva No. 349.

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1933

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decypher. Sir F. Humphrys, (Bagdad),
27th November, 1933.

D. 4.30 p.m. 27th November, 1933.

R. 7.10 p.m. 27th November, 1933.

No.477.

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Addressed to Geneva No.12, November 27th.

Following for United Kingdom delegation.

Foreign Office telegram No.343.

(Cost of resettlement of the Assyrians in Brazil).

Nuri's view is that the Cabinet will have great difficulty in obtaining Parliamentary sanction for contribution but that their hand would be strengthened if they could present concrete scheme based on reliable estimate of number of Assyrians willing to leave Iraq. I proposed formulation of an offer to pay percentage of total cost of resettlement with a fixed maximum and explained that Government could if they wished to instruct their representative at Geneva to inform Committee that Parliamentary sanction for a contribution in this form would be asked for after committee had adopted a scheme of resettlement. I understand Nuri has since put forward to the Cabinet proposal on these lines and that he is pressing the Government to send an early reply to Council Committee. I mentioned percentage of contribution with fixed maximum rather than minimum plus percentage of balance because I am convinced that Iraqi Government will never accept indefinite liability nor fixed minimum without knowing what proportion total cost of this will represent.

Repeated to Foreign Office No.477.

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FROM IRAQ

Decypher. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
20th November 1933.

D. 4.25 p.m. 20th November 1933.

R. 4.00 p.m. 20th November 1933.

No. 468.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

Your telegram 330.

I have discussed the matter again with Nuri Pasha who agrees that arrival of Nansen representative is not required until place where Assyrians can be re-settled has been determined. I am sending record of our conversation on the subject of Iraq's contribution to cost of settlement by today's air mail due London on Thursday.

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Cypher telegram to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).

Foreign Office, November 25th, 1933. 5.30 p.m.

No. 343.

7880 Your telegram No. 468 (of November 20th, Iraqi contribution to cost of Assyrian settlement).

Record of your conversation with Nuri has not arrived.

Please telegraph brief summary to Geneva.

Addressed to Bagdad No. 343, repeated to Geneva, No. 344.

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Cypher telegram to H.M's Consul, (Geneva),

Foreign Office, 25th November, 1933, 5.30 p.m.

No. 345.

My telegram No. 343 to Bagdad (of November 25th; Iraqi contribution to cost of Assyrian settlement).

Following for Mr. Sterndale Bennett from Mr. Rendel.

Please repeat Sir F. Humphrys' reply by Saving telegram.

P.Z. 7862/33.

Extract from

Koweit Intelligence Summary for October 1933.

Coll 17/16

VIII. ASSYRIAN TROUBLES

A prominent Basra notable (name need not be divulged) visited Kuwait early in the month and in conversation with the Shaikh gave the following appreciation of the Assyrian trouble. This is given below, with due apologies, as an interesting example of how certain politically minded Basrawis, viewed that

unfortunate business.

(a) Had not the Assyrian trouble eventuated, there was to have been a Shiah tribal rising on the Eupherates.

(b) The Assyrian situation gave the 'Iraq Government a heaven sent chance of turning the peoples minds in the direction of an anti-English and anti-Christian campaign, with the result that (a) above did not come off.

(c) The Turkish Minister in Baghdad had a large hand in the Assyrian business and advised the Government to adopt the strong measures they did which followed good Turkish precedent. Explanations could always be given later in order to put 'Iraq right with His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations.

(d) The Army however went too far, and Government realized too late that England had been deeply roused as well as the League of Nations. Orders went forth to all officials to go out of their way to please the English, so as to get them on their side at Geneva.

(e) Strong efforts were at the same time made to prevent an independent enquiry by the League of Nations. England had at all costs to be dragged in - a not difficult task, as it was believed that she would have to see 'Iraq through her difficulty, owing to the fact that she herself had sponsored her independence.

(f) As soon as League of Nations enquiry was over, in the opinion of the informant, there would be another heavy anti-English attack throughout country against England, all inspired from Baghdad.

(g) The informant further gave it as his opinion that His Majesty's Government would do well to allow an independent enquiry, even though it meant blame for herself, as only thus would England regain the confidence of other minorities in 'Iraq, both Jew and Christian.

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [515v] (1043/1206)

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views.

The Shaikh repeated to the writer the above story, though he was careful to say they were not necessarily his own views.

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1933

CONFIDENTIAL

P.Z. 7806

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

DER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 49 7 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

oreign Office,

5 Nov , 1933

The Under-Secretary of State
for India,

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Decypher. His Majesty's Consul (Geneva).
November 29th 1933.

D. 5.10 p.m. November 29th 1933.

R. 5.15 p.m. November 29th 1933.

No.422. L.N.

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Addressed to Bagdad No.34 November 29th.

Your telegram No.12.

Following from Mr. Sterndale-Bennett:-

According to new report prepared by Nansen Office, after discussions in London with Parana Plantations Limited and shipping companies, total cost of settling 2,000 families (10,000 persons) in Brazil is likely (at rate of 1 milreis equals 4 pence) to be £314,000 made up as follows.

Transport, Beirut-Brazil £120,000. Purchase of land £65,000. Settlement £49,000. Maintenance for 9 months £80,000.

Possibility of all Assyrians leaving Iraq though doubtless remote has to be reckoned with and maximum liability is presumably about double above.

I appreciate difficulty which Iraqi government may find in committing themselves to definite figures in the circumstances which are still x hypothetical x. But before adopting Brazil scheme and authorising it to be put before the Assyrians, committee will certainly require to be assured that it is financially practicable. Early indication of amount as distinct from form of offer which

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Iraqi government will be prepared to ask parliament to sanction if Brazil scheme is adopted, is therefore most desirable.

As stated in Foreign Office telegram No.319 suitable contribution would be 60% and if maximum rather than minimum limit is preferred I trust it will be not less than £300,000 and preferably more.

I presume Iraqi government fully realise that any contribution will be for the most part recoverable. Will not this fact help to overcome parliamentary difficulty and facilitate much larger offer than might otherwise be feasible.

Repeated to Foreign Office No.422 L.N.

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

ER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DEC 1933

reign Office,

0th Nov, 1933.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
NO. 49
7 DEC. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

The Under Secretary of State
for India

—9048 (4)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

P.Z.
7806
1933

From SWITZERLAND.

Telegram (en clair) from H.M.'s Consul (Geneva).
D. 29th November, 1933.
R. 30th November, 1933.

No. 121 Saving.

::::::::::::::

Confidential.

Following from Storndale Bennott.

At private meeting (i.e. without Iraqi delegate) of Assyrian Committee this morning, one of subjects discussed was raising of funds necessary to supplement eventual Iraqi contribution to Brazilian scheme. I stated that as root of present trouble was Council's decision on Mosul boundary in 1925, the cost of re-settling the Assyrians in so far as it was not met by Iraqi Government and Assyrians themselves should in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom be borne by the League, and that His Majesty's Government could only contemplate payment of their share of League contribution.

Idea of League contribution was evidently disturbing to my colleagues who scouted its practicability and expressed doubt whether financial responsibility of this kind could constitutionally be accepted on behalf of League without approval of Assembly. Latter point is to be investigated, but disposition of my colleagues was to leave it entirely to January Council, without recommendation of any sort, to decide how any balance over and above Iraqi and Assyrian contributions was to be met. Their view seemed to be that Council could probably only issue appeal for funds from public and private sources.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 121 Saving, repeated to Bagdad No. 35 in cypher, marked "Confidential".

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(2) M.M. ✓

P.Z.
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1933

CONFIDENTIAL

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6803/4/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

THE Under-Secretary of State for ~~Foreign Affairs~~ presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

P.P. 7665

Foreign Office,
November 25th, 1933.

Reference to previous correspondence: 7452

F.O. Letter: E 6464/4/93 of November 15th

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
d of 6th Meeting of of Nations Council ttee held 10-30AM 1st	Assyrian resettlement.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 48 30 NOV. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

28 NOV 1933

Similar letter sent to Adm
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P.Z.
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EASTERN (IRAQ).

CONFIDENTIAL.

November 8, 1933.

SECTION 1.

[E 6803/7/93]

No. 1.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

Record of Sixth Meeting of the Council Committee held at 10·30 A.M. *on October* 31, 1933.—(*Received in Foreign Office, November* 8.)

IT had been the intention that this meeting should be in the nature of an informal conversation between certain members only of the committee and Major Johnson. The Italian representative was, however, able to attend after all, and as the committee was thus at full strength, the meeting resumed its formal character.

The President informed the committee that he had received a note from the Brazilian Minister at Berne, intimating that he had duly addressed an enquiry to the Brazilian Government concerning their willingness in principle to accept a large number of Assyrian colonists on the Paraná Plantations land. The note showed that the Brazilian Minister had misunderstood one important point and had informed his Government that the Assyrians were Roman Catholics.

In reply to questions from various members of the committee, *Captain Holt* explained that while a number of the Assyrians in question were converts to Presbyterianism, the great majority were Nestorians. The Catholic branch of the Assyrian race was the Chaldeans, whose affairs were not at present in question.

The President suggested that the secretariat should take immediate steps to explain the position to the Brazilian Minister in order to remove what might be a serious misunderstanding. This was agreed to.

The President said that he had also been informed by the Iraqi delegation that a reply had been received from the Iraqi Government concerning the committee's draft resolution on the subject of the formation of a local committee in Iraq to deal with certain questions concerning the Assyrians. He thought, however, that as Major Johnson wished to leave that day for London in connexion with the work of the Nansen Office, it would be best that the committee should begin their meeting with a further general discussion of the proposals which the Nansen Office had put forward with regard to the settlement of Assyrians in Brazil.

Major Johnson said that he proposed to go to London at once to discuss this matter personally with the head office of the Paraná Plantations Company, and would be glad to know whether any members of the committee desired information on any particular points. There was one matter on which he thought it was desirable that he should make an explanation to the committee. This was the arrangements for the purchase of the land on which the Assyrians might be settled. The plan usually adopted by the Nansen Office in settling refugees on the Paraná Estates was to make an initial payment of £10 on behalf of each family of settlers towards the purchase price of the 12 hectares of land generally allotted to them, the balance of about £30 being paid by the settlers themselves in three annual instalments, beginning in the second year of their settlement. If the property required for each family were bought outright by the Nansen Office, about £25 per family would have to be added to the initial capital outlay which would be required. That is to say, approximately £125 per family would be needed for transport and resettlement, as compared with the figure of £100 per family which he had given to the committee previously.

In discussing this explanation some members of the committee expressed their preference for the purchase outright by the Nansen Office of the property to be assigned to the Assyrian settlers. They maintained that it would be most desirable that the Assyrians should be safeguarded from any possibility of being exploited by the company, and this could be guaranteed if their financial relations

[963 h—1]

were solely with the Nansen Office. Some discussion followed regarding the social services which it would be necessary to organise for the Assyrians when settled in their new home. It was agreed that educational and medical assistance would be necessary, and members of the committee were generally of the opinion that an appeal might be made to benevolent organisations to help in this regard.

The French Representative suggested, for consideration, that instead of purchasing separate plots for each family it might be more satisfactory for the Nansen Office to acquire from the company a large tract of territory which their representative in Brazil could himself divide among the Assyrian colonists according to the special requirements of each family.

The Danish Representative noted that the project put forward by the Nansen Office (document C/Min.Ass./2.1933) provided for the allotment of 12 hectares to each family of settlers. He would like to know whether this was considered to be sufficient or whether, as appeared to be contemplated in the report, which had been made by the counsellor of the Swiss Legation at Rio de Janeiro, more land might not be required by certain types of Assyrian settlers.

Mr. Edmonds said that he thought that 12 hectares, representing about 30 acres of land, was quite as much as the average Assyrian family could handle by themselves, and was, he considered, more than that which was usually worked by Assyrian families now settled in Iraq.

The President then raised the question of the arrangements which might be necessary for those Assyrians who did not normally maintain themselves by agriculture. He said that he understood that the Brazilian Government did not favour non-agricultural colonists.

The United Kingdom Representative said that there were certainly a considerable number of Assyrians now in Iraq who were not engaged in agriculture. There was a tendency to drift to the towns where he understood that many of the Assyrians were employed as servants. A few were employed on the railways in Iraq and by the oil companies. Still more were serving in the levies and police. But as the majority came from ordinary peasant stock and had probably had experience of work on the land, it should not be difficult, he thought, for them to adapt themselves to work on the land in Brazil. One of the advantages, however, of the project which had been put forward by the Nansen Office was that there was reasonable prospect of a certain number of settlers finding manual and other work in connexion with railway construction and in the townships which appeared to be developing.

Mr. Edmonds referred the committee to the document which had been put forward by the Iraqi delegation (C/Min.Ass./1.1933), in which some details had been given of the number of Assyrian families at present established on the land in Iraq and of others employed in the towns. He offered the suggestion that it might be best to arrange first for the transfer and resettlement of the entirely agricultural element and to allow other categories who wished to emigrate to follow afterwards.

The Danish Representative enquired whether Major Johnson could give the committee any information about the juridical status of the Paraná Plantations Company in Brazil. He would like to know, for example, whether they enjoyed any special legal privileges *vis-à-vis* the Brazilian Government.

Major Johnson undertook to endeavour to obtain information on this point during his visit to London.

The committee then devoted some time to discussing to what extent it would be desirable that the Assyrians settled in Brazil, or elsewhere, should be held liable to refund the cost of their transfer and establishment in the place of resettlement.

Major Johnson explained that the practice of the Nansen Office was to make each family of refugees liable to refund all the money which had been spent on them, including that expended on transport. The normal system (*i.e.*, as practised in Syria) was that the Nansen Office held the title deeds of the property on which the refugees were settled, and these were not handed over to the settlers until, by annual instalments, all expenditure incurred on their behalf by the Office

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Coll 17/16(3) 'The Assyrian Question' [524r] (1060/1206)

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had been refunded. It was the experience of the Nansen Office that these conditions encouraged hard work and thrift among the refugees whom they had settled, and he thought that it would be a mistake to make free grants of land and passages to any class of refugee colonist, even if sufficient funds were available to enable this to be done. In the experience of the Office, such treatment would only lead to pauperisation and the weakening of the moral stamina of the refugees themselves. The members of the committee, in discussing this point, while agreeing in principle with Major Johnson's views, showed a tendency to consider it desirable that the Assyrians should be exempted from repayment of some part of the money which it would be necessary to spend on their resettlement outside Iraq. No decision was, however, adopted on this point.

(After this Major Johnson withdrew from the meeting.)

The President then invited M. Shabandar to explain to the committee the reply which had been received from the Iraqi Government regarding the committee's draft resolution concerning the local committee in Iraq.

M. Shabandar distributed copies of this draft resolution amended in accordance with the suggestions put forward by the Iraqi Government, which, in each instance, he had underlined(¹) in order that the committee might easily see where alterations had been introduced (see annex). He reminded the committee, however, that owing to the resignation of the Cabinet it would not be possible for a definite decision concerning the resolution to be reached until a new Government had been formed.

A discussion followed in which the committee generally expressed themselves willing to adopt all the amendments proposed by the Iraqi Government, except the introduction of the words "as far as local circumstances permit" in the second line and the substitution of the words "with the local authorities" for "with the above-mentioned local committee" in line 13.

It was pointed out that the first of those amendments implied that the composition of the local committee might be changed at any moment, and even that in certain districts no committee might be set up at all.

M. Shabandar, although without precise information, expressed his personal opinion that the amendment was simply designed to guard against unforeseen contingencies, such as the inability of one of the persons concerned to serve, owing, perhaps, to illness.

The United Kingdom Representative said that any committee naturally ran the risk of variation owing to illness, but there seemed no reason why the committee should not be set up in the first place in the form originally proposed without qualification. He suggested, however, that the saving clause might be designed solely to refer to the alternation of the kaïmakam and the mudir, and if this was so, it would be clearer to delete the words "as far as local circumstances permit" and to insert some such phrase as "according to local circumstances" after the words "kaïmakam or nahiya mudir."

All the members of the committee were opposed to the substitution of the words "with the local authorities" for the words "with the above-mentioned local committee." It was pointed out that the result would be to remove any guarantee regarding the way in which the Assyrians would be dealt with, and, in particular, the way in which their wishes regarding departure from Iraq would be ascertained.

The Danish Representative suggested that the two phrases should be combined, to read "with the above-mentioned local committee and the local authorities," as he saw some advantage in the Nansen representative having wide powers of contact.

The United Kingdom Representative expressed his preference for the simple reinsertion of the words "above-mentioned local committee," as the addition proposed by the Danish representative seemed to create an element of uncertainty as to who would actually carry out the tasks of ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians, &c. European public opinion would require to be satisfied that the interests of the Assyrians would be safeguarded, and he hoped the Iraqi delegate would not only put this point of view to his Government, but would also represent

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(¹) Printed in italics in Annex.

to them that the resolution as originally worded would be a safeguard against criticism for the Iraqi Government themselves as showing the fairness of their intentions towards the Assyrians.

The President and other members of the committee also urged upon the Iraqi delegate the importance of showing that Assyrian interests would be safeguarded and the responsibility of the committee on this point. They indicated, however, that they saw no objection to, and possibly some advantage in, the Danish representative's proposal.

Finally, it was decided to request the Iraqi representative to reply to his Government making the following suggestions:—

(1) That the phrase "as far as local circumstances permit" should be omitted, but that if the Iraqi Government attached a special importance to the retention of some such words, the phrase "the kaïmakam or nahiya mudir" might be altered to read "the interested kaïmakam or nahiya mudir according to local circumstances," and that the words "above-mentioned local committee" should be retained with the addition, if the Iraqi Government desired, of "and the local authorities."

M. Shabandar undertook to act on this suggestion, but again pointed out that he could not expect to receive definite instructions until a new Government had been formed in Bagdad.

Geneva, October 31, 1933.

Annex.

THE committee takes note of the intention of the Iraqi Government, *as far as local circumstances permit*, to nominate a local committee, composed of the land settlement expert as president, an administrative inspector, the kaïmakam or *nahiya mudir* and the Assyrian village headman concerned, *to explain to the Assyrians* the exact meaning of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, and that a committee of the Council is actively examining plans for its execution. As soon as possible after the place of settlement has been definitely fixed, a representative of the Nansen Office for Refugees appointed by that Office in agreement with the president of the committee of the Council will proceed to Iraq to collaborate *with the local authorities* in the task of (*a*) ascertaining what persons wish to leave the country; (*b*) taking all necessary measures required for their departure, such as liquidation of property, participation by intending emigrants in the cost of transport and resettlement, conveyance from their homes to the port selected, &c. Full reports of the work will be forwarded through the Iraqi Government to the committee of the Council.

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With the Compliments

of the

er-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY LETTER
No. 48 30 NOV. 1933
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL AND
SECRET DEPT. INDIA OFFICE

27 NOV 1933

reign Office,

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The Under-Secretary of State
India Office

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NO DISTRIBUTION.

Decode. Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).
23rd November, 1933.

D. 12.30 p.m. 24th November, 1933.

R. Noon. 24th November, 1933.

No. 471. (R).

7615 Your telegram No. 337.

I was aware of this discrepancy which provoked reservation at the end second paragraph of my telegram No. 463. 7561

Incident A in my telegram No. 463 is the affair reported in my despatch No. 667 and in paragraph 4 Iraqi observations on Mar Shimun's telegram of September 15th although Iraqi Government incorrectly gave date as September 1st instead of September 29th. not rec'd

Ministry of the Interior have now made further enquiries into the report of earlier murder of 3 Assyrians and establish definitely that these men were murdered on September 1st in the course of a raid on their village by Iraqi Kurds.

This makes a total of 10.

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Pl. put with pp. before submission → Papers already submitted

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(No copies from E+O or F.O.)

24/11

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. E 6857/7/93
and address—*not to any person by name*, but to—
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

P.Z.
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1933

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
November 22nd, 1933.

P.Z. 7615.

~~[illegible]~~

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Mes 24/11

7614

Reference to previous correspondence:

F.O. Letter: E 5964/7/93 of November 6th

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
ue of Nations . 625. 1933. I. October 31st	Assyrians in Iraq.

MAILS BRANCH
23 NOV 1933
INDIA OFFICE

Similar letter sent to Adm. W.O.

14—6130 8931 (2)

P.Z.
7617
1933

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to
the Council.

C.625 1933.I.

Geneva, October 31st 1933.

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN IRAQ.

Supplementary petition, dated October 8th, 1933,
from the Mar Shimun, "Catholicos" Patriarch of
the Assyrians, concerning the situation of
Assyrians in Iraq.
(Docs.C.504,535, 545, 556, 567 and 573, 1933.I.).

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate, for the examination of the Council, a petition from the Mar Shimun, dated October 8th, 1933. This petition has been considered as supplementary to those from the same source and concerning the same question previously communicated to the Council.

The text of this communication is being forwarded simultaneously to the Iraqi Government, for its observations.

The Secretary-General will not fail to circulate these observations to the Council as soon as they reach the Secretariat.

Report of Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians.

October 8th, 1933.

In making this final appeal on behalf of my people, I recapitulate first the substance of previous reports, knowing that this document is likely to fall into the hands of many who did not receive them.

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The League of Nations is aware that, after the Assyrian tion lost its home in Hakkiari as a result of the Great War, the cision given by the League in 1924 assigned our home to Turkey, ile leaving the Nation still refugee in Iraq. The Turks refused allow us to return to Hakkiari.

The League of Nations expressly said* that we ought to ve a home where our national life could go on, with its traditions d culture; and it was to secure that, among other things, that the ndate over Mosul for 25 years was given to Great Britain. Yet the estion of Assyrian settlement was left unsettled for ten years; rious efforts were made after a solution, but none succeeded, ough the problem - in the opinion of one British High Commissioner was not insoluble (See note I).

Meantime, the Assyrians were used as a military force by the andatory Power, a fact that made bad blood between the Assyrians nd Iraqis.

In 1932 the mandate was brought to an end, the question of ssyrian settlement being still open. The Mandatory Power was warned that massacre would follow their withdrawal, and the High Commissioner Sir Francis Humphrys admitted that he had had to take steps to prevent such already.

Nevertheless, that gentleman assured the Assyrians that there was no danger, and declared to the League that Iraqis were always tolerant, and that Great Britain would be morally responsible in the event of trouble.

Now it is an admitted fact that there has been very serious trouble: those tolerant people have proclaimed a "Jihad" (Holy War) and a massacre as hideous as any of late days has taken place. (see note II details of massacre).

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* "Question of Frontier between Turkey and Iraq" C.400.M.147. 1925. VII.P.90.

This was regarded as a national triumph and those responsible have been promoted.

We mention these facts, not because we desire vengeance, but as showing why we feel that Assyrians cannot live under Iraqi administration and why we are sure Iraqis would be glad to see them out of the land.

Hence we ask what the League - which has a definite responsibility in the matter - proposes to do.

The actual massacre and its causes.

Great Britain had not settled the Assyrians when - long before its legal term - she "closed" her mandate. Hence, when in June 1932 the "closure" was near, Assyrians made an effort to secure settlement. The men of the "Levy" in British service gave a month's notice, - as was their legal right, - of terminating their service.

To avoid inconvenience, the High Commissioner asked Mar Shimun to use his influence to keep the levy serving, gave various vague promises of the good treatment he hoped to secure for the people and suggested a reference of the whole matter to the League of Nations.

Mar Shimun did as requested, and this is the most conspicuous instance of his use of that "Temporal Power" of his, for which he has been much blamed.

In September 1932, Mar Shimun proceeded to Geneva, and on November 14th of that year the Permanent Mandates Commission having heard him recommended the settlement of the Assyrians in a homogeneous Group or Unit in Iraq territory, saying that they believed this quite possible. As this solution was not acceptable to the Iraq Government, the Council of the League recommended "settlement in homogeneous units", - and left the size of the "Units" to the discretion of Iraq.

In January 1933, Mar Shimun returned to Mosul (where the Mutasarrif told him that his appeal to the League was an unforgivable insult to Iraq) gathered the chiefs of his people - after leave secured - explained the position, and begged them to be loyal and wait the fulfilment of the resolution of the League. He was also requested to secure the continuance of the service of the levy. From that time till May the Government of Iraq - now independent, with the late High Commissioner as British Ambassador only - attempted to force a "settlement" by the method of displacing the known leaders of the people and setting up instruments of their own. The people were settled in small groups, isolated among hostile elements, and were established only as "tenants at will" under Arab or Kurd landlords, with no title deed or rights to show. It being the plain object of these proceedings to destroy all the corporate life of the Nation, Mar Shimun refused to co-operate in them, a fact which brought him into bad repute with officials, and gave rise to the accusation that he thought only of his own position and that of his family, and that he wished to retain his "Temporal Power" against the Government.

Mar Shimun wishes to repudiate that accusation strongly. Had it been only his own interests that he thought of, he had only to accept an abundant provision offered by the Government as the price of abandoning his people.

As for the "Temporal Power" (see note 3) he is accused of claiming, Mar Shimun recognised and recognises that every Iraqi subject must obey the laws and have right of direct access to the Sovereign. He never had any notion of asking for an "Imperium in impero" for himself. He only transmitted the desires of the people for an enclave, such as British Statesmen had encouraged them to hope for, to the League of Nations. (House of Lords. Lord Curzon. December the 1st, 1919).

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But Assyrians are mostly tribesmen still, and have always been accustomed to use the mediation of their Patriarch in dealing with Government. While any man who so wishes can petition Government direct, any man who prefers it can present his petition through another. The fact that a poor man among the Assyrians normally ignorant of Arabic could not obtain attention from local officials made this a necessity for them.

Mar Shimun sought no more than the continuance of this practice needful for his people, and granted in Iraq to other types, Arab and Kurdish, in the same position as the Assyrians. As the tribesmen become settled and educated the right would naturally lapse. (See note 4).

In May 1933, Mar Shimun was summoned to Baghdad and detained there under surveillance; with the idea, admitted by the British administrative Inspector at Mosul, that his absence from his people would break his influence with them, so that such a settlement as Government desired could be forced upon them. (See note 5). Here Mar Shimun had interviews with Major Thomson the English "Settlement expert", but found that that officer regarded himself as no more than an agent for the execution of the Government policy. Meantime, in Mosul attempts were made to go on with the Government scheme, but the people refused to co-operate with it, ignoring the "Maliks" (local Chiefs) set up by Government in place of those they knew, and petitioning for the return of the Patriarch. (See note 6).

Ugly signs began to multiply; there were threats bruited that the Patriarchal House should be exterminated; inflammatory speeches were made in Parliament advocating the destruction or expulsion of all the Assyrians; and fears of massacre spread among them.

The climax was reached July 10th-11th. In those days the Mutasarrif of Mosul called the Assyrians together saying "Here is the Government scheme. Those who do not accept it can get up and leave the country". Hence came the departure of a total of about 1500 men - in several parties under their own "Maliks" rather than one body under Yaku d'Malik Ismail - with the idea of passing into French territory.

It was not a rebellion, it was the migration of a body of men who despaired of life in Iraq and were doing what a Government official urged them to do. (See note 7). They intended that their families would follow them. It was when others tried to follow and join them that Government troops tried to check the movement and the collision of August 4th resulted.

For six days after that date there was deliberate and appalling massacre of all Assyrian males in the Dohuk district, - many women and children being killed also - by Iraq troops in uniform, with the knowledge of Iraqi officials.

The massacre was stopped when it was considered to have gone far enough and celebrated as a triumph. On August 18th Mar Shimun - still till then under surveillance in Baghdad - was deprived of Iraqi nationality and deported. This was done without trial by ex post facto law, a procedure applicable now in any other individual case. He was sent to Cyprus, and now having come to Geneva presents this appeal to the League.

Ten or more of the leaders of the people remain in captivity or exile and we ask that the League concern itself with their safety. (See special note).

His petition to the League is as follows:

If there be any doubt as to the facts complained of, let a Commission of the League be ordered to investigate matters, and to make an independent enquiry.

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For the future:

We ask for no vengeance, nor do we wish to be regarded as making propaganda against the Government of Iraq, though we do ask for compensation for the wronged. We say this:

Facts have shown that it is not possible for Assyrians to live under ordinary Iraqi administration and equally impossible for Iraqis to receive them. We ask that the Commission we have requested should make suggestions for the future of the people and we put forward our own ideas on the point.

A. If it should be possible at this late date, to form (as suggested by Lord Curzon Dec. 17, 1919) a "Kurdish-Assyrian enclave in the north of the vilayet of Mosul under a special administration", where Kurds and Assyrians might dwell together, we would accept that solution; but we doubt the possibility. It could only be by the consent of the Government of Iraq, in which Kingdom the enclave would be.

B. Should it be deemed - under a resolution adopted 5/9/23, - that it is not regular for a minority to ask to be removed from the jurisdiction of the government under which it lives, then we waive the intention of such a request: but we point out that the government of Iraq has recently passed a law by which it can deprive all Assyrians of Iraqi nationality if it pleases, without trial; and it has done so in our own case. Mar Shimun the petitioner is not a subject of Iraq, and so does not come under the terms of the resolution referred to.

At any rate we do ask the League to appoint a commission to report as to what ought to be done in our Assyrian case, for failing some effective protection, the Assyrians will either be destroyed, or the more vigorous will scatter over the earth while the weaker are reduced to the status of serfs of Iraqi landlords.

535 ~~583~~

To stop such a scandal, we appeal to the sense of honour both of the League of Nations and the Great Power that undertook the settlement of the people and accepted service from them pending settlement.

We also beg not only for the appointment of the Commission that shall have the authority of the League of Nations for investigating the matter and finding a final solution for the Assyrian problem but also we beg that this Commission shall be empowered to take all necessary steps for the relief of those whom the recent massacres have left starving and destitute.

Murders we know are still going on in the districts and unless these steps are taken promptly, there will be an extension of the recent lamentable events.

(signed) ESHAI SHIMUN

By the Grace of God,
Catholicos Patriarch
of the Assyrians.

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It being reliably reported from Iraq that some of the Iraq Government's accusations against the Mar Shimun are as follows, he considers it essential to refute these allegations which are devoid of foundation.

Note No.1.

The Commissioner in question was Sir Henry Dobbs who declared that "there were more than sufficient deserted lands, the property of the Iraq Government, to the north of Dohuk, in Amadiyah and the northern hills, upon which the mountaineers could be permanently settled."

At the utmost, no more than 15,000 individuals were settled, mostly as tenants to Kurdish landlords, out of 40,000.

Captain Foweraker was British settlement officer in the later days of the mandate, and settled several hundred Assyrian families in various places. The Iraq authorities declare that they continued his work of settlement.

In fact, while settling some 30 families, they dispersed about 100 for whom he had found homes. The practice of first "settling" and then displacing Assyrians was very widespread.

Some families were displaced as many as three times.

Note No.2.

In continuation of lists previously sent to the League of Nations, attached herewith are:

(a) a statement of names of Assyrians killed between 11th and 16th August 1933 and
(b) a list of villages looted.

The Assyrian leaders in Iraq have, on the 9th of September 1933, furnished the League of Nations with a petition "unsigned" with which the above lists were enclosed, copies of which were sent to the Mar Shimun. If the League of Nations can undertake the safety of the signatories to the petition, the Mar Shimun would be prepared to furnish the League of Nations with their names.

Note No.3.

With reference to the accusation that Mar Shimun had political ambitions, one of the accusations brought against Mar Shimun and the Assyrians by the Iraq Government is, that they proposed to take possession of Dohuk or some other area by force of arms.

There never was any such intention or idea. Had this ever been intended, it would have been easy when in 1920-25 the Assyrian levy of 4500 men was in military occupation of that area and preserving it for Iraq by defending it from the Turks. May we point out that Mar Shimun is accused at once of being A) only the leader of an insignificant minority and B) of being the leader of a force big enough to be a political danger.

Note No.4.

Mar Shimun has been accused of using the ecclesiastical position that is indisputably his for political ends, e.g. by the threat of excommunication if people will not obey him politically.

Mar Shimun wishes to say that during his tenure of office he has never excommunicated anybody: further by the canons of the Assyrian Church that sentence can only be inflicted for moral offences and not for any political act.

Note No.5.

It was Major Wilson, Administrative Inspector, Mosul, who advised in May 1933 that Mar Shimun, Lady Surma and Yaku should be invited to Baghdad and detained there in order to permit the foreign settlement expert to enforce the Government policy. Perhaps it was excusable then that when Mar Shimun met that expert in Baghdad, he should have felt unable to feel full confidence in him, although most anxious to co-operate. An extract from Major Wilson's letter written in May 1933 that reached the Mar Shimun from Iraq should throw ample light on the unconstitutional motives lying behind the policy of the Government. The extract begins:

> "Ask Mar Shimun to come to Baghdad to discuss matters with the government. Detention to follow forthwith. This should eliminate the danger of seeing Mar Shimun installed in his summer residence at Sar Amadiyah, the consequence of such a move will be against the interests of the Iraqi case.
>
> "In order to break up the influence of the Patriarchal family the Iraq Government would be well advised in increasing immediately the number (from 6 to 8) of the Assyrian police inspectors.
>
> "Immediate promotion of Christian officers having taken part in the campaigns of the Iraq army against Shaikh Barzan.
>
> "Lady Surma and Captain Yaku have undertaken a strong anti-government propaganda amongst the Kurdish tribes.
>
> "It is urgently needed to invite these two persons to come to Baghdad where they should be detained and kept under control.
>
> "Make pressure on the Patriarch to sign an official document recognising the suppression of his temporal power. Iraq Government runs the risk of seeing the Assyrians proposing a scheme on lands near or bordering the Syrian frontier. All necessary steps should be taken to oblige the Patriarchal family to accept the Dashtazi region."

The Mar Shimun has learnt that the Iraq Government has printed at the Government press, Baghdad, and circulated a blue book to the Council containing correspondence bearing on the Assyrian question.

The Mar Shimun asks the members of the Council to verify in the blue book whether it contains a copy of the letter of Major Wilson herewith given. As the Mar Shimun is not in possession of the said blue book, it is impossible for him to verify what correspondence has been published and what not. If this letter should figure in the book, it would be interesting to find whether parts of it have been suppressed or not. If suppression has been made, this example will throw light on the accuracy of the information given in the blue book.

Major Wilson has brought many accusations against the Mar Shimun but has never asked him to explain personally any supposedly suspicious circumstances. All his accusations rest on the word of certain known spies.

Note 6.

It is said by Nuri Pasha (Times, September 1st) that when once Mar Shimun had been removed to Baghdad, no Assyrian ever petitioned for his return. We append copies of petitions that were sent with that object.

Note 7.

Letter from Yaku D'Malik Ismail to the Minister of the Interior:

"As a result of Mosul meeting, the Iraq Government policy was explained to us both regarding settlement and Patriarch. Mutasarrif openly said: "Those unsatisfied with this policy are free to emigrate from Iraq". Accordingly, we have come to the frontier and we request the Iraq Government not to block the road to those who want to join us. We got no intention to fight unless forced."

Note 8.

As the fact of the massacre of Simel has been denied, we append herewith a description of it from a Foreign Missionary well acquainted with the facts because he was in the area at the time.

The Rev. Mr. Cumberland, whose letter we quote, is no friend of the Mar Shimun.

" ..... After this a body of men estimated at from 1300 and 2000 left their families in the villages and moved across the Tigris river into Syria. There seems to have been no disorder during this emigration.

"Just what happened next is difficult to say. The Iraq Government dispatched soldiers (report states from two battalions to eight thousand soldiers) to Peshkhabour with the orders to disarm all Assyrians who desired to return to Iraq. A large party started to come back across the border, promising to give up their arms, and somehow either by accident, or as seems more likely, by the order of the extreme malcontents - shots were fired and a general engagement took place between the Government forces and the Assyrians. The fighting lasted two days, August 4th and 5th, and during its course about one hundred Assyrians were killed and thirty-five Iraqi soldiers.

This incident started the "rebellion" and the Government hurried extra police and troops to the area and formed a force of special police from among the Kurds. Kurdish and Arab tribesmen started to loot Assyrian villages, but with little loss of life. Around Dohuk there were some individual Assyrians murdered or spirited away in the dark, and Assyrian prisoners taken as hostages were sent to Mosul - it is said, to be disposed of on the way. On the whole, the Kurds did far less damage than might be expected, even the special police behaving with surprising (for a Kurd) restraint.

So far the Government seem to have handled the situation fairly well - considering the character of the Arab officials and the traditional feud between the Kurds and Assyrians. But on the 11th of August, there occurred an incident for which there can be no excuse whatsoever. One can say that it was sheer brutal savagery - a revision to the worst days of the Turkish treatment of the Armenians.

Some miles from Dohuk, there is (or was) an Assyrian village called Simel. It lies in the plain at the base of the Kurdish hill ranges, and near it are several other Assyrian villages. These villages did not belong to the disaffected group. Their men had not left to cross into Syria. Many of the villagers were Iraqi citizens, and during the troubles had remained loyal to the Government. Although the orders were to allow all loyal Assyrians to retain their arms, many of the villagers had given theirs up to the Police. When the Kurds and Arabs started to loot, the Government ordered the surrounding villagers to come to Simel where there was a police post and they could be protected. Then on either the 10th of August or

the morning of the 11th, the remaining arms were collected so that the village - even had it been rebellious - was incapable of any kind of resistance.

This defenceless village, packed with refugees, was then systematically massacred. All of the men, with the exception of two or three who had gone to Dohuk, were killed. The small Arab population of the town was untouched. Estimates of the number massacred vary from a minimum of 350 to 700. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate estimate at this time, as no impartial or European observer has been allowed in Simel. I suppose the truth will never be fully known, for the only people on the spot - the Iraq army - 'Do not choose to tell at least the truth'.

The Government communiqué issued in response to certain articles appearing in the English papers stated that if there had been a massacre (a fact which seems dubious!) it was the work of Arabs and Kurdish tribesmen who were looting, but the truth is that all the evidence points to the Iraq army itself acting under definite orders. All the survivors testify that the killing was done by men in blue shirts. It is obvious that the Arab never uses any shirt and Kurd does not use blue ones. The only section of the population wearing blue shirts is the machine gun corps, so the massacre must have been at the hands of the forces sent there for protection! At dusk the Arabs and Kurds did come in for loot and they probably killed some of the wounded. But the Government claim that "'If there was a massacre the Arabs and Kurds did the killing and the troops hurried there for the defence of villages', cannot be accepted as anything but clear and deliberate untruthfulness."

Statement "A" showing names of Assyrians massacred between 11th and 16th August 1933 in the Mosul Liwa.

Name of person killed	Tribe	Remarks
1. Priest Arsanis	Lawan	Strangled with a cord.
2. " Shmiwal	Nodis	
3. " Giwargis	Baz	
4. " Masikh	Tiyari	
5. " Shmoel	Diz	
6. " Seda	Lawan	Beheaded
7. " David	Tkuma	
8. " Adam	"	Burnt whilst alive.
9. Rais Goriyil Shimun	Baz	
10. Rais Mushi Haron		
11. Rais Shima Isa		
12. Rais Tailu David		
13. William Goriel		
14. Giwargis Goru		
15. Goru Giwargis		
16. Badal Giwargis		
17. Haron Pattu		
18. Zia Tuma		
19. Shmiwal Khoshab		
20. Dr. Hakim Barkhu		
21. Ishu Shaba		
22. Elias Marus		
23, Yonadan Balu		
24. Kaisar Nisan		
25. Musa Shiba		

Name of person killed (continued)	Tribe	Remarks
26. Kanaisah Jammu		
27. Slaiman Khoshaba	Baz	
28. Silmu Somo		
29. Soru Khamur		
30. Ellu Sorishu		
31. Mikhail Ellu		
32. Siblin Khamu		
33. Khamu Sibdin		
34. Khoshaba Musha		
35. Isa Shima		
36. Aprim Isa		
37. Baruta Dinkha		
38. Pittu Shaba		
39. Dashtu Shaba		
40. Khamu Pittu		
41. Shiba Pittu		
42. Ishu Isdu		
43. Dinkha Shiba		
44. Shibu Dinkha		
45. Nimrud Oraham		
46. Marahu Kosha		
47. Yosep Sodo		
48. Dinkha Abdul		
49. Yunis Giwargis		
50. Giwu Azzu		
51. Shabu Azzu		
52. Shaba Dinkha		
53. Yukhanna Matti		
54. Matti Yukhanna		
55. Dikhu Yukhanna		
56. Shabu Malishu		
57. Odishu Shaba		
58. Yuwal Shmiun		
59. Sulaqa Rahu		
60. Rashu Sulaqa		
61. Khamu Mina		
62. Odishu Mina		
63. Eddi Shirninha		
64. Benyamin Eddi		
65. Mikhail Eddi		
66. Yalda Soru		
67. Dashtu Soru		
68. Qasha Zia		
69. Shimun Qasha Zia		
70. Qasim Yacub		
71. Khubiar Matti		
72. Yosep Matti		
73. Salman David		
74. Attu Shimun		
75. David Attu		
76. Yacub Attu		
77. Nisan Khoshaba		
78. Khoshaba Nisan		
79. Yatrun Warda		
80. Elias Gandar		
81. Eshu Asmoru		
82. Daniel Hanna		

Name of person killed	Tribe	Remarks
(continued)		
83. Japu Dishu	Baz	
84. Sava Kharibu		
85. Jubbu Kharbu		
86. Sulaiman Pulus		
87. Elias Darmu		
88. Jangar Baram		
89. Rais Jindu	Barwar Qochanis	
90. Rais Yacub.		
91. Rais Howel		
92. Rais Bakus		
93. Rais Odishu		
94. Sapar		
95. Mando		
96. Evan		
97. Bilbas		
98. Babila		
99. Havil		
100. Nisan		
101. Khoshaba		
102. Hablu		
103. Badal		
104. Giwargis		
105. Jallu		
106. Yosep		
107. Jwamar		
108. Kasha		
109. Tolus		
110. Yacub		
111. Sawa		
112. Hormiz		
113. Badal		
114. Tosi		
115. Yosep		
116. Is-haq		
117. Iskandar		
118. Enwiya		
119. Tatar		
120. Khamo		
121. Babila	Tkhuma	
122. Nisan		
123. Barcham		
124. Nisan		
125. Barcham		
126. Hormizd		
127. Giwargis		
128. Yukhanna		
129. Hanna		Woman
130. Sliwu		"
131. Sonki		"
132. Khammi		"
133. Qasi		"
134. Miriam		"
135. Esmar		"
136. Sinjana		"
137. Shmini		
138. Marta		

N.B. The above persons were killed in Dohuk and Simel whose bodies could be identified. Further lists of persons killed to follow as soon as these are ready.

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List of Assyrian villages looted during the time of the massacre.

Qadha		Name of village	Remarks
Dohuk	1.	Simel	
	2.	Kolabni	
	3.	Mansiria	
	4.	Kharab Kulki	
	5.	Sayyid Dhahir	
	6.	Qasr Yazdin	
	7.	Mawana	
	8.	Giril	
	9.	Ser Shari	
	10.	Jajamani	
	11.	Dhari	
	12.	Garmawi	
	13.	Hajisni	
	14.	Masiki	
	15.	Rucaidi	
	16.	Khabartu	
	17.	Kala Badri	
	18.	Zorawa	
	19.	Dostikia	
	20.	Salayha	
	21.	Tel Hishf	
	22.	Caraiphan	
	23.	Iazkin	
	24.	Raikawa	
	25.	Badi	
	26.	Babalu	
	27.	Bagiri (a)	
	28.	Bagiri (b)	
	29.	Kola Hasan	
	30.	Majal Makhti	
	31.	Alqushta	
	32.	Gundikta	
	33.	Tutika	
Amadiyah	34.	Aloka (upper)	
	35.	Baroski	
	36.	Chami Ashrit	
	37.	Musalakia	
	38.	Sanora	
	39.	Chamashaki	
	40.	Atush	
	41.	Chamsuski	(looting reported only)
	42.	Berbangi	
	43.	Dahoki	
	44.	Nourdisswa	
Shaikhan	45.	Ain Baqra	
	46.	Karanjawa	
	47.	Porusawa	
	48.	Jarahiya	
	49.	Nasiriyah	
	50.	Didawa	
	51.	Mali Chaparin	
	52.	Naristik	
	53.	Ain Sifni	
	54.	Basifni	
	55.	Machna	
	56.	Badriya	
	57.	Dikan	
	58.	Baqqaq	
	59.	Qasroki	
	60.	Totiyan	
	61.	Ain Halwa	
	62.	Karana	

N.B. The greater part of the above villages were burnt down after being looted.



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ranslation.

MOSUL

Date 10th July, 1933.

To the Mutasarrif,

Mosul.

We the undersigned bring the following lines to Your Excellency's notice.

When we were invited to the Mosul meeting, we were under the impression that the invitation was in regard to the settlement only. Our definite reply is this:

His Beatitude the Mar Shimun is our representative. This representation has not been withdrawn from him. We regret that we shall be unable to give any decision or undertaking until His Beatitude the Mar Shimun is present here.

Copy to:

Colonel Stafford, Administrative Inspector, Mosul.
Major Thomson, Settlement expert.
His Beatitude the Mar Shimun.

Signatories to the Petition:

Mar Yosep, Metropolitan
Malik Andraos, Jelu
Malik Baitu, Tkhuma
Shamasha Is-haq, Ashita
Tuma Makhmur, Baz
Rais Hormizd Talya, Baz
Rais Orwham Giwargis, Baz
Rais Tailu Dano, Baz
Rais Giwargis, Baz
Rais Yokhanna Odishu, Baz
Dikhkhu Oshana, Baz
Yaku Zia, Ashita
Khiwran Daud, Ashita
Malik Sulaqa, Bohtan
Malik Benyamin, Iyyil
Yushiya Ishu, Iyyil
Rais Yokhanna, Halmoon
Qasha Yokhanna, Tkhuma
Malik Gullu, Sara
Rais Hormuzd, Tkhuma
Malik Sawa, Tal.
Khiyyu Barkho, Tkhuma

Malik Yokhanna, Tkhuma
Loco Shlaimun, Tkhuma
Rais Warda, Tiyari
Shamasha Ishaq, Nochiyya
Mikhail Benyamin
Malik Warda, Dizen
Malik Siliwu, Barwar Kochanis
Malik Maroguil, Sara
Shamasha Goriyyil, Sara
Rais Mikhail, Sara
Rais Ithniyyil, Upper Tiyari
Rais Is-haq Sarta, Tiyari
Shamasha Kannu, Jelu
Rais Basu, Jelu
Rais Odishu, Jelu
Adam Shimun, Jelu
Kalashahu Gurgy, Jelu
Malik Talya, Gawar
Nisan Kannu, Jelu
Yaku D'Malik Ismail
Ishu Kelaita.

Translation.

Dohuk,
Date 26th June, 1933.

To
Major Thomson,
Settlement expert.

(1) The wishes of the Assyrian people are these:

Since our arrival in Iraq some 15 years ago, we have loyally served the British and the Iraqi Governments. In support of this statement you know that we fought against the enemies and bad wishers of Iraq. This cannot be denied.

(2) We have lost many lives and much property was stolen. We did not murmur. We thought that in consequence of our silence, we would be compensated by giving us a home in Iraq in return for all our services. We have awaited until the last moment and no home has been given us. We asked our Maliks, Chiefs and Raises that we must have a home to live in. The Chiefs thereupon had a meeting and last year they went to Sar Amadiyah to see the Mar Shimun, Patriarch, to place the demands of the people for a home before him. We compelled the Patriarch to go to the League of Nations and ask on our behalf for a home. In accordance with the wish of the Maliks and the People, the Patriarch went to Geneva. There he submitted our demands and claims and the League of Nations decided that a settlement expert should be sent out. When he arrived we were under the impression that he would carry out the settlement work peacefully in consultation with each other and with the Iraq Government. On the contrary, the Patriarch has been called to Baghdad immediately by the Minister of Interior and he was detained there. Further, Qaimaqam Dohuk proclaimed Yaku D'Malik Ismail as an insurgent.

(3) It is hoped that the Iraq Government will understand that the demands of the people are not only those of the Patriarch;

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settlement
with him
moment.
our wishes
better men

Copy

Name of Tr

Tkhuma

Tiyari

Jelu

Baz

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they are the wishes of all the Nation and what the Iraq Government has heard from the Patriarch, he has merely conveyed our representations. The Iraq Government, it is hoped, will also realise that Yaku is not acting on his own in this matter of settlement. We are all of his opinion and we have our men with him and we will all insist on our claims up to the last moment. If Yaku refrains from this idea, this will not alter our wishes as with the consent of the people we can appoint better men than Yaku.

Signatories to the petition.

Copy to:

Colonel Stafford, Administrative Inspector, Mosul.
Minister of the Interior, Baghdad.
The Mar Shimun, Patriarch.

Name of Tribe.	Name of signatory.
Tkhuma	Qasha Giwargis
	Haitu Marquz
	Malik Daud
	Yonan
	Oshana Dinkha
	Rais Dinkha
	Rais Hormiz
	Shamasha Afram
	Yokhanna Sliwu
	Oraham Yonan
	Makku Shimun
	Shaba Yokhanna
	Yokhannan Khamo
Tiyari	Rais Warda
	Shamasha Lawandu
	Shinu Wiyya
	Yigu
	Khoshaba
	Rais Ethniyyil
	Shamasha Yonan
	Giwargis Maroguil
	Yokhannan Goliath
Jelu	Khiyyu Yosep
Baz	Qasha Khoshaba
	Shamasha Daud
	Rais Piru
	Rais Tillu
	Daud Nisan
	Rais Shiba

Name of

Barwa

Liwan

Sara

Nodi

Dize

Sham

546 ~~544~~

Name of Tribe.	Name of Signatory.
Barwar	Malik Sillu Qasha Maroguil Rashshu Rais Is-haq
Liwan	Qusha Sada Rais Ismail Rais Ishu Choshina Tannu Sawa Mirza Hammik
Sara	Mishsha Is-haq Malik Moroguil
Nodis	Shakir Koohu Qasha Ishmail
Dizen	Malik Warda Dikhu Qasha Yuwil Is-haq Tammu
Shamsdinan	Hanna Dinkha Rais Is-haq Qasha Chelabi Laskari Jammu.

anslation.

Date 8th July 1933.

To His Beatitude the Mar Shimun.

We the undermentioned went to Dohuk in accordance with the order of the Qaimaqam. We expected our brethren of Amadiyah to arrive also so that all of us would meet the Qaimaqam and put before him jointly the points upon which we had agreed upon before leaving Mosul but to our surprise we observed both the Qaimaqams of Dohuk and Amadiyah leave for Mosul. With them there was not one Assyrian from the Qadha of Amadiyah. For this reason, we are not proceeding to Mosul. The points referred to above are these:

If we are required to go to Mosul, we see no reason why we should go as the Patriarch, Mar Shimun, is our representative in matters affecting the Nation. Our demands were put forward through him last year. We will add that as the Mar Shimun is our legal representative, he ought to be allowed to return to Mosul and the whole matter placed before him. If, on the other hand, our presence in Mosul is in connection with our seeing the settlement officer, he has already been to Dohuk and Amadiyah and he had met the persons who were called to the meeting by the government and they told him what their opinion was. If, however, we are being called for some other affair, it is also essential that the Mar Shimun should be present at the general meeting of the Nation. Without the Mar Shimun, we cannot guarantee that the Assyrian question could be solved. We therefore beg the government that the Mar Shimun should be allowed to return from Baghdad and then in conjunction with the remainder of the Maliks and Raises, the question may be solved once and for all so that the present troublesome situation may pass away which we hope is the intention of the government.

Tkhuma

asha Giwa
alik Yona
Malik Daud
Baitu Marq
Rais Horm
Rais Orahe
Rais Danie

Upper Tiya

Rais Ethni
Shabo Nars
Barutha Ma
Yosep Soro
Rais Barch
Rais Yosep
Yono Nannu
Rais Adam
Rais Is-ha
Khamis
Rais Giyyu
Rais Odish

Rais Ishu
Rais Mano
Rais Warda
Rais Baroc

Albaq

Rais Is-ha
Musa Matlu

Shamsdin

Malik Shin
Rais Is-ha
Rais Kisht
Rais Yohan

Nodis

Qasha Ishm
Rais Shaki
Iskandar B

Baz

Tuma Makhm
Giwargis G
Mina Adam
Ishu Soro
Qasha Khos
Qasha Yose
Daud Qasha

548 ~~546~~

Signatories to the petition:

Tkhuma

Qasha Giwargis
Malik Yonan
Malik Daud
Baitu Marquz
Rais Hormuz
Rais Oraham
Rais Daniel

Upper Tiyari

Rais Ethniyyil
Shabo Narsay
Barutha Malik Tiyya
Yosep Soro
Rais Barcham
Rais Yosep
Yono Nannu
Rais Adam
Rais Is-haq
Khamis
Rais Giyyu
Rais Odishu
Rais [illegible]
Rais Ishu
Rais Mano
Rais Warda
Rais Barcota

Albaq

Rais Is-haq
Musa Matlub

Shamsdin

Malik Shinko
Rais Is-haq
Rais Kishtu
Rais Yohanna

Nodis

Qasha Ishmail
Rais Shakir
Iskandar Howel

Baz

Tuma Makhmoura
Giwargis Goriyyil
Kina Adam
Ishu Soro
Qasha Khoshaba
Qasha Yosep
Daud Qasha Inwiyyah

Baz (contd)

Rais Giwargis Margu
Rais Hormiz Talya
Shima Nisan
Elia Darno
Shabo Dinkha
Rais Milu Daud
Bara Nisan
Sawa Khanbu
Rais Oraham Giwargis
Piro Mando

Sara

Malik Merogil
Rais Mikhail

Jelu

Malik Yosep
Shamasha Mando
Yokhanna Goliath
Tawir Yushiyya
Rais Oshana

Gawar

Malik Talya
Rais Tattu
Yosep Odishu
Qasha Yokhanna

Diz

Malik Warda
Rais Shikhu
Rais Attu
Rais Khamo
Rais Giwargis.

anslation. Date 1st November, 1933.

Mr. Zia D'Mar Shimun.

We hear that you are not satisfied with our behaviour. Whenever you wish to summon us to hear our point of view we are at your disposal. You can, if you so desire, send a representative on your behalf to find out what we have to say. We will never leave you until our death. There is only one man, Khiyyu, among us whose deeds are known to you. Malik Khoshaba is our representative in so far as he finds out our wishes and acts accordingly and he is not authorised to do anything secretly or agree to anything without our consent. From now onward we have no confidence in him. We hear that he has sent in to the government some petitions after the departure of His Beatitude the Mar Shimun. The names shown on those petitions alleged to be ours are forged. We are prepared to appear before you at any time and at whatever place you direct. We the sons of Ashita are your obedient servants.

Signed:
Shamasha Is-haq
Bukhkhu Oshana
Yosep Adam
Khamis Dinkha
Yaku Yokhannan
Odishu Enwiyah
Rais Jajju
Shimun Mushi.

550 ~~348~~

ranslation. Date 22nd May, 1933.

To Qaimaqam Dohuk.

I have to-day come to the Markaz al Qadha in accordance with your instructions and I was sorry to hear that you were ill and I was therefore unable to see you. I learn, however, that you wanted to take from me a sanad to the effect that I would not tour among my followers, the Upper Tiyaris, because you think that I am upsetting their ideas, etc.

I am only telling my people what you in conversation had told me to tell them. Your orders which I have explained to my people were that anyone not willing to stay in Iraq can go to wherever he likes and that the government will bear his expense until he reaches the frontier. Because we are not meddling in the settlement scheme, the opinion held by the Chiefs of my people is that whoever has meddled or will meddle in this settlement, he is being disgraced among his people. The people pay no attention or listen to such persons and such persons will ultimately be disgraced before the government as they will no doubt fail and will not be able to carry out their promise to the government. This fact is well known and it is self-evident to the government. For this reason I hope the government will not listen to the mal-doers or to those who are fabricating false tales and reporting same to the government about me. I am obeying the orders of the government and I have no other intention, as you will have observed in the cases of grazing ground, rifle permits, estimation of crops, etc.

In regard to our leaving Iraq peacefully or our stay in Iraq, neither of these questions adversely affect the policy of the Iraq government. My work is confined to your orders as were conveyed to me in conversation to me face to face when I had come to meet you after the Easter.

Will you please accept my excuse and regret if I shall not be able to come again to meet you as I am busy in domestic affairs.

(Signed) YAKU D'MALIK ISMAIL.

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anslation. Date 17th June, 1933.

[illegible] Qaimaqam Dohuk.

I have heard that Warda Yonadam has been arrested in the Markaz al Qadha of Dohuk. The reason for his arrest is because of his quarrel with Chikhkhu Giwu as the former has told the latter that he would not recognise him as the chief for the Upper Tiyari.

This man Chikhkhu has informed you that the people will not accept him as a Malik and that he could not therefore carry out the obligations of a Malikship for the Tiyari. This is the reason that has apparently led to the illegal detention of Warda. You personally informed me that every Assyrian is free either to remain in Iraq or leave the country and that those wishing to leave Iraq, the Government would bear the expenses until such persons reach the frontier of their new destinations. As long as you have given the option to the people, then it is the right of every person to say whether or not he would accept Chikhkhu as Malik and there exist no such governments to imprison people for such causes. It is evident that you are using coercive measures because I also was invited by you to the Markaz on the 22nd of May. With me there were ten horsemen whose intention was to go and meet Ezra effendi to offer their condolences on account of the death of his brother and so the destination of these people was to go and offer their condolences to him. On the other hand, you informed the government that I came to Dohuk with 50 horsemen and that our intentions were unconstitutional and before you had seen me to enquire from me, you sent me a word via the Assistant Commandant of Police that I should return home as you were ill and could not see me.

On 14th June, you sent for me to see Major Thomson, the settlement officer, and in accordance with your orders I

appeared at the Markaz al Qadha. After my arrival at Dohuk, the police went around the Khans and saw 70 mules belonging to the muleteers that had come there and it was reported that 70 armed men had come with me. Before you saw me and before making enquiries as to whether these were or were not my people, you gave orders that I must not go to Major Thomson as the police had reported that they saw 70 mules in the khans of Dohuk when you called for two armoured cars from Mosul and which you stationed at the Police offices in Dohuk. By bringing these cars, it was an insult to us as we had no evil intentions. All these excuses you have put forward against us because we have not and shall not involve ourselves in the settlement as we have as our representative His Beatitude the Mar Shimun who is putting forward our representations with the unanimous approval of all the Assyrians and he is working in accordance with our wishes. We hereby inform the government that it should not ask us for any guarantees as you are pressing us. We consider death as nothing nor do we consider any material losses as we have no houses and no immoveable property. We don't want to spoil our name which we have gained by our good services to the British and our advantageous work to Iraq. If you force us in your own ways, we prefer to die in honour rather than live in disgrace. For this reason we request that a definite reply should be given to the Mar Shimun before the evil doers spoil our name with the government.

(Signed) YAKU D'MALIK ISMAIL.

553 361

anslation.

June 23rd, 1933.

To
utasarrif,
Mosul.

With reference to the false accusations made against me by the Qaimaqam Dohuk, his threats, the armament of the Kurds and their encouragement to rise against us.

From our past experience, it is evident that the Government is accepting, as a Bible, all the reports of the Qaimaqam. This is obvious as, without enquiring into these reports, the Government has sent an expedition against us. For this reason my people and I have no more respect in the eyes of the Government. I myself am giving this sanad and do declare that upon my honour I had no evil intention against the Government in collecting my people until I saw the suspicious movements of the Government. I now moreover promise that I will not resist the Government unless the Government presses me to do so. I will disperse my people as soon as the Government forces are withdrawn. I am prepared to meet the Government officials at all times in the neighbourhood of the four villages occupied by my people.

As regards the settlement, I am not authorised to discuss with or intervene on behalf of my people. The Government should not press our people to recognise as chiefs, persons who are not elected by the people as such. To complete this sanad, I am prepared to produce either cash guarantee or a guarantor to stand bail on my behalf.

(Signed) YAKU D'MALIK ISMAIL.

Copy to:

Minister of Interior,
Qaimaqam Dohuk,
H.B. Mar Shimun.

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slation.
hi

Date June 24th, 1933.

To
The Mutasarrif,
Mosul.

1. I will give this undertaking to the effect that my work and behaviour will be as good as it has been hitherto unless I am falsely accused in the future as is the case at present.

2. I will obey the instructions of the Government and respect all legal orders that I may receive from the Government officials on condition that the orders of those officials are not oppressive or be against the interests of my Nation.

3. As soon as an agreement has been reached between His Beatitude the Mar Shimun and the Government in regard to the claims made by the people and who pressed the Mar Shimun to insist on those demands, then I will be prepared to go not only to the Mosul officials but also to Baghdad.

4. I will order my people to disperse as soon as Government forces have been withdrawn.

5. Rev. Panfil will stand as a guarantor for all that I have said in this sanad.

(Signed) YAKU D'MALIK ISMAIL

Copy to:

Minister of Interior,
His Beatitude Mar Shimun,
Qaimaqam Dohuk.

P.S. Not accepted by the Mutasarrif.

E&O 8212/33

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No. E 6552/7/93

Put with P.Z.

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27/11

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for India and, by direction of the Secretary of State, transmits herewith copies of the undermentioned papers.

Foreign Office.
November 21st 1933.

Description of Enclosure.

Name & Date.	Subject.
From:	
League of Nations C/Min.Ass./3.1933 - Oct.24.	Assyrian re-settlement.
C/Min.Ass./4.1933 - Oct.25.	
C/Min.Ass./5.1933 - Oct.26.	
From:	
United Kingdom Delegation No.240, October 29th.	

Similar letter sent to:
Air Ministry
War Office
Dominions Office.

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E. & O.
8212
1933

ls.
6524/7/93)

SOCIETE DES NATIONS

Communiqué aux membres
du Comité pour l'établissement
des Assyriens de l'Irak.

C./Min. Ass./ 3. 1933.

Genève, le 24 octobre 1933.

ETABLISSEMENT DES ASSYRIENS DE L'IRAK

Note du Secrétaire général

Le Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer aux membres du Comité pour l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak et sur la demande de son président, la lettre ci-après, adressée en date du 17 octobre par le Prof. Keller, Secrétaire général de l'Office Central d'Entr'aide des Eglises à S.E. M. de Madariaga et relative à l'établissement des Assyriens.

OFFICE CENTRAL D'ENTR'AIDE
DES EGLISES.

Genève, le 17 octobre 1933.

A Son Excellence
Monsieur de Madariaga,
Président de la Commission du Conseil
de la Société des Nations pour
les Assyriens,
Genève

Excellence,

Vous vous rappelez sans doute la visite que Paul Lachenal

/et

et moi vous avons faite au sujet des Assyriens. Depuis lors j'ai assisté comme auditeur à la séance du Conseil et j'ai entendu votre rapport. Le sous-comité assyrien de notre Bureau Central qui s'occupe des Assyriens depuis dix ans se permet d'adresser au Comité composé par le Conseil les considérations suivantes relatives à une solution future du problème assyrien:

1) Tout d'abord notre Bureau international dans lequel toutes les Fédérations protestantes du monde entier sont représentées, assure la Commission de l'intérêt très vif que les Eglises chrétiennes portent à une solution satisfaisante de ce problème. Nous tenons beaucoup à ce qu'une protection suffisante et plus efficace que dans le passé soit donnée à ce qui reste du peuple Assyrien.

2) Le Conseil ayant en vue l'émigration d'une partie de ce peuple, nous tenons beaucoup à attirer votre attention sur le fait qu'il y a non seulement en Irak un groupe d'Assyriens malheureux et souffrants, mais qu'une solution de leur problème devrait aussi prendre en vue les différents réfugiés Assyriens qui se trouvent au Midi de la France, à Zahle au Liban et au Sud de la Russie. Aux environs de Marseille il y a 250 Assyriens, dont plus de cent chômeurs, qui vivent dans une grande misère. Notre Bureau a secouru ce groupe surtout au commencement quand il y avait un millier de réfugiés à Marseille. A Zahle il y a de 300 à 400 personnes qui travaillent pour les propriétaires Maronites et pour le Pacha à qui plusieurs villages appartiennent. Ils ne peuvent guère gagner leur vie et l'Ecole avec quatre-vingt enfants doit probablement être fermée prochainement. Il est assez difficile de

/donner

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donner des chiffres précis concernant le nombre des réfugiés Assyriens en Russie. Il y en a quelques milliers, dont beaucoup voudraient émigrer et dont un groupe s'est déjà échappé à Vienne, il y a deux ans, où ils vivaient dans une misère atroce.

3) En vue de ces petits groupements de réfugiés nous nous permettons de proposer une enquête à faire par le Comité Nansen et de le charger de l'étude du problème comme un tout et dans tous ses aspects, y compris celui du petit groupement en dehors de l'Irak.

4) Quant aux démarches pratiques, ayant pris des renseignements préliminaires, nous prévoyons les possibilités suivantes qui devraient être étudiées en détail par le Nansen-Comité:

a) Achat d'un terrain suffisamment grand qui permettrait aux réfugiés de rester ensemble, soit en Syrie, ou en Perse.

b) Si cette possibilité n'offre pas une solution satisfaisante, nous proposons d'étudier la possibilité d'un achat de terrain au Midi de la France où beaucoup de villages sont presque déserts et où le terrain est assez bon marché. En outre l'achat d'un village au Liban pour les réfugiés en Syrie qui leur permettrait de gagner leur vie plus convenablement que jusqu'à présent.

c) Etude d'un achat de terrain au Brésil où dans un autre Etat sud-américain.

Nous réitérons l'intérêt que les Eglises ont dans une solution satisfaisante de ce problème et, si notre Bureau par nos expériences et notre occupation avec les Assyriens depuis dix ans pouvait vous être utile en vous fournissant

/des

559 ~~557~~

des renseignements ou en assurant la collaboration des Eglises nous le ferions très volontiers.

Veuillez agréer etc,

(signé) Prof. Adolf Keller.

560 ~~528~~

8212
1933

COPY.
(E 6525/7/93)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C. Min.Ass.4.1933.I.
Geneva, October 25th, 1933.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the members of the Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq two letters from the Mar Shimun, the first, dated October 24th, 1933, with annexes, submitting certain proposals for the settlement of the Assyrians and information on the situation in Iraq, the second, dated October 25th, 1933, with annexes, containing suggestions with reference to the emigration of the Assyrians, as well as certain statistics of the population in question.

COPY.

I. Letter of October 24th, 1933.

No. 9/2.

ASSYRIAN PATRIARCHATE,
GENEVA.
October 24th, 1933.

Excellency,

Whereas a Committee has been set up in accordance with the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations dated 14th October, 1933, to establish the Assyrians now in Iraq outside that country; and whereas the emigration question requires careful examination from all its angles, I beg to transmit herewith my preliminary suggestions bearing on the question of emigration, trusting that these will help the Committee in its task.

As my legal adviser, Professor Borel, has already informed you in his letter of October 17, 1933, I am at all times at Your and the Committee's disposal to clear up any particular point You or the Committee wish to discuss with me.

I may be permitted to add that the present situation of the Assyrians in Iraq is critical despite the assurances given by the Iraq Government to the contrary, for individual murders are still of common occurrence as you will observe from the copy of a report enclosed herewith, based on information received from six different sources, whose names can be disclosed if the writers are assured personal safety. Whilst on this subject, I beg to draw your attention to my telegram dated 16th September, 1933, confirmed in my letter dated 24th September, with which I enclosed a statement showing the names of the 28 Assyrians killed subsequent to the orders to stop massacre. Despite those representations,

no/

His Excellency
Secretary General,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

562 ~~560~~

no effective action has been taken on the spot to stop further murders.

I would also humbly suggest that some of the present misery of the Assyrians can be removed by the despatch of a relief committee to Iraq, pending further decisions of the Committee.

Would you be good enough to transmit this report with my suggestions to the Committee set up under the Council's resolution of 14th October, 1933, please.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) ESHAI SHIMUN.

By the Grace of God,
Catholicos Patriarch,
of the Assyrians.

563 561

COPY.

Preliminary suggestions made by His Beatitude the Mar Shimun, Catholicos Patriarch of the Assyrians, for the emigration of the Assyrians from Iraq.

(I) A general amnesty proclamation to be issued by the Iraq Government to cover all alleged offences in regard to:

(a) Assyrian National movement and/or

(b) All alleged offences resulting from the settlement scheme.

(2) Assyrian leaders now under Government detention to be set free and allowed to return to their homes pending emigration.

(3) Effective measures to be taken by the League of Nations to stop the present individual murders.

(4) Urgent steps to be taken to send a relief committee to Iraq to remove misery from thousands of Assyrians who are left homeless and destitute.

(5) An Enquiry Commission appointed by the League of Nations to proceed to Iraq with full powers to enquire into the reasons leading up to the recent massacre of the Assyrians; the extent of the excesses committed, and define the responsibility of the two parties concerned.

(6) The Assyrians to be assured, by the Enquiry Commission, full liberty to speak, and their safety to be adequately safeguarded until they leave Iraq territory.

(7) A special emigration committee to be set up under the auspices of the League of Nations to remain in Iraq until migration is successfully completed.

(8) The Assyrian Patriarch to be allowed to return to Iraq to help the Emigration Committee. Provision for his safety to be made.

(9) Assyrians possessing Mulk lands (privately owned lands)

or/

or any other privately owned immovable property, wishing to leave Iraq, to have their mulk valued by the League's Commission or by a sub-committee and paid for by the Iraq Government.

(b) This similarly applies to Assyrian Waqf property (property of charitable or religious institutions).

(10) Full indemnity to the relatives of persons massacred, other than those actually killed in action on the Iraq-Syro frontier.

(b) Valuation of and payment for all Assyrian property, movable or immovable, looted or destroyed.

(11) Iraqis indebted to Assyrians should settle such outstanding debts prior to emigration and/or such debts should be collected by the new State accepting the Assyrians on their behalf in accordance with a procedure to be laid down for the purpose in agreement with the Government of Iraq.

(12) Assyrians forced to embrace Islam or Assyrian women kept by Iraqi troops or Muslim population to be set free.

(13) A new country, other than Iraq, to be found under the auspices of the League of Nations for the new settlement of the Assyrians in a manner that should avoid the repetition of the very near past i.e. permanent peace and security for the Assyrians and not to be used for any political ends.

(13) B. Agricultural and medical aspects to be among other main considerations.

(14) Open door to Assyrian refugees, from all countries, wishing to establish themselves in the new Assyrian settlement on conditions to be agreed upon with the Government concerned.

(Signed) ESHAI SHIMUN.

By the Grace of God,
Catholicos Patriarch,
of the Assyrians.

GENEVA,
October 24th, 1933.

Report/

Report based on information received from six different sources covering the period ending 28th September, 1933.

(I) During the official massacre period, 82 men from the Baz tribe were killed. This has now risen to 95 men (excluding women and children).

(2) The families of the levies have been removed to Baghdad. About 2000 souls made their way to Mosul during early days, subsequent to the massacre. The remainder who number some thousands, women, children and some men, are stranded in the ruined villages under alleged police protection. These policemen are using the basest acts on the women and girls under their protection. Those in Mosul are placed in a camp but they are being

(a) terrorised and

(b) their food, clothing and medical help is of the poorest quality. Every penny and belongings the Assyrians had, have been robbed by the Iraq army and their irregulars. If the value of the property robbed from the Assyrians were spent on the upkeep of the Assyrians, their conditions would have been quite different to what they are now.

(3) Forced conversion to Islam is in process. Four families from one village, Badi, have thus been forced to embrace Islam. Others, on refusal, are being killed.

(4) Individual murders and all kinds of oppression continue.

(5) An English friend living in Iraq states that the Assyrians can prove, by actual figures, that so far not less than 3,000 Assyrians have been massacred.

(6) Many Assyrian women and girls are kept by the Muslims.

II. Letter of October 25th, 1933.

No. II/2.

Assyrian Patriarchate,
Geneva.
October 25th, 1933.

Excellency,

In continuation of my letter No. 9/2 of 24/10/33.

As I am profoundly keen to facilitate the task of the Committee duly set up under the Council resolution of 14th October, 1933, for the establishment of the Assyrians in a country, other than Iraq, I have the honour to append herewith names of possible countries to which the Assyrians would wish to emigrate. These have been arranged in order of preference, the comprehensive details of which need further study. Nevertheless, they may help the Committee in ascertaining the wishes of the Assyrians generally.

I should be grateful if you would very kindly bring the contents of this letter to the notice of the Committee in question.

(A) Syria.

Financially, the Assyrian emigration to Syria - due to its proximity to Iraq - would be far less objectionable than any other remote country.

The Assyrians would, however, like to know in which part of Syria or the Lebanon they would be settled. This would necessarily take into consideration the climatic conditions and agricultural possibilities.

The Assyrians emigrating from Iraq to be accepted en/

His Excellency
Secretary-General,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

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en bloc, for the acceptance of a section only would further weaken the Assyrians whose desire has always been a satisfactory settlement in compact community, as by this means alone can they preserve their existence as a race. With the projected emancipation of Syria, a compact settlement is of primary importance.

Assyrians outside Iraq to be permitted to join their compatriots on conditions to be agreed upon.

The Assyrians, if assured equality and justice, would - like all the other inhabitants - willingly abide by the laws of the land.

(B) Brazil.

I understand the Nansen office has submitted proposals for the emigration of the Assyrians from Iraq and their settlement in Brazil. Assyrians have, from time to time, applied for settlement in Brazil or in some other adjacent colonies with similar possibilities as those in Brazil. There is already an Assyrian colony there. Guided by the report of an expert, Brazil would appear to be acceptable to the Assyrians from climatic, agricultural, racial, linguistic, religious and educational points of view. These are also matters for more study.

The open door referred to under "Syria" equally applies to any country where the Assyrians will be settled.

(C) Argentine.

Conditions to be studied on the spot. An expert who is acquainted with affairs there reports that the present Government is not disposed towards new emigrations. If this is so, that country will be out of the question.

(D) France.

(E) Spain.

Have been suggested. Possibilities subject to consideration.

(F)/

(F) Cyprus.

Has also been suggested, but lack of water, lack of pastures and the likewise leave very little or no hope for economic prosperity. My short sojourn in Cyprus goes to justify this view. The Assyrians have never before expressed desire to go to Cyprus and I am sure the proposal would not appeal to them.

(G) Palestine.

Undesirable politically.

(H) Canada.

The Assyrians have in the past applied for settlement in Canada. Their request was not entertained. If that is now possible, the proposal may be worth while consideration.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) ESHAI SHIMUN.

By the Grace of God,
Catholicos Patriarch
of the Assyrians.

Assyrian population in Iraq.

The number of the Assyrians in Iraq varies from 37,000 to 40,000. This is based on statistics collected in 1932 and therefore no provision has been made for the decrease caused by the massacre.

ame of liwa.	Number of families settled.	Number of souls at an average of 5 per family.	Number of families unsettled.	Number of souls at an average of 5 per family.	Remarks.
osul and rbil	3294	17270	2800	14000	Add 4500 Urmians unsettled. Add 1230 souls in other parts of Iraq.

Summary of above:

(a)	Number of souls settled	17270
(b)	Number of souls unsettled	14000
(c)	Unsettled Urmians	4500
(d)	Unsettled Assyrians in other parts of Iraq such as Basrah, Baqubah, Ramadi, Kirkuk, etc.	1230
		37000 Total.

Note. As two thirds of the main Assyrian settlements and villages have either been burnt or destroyed (Please see my report dated October 8th, 1933 to the Secretary General, League of Nations), it is quite safe to say that at present there cannot be more than 6000 souls settled.

The figures given in Major Thomson's Confidential report No. T/A/C/ 172 dated 28th September 1933 (a copy of which reached me recently) are wholly and totally based on the figures supplied/

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supplied by the Iraq Government last year which I disputed at the time vide my "Notes" enclosed with my letter dated November 3rd, 1932, addressed to the Secretary, Council of the League of Nations, copy to the Director of the Mandates Section. I observe that Major Thomson has omitted the number of the people massacred in which case there should have been a "decrease" in the figures quoted by him.

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1933

COPY

(E 6526/7/93)

C/Min.Ass/5.1933.I.

Geneva,

October 26th, 1933.

SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Note by the Secretary-General

With reference to document C. Min. Ass. 4.1933, containing two letters from the Mar Shimun, dated October 24th and 25th, 1933, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the members of the Committee for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, in accordance with the request contained therein, a letter from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated October 26th, 1933.

DELEGATION OF IRAQ
to the
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

GENEVA, October 26th, 193

The Secretary-General,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

Sir,

In acknowledging receipt of your endorsement C. Min. Ass. 4. 1933.I of 25th October 1933, circulating copies of two letters from Mar Shimun dated respectively October 24th and October 25th, I feel obliged to record my regret that these letters should have been accepted and communicated to the Committee set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 13th October 1933.

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The letter dated October 24th is for the most part a repetition of accusations previously made and already disposed of. No specific cases are quoted in support of the allegations of continued oppression, terrorization and the like. The "preliminary suggestions", like the letter, are almost entirely irrelevant to the task of the Committee. The language is in parts violent and most improper.

The task of the Committee is to take, in close cooperation with the Iraqi Government, steps for the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme of settlement elsewhere than in Iraq of such Assyrians as may wish to leave. My Government is prepared to approach it with complete good-will towards the Assyrian people, in the spirit of Yassin Pasha's declaration to the Council. But in the eyes of the Iraqi Government the writer of these letters is guilty of the criminal instigation of the recent revolt; the admission of undue intervention by him can only prejudice the prospects of a satisfactory result.

You are requested to bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Committee.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) Noury Pasha as Said

Minister for Foreign Affai

COPY

6552/7/93)

No. 240.

The United Kingdom Delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of the under-mentioned document, of which a copy has been sent to H.M. Ambassador, Bagdad.

U.K. Delegation, Geneva,
29th October, 1933.

No. and Date.	Subject.
Record of meeting of Assyrian Committee, Oct. 26.	Assyrian question.

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Record by Mr. Ashley Clarke of meeting of the Assyrian Committee on October 26th, 1933.

The Committee had before it

(1) the memorandum (C/Min.Ass./2.1933) prepared by the Secretariat on the settlement of the Assyrians in Iraq;

(2) Document C/Min.Ass./4.1933.1, containing (a) a letter from the Mar Shimun of the 24th October making certain suggestions for the Committee's work, and (b) a further letter from the Mar Shimun dated the 25th October enumerating certain possibilities of settlement; and

(3) a letter from Professor Keller (C/Min.Ass/3.1933).

The Chairman of the Committee (the Spanish representative) observed that (2)(a) above seemed to be concerned less with practical suggestions for settlement than with past events and expressed the view that it was outside the competence of the Committee to go into most of the Mar Shimun's points. Points 9, 11 and 12 might, however, be borne in mind when detailed treatment of the problem was undertaken, but he thought that the remainder of the Mar Shimun's communication should be ignored. The Italian and French delegates agreed that the Committee should not take official cognisance of the Mar Shimun's letter. The United Kingdom delegate also agreed pointing out that much of the Mar Shimun's letter covered points which had already been dealt with by the Council and that the vague and unsubstantiated allegations of further incidents related to the period ended September 28th, i.e. only four days after the date of the last petition from the Mar Shimun which had been before the Council. The Danish representative did not think that the Committee could leave

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out of account past events and those taking place at present since they might affect the numbers to be settled. The Chairman replied that if new facts arose they would perhaps have to be examined, but so far as the present Committee was concerned they must remember that the Council had deliberately decided not to enter into an enquiry into the past.

M. Azcarate pointed out that the Iraqis themselves might quite possibly be not only willing but anxious to give explanations in reply to the Mar Shimun's statements. The present Committee was not bound by the ordinary rules governing a Minorities Committee of Three but had been specially appointed by the Council for a given purpose and was entitled in his view to hear anything bearing materially on the problem it had to consider.

The United Kingdom representative asked whether the Mar Shimun's letter should be considered as a petition and therefore as falling for treatment by a normal Committee of Three and not by the present Committee. M. Azcarate replied that he thought that it bore to such an extent on the work of the present Committee that it ought not to be subjected to the usual minorities procedure.

The United Kingdom delegate suggested that the Committee should take no official cognisance of the letter unless the Iraqi Government made observations on it which made it necessary to consider afresh what procedure ought to be adopted regarding it.

The Chairman said he would take it that for the moment at least the Committee did not wish to examine the letter.

The Chairman then pointed out that the Committee would require the collaboration of the Iraqi Government and proposed

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that the Iraqi representative should be invited to assist at the Committee. The United Kingdom delegate agreed with this suggestion and pointed out that the sooner he could be brought into the work of the Committee the more willing would his collaboration be. Moreover Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, was already in Geneva and had been waiting at the disposal of the Committee.

It was therefore decided to invite Nuri Pasha to be present at the following meeting of the Committee.

The Chairman, observing that the Mar Shimun had in his letter of October 25th mentioned the possibility of settlement in Syria, then asked the French delegate whether he could give details regarding the negotiations with Nuri Pasha in respect of the families of Assyrians already in Syria.

The French delegate explained that no decision had yet been arrived at since it was the view of the French Government that the settlement of Assyrians whose transfer to Syria had been proposed by Nuri Pasha could only be effected as part of a general plan of settlement. The French Government would not wish to keep in Syria any Assyrians who wished to go to Brasil or such other place as might eventually be decided upon for their transfer.

The Chairman mentioned the Ecuadorean Minister's indication
of interest in the problem before the Committee and proposed
that the Committee should ask the Ecuadorean Government to
submit details. M. Ascarate, however, thought it more prudent
not to encourage the idea that the Committee was anxious to
arrange for settlement in Ecuador, where the prospects were
not nearly so promising as in Brasil. He suggested therefore
that the Ecuadoreans should simply be informed that if they
desired to put forward a detailed plan the Committee would be

/prepared

prepared to consider it, thus leaving to them the initiative of putting forward proposals if they thought fit. This was agreed to.

The Chairman then raised the question of calling in a member of the Nansen Refugee Office or other person qualified to speak as an expert on refugee matters. The United Kingdom delegate said that he would like to see the technical aspects of the question eventually put into the hands of the Nansen Office working of course in close touch with the League Secretariat. The Committee had (1) to find out whether the Brasilian Government were willing to agree to the scheme for settlement in Brasil; and (2) if this agreement were secured to work out the details of settlement. He suggested that the second of these tasks fell within the scope of the Nansen Office. The Chairman, however, said that for the moment he had only envisaged bringing in one or two experts to take part in the work of the Committee.

M. Azcarate agreed that there were two aspects of the question: (1) the Committee had to decide whether to examine seriously settlement in Brasil. (2) For the technical side of the problem he saw great advantage in bringing in the Nansen Office which was, as a matter of fact, the author of the Brasilian scheme. The Committee might begin by inviting M. Werner and Major Johnson, President and Secretary-General respectively of the Nansen Office, to assist at the Committee's meetings. Later the Committee could consider the manner in which the details of the scheme could be worked out.

The French delegate thought it might be embarrassing to enter into any arrangement with Brasil until the question of finance had been to some extent settled. The United Kingdom delegate however suggested that before this question could be usefully examined, it would be necessary for experts to work

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out a detailed plan with an estimate of costs, showing what proportion of the capital outlay would be recoverable, and how far therefore the financing could be in the nature of a loan. As regards the Brasilian Government, it seemed only necessary at present to secure their agreement in principle.

The Chairman then enquired whether the Committee would agree to invite (1) the President and the Secretary-General of the Nansen Office, (2) an Iraqi representative and (3) a Brasilian representative to be present.

M. Ascarate doubted the advisability of having a Brasilian representative present which might give the impression that the question was more advanced than was in fact the case. He thought the approach to the Brasilian Government at this stage should be quite general. The United Kingdom delegate entirely agreed. He raised the question, however, whether it would be ultimately for the Committee itself to negotiate with the Brasilians and other interested parties. He had supposed that this task would be entrusted to the Secretariat and the Nansen Office in collaboration. To this the Chairman replied that in his opinion the Committee could not well separate without having achieved something concrete. The United Kingdom delegate agreed but suggested that it was the Committee's task to decide on the principles and general lines to be worked out by settlement experts but not necessarily to go into all the details. The Chairman, however, considered that not many questions of principle arose which did not in fact amount to problems of detail.

To an enquiry by the French delegate whether the Brasilian Government had been sounded in any way, M. Ascarate replied that the Brasilian Government certainly knew of the Parana Company's scheme for colonising the land which that Company

/had

had acquired, but it was not known whether they would consent to its application to the Assyrian case.

The Committee then decided (1) to invite M. Werner, Major Johnson and Nuri Pasha to assist at the meeting of the Committee on the following day; (2) to empower the Secretary-General to ascertain through the most appropriate channel whether the Brazilian Government would consent in principle to the settlement of the Assyrians in Brazil; and (3) to empower the Secretary-General to indicate to the Ecuadorean Minister at Berne that the Committee would be prepared to consider any detailed plan which his Government might wish to put forward.

(Sd.) J.C. STERNDALE BENNETT.

Geneva,
27th October, 1933.

P.Z. 7617 Folio.

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Many thanks. With refce to Mr Rendel's note overleaf, ~~[illegible]~~ we sd. be v. glad to have a spare copy, if one is available, for our file.

J.G.L. 24/11.

Sir Malcolm Seton.
Mr. Laithwaite

These Assyrian troubles were referred to in A.H.Q. Intelligence Summary of 1st Sept. 1933.

You may care to see this summary which is much more complete and describes the various incidents in detail.

20.11.33

Thanks. Very interesting. M.S. 24/11

Sir J. Walton 22.xi

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Mr M

You may care to see

21/11

Some of this is distinctly
interesting, if it is reliable. We
might have a copy for the file? The
account of the French reasoning is
the most plausible yet. I always
suspected that the mistake of a
local French officer started the whole
thing. The reason for the Assyrians' return
emerges clearly.

It is also noteworthy that this report
take a far less alarmist view of
nationalist demonstrations & dangers
in Iraq than Sir F. Humphrys does.

AFM.
22/11

SUPERINTENDENT, INDIA STORE DEPÔT.

For necessary steps.

Director-General of Stores.

10 1442 I 1077 100 8/19

Noted and returned.

Secretary, Political Department.

I. O.

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SECRET.

This document is SECRET.

The information contained in this Summary is not to be communicated directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not holding official position in His Majesty's Service.

SUPPLEMENT
to
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.9/33.

Compiled from information received
during the period
1st. to 31st. August,1933.

Headquarters, British Troops in Egypt,
and
Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.

B.T.E./G.S."I" 26/1.
.M.E./S.5736.

CAIRO.
31st. Oct.1933.

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'I R A Q.

191. HOME POLITICS.

Owing to the steady deterioration of the Assyrian situation in Northern Iraq, H.M.King Feisal cut short his rest cure in Europe and accompanied by Nuri Pasha as Sa'id, Minister of Finance and one other member of his staff, returned to Baghdad by Imperial Airways on 2nd. August. In view of the urgency of the situation, no official civic reception was given on his arrival.

At the request of the British Ambassador who had returned to Baghdad on the 23rd. August, King Feisal agreed to postpone his return to Europe till 1st. September in order to allow for discussions to take place in regard to the Assyrian situation.

His Majesty passed through Egypt at the beginning of September on his way back to Europe and he died at Berne on the 7th. September.

192. THE ASSYRIAN SITUATION.

(Compiled from information received between 1st. and 31st. August, 1933.)

NOTE: The operations in the following narrative took place in an area North West of MOSUL, whose maximum limit is a radius of 75 miles and whose minimum 35 miles from MOSUL. This area is in the northern most corner of the angle formed by the River TIGRIS and the TURCO - IRAQI Frontier.

Activities of Assyrians in SYRIA 1st. to 6th. August.

Further to paragraph 184 of M.I.S. 8/33 although the boundary mark demarcating the new boundary between 'IRAQ and SYRIA was placed in position on 30th. July, the new frontier was not actually taken over by the French until the night of 4th./5th. August. The frontier in use up to the night of 4th./5th. August started at the mouth of the WADI for a WADI SUFAN and followed the centre line of the WADI was distance of about two miles. The right bank of the French Political Officer, therefore 'Iraqi territory. The French Political Officer, acting on his own initiative or on orders from some non-competent authority, had disarmed some three hundred and thirty Assyrians, not one thousand as previously reported, on the right bank of the WADI SUFAN, and had concentrated them in a camp as MANIK, about fifteen miles North-west of FAISH KHABUR, which is on the River TIGRIS.

On being informed of the disarming, the High Commissioner in SYRIA pointed out that this party had been disarmed in what was at that time 'Iraqi territory, and that the action of the local political officer constituted a violation of International Law. He directed therefore that the arms should be returned forthwith.

/By............

By the evening of the 4th. August, the rifles had been returned to the Assyrians and they had gone back to their original camp on the WADI SUFAN. They were informed of the reason for the return of the rifles and were further informed that, although their camp was not in 'Iraq, it would be in SYRIA after 4th. August, and, if they were still there after that date, they would again be disarmed by the French.

On the evening of 4th. August, the local authorities in MOSUL were informed that a party of Assyrians had crossed the TIGRIS near FAISH KHABUR and had attacked an 'Iraqi Army Post. There were many conflicting reports regarding the circumstances under which fire was first opened. The administration states that an 'Iraqi officer went over to the Assyrian camp in the afternoon and was told that a party of Assyrians proposed crossing over in the evening to surrender and hand in their arms. In the evening, a party was duly reported to be crossing, carrying their arms. A company of 'Iraqi troops was sent forward to meet them and, when within a short distance of the Assyrians the latter opened fire, killing the 'Iraqi officer. Confusion followed and heavy fire was exchanged. The Assyrians then advanced Eastwards and, during the night, attacked the picquets of the 'Iraqi Army Camp at DAIRABUN. They occupied one of the posts, but abandoned it later when they took to the hills.

Another version states that the Assyrians intended to surrender their arms to the 'Iraqi Army and were fording the river in small groups over a mile frontage when fire was suddenly opened on them. This is supposed to have happened while the French officials were in the process of issuing, or had just finished issuing, rifles to those men from whom they had taken them. This report states that the Assyrians refrained from returning the fire of the Army and that one of the Army Posts had a white flag raised.

It seems remarkable that men with the military training of the Assyrian leaders should, if their intention was to surrender, bring their followers across the river in a manner which could not help being mistaken for extended order. A possible explanation is that the leaders, knowing that the majority of the men wished to surrender, brought them across in a manner calculated to provoke an incident.

It appears fairly certain that the French order of ejection was sudden and that the actual crossing of the river was haphazard and completely lacking the organisation which might be expected to accompany a premeditated attack. It is certain that a considerable number of Assyrians were actually desirous of surrendering their arms, and subsequent events point to the fact that, of the men who crossed to IRAQ on the night of 4th./5th. August, a large number did so with the intention of returning to their homes; the remainder, numbering over five hundred, either did not leave SYRIA at all or re-crossed the TIGRIS between 5th. August and 7th. August, and are now interned.

On 5th. August, it was reported that 'Iraqi Army casualties were three officers and sixteen Other Ranks killed and thirty six wounded, Assyrian casualties being about the same.

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There was no information regarding the dispositions of the Assyrians on 5th. August. As far as was known at the time, something like one thousand Assyrians had broken through the Army cordon and were presumed to be moving eastwards towards DOHUK, approximately 35 miles North of MOSUL and AMADIA, approximately 55 miles North North-East of MOSUL with unknown intentions. On the same date, instructions were given to the Director-General of Police to enlist one thousand additional police from among the Kurds.

Reliable reports indicate that on 20th. July, the Government suggested to Shaikh Ajil al Yawar, Paramount Shaikh of the 'Iraqi Shammar, that the Shammar should assist the Government in disarming the Assyrians if, on their probable return from SYRIA, they should pass through Shammar territory.

Operations of 'Iraqi Forces between 6th. and 16th. August.

Very little definite information is available regarding events between 6th. and 16th. August as British advisers and British Officials were kept in the dark. The following is a general summary of the operations based on Official information and on a number of unconfirmed reports of individual incidents. The latter must, therefore, be treated with reserve.

On the afternoon of the 6th. August, the two columns of the Iraq Army, AMINCOL and HAJCOL moved eastwards from the River Tigris, HAJCOL moving along the northern FAISH KHABUR - ZAKHO road (70 miles approximately North of MOSUL) and AMINCOL along the crest of the JEBEL BEKHAIR (60 miles approximately, North of MOSUL). The intention of the columns was to round up any organised body of Assyrians or any stragglers encountered on the JEBEL BEKHAIR or in the country to the north of it.

Information regarding the position and movements of the Assyrians on the 6th. is vague. It appears, however, that Yacou, son of Malik Ismail, with a following of about five hundred, returned to SYRIA on the night of 5th./6th. August and that the following included almost all those whose intention it was to oppose Government. The remaining Assyrians, numbering about 900, had crossed the TIGRIS on the evening of 4th. under the impression that they were going to surrender. They had never intended armed resistance and their object was to return as quickly as possible to their village. By the morning of 5th. all cohesion in this body seems to have disappeared and the JEBEL BEKHAIR and the plain to the south-east of FAISH KHALBUR was sprinkled on the 5th. and 6th. with small parties of fugitives making their independent way homewards.

Meanwhile, pre-arranged plans were put into execution by the Iraq Army for Kurdish tribal participation and, between 5th. and 8th. August, a number of reports were received of the rounding up of fugitives by Kurdish tribes and of prisoners being brought into ZAKHO and surrendering to the authorities. By 8th. August the district must have been cleared of all but a few scattered parties.

HAJCOL met with no encounters during the 6th. August in its advance eastwards, searching the wadis and

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Qatar National Library

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spurs of the northern slopes of the JEBEL BEKHAIR.

AMINCOL struggled along the crest of the JEBEL BEKHAIR. The going was difficult and it is believed that there were deaths from fatigue and thirst. Both columns camped on the night of 6th./7th. August.

On 7th. August HAJOOL moved to a point about one mile west of ZAKHO, 65 miles (approximately) North North-West of MOSUL. Meanwhile AMINCOL pressed eastwards along the summit of JEBEL BEKHAIR. The general intention before the movement began was that AMINCOL should move along the summit as far as practicable and then make its way down the northern slopes of the range and join HAJOOL in the neighbourhood of ZAKHO.

When the nature of the ground and the exhausted condition of the troops prevented further movement eastward, it was found that the northern slopes of the JEBEL BEKHAIR were too steep to descend, and the column descended the southern slopes and camped for the night at the southern extremity of the ZAKHO pass. It is understood that there were no encounters between the Army and Assyrians during 7th. August.

During these movements Kurdish tribes had been active in the mountains. Large bodies of the Kurds of the Sindi, Guli and Slivani tribes appeared in ZAKHO on 5th. August. Nothing definite is known regarding the scope of the official instructions received by these tribesmen, and, beyond the fact that they wore no uniform during the three or four days of intense activity in the ZAKHO Quadha, nothing is known of their organisation or method of operation. It appears that they operated under their own leaders and they may, in some cases, have been accompanied by parties of police.

These tribal parties combed the surrounding country for Assyrians from 5th. to 8th. August and brought many Assyrian prisoners into ZAKHO. It appears probable that all, or nearly all, of these prisoners were handed over by the civil authorities to the army by whom they were executed. There is little doubt that widespread executions by the Army took place in and around ZAKHO.

The work of execution appears to have been carried out almost invariably by the Motor Machine Gun detachments at some little distance from the town itself, although a number of reports indicate intermittent executions by patrols of the Motor Machine Gun Company on encountering Kurdish parties with their prisoners. The total number of Assyrians accounted for in this way is unknown, but is estimated at not less than one hundred.

By 9th. August the JEBEL BEKHAIR and the ZAKHO region may be assumed to have been clear of Assyrians. Small groups were still hiding in the mountain but generally speaking all those who had survived had passed out of the area and had reached their own villages, or were in the mountains above their own villages seeking refuge from the raiding by Arabs of the Shammur and Jabur tribes from west of the TIGRIS and by Kurds. A number had found

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sanctuary in Assyrian villages, the inhabitants of which had not taken part in the emigration to SYRIA.

Up to this time no proclamations or terms of surrender had been issued by the 'IRAQI authorities and it is doubtful if the Assyrians who had returned to 'IRAQ realised fully that they were regarded as rebels. Their main idea appeared to be to get back to their villages as quickly as possible and resume their old lives again. It is doubtful if they heard of the fate of their friends at the hands of the Army, but they were certainly afraid of the fate which awaited them at the hands of the raiders and reports at this time point to the fact that they still, in most instances, regarded a peaceful surrender to the Army or Police as a safe and correct procedure for them under the circumstances. Further it is certain that the Assyrians who had taken no part in the migration to SYRIA, and who could not be regarded as rebels or beyond the law, still looked to Government forces for protection.

On the evening of 8th. August, HAJCOL and AMINCOL were encamped within a mile of each other in the neighbourhood of BASTIKA BALA, approvimately 50 miles North North-west of MOSUL, and several reports indicate that, between 9th. and 11th. August, many Assyrian villagers, pressed hard by the general raiding in progress, gave themselves up to the Army at BASTIKA BALA or surrendered to Army Patrols operating in the area. The same reports state that all or nearly all the men who surrendered in this way were shot by the Army, irrespective of whether they had been to SYRIA or not.

At ALOKA, a number of executions were performed on Assyrians from DOHUK, approximately 65 miles North of MOSUL. The method by which these man were collected is uncertain. The Qaimmaqam of DOHUK has stated that the Army sent a detachment into the town, arrested the wanted men and took them away without consulting the civil authorities. Other reports state that the police arrested the men on application of the Army and handed them over.

By 6th. August, Arab and Kurdish raiding had rendered untenable most of the Assyrian villages in the DOHUK Qadha, and the villagers accompanied by their women, had made for DOHUK, SIMEL and AL QOSH, where they surrendered their arms to the Army or Police. Although a number of the men had probably taken part in the exodus, the majority were law-abiding and their object was to seek the protection of Government forces.

MASSACRE at SIMEL
(approximately 60 miles North North-west of MOSUL.)

On 8th. August about one thousand Assyrians, including women and children, had collected in SIMEL, and the men had handed over their rifles to the police. On the morning of 11th. August, an Army detachment arrived at SIMEL, and, entering the village, killed the entire male population with the exception of six or seven. The massacre appears to have taken some time to perform, entailing a house-to - house hunt for those in hiding. The lowest number of dead quoted in any report is three hundred and five, and the few casualties among women indicates that the men were deliberately separated from the women and killed.

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The leading man at the time in the village, Gorial Shimun, who was killed, was well known for his loyalty and co-operation with the Government.

Cessation of Operations.

On 12th. August, a proclamation was issued calling upon the Assyrian rebels to surrender and giving them a respite of sixty hours from 1200 hours on 12th., August in order to enable them to surrender their arms. This was followed by a second note informing the rebels that those submitting could consider their lives safe and they would be permitted to return to their villages.

The operations against the Assyrians by Army and Police may be considered to have been stopped from 12th August.

On 18th. August, the Acting Mutasarrif of MOSUL published a notice announcing the termination of the rebellion and threatening any person molesting Assyrians with legal punishment.

The casualties of the 'Iraqi Army during the operations against the Assyrians amounted to thirty-two killed and forty-two wounded, being incurred for the most part in the clash of 4th/5th. August.

Relief Measures.

On 18th. August Major D.B.Thomson was appointed President of the Relief Committee of the Assyrian refugees and an initial instalment of 'Iraqi Dinars 1,000 was granted to him by the Government. The committee consists of Major D.B.Thomson, two Arab Officials and two Assyrians. A Royal Air Force Medical Officer has been attached to the committee. Major D.B.Thomson was the official selected by the 'IRAQI Government to advise in connection with Assyrian settlement; he arrived in 'IRAQ at the beginning of June.

Assessment Committees.

On 16th. August, three committees were formed for the Qadhas of AMADIA, DOHUK and SHAIKHAN for the purpose of investigating and reporting on the following points :-

(a). Counting the number of stricken villages.
(b). Stating the nature of losses and estimating their costs.
(c). Stating the extent of relations of those villages with the insurgents, such as the number of men taking part in the rebellion, the supplying of rebels with weapons and food, or harbouring rebels.
(d). In villages which are not proved to have had an actual relation with the insurgents, to investigate the factors leading to aggression.

The Committee in each case consists of the Qadha Qaimmaqam and three or four members. The SHAIKHAN Committee includes as a member Shaikh Ajil al Yawar of the Shammar. It is reported, however, that none of these Committees has the competence or power to be of any value.

Attitude of IRAQ Levies.

Throughout the period of crisis, the Iraq Levies remained calm - their main fears were for the safety of Mar Shimun and for the safety of their dependents in the disturbed area. The action to allay their fears in respect of Mar Shimun is given in a subsequent paragraph.

Collection of Levy Dependents.

On 18th. August, a Royal Air Force Relief Commission consisting of two Royal Air Force Officers, one British Levy Officer and two Assyrian Officers, was formed with a view to collecting in MOSUL the immediate dependents of serving Levies, in order to enable them to be transported by air to HINAIDI. By the end of August two hundred and twenty three souls had been collected in MOSUL and sent by Air to HINAIDI where they are now accommodated.

Frequent applications have been made to the 'IRAQI Government for permission for the Commission to visit the disturbed area for this purpose, but, up to the end of August permission was withheld and the activities of the Commission were confined to MOSUL town, where a refugee camp was established by Major D.B.Thomson.

Nationalist Re-actions to the Assyrian Situation.

Although at one time it was considered probable that the Assyrian situation in the North would give rise to dangerous manifestations of public sentiment throughout 'IRAQ this did not in actuality prove to be the case. The situation never passed beyond the control of the local civil authorities, although in MOSUL and KIRKUK, in both of which districts old sores still rankled and the Assyrian community were regarded as dangerous interlopers, the position was at times very delicate. It needed but a single incident to tip the scale in favour of the extremist element; this party, with public opinion in its favour and with a backbone recruited from the riffraff of the towns was quite capable of creating disorder on a very large scale.

Local Re-actions in MOSUL, KIRKUK and SULAIMANI.

The 18th. August, when the victorious Army arrived in MOSUL, was a critical period and no effort was spared to goad the Christian element into some overt act in respect of which retribution could be demanded. The occasion passed, however, without incident.

On 29th. August a ceremonial parade of all Army units stationed in MOSUL was held on the main parade ground outside the barracks; this was attended by H.R.H. the Amir Ghazi and the Prime Minister. Public enthusiasm reached a very high pitch and there was evidence that anti-Christian and anti-British sentiment, though under some sort of control, showed no appreciable dimunition. The situation in MOSUL at the end of the month was easier but was still decidedly unsettled.

The SULAIMANI Liwa has remained comparatively quiet throughout the period of disturbances; there are very few Christians domiciled in SULAIMANI and there has been no

serious display of anti-Christian feeling. The PIZHDER are not concerned with Assyrian affairs, their own internal matters and fear of PERSIAN aggression being of much more importance to them; the main point of interest as far as they are concerned is the fact that the Royal Air Force has taken no active part in the proceedings. The Pizhder chiefs have, in the past, openly declared their intention of resisting the Government by force of arms, and one of the restraining factors has always been the fear of Royal Air Force intervention; that they have never been quite convinced that the Royal Air Force would not assist the Government in the event of internal disorder and the recent operations against the Assyrians have tended to re-assure them on this point.

Local Re-action in BAGHDAD and the Southern Province.

In BAGHDAD, patriotic sentiments, voiced by the local press, awakened but a faint echo among the general populace, and the excitement occasioned by the reported successes of the Army in the North was mainly limited to the local politicians and their immediate emtourage. The large number of unemployed and unemployable in the Capital itself constituted, however, a dangerous element should they discover a self-appointed leader or be utilised by one or other of the political parties.

Various small and comparatively orderly demonstrations of popular feeling took place from time to time, but the majority of these seemed to have been politically inspired and showed no marked degree of spontaniety. The arrival of the Hikmat Beg Sulaiman, the Minister for the Interior, at BAGHDAD Airport on his return from MOSUL on 23rd August may be cited as a specific instance of this "Organised enthusiasm" on the part of the general public. That the Government was aware of the danger of arousing mob-enthusiasm beyond a certain controllable pitch was quite evident by the official cancellation of two processions, proposed by the local City Guilds to commemorate the death of the "martyred" officers of the 'Iraqi Army.

It was not until the arrival of the returning army units from the MOSUL districts on the morning of the 26th. August that the citizens of BAGHDAD gave any indication of their patriotic reactions to the victorious conclusion of the operations of the Army in the North. The processions which were formed on this occassion to accompany the victorious Army, which marched from the station to their barracks at BAGHDAD WEST, were strongly reminiscent of those which appear during the annual Muharram celebrations, and it was evident that a good deal of money had been expended in order to work up the necessary enthusiasm suitable for the occasion; the drums, knives and other theatrical effects, usually associated with religious festivities in BAGHDAD, were much in evidence. Adequate arrangements had been made for the police control and no incident of an untoward description took place.

Re-actions of Cabinet to Assyrian Situation and effect on British Relations.

The extreme measures taken by the Military authorities against the Assyrians in the North created a critical situation for the Cabinet, who, genuinely alarmed at the possibility of intervention by the League of Nations,

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GREAT BRITAIN and other foreign powers, quickly cast about to counter such an eventuality and to prepare a case in their own favour for presentation to the League. Their first step was to deny all excesses. They then proceeded to collect evidence to prove that the Government and Army were not implicated in any way and that the Christian Minorities and others were whole-heartedly with the Government. In support of their campaign they advertised the victory over the rebels, encouraged public demonstrations in favour of the Army and Government, and canvassed all sects for letters of appreciation.

The demonstrations soon developed into anti-British and anti-Christian manifestations, which the Government took no steps to stop; It was even hinted in official circles that the demonstrations might take a more practical turn in the event of foreign intervention. Towards the end of August it was evident that the public manifestations against the hated "foreigners", "Colonisers" and Christians had gone far enough and the seriousness of the situation was presented to the King and Cabinet by the British Ambassador. At the same time it appeared as if matters had developed beyond the control of the Government, but, following on official action by the Cabinet, the close of the month saw a distinct falling off in publicity directed against the Christian minorities and the British. This confirmed the view that the demonstrations had been officially organised and did not represent truly the feeling of the people.

As a result of its efforts, the Cabinet is now satisfied that it has a strong case in support of the action taken against the Assyrians, more especially if GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE do not advance any evidence to the contrary. At the same time the Government appreciate that the 'Iraqi case would be weakened and possibly ruined if further incidents occur between Moslems and non-Moslems, or if it becomes evident that the whole Moslem population of 'IRAQ is anti-Christian in the extreme. It may be assumed therefore, that the Government will do everything in its power, pending the meeting of the League of Nations to maintain public security and safeguard the Christians and other minorities against possible excesses from the more unruly elements of the public. The Prime Minister made an official declaration to this effect at MOSUL on 30th. August. The Cabinet is united, with the support of the people and the Army, and is in a strong independent position in relation to its dealings with GREAT BRITAIN.

Assyrian Situation - Re-actions against 'Iraq Petroleum Company Employees.

Reports of the recent operations spread with rapidity among the employees of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company. For some time past, the local Nationalist press in BAGHDAD had been stressing the desirability for the employment of Moslems, or, at any rate, 'Iraqi born subjects by foreign commercial organisations operating within 'Iraq; this had already led to a good deal of ill feeling between the Christian and Moslem employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and, with the employment of a large percentage of tribal unskilled labour on the pipe-line itself, relations between the two sects were strained.

The grotesquely distorted stories of fighting in the North had the immediate effect of bringing this latent animosity to the surface at the three main centres of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's activity - KIRKUK, HADITHA

and BAIJI. The first incident of this nature occurred on the night of 8th/9th. August when an Armenian employee engaged on the pipe-line at BAIJI, insulted some moslems; free fighting ensued and three persons were injured. The offending Armenian was at once removed to TIERIT, but the trouble had already assumed for so small a community, alarming proportions. It is probable that agitators were at work in the camp.

No further fighting occurred, however, until the night of 12th. when shots were fired, one Assyrian being killed and several other people wounded. The question of evacuating the Christian employees from BAIJI to BAGHDAD was considered but was rejected by Ali Kemal, the acting Commandant of police in BAGHDAD, who stated that during the existing period of tension in the capital, he could not guarantee the safety of new arrivals from outside districts; a certain number of Assyrians and Armenians were, however, removed from BAIJI to one of the smaller pipe-line stations known as "location K.2.".

It was now clear that all Moslem activities were in no sense of the word spontaneous, but were being organised and directed by some outside political organisation; by Thursday 15th· August, a general strike had been declared by the Moslem employees, who stated that they would not return to work unless all Christians were removed from BAIJI.

Rioting took place on 15th. but, although the rioters were joined by local tribesmen who had come in on the side of their co-religionists and in the hopw of loot, both rioters and tribesmen were kept at bay by the police until the arrival of strong police re-inforcements from BAGHDAD on 16th· August. The tribesmen dispersed and some forty of the rioters were arrested and dismissed. Some seventy Assyrians and Armenians and about the same number of Moslems have left BAIJI. The situation is now returning to normal and work has again been commenced on a reduced scale.

At HADITHA, where the pipe-line crosses the EUPHRATES, similar racial disturbances appeared probable; the number of non-Moslem employees was, however, smaller and prompt action was taken by the local British manager to secure interviews with leading local Dulsimi Shaikhs and to obtain guarantees from them that neither they nor their people would take part in anyracial disturbances that might occur. The Dulaim, who are, as a rule, but little influenced by political parties in BAGHDAD agreed to remain neutral and, although the situation remained somewhat tense for several days, no incident of a serious nature took place.

KIRKUK the scene of the 1924 incident, in which the Assyrian Levies attacked the Moslem population of the town was, in view of its proximity to the oilfields themselves, an obvious danger spot. The strongest possible action to counteract anti-Christian propaganda was take by the British Inspecting Officer of Police, who also managed to convince the local officials that any single incident would have the most widespread results in the urban district and might also lead to an attack on the oilfields by the tribes who, given the lead, would be only too glad to exploit racial divergences of opinion to their own interests.

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The arrival of some forty of the BAIJI rioters at KIRKUK on 15th. August created rather a difficult situation and notices appeared in the streets of the Bazaar calling on loyal Kirkuklis to revenge the blood of the Moslems shed in KIRKUK in 1924. This party was led by Abdul Samid, a former labour superintendent of BAIJI and the ringleader during the trouble there; he was interviewed by the Mutassarrif of KIRKUK and told that the liwa was under strong Government administration and that no form of disorder would be tolerated therein. This, though sheer bluff, had the desired effect.

The situation in the town of KIRKUK itself remained extremely difficult and deliberate efforts were made by the Army to provoke an "Incident" with the civil population. Latest reports state that, although anti-Christian propaganda is still being disseminated, general conditions have much improved. The majority of the rioters, many of whom were not regular employees of the Company and who came from as far south as NAJAF and KERBALA, have been returned to their villages by the police, and the work of the Iraq Petroleum Company is stated to be proceeding under normal conditions.

Tone of the Local Press.

As a result of the protest raised by the acting British Ambassador relative to the publication of malicious articles by the local press, the 'Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has given an official assurance to the British Embassy that the necessary steps have now been taken to prevent the publication of any further press matter of a nature "inconsistent with the spirit of accord and sincere amity characterising Anglo-Iraq relations".

The temporary suspension of two papers at the end of July, coupled with a warning issued to the responsible editors of other news-sheets has acted as a check on the more blatant forms of anti-British propaganda which were rapidly becoming a leading characteristic of the local press, at the same time, but thinly veiled under the cloak of patriotic and national sentiment, a good deal of anti-Christian and anti-foreign propaganda is still being disseminated. The excitement engendered by the Assyrian situation is now however, dying down. The vexed question of Conscription, which is again being brought before the literate public by the press, will tend to exclude the more blatant forms of propaganda articles.

Detention and Extradition of Mar Shimun and Family.

With the return of H.M.King Feisal on 10th. August, it became obvious that the IRAQI Government was no longer prepared to consider the question of the return of MAR SHIMUN to MOSUL and that pending final settlement of the Assyrian imbroglio, he was to be detained in BAGHDAD. During the first two weeks in August, MAR SHIMUN was resident at the Y.M.C.A. in BAGHDAD; he was allowed complete freedom of movement within the City and was also permitted to receive visitors, although these were naturally under surveillance of the Police authorities. As a leading character in the Assyrian situation, Mar Shimun had almost ceased to exist and public attention was entirely focussed on the activities of Yacou Ismail who, since his dramatic movement to Syria on 20th/21st., July, had constituted himself the militant leader of Mar Shimun's party.

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Considerable fears were, however, entertained for the safety of Mar Shimun, and the situation arising out of his residence in BAGHDAD was further complicated by the fact that the Assyrian Levies at HINAIDI were eager to undertake the responsibility for his protection. They had openly stated that they were not satisfied that the Iraqi Government was in a position to frustrate any attempt on Mar Shimun's life, which might be made by some fanatical member of the Moslem community. As a gesture of good faith, four officers of the Levy units at HINAIDI were permitted to reside for thirty six hours in the same house as Mar Shimun with effect from 10th August; this had the effect of calming the apprehensions of the Assyrian community in respect of the Patriarch's safety.

Events moved rapidly after this; on 17th. August, Mar Shimun, his father David and his brother Theodore, were served with deportation notices by the Government, having been deprived of 'Iraqi nationality under an emergency Ordinance issued on 16th. August. Their transportation by aircraft of the Royal Air Force to a place of Asylum in British territory* was requested by the 'Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and after consultation with the Air Officer Commanding, was acceded to by the Acting British Ambassador; permission was also given for two Levy Officers and one attendant to accompany the Assyrian Patriarch on his journey. Mar Shimun, after some demur, acquiesced in these arrangements and, on the morning of 18th. August left HINAIDI by air together with the rest of his party enroute for CYPRUS. Mar Shimun arrived in Palestine on the same day, continuing his journey to CYPRUS in two flying boats which had been placed at the disposal of the Iraqi Government for this purpose. He arrived at CYPRUS on the morning of 21st. August.

Military operations.

It is of interest to note that there were seven out of the total of twelve Iraqi Infantry Batallions in or North of MOSUL, also two flights of the Royal Iraqi Air Force (six D.H.Dragon Aircraft) on the 11th. August.

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